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B. C. McGING

THE FOREIGN POLICY
OF MITHRIDATES VI EUPATOR
KING OF PONTUS

LUGDUNI BATAVORUM E. J. BRILL MCMLXXXVI

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BY

B. C. McGING

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PREFACE

In the first century B.C. Mithridates VI Eupator Dionysus, king of Pontus, proved himself one of the most aggressive and determined opponents that the Senate and People of Rome ever faced. As enemies of Rome go, he lasted a great deal longer, and achieved considerably more success than most. This alone would have ensured his fame, but he was also an extravagant, attractive figure: ruthless, cruel, exotic. Stories about him abounded: how he could ride a sixteen-horse chariot, speak dozens of languages, how he murdered his mother, brother, nephew and massacred tens of thousands of Romans and Italians, and how he took antidotes throughout his life making it impossible at the end of it all to do away with himself by poisoning. Not surprisingly artistic interest was aroused by the king in modern times: dramas came from, among others, La Calprenède (1635), Racine (1673), Nathaniel Lee (1681), and a host of operas appeared—Aldrovandini's *Mithridate in Sebastia* (1701), Alessandro Scarlatti's *Mitridate Eupatore* (1707), and a *Mitridate rè di Ponto* from Capello (1723), Quirino Gasparini (1767) and Mozart (1770), to name just a few.

Mithridatic scholarship was only put on a firm footing towards the end of the 19th century. In 1879 Ed. Meyer published his *Geschichte des Königreichs Pontos*, an excellent study that concentrated not on Mithridates Eupator but his predecessors. Then in 1890 Théodore Reinach brought out his masterpiece, *Mithridate Eupator, roi du Pont* (translated into German with corrections and additions in 1895), which has remained the standard work on the subject, and indeed the only substantial study of Eupator. Perhaps the definitive nature of Reinach's book contributed to the comparative lack of interest in Mithridates this century. Rostovtseff did some good work, and of course later general studies like Magie's *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, and Will's *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique* contain valuable coverage of Pontic affairs. But although interest seems to have been reviving recently with several expert articles, and now Sherwin-White's analysis of the Mithridatic Wars in his *Roman Foreign Policy in the East*, I think it is fair to say that this is still a relatively bare area of classical scholarship: for such a major and fascinating figure of the first century, Mithridates has received remarkably little treatment. A new study such as the present one does not, I trust, need special justification.

Long expressions of thanks can be distasteful, but I do have some debts which it is a pleasure to acknowledge: the generosity of the Trinity Col-

lege Dublin Trust, and of the Arts and ESS Benefaction Fund, in providing much appreciated financial assistance; the hospitality of the Fondation Hardt; the encouragement and interest of colleagues in the TCD Classics Department, and indeed the speedy, accurate typing of our secretary, Rosemary Doran. For some years I had the good fortune to study at the University of Toronto, where I worked under the guidance of a formidable triumvirate. Timothy Barnes and Graham Sumner were not closely involved in my work, but from time to time cast their exact and demanding scholarly attention on it. I am grateful to them, and only wish that Graham Sumner were still alive to hear me say so: he may have fought with his colleagues, but with his students was always unassuming and fun, even when immersed in the deepest pools of Roman history. Most of all, however, I want to thank Christopher Jones, not only for his unquestioning sacrifice of time and effort whenever I wanted it, but also for the example he sets by the quality of his own scholarship. One could have no better master.

Trinity College Dublin, B. C. McG.
June, 1985.

ABBREVIATIONS

The titles of modern journals have been abbreviated (with slight changes) as in *l'Année Philologique*. Ancient authors and their works are abbreviated according to the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*.

ANRW	*Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt.*
BMC Pontus	W. Wroth, *Catalogue of Greek Coins in the British Museum. Pontus Paphlagonia, Bithynia and the kingdom of Bosporus* (1889).
Broughton, *MRR*	T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* (1951-2. Suppl. 1960).
Bull. Epig.	*Bulletin Épigraphique* of J. and L. Robert appearing annually in *REG.*
Durrbach, *Choix*	F. Durrbach, *Choix d'inscriptions de Délos* (1921).
IGBulg.	*Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae*, ed. G. Mikhailov.
IGR	*Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes*, ed. R. Cagnat, J. Toutain, G. Lafaye.
ILS	*Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, ed. H. Dessau.
Ins. Delos	*Inscriptions de Délos* No. 1497-2897 ed. P. Roussel and M. Launey.
IOSPE	*Inscriptiones Antiquae Orae Septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae*, ed. B. Latyshev.
Jacoby, *FGrHist*	F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker.*
Janke, *Memnon*	M. Janke, *Historische Untersuchungen zu Memnon von Herakleia* (1963).
Magie, *RRAM*	D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (1950).
Meyer, *Geschichte*	E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Königreichs Pontos* (1879).
Milet	*Milet, Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahre 1899* (1906-).
OGIS	*Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae*, ed. W. Dittenberger.
OMS	L. Robert, *Opera Minora Selecta. Épigraphie et antiquités grecques* (1969-1974).
Recueil Général	W. H. Waddington, E. Babelon, T. Reinach, *Recueil Général des monnaies grecques d'Asie Mineure.*
Reinach, *Mith.Eup.*	T. Reinach, *Mithridates Eupator König von Pontos* (1895).
Rostovtseff, *SEEHW*	M. I. Rostovtseff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (1941).
Sherk, *RDGE*	R. K. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East* (1969).
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.*
*SIG*³	*Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, ed. W. Dittenberger.
SNG Von Aulock	*Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum Deutschland. Sammlung Von Aulock.*
Welles, *Royal Correspondence*	C. B. Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (1934).
Will, *Histoire politique*	E. Will, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique 323-30 av. J.C.* (1966-1967).

THE LAND AND PEOPLE OF PONTUS

The Hellenistic kingdom of Pontus which Mithridates Eupator inherited from his ancestors spanned much of the south coast of the Black Sea from Amastris in the west at least as far as Pharnaceia in the east.[1] It was bounded inland by Paphlagonia and Galatia in the west, by Cappadocia in the south and by Armenia Minor in the east. Strabo (12.1.4 c.534) gives its name as "Pontus" or "Cappadocia on the Pontus",[2] while its neighbour to the south was known as "Cappadocia", "Cappadocia on the Taurus" or "Greater Cappadocia". Both Cappadocias had been satrapies of the Persian Empire but became independent kingdoms in the Hellenistic age. Pontus was situated in a remote area on the edge of the Greek and Roman world,[3] but fortunately the detailed description of Strabo, a native of Pontus, survives and provides much of what we know about the land.

It divides into two distinct parts—a narrow coastal plain and a mountainous inland region.[4] Communication between the two parts was made very difficult by the steeply rising range of the Pontic Alps, which runs parallel to the coast and close to it, leaving the coastal plain only a few miles wide in many places. It was on the coast that the only real cities of the kingdom were located: these were Greek settlements. At the west end was Amastris a city of two harbours noted for its boxwood, founded by Queen Amastris, wife of Dionysius tyrant of Heracleia.[5] In the third century Heracleia had been anxious to gain possession of the city of Amastris, but Eumenes its ruler ignored the Heracliots' offer of money, and in what Memnon describes as an irrational fit of rage, handed it over to Ariobarzanes of Pontus in about 279.[6] This may well have been the first coastal acquisition of the new kingdom.[7]

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[1] Possibly it stretched to Trapezus: see below p. 5.

[2] Polybius (5.43.1) calls it "Cappadocia on the Euxine". For the different uses of the word "Pontus" see Meyer, *Geschichte* 1-2.

[3] According to Polybius (4.38.11), even Byzantium was a remote and relatively unknown spot.

[4] For detailed descriptions see, for instance, T. R. S. Broughton, "Roman Asia Minor" in T. Frank, ed., *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome* vol. 4 (1938) 599-607; Magie, *RRAM* 177-188; 1066-1083 nn. 1-34; D. R. Wilson, *The Historical Geography of Bithynia, Paphlagonia and Pontus in the Greek and Roman Periods* (B. Litt. Thesis Oxford 1960) 10-24.

[5] Strabo 12.3.10 c.544; Wilson (supra n. 4) 162.

[6] Memnon 9.4. For the date see Meyer, *Geschichte* 43.

[7] Magie, *RRAM* 1087 n. 36.



Map 1

About one hundred and fifty miles east of Amastris along the coast was the city of Sinope, "the most noteworthy of the cities in that region" (Strabo 12.3.11 c.545). It was a Milesian or Corinthian settlement of great prosperity dating perhaps from the early eighth century.[8] It planted its own colonies towards the eastern end of the Pontic coast at Cotyora, Cerasus and Trapezus. These had to pay tribute to their mother-city (Xen. *An.* 5.5.10). Sinope was situated on a narrow isthmus extending eastwards out of the Lepte promontory, and there was a harbour on both sides of the isthmus, the southern one being probably the best harbour on the whole coast.[9] This harbour and its central position on the south shore of the Euxine combined to make Sinope the most important trading centre of that coast. The sea was the basis of its prosperity. As well as dominating the carrying trade along the south coast, Sinope also maintained extensive relations with the north coast of the Black Sea—the crossing to the Tauric Chersonese could be made without losing sight of land (Strabo 7.4.3 c.309)—and with the Greek world outside the Euxine which relied to a considerable extent on produce from the area (Pol. 4.38.3-10): Attica, Delos, Euboea, Rhodes, Cos, Alexandria and others.[10] Although mainly a trading centre it did have resources of its own for export. Ship-building timber was abundant along much of the Pontic coast and especially around Sinope (Strabo 12.3.13 c.546). Maple and walnut used for making furniture also grew in the area. The whole land along the coast was planted with olives, and in the sea itself the tunny fishing industry was of great importance (Strabo 7.6.2 c.320). Good iron came from Sinope, although further to the east was a much more famous supply.[11] The Greeks of Xenophon's expedition were presented by the city with three thousand measures of barley and fifteen hundred jars of wine (Xen. *An.* 6.1.15), so these commodities also may

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[8] The date of its settlement and of other Black Sea colonies is much disputed. Recently R. Drews, *JHS* 96 (1976) 18-31, has re-examined the evidence and modern opinion, and favours a date for Sinope's foundation in the middle of the eighth century, against those (e.g. Magie, *RRAM* 1075 n. 19) who doubt Eusebius' date of 756 for Trapezus, a colony of Sinope whose foundation would have to be earlier. Drews thinks it was Corinthians rather than the more usually assumed Milesians who settled in Sinope, in pursuit of the mineral deposits of the Pontic Alps. No Greek pottery from earlier than the end of the seventh century has been found at Sinope, but only the cemetry has been dug: see E. Akurgal and L. Budde, *Vorläufiger Bericht über die Ausgrabungen in Sinope* (1956) 4ff.

[9] For the location see W. Leaf, *JHS* 36 (1916) 5, and for a general description D. M. Robinson, *AJP* 27 (1906) 125-153; 245-279.

[10] For Sinope's external relations see Robinson (supra n. 9) 136ff.; M. Rostovtseff, *ABSA* 22 (1916-1918) 1-9; Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 593-594; 1331 n. 43; 1456 n. 356; Magie, *RRAM* 1077 n. 23; Wilson (supra n. 4) 299; L. Robert, *Noms indigènes dans l'Asie Mineure gréco-romaine* (1963) 523-540; V. F. Gajdukevic, *Das Bosporanische Reich* (German ed. 1971) 103-104.

[11] Daimachus in Jacoby, *FGrHist* 65 F4.

have been produced. Sinopic ochre was not in fact from Sinope: it got its name because it was shipped from Sinope, being transported there across land from Cappadocia.[12] This indicates that although the sea may have been the city's main channel of communication and trade, Sinope was not entirely cut off from the interior.[13]

In the fourth century Datames satrap of Cappadocia seems to have controlled the city, followed perhaps by his son Sysinas and by another satrap, Ariarathes.[14] Mithridates II of Pontus made plans to capture it in 220, but the intervention of Rhodes prevented him (Pol. 4.56.1). Finally in 183 Pharnaces I brought Sinope under Pontic control when he attacked unexpectedly and succeeded in occupying it, in spite of its strong defences (Strabo 12.3.11 c.546; Pol. 23.9.2). It became the capital of the kingdom and Mithridates Eupator was born there.

Sailing south-east down the coast from Sinope one passes the outlet of the river Halys, and then the districts of Gazelonitis and Saramene which were fertile and good for sheep farming. Elsewhere in Pontus and Cappadocia wool was a rarity (Strabo 12.3.13 c.546).[15] Eighty miles along the coast from Sinope was Amisus, the second city of the kingdom.[16] Although not blessed with as good a harbour as Sinope, Amisus was situated at the point where the most important trade route from the interior emerged through the mountains onto the coastal plain. This route led south crossing the great east-west highway of the kingdom between Therma and Laodiceia, both of which were connected with Amaseia. From here the road led to Zela in southern Pontus, and then on to Mazaca in Cappadocia. The route from Zela to Mazaca seems to have been more or less due south over the mountains, rather than southeast to Sebasteia and then down the Halys valley, or southwest to Tavium and thence to Mazaca: these latter two would be easier but longer routes.[17] This was the most important north-south road of Pontus.

[12] This was in the days before Ephesus opened up a route into Cappadocia from the west coast of Asia Minor—Strabo 12.2.10 c.540.

[13] Cf. Leaf (supra n. 9) 6ff.

[14] The names of Datames (in Greek) and Ariarathes (in Aramaic) are inscribed on the coins of Sinope: see *BMC Pontus* 96 No. 8 (Datames); No. 9-10 (Ariarathes); *Recueil Général* 199*-200* No. 21b (Datames); 198**-199** No. 34-36; *SNG Von Aulock*, 1[1] No. 210, 1[15] No. 6850 (Datames). The identification of Sysinas, accepted by B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum* (1911) 508, is by no means certain, as the transcription from the Aramaic ABD SASAN, suggested in *Recueil Général* 197** is only a possibility. Even if it were correct, one would expect a name in front of ABD, as this means "servant of".

[15] In contrast to the rich sheep lands of Galatia (Strabo 12.6.1 c.568): see S. Mitchell, *ANRW* II, 7.2 (1980) 1069.

[16] For its origins as a Milesian settlement, see Strabo 12.3.14 c.547. For other versions of its origins, see Magie, *RRAM* 1078 n. 24. For possible Hittite penetration as far as Amisus, see M. I. Maksimova, *JNES* 10 (1951) 74-81.

[17] Magie, *RRAM* 1264 n. 22. For the road system of Pontus see J. Munro, *JHS* 21 (1901) 52-66; J. N. Birmingham, *AS* 11 (1961) 185-195.

Amisus possessed extensive holdings east along the coast as far as Sidene, about seventy miles from the city. The most valuable land was the plain of Themiscyra, made wider than most of the coastal zone of the kingdom by the alluvial deposits of the rivers Iris and Thermodon. As the plain was so well watered it was fertile and green, supporting herds of cattle and horses, and producing great quantities of sorghum and millet. Fruits abounded too—grapes, pears, nuts (Strabo 12.3.15 c.548). The plain of Sidene was not as fertile.

Amisus had been a democracy both before and after a long period of subjection to the Persians, and came under Pontic control at an unknown date, but certainly before the time of Mithridates II for whom the Heracliots sent supplies to Amisus when he was under pressure from the Galatians in the middle of the third century (Memnon 16.2).

The eastern extremity of the kingdom before the time of Mithridates Eupator is difficult to determine. Pharnaceia was a foundation of Pharnaces I about one hundred miles east of Amisus, so the kingdom certainly stretched this far.[18] In the sea off Pharnaceia the tunny were first caught in their journey past Sinope to Byzantium, and in the Paryadres mountains south of the city there were abundant supplies of timber and extremely important metal resources (Strabo 12.3.19 c.549): the steel of the Chalybes was famous since the time of Homer.[19] Silver was also mined in the area. It is not clear whether Trapezus became part of the kingdom when Sinope its metropolis was annexed.[20] Strabo (12.3.28 c.555) tells us that the princes of Armenia Minor held sway as far as (*mechri*) Trapezus and Pharnaceia, and that it was Mithridates Eupator who first brought the area under Pontic control. If earlier kings of Pontus did control the coast between Pharnaceia and Trapezus, it was only a very narrow strip: native princes held the hinterland.

The interior of Pontus is a land of mountains interspersed with rivers and their valleys, the mountains and rivers running generally in an east-west direction. In the west was the Paphlagonian mountain range, cut north of Olgassys by the Amnias valley, and south of it by a tributary of the Halys. Cimiata in this region was where the Pontic kingdom had its beginnings (Strabo 12.3.41 c.562). In the east, south of the Paryadres, the major rivers of Pontus had their springs. About eighty miles south of

[18] E. Meyer, *Die Grenzen der hellenistischen Staaten in Kleinasien* (1925) 117-118.

[19] Broughton (supra n. 4) 622; Magie, *RRAM* 1068 n. 8; Prentiss de Jesus, *AS* 28 (1978) 97-102.

[20] Trapezus' most natural connections were with the interior: see Drews (supra n. 8) 28-9. This is perhaps reflected in its apparently low degree of hellenization: Arrian (*Peripl. M. Eux.* 1-2 ed Roos 1968) comments on its crude statues, and inscriptions written in incorrect Greek.

Pharnaceia the river Halys rose in Greater Cappadocia but near to Pontus (Strabo 12.3.12 c.546). It then headed in a southwesterly direction into the heart of Asia Minor making its way gradually round to the northwest, and then due north about thirty miles west of modern Ankara before turning back northeast and issuing into the Black Sea between Sinope and Amisus. It was navigable, like the other rivers of Pontus, only near its mouth. The Iris is met by another tributary, the Scylax, just south of Amaseia, then bends to the north and northeast through the mountains, is joined by the Lycus downstream from Amaseia and flows to the sea through the plain of Themiscyra. The valleys of the Iris and Lycus were very fertile and formed the core of the kingdom's inland region, but they and the other river valleys were also particularly important for providing the main roads of the interior. As we have seen, Amisus-Amaseia-Zela-Mazaca was the major north-south route. It was matched in importance by the much longer east-west road which led from Armenia Minor to Bithynia.[21] Travelling westwards, the road followed the valley of the Lycus until it came to the plain of Phanaroea. From there it continued through the mountains to Laodiceia, and on to the Halys which it crossed over into the Amnias valley, and then led right through Paphlagonia to Bithynia. If the Amisus-Mazaca road was "the alimentary canal of the national body" the road from Armenia to Bithynia was "its spinal cord".[22] There were other minor routes. The upper Iris valley provided a route by Gaziura through the plain of Dazimonitis and up to Comana. On the lower stretches of the Iris there was a road from Phanaroea to Themiscyra. The river south of Olgassys flowing into the Halys was perhaps the way by which Mithridates invaded Bithynia at the beginning of the Third Mithridatic War.[23] From Cabeira there was a road north over the Paryadres to the coast, and from Sinope another south to join the greater east-west highway in the Amnias valley.

The best part of Pontus according to Strabo (12.3.30 c.556) was the plain of Phanaroea, in the middle of which the Iris and Lycus rivers met. In Strabo's day it was rich in olives and vines, at the beginning of this century was still "a veritable garden, producing abundance of grain, fruit, vegetable and tobacco,"[24] and in more recent times has been productive of rice and the opium poppy. Phanaroea extended some twenty five miles up the Lycus valley, and was marked at the east end by the

[21] Magie, *RRAM* 1083 n. 33.

[22] Munro (supra n. 17) 55.

[23] Munro (supra n. 17) 56. The main road north of Olgassys, however, seems just as likely a route.

[24] J. Anderson in *Studia Pontica* vol. 1 (1903) 54.

stronghold of Cabeira where Mithridates Eupator had a palace and watermill, with gardens, hunting grounds and mines nearby. Close to Cabeira was Caenum Chorium, an impregnable fortress where Eupator stored his most valuable treasures (Strabo 12.3.31 c.556).

Upstream on the Iris from its junction with the Lycus was the only sizeable urban settlement of the interior, Amaseia. It was situated by the river on the main road from Amisus in a large deep valley between two towering rocks.[25] The western rock was garrisoned with a strong fortress and contained the palace of the Pontic kings and five royal tombs. It was the capital of the kingdom before Sinope. Not far to the east was a sanctuary of Zeus Stratios, to whom Eupator sacrificed so spectacularly on two known occasions (App. *Mith.* 66; 70). The territory of Amaseia extended westwards to the districts of Diacopene and Pimolisene by the Halys. It included the fertile area of Chiliocomum, from its name apparently a region of dense population. North of Amaseia was Phazimonitis which produced a good supply of grain. Here also was lake Stiphane, which abounded in fish and was surrounded by rich pastures, and the town of Laodiceia, no doubt named after one of the queens of Pontus.[26] In the upper reaches of the Iris before it was joined by the Scylax, was the rich plain of Dazimonitis, at the end of which stood Gaziura, an ancient royal residence (Strabo 12.3.15 c.547).

Much work has been done recently on the system of land tenure and the status of the native population in Asia Minor, but as de Ste Croix emphasises, the scanty sources provide information on only a very few places scattered throughout the Hellenistic orient, and it is difficult to make general statements.[27] There is, however, every reason to suppose that the three main types of landed property in Pontus, as elsewhere, were king's land, city land and temple land, with serfdom being

[25] Strabo 12.3.39 c. 561. See F. Cumont in *Studia Pontica* vol. 2 (1906) 150 for its setting.

[26] Magie, *RRAM* 1068 n. 6. Laodice was perhaps a common name for Pontic queens. At least four of them bore it according to T. Reinach, *BCH* 30 (1906) 50-51: the wife of Mithridates III, the sister-wife of Mithridates IV Philopator Philadelphus, the wife of Mithridates V Euergetes and the sister-wife of Mithridates VI Eupator. The names of the wives of Mithridates III and V, however, are not known for sure.

[27] G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World from the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests* (1981) 150ff. In addition to de Ste Croix, see, for example, P. Briant, *Actes du colloque 1971 sur l'esclavage, Annales littéraires de l'université de Besançon* 140 (1973) 93-133; P. Debord, *Actes du colloque 1971 sur l'esclavage, Annales littéraires de l'université de Besançon* 140 (1973) 135-150; M. A. Levi, *Actes du colloque 1973 sur l'esclavage, Annales littéraires de l'université de Besançon* 182 (1976) 259-279; H. Kreissig, *Actes du colloque 1973 sur l'esclavage, Annales littéraires de l'université de Besançon* 182 (1976) 237-255; *Klio* 59 (1977) 375-380; *Eirene* 15 (1977) 5-26; K. W. Welwei, *AncSoc* 10 (1979) 97-118.

widespread.[28] Strabo (12.3.28 c.555) tells us that Mithridates Eupator built seventy five strongholds in the eastern part of his kingdom, mostly in the Paryadres mountains, and others are mentioned elsewhere in Pontus. These were used especially as treasuries, but must also have functioned as protection for the king's land. In Cappadocia, some of the many fortresses belonged to the king, and others to his 'friends' (Strabo 12.2.9 c.539): clearly the king had granted possession of certain places to his courtiers, just as other Hellenistic kings did.[29] There are no specific examples of such grants in Pontus, but presumably they occurred, as the whole court system was similar to other kingdoms (see below p. 39; 93).[30] Most of the city land of the kingdom will have been on the coast, where there were old established Greek colonies like Sinope and Amisus, but even if the cities enjoyed a different system of land tenure, they were still far from being autonomous: any privileges they enjoyed were very much at the discretion of the king.[31] In the interior, apart from one or two substantial settlements such as Amaseia and Cabeira, villages predominated.[32] We also hear of some important temple estates. At the *kōmopolis* of Ameria in the territory of Cabeira was the temple of the Anatolian god, Men Pharnacou, who was so revered by the kings that they swore their oaths by him (Strabo 12.3.31 c.556).[33] Revenue from

[28] Even within these broad categories, however, there were several different types of tenure: see the works cited above in n. 27.

[29] See, most famously, the grants to Mnesimachus (W. H. Buckler and D. M. Robinson, *AJA* 16 [1912] 11ff.; K. M. T. Atkinson, *Historia* 21 [1972] 45-74), Aristodicides (Welles, *Royal Correspondence* No. 10-13), Laodice (this was, in fact, a sale—Welles, *Royal Correspondence* No. 18-20), or the gift of Eumenes to his 'friends' (Plut. *Eum.* 3.7) and of Antiochus IV to his mistress (2 *Macc.* 4. 30).

[30] Rostovtseff, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 215, thought that Meriones was a local baron at Amaseia, but probably he was the fortress commander: see Magie, *RRAM* 1070 n. 10; *Studia Pontica* vol. 3 (1910) 116 No. 95a.

[31] On the relation between Hellenistic kings and the cities in their kingdoms, see H. Kreissig in Ch. Welskopf (ed.), *Helenische Poleis* (1973) 1074-1084; A. H. M. Jones, *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (1940) 95ff. The relevance to Mithridatic propaganda and similarity of types used on coins issued throughout Pontus during Mithridates Eupator's reign show well his degree of control over the whole kingdom.

[32] See Rostovtseff, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 214-216; Broughton (supra n. 4) 628-648; Magie, *RRAM* 1022-1026 n. 69; P. Briant, *JESHO* 18 (1975) 165-188.

[33] For basic treatments of Men, see H. Drexler in W. H. Roscher (ed.), *Ausführliches Lexicon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* vol. II, 2 (1894-1897) col. 2687-2770; Daremberg and Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines d'après les textes et les monuments* vol. III, 2 (1904) 1392-1398; Lesky, *RE* 15 (1931) col. 689-697; E. Lane, *Corpus Monumentorum Religionis Dei Menis* 4 vols (1971-1978). See also M. D. Hardie, *JHS* 32 (1912) 111-150; J. G. C. Anderson, *JRS* 3 (1913) 267-300; L. Robert, *Hellenica* vol. 9 (1950) 39-50; *Nouvelles inscriptions de Sardes* (1966) 32-36; *À travers de l'Asie Mineure. Poètes et prosateurs, monnaies grecques, voyageurs et géographie* (1980) 311-318. The name of Pharnaces in the Pontic manifestation of Men perhaps refers to the founder of the cult in this region—possibly Pharnaces, the husband of Atossa, Cyrus' aunt: see Drexler (above) col. 2752.

the sacred land belonging to the temple went to the priest, as it did at the other temples of the kingdom. The temple at Comana was dedicated to Ma, in imitation of Cappadocian Comana.[34] As with the Cappadocian cult, there were six thousand temple servants, and the priest of Ma was second in rank to the king in both kingdoms. The people of Comana led a very luxurious life, having great vineyards and enjoying considerable income from the trade attracted by temple prostitution. Zela had a temple dedicated to the Persian deities Anaitis, Omanus and Anadatus (Strabo 11.8.4 c.512; 12.3.37 c.559). Here the people of Pontus made their vows about their most serious concerns. The organisation was the same as at Comana and Cabeira, with the temple servants and sacred territory at the disposal of the priest. That even a temple estate like this, however, was still in some sense subject to the king, is implied by Strabo's statement that it was the kings who governed Zela, not as a city, but as a sacred precinct of the Persian gods.

The geographical division of Pontus between coast and interior also reflects a sharp cultural division between Greek and Iranian/native Anatolian. The Greek cities of the coast looked mostly towards the sea, and their influence did not penetrate far into the interior. In the centuries before the existence of the Pontic kingdom the non-Greek population of the countries along the south coast of the Black Sea had been made up of local tribes which are on the whole just names to us now. The third and nineteenth satrapies of Darius contained these tribes (Hdt. 3.89-96). The Syrians, or to use their Persian name, the Cappadocians (Hdt. 1.72.1) occupied the area of the later kingdom of Pontus. To the west of them lay the Paphlagonians with the Halys the boundary line between the two (Hdt. 1.72.2), and to the east were the Macrones and Colchi.[35] There appears, however, to have been a certain amount of movement between these groups. Xenophon's expedition passed through the territories of the Colchi, Massynoeci, Chalybes, Tibareni, Paphlagonians, Mariandyni, Bithynians. At this stage then, the Paphlagonians occupied what we know as Pontus, the land around Sinope and to the east of it:[36] the Cappadocians had apparently been squeezed out since Herodotus' day. By the time of Strabo they were back in Pontus, and the same language was spoken over a large area bounded by Cilician Taurus in the south, by the Euxine in the north, by Armenia and Colchis in the east and by the Paphlagonians and Galatians in the west (Strabo 12.1.1 c.533). The

[34] Cappadocian Comana—Strabo 12.2.3 c.535. Pontic Comana—Strabo 12.3.32-6 c.557-9.

[35] The practice of circumcision was passed westwards along the coast from the Colchi, through the Macrones, to the Cappadocians—Hdt. 2.104.2-3.

[36] Xen. *An.* 6.1.14-15. See Wilson (supra n. 4) 423.

region bordering on Paphlagonia, however, was bilingual and used Paphlagonian personal names (Strabo 12.3.23 c.553). So the tribal content of Pontus was probably quite homogeneous by the first century, although the earlier movements of people may well have left traces. Certainly by the time of Mithridates Eupator the native population was stable and unified after nearly two hundred years of Mithridatid rule, except, that is, towards the east where the tribes were still exceptionally wild (Strabo 12.3.18 c.549) and had to be subdued by Eupator (Strabo 12.3.28 c.555).

As well as the native Anatolian culture there was another very important element in Pontic society, the Iranian. A long period of Persian rule had left a deep impression. As we have seen, there was a temple at Zela dedicated to the Persian deities Anaitis, Omanus and Anadatus, and it is significant that it was at this temple that the people of Pontus made their most sacred vows. Zeus Stratios was a god to whom Eupator followed the kings of Persia in making sacrifice (App. *Mith.* 66; 70): he was probably a form of Ahuramazda.[37] This is an indication of the strong Iranian character of the Pontic royal house, whose members were descended from a noble Persian family ruling in Cius (see below p. 13 ff.), and who claimed descent from higher Persian nobility—from Darius I, or one of the seven Persians who killed the Magian Smerdis. Such a claim was presumably meant to glorify the dynasty, at least in the eyes of its subjects, and thus shows how important the Iranian element was in Pontic society. It need not surprise us to find such a Persian family in Anatolia: the extent of Persian colonization throughout Asia Minor, and the survival into imperial times of its influence, especially in religion and onomastics, have been made increasingly clear by the work of Louis Robert particularly.[38] The Mithridatids of Cius are themselves evidence of this colonization, and may be compared to the fourth century B.C. Lycian dynasty of Arbinas, who also seems to have been of Persian stock.[39]

[37] F. Cumont, *RHR* 43 (1901) 47-57; *Studia Pontica* vol. 2 (1906) 171-184 sees a threefold development in Zeus Stratios—first of all a local indigenous deity which the Greek colonists transformed, as was their custom, into a warrior Zeus, who in turn was recognised by the Mithridatid dynasty as a form of Ahuramazda. For Zeus Stratios, see also Kuhnert in Roscher (supra n. 33) vol. IV (1909-1915) col. 1545-1550; A. B. Cook, *Zeus. A Study in Ancient Religion* vol. II, 2 (1925) 974-977; A. H. Smith, *JHS* 36 (1916) 65 No. 1. Gebhard, *RE* IV a 1 (1931) col. 257-262 does not accept Cumont's explanation of Zeus Stratios but thinks that the Mithridatid dynasty took over the cult of Zeus as protector of the army and king, which we can see Eumenes of Cardia following (Plut. *Eum.* 17). Zeus was not usually a protector of soldiers, but could be, for example at Sparta, where the kings sacrificed to Zeus Agator before battle: see Xen. *Lac.* 13.2.

[38] See, for instance, L. Robert, *Hellenica* 6 (1948) 16-22; 27; 56; Robert (supra n. 10) index s.v. Perses; *CRAI* 1975, 306-330; *RN* 18 (1976) 25-48; *CRAI* 1978, 277-286.

[39] On Arbinas see J. Bousquet, *CRAI* 1975, 138-148; L. Robert, *JS* Jan/Jun 1978, 3-48.

Although proud to proclaim their Persian origins, the kings of Pontus, as we shall see, also aspired to the status of respectable Hellenistic monarchs and behaved more and more as such, rather than as oriental kings, in the structure of their court and their external relations.[40] They thus began to span the gap between the Greek and Iranian/Anatolian elements of their kingdom. Greek became the official language. A Greek inscription of about 100 from the fortress of Gaziura forbids anyone to enter without the permission of the garrison commander.[41] An order such as this would presumably have to be understood by more than just hellenized courtiers.[42] In the third century two women of possibly indigenous name, Arte and Mata, are recorded in a Greek inscription, but the inscription does come from Amisus, and Robert has suggested that the names have an Ionian association.[43] A non-Greek, is, however, recorded in a Greek metrical epitaph from Amaseia in the first century.[44] Amaseia must have been the inland town most susceptible to Greek influence, because of the great trade route from Amisus: the visit of Greek merchants cannot have been without effect, at least on court society, unless there was a systematic effort made to suppress all foreign influence.[45] There was then probably a steady process of hellenization going on in the higher levels of society for some time. The moving of the capital to Sinope after its capture by Pharnaces I will no doubt have speeded up this process, and in the second half of the second century the espousal of Hellenism by the monarchs is clear, and their court very much that of a Hellenistic monarchy. In some ways now there was a danger of a gap developing between the king and his native subjects, but this could be filled by recalling and emphasizing the Persian origins of the royal family. To present a Greek face to the Greek world and an Iranian/Anatolian face to the barbarian world was one of the tasks facing, or rather set for themselves, by the last three or four kings of Pontus, and a task accomplished with particular skill by Mithridates Eupator.

Pontus was in short a country of mixed culture, well populated, of very specific and influential geographical structure and of considerable material and economic resources. For a king who could draw all these elements together and make full use of them, it was a kingdom of potentially great strength.

[40] C. Schneider, *Kulturgeschichte des Hellenismus* vol. 1 (1967) 794-800; E. Olshausen, *AncSoc* 5 (1974) 153-170.

[41] *Studia Pontica* vol. 3 (1910) 251 No. 278.

[42] Another Greek inscription from Gaziura, dating from the early second century celebrates the victory of a local athlete, perhaps named Antiphilides, in the boys' torch-race at Byzantium: see G. Bean, *Belleten* 17 (1953) 171-172.

[43] *Studia Pontica* vol. 3 (1910) 5 No. 1; Robert (supra n. 10) 344-346.

[44] *Studia Pontica* vol. 3 (1910) 118 No. 95b.

[45] An unlikely supposition: see Olshausen (supra n. 40) 159.

CHAPTER ONE

PONTUS TO THE TIME OF MITHRIDATES V EUERGETES

Pontus emerges as an independent kingdom in the first half of the third century. Its existence before that, and the ancestry of its kings are matters of great uncertainty, as the sources are few and distorted by the propaganda of later kings. Towards the end of the third century Mithridates II claimed to be a descendant of one of the seven Persians who slew the Pseudo-Smerdis, and to have maintained the *dynasteia* given to his ancestors as a reward by Darius (Pol. 5.43.2). We hear of this claim to go back to one of the seven Persians in other sources, but we cannot verify it.[1] Even grander ancestry is asserted: the line is traced back to Cyrus, Darius, Seleucus I, Alexander the Great.[2] Meyer showed that this was all propaganda: ancient and noble lineage was invented, especially in the time of Mithridates Eupator, to give added respectability and nobility to the ruling family.[3] Not only was the ancestry fictitious, but Pontus did not exist as a kingdom in Persian times. When Diodorus describes the fourth century members of the family as "kings", he is either anticipating the establishment of the kingdom or perhaps referring in exaggerated terms to the dynasty of the Mithridatids in Cius.[4] It is in this dynasty that the traceable origins of the family lie. Diodorus follows part of it clearly through Ariobarzanes (362-337), Mithridates (337-302), and another Mithridates (302-266).[5]

The earliest we can go back appears to be the Mithridates who was succeeded by the famous satrap of Phrygia, Ariobarzanes (Diod. 15.90.3). This Mithridates I of Cius may have been the friend of the young Cyrus mentioned by Xenophon (*An.* 2.5.35; 3.3-4), and the gover-

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[1] Diod. 19.40.2; Florus 1.40.1; Aur. Vict., *De Vir. Ill.* 76.1. Reinach, *Mith.Eup.* 2 accepted this claim, tentatively connecting the Pontic royal family with Norondobates one of the seven Persians in Ctesias' list, and perhaps the father of the Mithridates who donated a statue of Plato to the Academy (Diog. Laert. 3.25).

[2] Sall. *H.* 2.73 Maurenbrecher; Florus 1.40.1; App. *Mith.* 112; Just. *Epit.* 38.7.1; Tac. *Ann.* 12.18.4.

[3] Meyer, *Geschichte* 31-38. The same propaganda was devised in Cappadocia—Diod. 31.19.

[4] Diod. 20.111.4. Another town is coupled with Cius, but the name is not clear, Arrhina perhaps, or Marina.

[5] Diod. 16.90.2; 20.111.4. See E. Meyer, *Die Grenzen der hellenistischen Staaten in Kleinasien* (1925) 157-158. Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 5 n. 4 argues against such a dynasty, but has to discount entirely the evidence of Diodorus. For a defence of the dynasty see Geyer, *RE* 15, 2 (1932) col. 2157.

nor of Cappadocia and Lycaonia encountered by the Ten Thousand (Xen. *An.* 8.8.25), but there is no firm evidence for such an identification. Ariobarzanes is comparatively well documented.[6] We find him first in 407 conducting Athenian envoys to the coast under the orders of Pharnabazus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.7).[7] When Pharnabazus was called away to marry the king's daughter, Ariobarzanes succeeded him as satrap in Dascyleium (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28), and pursued a vigorous policy in Greece. He supplied ships for Antalcidas in 378, and in 368 sent Philiscus to make peace among the Greeks. Philiscus failed in this mission, but left mercenaries for the Spartans.[8] Probably an attempt was also made to win the favour of Athens, because when Ariobarzanes revolted against Artaxerxes Mnemon, not only did Agesilaus himself hurry to the aid of Ariobarzanes, but the Athenians also sent a squadron of ships under Timotheus.[9] In thanks Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus and presented Athens with the Thracian towns of Crithote and Sestus. It was perhaps in return for this that the Athenians granted citizenship to him and his sons, and to Philiscus and Agauus (Dem. *In Aristocr.* 141; 202). In the end Ariobarzanes was betrayed to the Persian king by his son Mithridates and was crucified.[10] Mithridates had already demonstrated his aptitude for treachery by skilfully engineering the murder of Datames.[11] It was probably he who made an unsuccessful attempt to gain control over Heracleia.[12] He may also be Mithridates II of Cius, whose predecessor Ariobarzanes died in 337 (Diod. 16.90.2).[13] This Ariobarzanes, however, must be different from Ariobarzanes the satrap who died almost certainly in 362.[14] After the death of Mithridates I, then, some

[6] Judeich, *RE* 2 (1896) col. 832 No. 1. It is not clear, as Judeich claims, that Ariobarzanes was a son of the Mithridates whom he succeeded.

[7] In fact he takes the envoys to Cius. Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 2. n. 5 says that we cannot draw any conclusions from this about the relations between Cius and the Mithridatids at this time, but it may signify that Ariobarzanes had taken over in Cius.

[8] Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27. According to Diodorus (15.70.1-2) it was Artaxerxes who sent Philiscus to Greece, so Ariobarzanes was probably just carrying out the king's orders.

[9] Xen. *Ages.* 2.26; Dem. *De Lib. Rhod.* 9; Nep. *Tim.* 1.3; *Ages.* 7.2.

[10] Harp. Ariobarzanes; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.8.4; Val. Max. 9.11.7.

[11] Polyaenus, *Strat.* 7.29.1; Nep. *Dat.* 10-11.

[12] Just. *Epit.* 16.4.7. That the Mithridates of Justin is the same person as the son of Ariobarzanes is argued by S. Burstein, *Outpost of Hellenism. The Emergence of Heraclea on the Black Sea* (1972) 126 n. 7.

[13] Olshausen, *RE* Suppl. 15 (1978) col. 401 disagrees, but he could, for instance, be a younger brother of his predecessor, and both could be sons of Ariobarzanes the satrap.

[14] Attempts to keep Ariobarzanes the satrap alive until 337 and thus dispense with the second Ariobarzanes are not successful. Diodorus (16.90.2) reports the death of Ariobarzanes in 337/6 after a rule of twenty six years, and implies (15.90.3) that Mithridates I had died, and that the satrap had taken over the dynasty, as must be the case, before 362: see Olshausen (supra n. 13) col. 402. In addition, although Harpocration provides the only evidence for the satrap's crucifixion, there is other evidence that he was betrayed, and it is

time before 362, Ariobarzanes the satrap took over the dynasty in Cius until his death in that year. He was succeeded by another Ariobarzanes who ruled for twenty six years and then by Mithridates II (337-302). The sources allow us only an occasional glimpse of these early ancestors of Mithridates Eupator, but enough to suggest an enterprising and ambitious Persian noble family.

THE MITHRADATID DYNASTY IN CIUS

MITHRIDATES I OF CIUS. d. before 362

ARIOBARZANES. Satrap of Phrygia d. 362

ARIOBARZANES 362-337 — MITHRIDATES II OF CIUS 337-302. born 386

MITHRIDATES III OF CIUS, I CTISTES OF PONTUS 302-266.

In 302 Mithridates II fell under suspicion of conspiring with Cassander against Antigonus and was killed near Cius. His son Mithridates III of Cius inherited the dynasty, but was warned by his friend Demetrius that he too was in danger from Antigonus and fled to Paphlagonia.[15] Here he ruled for thirty six years (302-266) at some stage proclaiming himself king Mithridates I Ctistes, founder of the kingdom of Pontus and of the line of Pontic kings.[16] After his escape from Antigonus he had established his base at Cimiata in Paphlagonia, a "strong fortress" in the mountainous country of Olgassys.[17] For twenty years there is almost complete silence about the new kingdom. Appian (*Mith.* 9) does say that Mithridates took advantage of the Macedonians' *ascholia* to expand over the whole of Cappadocia and neighbouring areas. Given the flexibility of the terms "Pontus" and "Cappadocia", Appian is probably referring to an expansion into what we know as Pontus.[18] The emerging kingdom was outside the

almost inconceivable that the leader of a major revolt against the king of Persia would have been allowed after his capture not only to live, but also to continue to rule in Cius: see Meyer (supra n. 5) 158; Geyer (supra n. 5) col. 2158 No. 5.

[15] I have followed Diodorus (20.111.4) in making Mithridates III of Cius the son of Mithridates. Plutarch (*Demetr.* 4.1) calls him the son of Ariobarzanes. For discussion see B. C. McGing, *RhM* forthcoming.

[16] Rostovtseff, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 217 ff. maintained that in fact Mithridates II of Cius was Mithridates I Ctistes of Pontus. For the arguments against this, and for discussion of the number and identity of the kings of Pontus, see McGing (supra n. 15).

[17] Strabo 12.3.41 c.562. App. *Mith.* 9 mistakenly places Cimiata in Cappadocia.

[18] P. Desideri, *Athenaeum* 51 (1973) 3 n. 3 argues that the kings of Pontus may also have ruled Cappadocia until about 245 thus explaining the claim of Pelopidas, Mithridates

interest of Lysimachus whose influence did stretch as far east as Heracleia and Amastris—he occupied Heracleia in 284—but whose main concern was further west: in company with Clearchus II, tyrant of Heracleia and son of Queen Amastris, he fought a long and unsuccessful war against Zipoetes king of Bithynia.[19] While this was going on, Mithridates was probably pushing his kingdom towards the city of Amastris, perhaps even clashing with its queen of that name.[20]

Early in 281 Lysimachus was defeated and killed by Seleucus I at the battle of Corupedium. Seleucus immediately set about gaining the recognition of northern Anatolia by sending Aphrodisius to regulate the cities of Phrygia and the south coast of the Euxine. Aphrodisius met with a favourable reception from all except the Heracliots whom he accused of being ill-disposed to Seleucus. In fact Heracleia had already dispatched ambassadors to Seleucus who angrily dismissed them on receipt of Aphrodisius' report (Memnon 7.1). This meant more trouble for the Heracliots: already Zipoetes of Bithynia, angry with them for their attitude to Lysimachus before, and now to Seleucus, both of whom he hated, had invaded and devastated their land (Memnon 6.3). To meet these threats Heracleia collected her allies and sent embassies to ask for help from Mithridates of Pontus, Byzantium and Chalcedon (Memnon 7.2). This was the beginning of the "Northern League", usually assumed to consist of Byzantium, Chalcedon, Heracleia, Tieium and Cierus, and as an ally, Mithridates I of Pontus.[21] In 281, however, the membership will hardly have been so large. How Byzantium, Chalcedon and Mithridates answered Heracleia's request, Memnon does not tell us. Reaction from the Chalcedonians was probably favourable: they, like the Heracliots, were enemies of Zipoetes, having been engaged in hostilities against him and his ally Byzantium in the period after 301.[22] The attitude of Zipoetes is important, as Tieium and Cierus were almost certainly in his possession at this time,[23] and Byzantium his ally may be expected to have followed his lead. There is no indication that Zipoetes became

Eupator's envoy at the time of the First Mithridatic War, that Cappadocia had always belonged to Eupator's ancestors (App. *Mith.* 12). But this and Appian's reconstruction of the joint Pontic-Cappadocian dynasty (*Mith.* 9) is probably propaganda devised to give legitimacy to Eupator's expansionist activities. Cf. Just. *Epit.* 38.5.6., where Eupator himself admits that he merely took Cappadocia by force.

[19] See Burstein (supra n. 12) 84.

[20] Burstein (supra n. 12) 142 n. 29.

[21] See, for instance, Magie *RRAM* 1087 n. 36; Olshausen (supra n. 13) col. 403.

[22] The date of these hostilities cannot be determined with any certainty: see Habicht, *RE* 10a (1972) col. 450-451. Byzantium and Chalcedon were enemies, but the Byzantines did prevent Zipoetes from utterly destroying Chalcedon when he had it at his mercy: Plut. *Mor.* 302 e ff.

[23] See Will, *Histoire politique* vol. 1, 120-121.

friendly towards Heracleia: in 280, the last year of his reign, he defeated and killed Hermogenes the lieutenant of Antiochus' general Patrocles.[24] Heracleia, probably out of hostility to Zipoetes, had made an arrangement with Hermogenes enabling him to attack Bithynia where Zipoetes defeated him (Memnon 9.2). An improvement in Bithynian relations with Heracleia seems only to have come with Zipoetes' successor, Nicomedes I. As a result of the defeat of Hermogenes, Antiochus decided to invade Bithynia forcing Nicomedes to look for help. He sought and achieved an alliance with Heracleia, probably on condition that the Heracliots be allowed to buy back Tieium and Cierus and the other lands taken earlier by Zipoetes.[25] Presumably the Byzantines followed their Bithynian allies into the league, as we find Heracleia sending generous help to Byzantium when the Galatians were besieging it in 279/8 (Memnon 11.1). The Galatians too, however, were soon in the league: Nicomedes negotiated an alliance with them in 278/7 primarily to strengthen his own delicate position in Bithynia, although Byzantium will also have benefited directly, as the Galatians were to be transported across the water to Asia on condition that they treated not only Nicomedes as an ally, but also the rest of the Northern League—Byzantium, Tieium, Heracleia, Chalcedon, Cierus and certain other princes (Memnon 11.2; Paus. 10.23.14).[26]

The evidence to support the assumption that Mithridates I was an ally of the league is not good. Pompeius Trogus (*Prol.* 17) refers briefly to a defeat of Diodorus, the general of Seleucus, in 281: *ut Seleucus amissis in Cappadocia cum Diodoro copiis interfectus est ab Ptolemaeo* ... The victor is not named, but the silence of Memnon on the subject is a good indication that Heracleia was not involved. Magie interprets "Cappadocia" as Pontus, and thus assumes justifiably that Mithridates was the victor.[27] It does not follow, however, that Mithridates was necessarily an ally of the Northern League just because he fought against Seleucus' general: it may, for instance, have been a private conflict, with Mithridates unwilling to let Diodorus interfere or even pass through his territory. Indeed

[24] For Hermogenes see Otto, *RE* 8 (1913) col. 862-3 No. 6. For the date and episode see Geyer, *RE* 17, 1 (1936) col. 493 No. 3; G. Corradi, *Studi ellenistici* (1929) 111; G. Vitucci, *Il Regno di Bitinia* (1953) 19-22.

[25] Memnon 9.3-4. See B. Niese, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea* vol. 2 (1899) 75.

[26] On the Galatians' move to Asia see P. Moraux, *MDAI* (I) 7 (1957) 56 ff.

[27] Magie, *RRAM* 1087 n. 36. See also H. Heinen, *Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Geschichte des 3 Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (1972) 39-40. There is a possibility that the victory belonged to Zipoetes, but in the section where Memnon recounts Zipoetes' victories over the Seleucids and their generals (12.5), both Lysimachus and Antiochus are specified as victims, but not Seleucus.

Mithridates' interests in Amastris are unlikely to have been compatible with answering Heracleia's call in 281.[28] It might even have been to his advantage if Heracleia's attention were occupied by Seleucus. As we have already seen, Mithridates' ambition to possess Amastris probably dated to the time when Queen Amastris ruled there. When she died in 284 Lysimachus appointed Eumenes governor of the city.[29] On Lysimachus' death Eumenes must have found himself virtually an indepedent ruler. The Heracliots increased their efforts to recover Amastris about 280, and entered upon open and perhaps violent competition for it with Ariobarzanes the son of Mithridates I of Pontus.[30] In spite of all their efforts, they failed. Eumenes handed over the city to Ariobarzanes,[31] and the kingdom of Pontus acquired its first important base on the coast of the Black Sea.[32] In view of this dispute it seems unlikely that Mithridates would have allied himself at this stage to Heracleia, or to a league of which it was a member.

This view receives support in the reference of Apollonius of Aphrodisias to hostilities between Pontus and Ptolemy Philadelphus: the newly-arrived Galatians, in alliance with Mithridates and Ariobarzanes of Pontus, defeated a force sent by Ptolemy of Egypt and drove it into the sea.[33] Because Pontus and the Galatians are here working as allies, some have wanted to include Mithridates as one of "the other princes", mentioned by Memnon, whom the Galatians swore to treat as allies under the terms of their agreement with Nicomedes of Bithynia in 278/7.[34] The

[28] Burstein (supra n. 12) 145 n. 69 assumes that Mithridates had defeated Diodorus before Heracleia sought Pontic help. Such a victory might have led the Heracliots to ask for his help in the first place, but there is no evidence for the relative chronology.

[29] Burstein (supra n. 12) 143-4 n. 45.

[30] Memnon (9.4) does not actually say that Heracleia fought with Ariobarzanes, but this seems to be the implication.

[31] The reason for Eumenes' decision is not known, but for a plausible suggestion see E. V. Hansen, *The Attalids of Pergamum* (ed. 2 1971) 17: Eumenes was almost certainly the brother of Philetaerus prince of Pergamum, who may have been allied with Antiochus, the successor of Seleucus, against Nicomedes and the Northern League. If so, perhaps Eumenes was unwilling to hand over Amastris to Heracleia, an enemy of his brother. One of the implications of this explanation is that Mithridates was not a member of the Northern League.

[32] Meyer (supra n. 5) 117 followed Meyer, *Geschichte* 43 n. 2 in supposing that the gift of Amastris only made sense if the whole coast up to Amastris was already in Pontic hands, but Magie, *RRAM* 1087 n. 36 rightly doubts this.

[33] Jacoby, *FGrHist* 740 F 14. Ariobarzanes may well have been joint ruler with Mithridates, as Eumenes had handed over Amastris to him, and the Galatians are said by Apollonius to be allies of both father and son: see Olshausen (supra n. 13) col. 404. By 279 Mithridates was about seventy years old, and it is quite possible that he made his son co-regent, or at least gave him increasing responsibilities.

[34] See, for instance, Niese (supra n. 25) 78 n. 1; Meyer (supra n. 5) 116. H. Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* vol. 3 (1969) 112 No. 469 tentatively suggests that Memnon was referring to Paphlagonian princes.

situation described by Apollonius, however, is that Pontus and the Galatians are fighting against one of the great benefactors of the Northern League. Being the enemy of Antiochus, the league was also the natural ally of Ptolemy, who we know presented land, corn, weapons and money to Byzantium, probably when it was under siege by the Galatians in about 279, and who also sent corn to Heracleia where he dedicated a temple to Heracles.[35] It is difficult to see how an ally of the league would be fighting one of its great benefactors.[36] Admittedly, the Galatians were doing just that, but it became clear only a short time after their arrival in Asia that they were unreliable and treacherous allies. There may also be another reason why we find them fighting against Ptolemy. It concerns the date of the episode reported by Apollonius. This cannot be fixed definitely, but the incident was most probably part of the First Syrian War between Ptolemy and Antiochus starting in the mid 270's.[37] Mithridates appears to be aligned on Antiochus' side, although not necessarily allied with him. The Galatians had been brought over to Asia on the side of the Northern League, and at first they may have kept their agreement, as we find them fighting against Antiochus, and indeed suffering a crushing defeat at his hands, probably in 275.[38] It was perhaps this victory that enabled Antiochus to use them on his side in the First Syrian War which followed immediately. The Galatians themselves may have been glad of the opportunity to pay back Ptolemy for helping Byzantium when they were besieging it before their crossing to Asia.

When Mithridates I died in 266 he left a kingdom firmly established. He had been strong enough to declare himself king, perhaps in 281 as a result of his victory over Diodorus, although possibly on the death of Lysimachus or Seleucus.[39] This victory may also have occasioned the first

[35] See Chr. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum und Griechische Städte* (ed. 2 1970) 116-121. Ptolemy's benefactions to Heracleia appear from their position in Memnon 17 to be later than his gifts to Byzantium, but Habicht argues that all this help (for Sinope also) is part of the same policy and dates from the same time.

[36] Nicomedes I of Bithynia must also have been on good terms with Ptolemy: along with Antigonus and the peoples of Byzantium, Heracleia and Cierus, Ptolemy was appointed guardian of Nicomedes' children (Memnon 14.1).

[37] See F. Stähelin, *Geschichte der Kleinasiatischen Galater* (ed. 2 1907) 11 n. 2. For the date of the war, see Will, *Histoire politique* vol. 1, 128.

[38] See Magie, *RRAM* 731 n. 12.

[39] See Heinen (supra n. 27) 40 n. 132 for the various opportunities available to Mithridates for a proclamation of royalty. A date of 281 for this proclamation may fit with Syncellus (p. 523.5; 593.7 Bonn) who says that the kingdom of Pontus lasted two hundred and eighteen years—from 281 to 63, according to G. Perl, in *Studien zur Geschichte und Philosophie des Altertums*, ed. J. Harmatta (1968) 324-330. Perl cannot explain the ten kings to whom Syncellus also refers. Jacoby, *FGrHist* 244 F. 82 Comm. suggests textual emendations resulting in eight kings (which fits with the evidence of App. *Mith.* 9; 112; Plut. *Demetr.* 44) and a two hundred and forty year span for the kingdom of Pontus (302/1-63).

issue of royal Pontic coins that we have—gold staters with the head of Athena on the obverse, and on the reverse a standing Nike with the vertical inscription "of Mithridates King". This was a direct copy of Alexander staters.[40] The issuing of gold coins was regarded as a forceful sign of independence, and G. Kleiner has suggested that this issue may be the reason why, according to Strabo (12.1.4 c.534), the Macedonians looked with displeasure on the change of Pontus from satrapy to kingdom, while accepting willingly the similar change of Cappadocia, where gold coins were not minted.[41] The attribution of these coins to Mithridates I cannot, however, be confirmed.

Through his son Ariobarzanes, Mithridates had gained an important base on the Black Sea coast with the acquisition of Amastris. From his starting point of Cimiata it is possible that he also pushed south into central Anatolia, as Apollonius reports in his reference to the engagement between Ptolemy and the Pontic and Galatian forces, that the Galatians were rewarded with the land around Ancyra; they named it Ancyra after the Egyptian anchors they captured in the battle. Who gave the land, however, is not specified, and in fact it seems unlikely that Mithridates was in a postion at such an early date to do so. If the story is to be believed, and the aetiological nature of the part of the story concerning anchors and Ancyra makes it unreliable evidence, it is more likely that Antiochus was the donor.[42] Although in 281 Mithridates had fought Seleucid forces in his kingdom, thus temporarily having the same enemy as Heracleia and the rest of the Northern League, he does not seem to have joined the League, or been its ally, or enjoyed smooth relations with Heracleia. He was aligned on the side of the Seleucids in the First Syrian War, but his battle against the troops of Ptolemy may indicate an assertion of Pontic independence rather than of whole-hearted support for the Seleucids—that is, he would not tolerate any attempt to interfere in his kingdom, whether by Ptolemy or before, by Diodorus. On the other hand it could be that he was developing a tendency to favour the Seleucid cause: the relations between the two kingdoms that led to the marriage alliances in the time of Mithridates II may have been initiated by Mithridates I.

There is almost no evidence at all for the events of the reign of the next Pontic king, Ariobarzanes. We do know that at the time of his death in about 250 he was at variance with the Galatians, who took advantage of the youth of his son and successor Mithridates II to ravage the kingdom

[40] *Recueil Général* 10 no. 1; *SNG Von Aulock* 1[1] No. 1. For the Alexander staters see, for instance, B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum* (1911) 226.

[41] G. Kleiner, *MDAI* (I) 6 (1955) 18-19.

[42] Stähelin (supra n. 37) 14; 41. For other possibilities, see Magie, *RRAM* 731 n. 13.

(Memnon 16.1).[43] Help came from the people of Heracleia who sent supplies to Amisus to relieve Mithridates. Clearly Pontus had by this time extended its rule to Amisus. It was nearly thirty years since Heracleia and Pontus had competed for Amastris, so there had been plenty of time for relations between them to improve. The Galatians had recently attacked Heracleia itself, and it may have been a desire to check them that motivated the Heracliots to help Mithridates. When Nicomedes I of Bithynia died he left as guardians of his children Ptolemy, Antigonus and the peoples of Byzantium, Heracleia and Cierus. The guardians took their jobs seriously and engaged in a struggle against Ziaelas the pretender to the Bithynian throne and his Galatian allies. In the fight Heracleia played a prominent part and as a result, the Galatians rounded on Heracleia and invaded it (Memnon 14). For their help sent to Mithridates the Heracliots again called down the wrath of the Galatians on themselves, until the historian Nymphis managed to make a settlement (Memnon 16). Mithridates weathered the Galatian storm with Heracleia's help, and we do not hear of him having any more trouble with the Celts.

One of the most important features of the reign of Mithridates II was the ambitious marriage policy which he initiated: he took as his wife the sister of Seleucus II Callinicus, daughter of Antiochus II Theos, thus allying himself to the most powerful royal house in Asia, and gaining impressive recognition for Pontus as a political power in the Hellenistic world (Euseb. *Chron.* 1 p. 118 Karst). It has been argued that the marriage took place early in Seleucus' reign in about 245 when he wanted a secure Anatolia behind him so that he could turn his full attention to war with Ptolemy III Euergetes.[44] If so, Seleucus miscalculated, for in the struggle for supremacy between him and his brother Antiochus Hierax, Mithridates backed the latter. He was influenced perhaps by his wife, and by a desire to weaken the Seleucid kingdom by supporting the brother who favoured joint rule.[45] It may have been to cement this new bond that Mithridates handed over Laodice, one of his daughters, to Hierax as some sort of pledge—a prospective bride perhaps or a hostage. She was brought up by Logbasis, the friend and supporter of Hierax.[46] At first Seleucus got the upper hand against his brother, but he was

[43] The date of Ariobarzanes' death is difficult to determine: see Olshausen (supra n. 13) col. 406.

[44] See J. Seibert, *Historische Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen in hellenistischer Zeit* (1967) 58.

[45] Seibert, (supra n. 44) 60.

[46] Pol. 5.74.5 says that Laodice was given *en parakatathēkē*. F. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* vol. 1 (1957) 600; vol. 2 (1967) 96 argues that she was a hostage, but her exact status is not absolutely clear.

defeated at Ancyra in about 240 by a coalition of Hierax, Mithridates and the Galatians.[47] After the victory, Hierax is said to have marched through Phrygia Maior demanding tribute (Euseb. *Chron.* 1. p. 118 Karst). At the time of the First Mithridatic War Mithridates VI Eupator claimed that Seleucus had given Phrygia to his sister as a dowry for her marriage to Mithridates II (Just. *Epit.* 38.5.3). If this is more than just a fabrication by Eupator to claim an ancient Pontic right to Phrygia, which Rome had taken away from him, then it may be that the action of Hierax after Ancyra marks a break with Mithridates. It is slender evidence: even if we believe Eupator, the dowry may have been only part of Phrygia, and Antiochus could have demanded tribute from the part not included in the dowry. There is, however, further slight support for a break between Mithridates and Hierax after Ancyra. Hierax, now the leading power in Anatolia, was soon challenged by Attalus I of Pergamum, and in the many engagements between the two, Hierax still has his Galatian mercenaries who helped him at Ancyra, but there is no mention at all of Mithridates, even though the evidence for the conflict is plentiful.[48] It could be, then, that Mithridates withdrew his active support from Hierax.

Reinach thought that the marriage of Mithridates and Seleucus' sister occurred after the battle at Ancyra, and that it was a successful attempt by the defeated Seleucus to win over Mithridates from the side of Hierax.[49] This then would have provoked Hierax into overrunning Phrygia and thus breaking with Mithridates, who in turn may have tried to patch up relations by pledging his daughter Laodice to Hierax. Such a pledge would not necessarily indicate a change of allegiance from Seleucus back to Hierax: Mithridates may have been trying to back both sides.[50]

A further tie with the Seleucid house was made in 222 when Antiochus III married another Laodice, daughter of Mithridates.[51] This too was an important recognition of the status of Pontus, as it was the first time that a major Hellenistic ruler married a princess from one of the small non-Madeconian ruling houses.[52] Achaeus, Antiochus' minister and vice-

[47] For the sources and date see Magie, *RRAM* 736 n. 23; Will, *Histoire politique* vol. 1, 266.
[48] Magie, *RRAM* 8 ff.; 737 n. 24.
[49] Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 32.
[50] Cf. E. R. Bevan, *The House of Seleucus* vol. 1 (1902) 327 Appendix M, who argues an early date for Mithridates' marriage.
[51] Pol. 5.43.1-4. See H. H. Schmitt, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochos' des Grossen und seiner Zeit* (1964) 10; 112-116. For this Laodice and her many activities, see Walbank (supra n. 46) vol. 3 (1979) 75; *Bull. Epig.* 1971 No. 621. p. 502 ff.
[52] Seibert (supra n. 44) 60.

regent, also married into the Pontic royal family, when he took as his wife the Laodice handed over by Mithridates to Antiochus Hierax and raised by Logbasis (Pol. 5.74.5; 8.19.7; 8.20.11).[53] Again the date of this marriage is not known. In 220 having campaigned successfully against Pergamum for Antiochus, Achaeus seceded and proclaimed himself king (Pol. 4.2.6; 4.48.3; 5.57.2). If his marriage to Laodice was before this, it would have complemented Antiochus' own marriage—a loyal subordinate following his master's example. If it was after 220, it might indicate an attempt by Mithridates to back both sides, as he may have done before. There seems to be no way of determining the date.

If chronological uncertainties will not permit a clear view of the exact circumstances of much of this marriage activity, it is at least clear that Mithridates II was making a determined effort to build up a close connection with the Seleucids and put Pontus firmly on the map of Hellenistic monarchies. His efforts extended in other directions also. When Rhodes was struck by an earthquake in 227/226 aid poured in from all quarters, the major monarchies, lesser princes and individual cities. Mithridates was not to be left out, and contributed generously (Pol. 5.88-90). On the other hand, he was prepared to dispense with diplomacy and use force of arms in his attempt to gain possession of Sinope in 220, although it is not clear whether he actually attacked the city itself, as Polybius (4.56) only says that the people of Sinope were fearful that he might do so. The account breaks off and is not completed in the extant remains. Mithridates may have been put off from starting a siege by the extensive help promptly voted and sent to Sinope by the Rhodians.[54] Whatever the extent of hostilities, Mithridates failed and Sinope remained independent. The attempt shows a recognition of the potential importance of Sinope to the Pontic kingdom. It was an obvious target and one for which Mithridates was apparently prepared to lose whatever favour he had gained with the Rhodians in 227/6.

After this incident at Sinope there is silence in the sources about Pontus for over thirty years. This is the best place to insert the necessarily assumed Mithridates III, who ruled between about 220 and 189/188 when we first hear of Pharnaces his successor.[55] Although the attempt on Sinope is usually attributed to Mithridates II it is quite possible that Mithridates III was the aggressor. A series of coins depicting for the first time a portrait of the monarch is also usually attributed to Mithridates

[53] There is no need to suspect a mistake in Polybius just because both Antiochus and Achaeus are married to a Laodice: see Walbank (supra n. 46) vol. 2 p. 96.
[54] See Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 677; 1485 n. 92; Walbank (supra n. 46) vol. 1 p. 511.
[55] See McGing (supra n. 15).

III, probably correctly.[56] An important feature of the early royal Pontic coins is the growing confidence in the style. The first coins, although a gold issue, were a straight copy of the Athena/Nike staters of Alexander. The coins of Mithridates III still have an Alexander type for the reverse—a seated Zeus holding an eagle—but on the obverse there is a striking portrait of the king, startlingly realistic and confidently non-Greek. And even on the reverse there does appear for the first time the star and crescent, a symbol whose significance is much disputed, but which is at least associated with the Pontic house.[57]

The reign of Pharnaces I marks the introduction of a more determined aggressive foreign policy than that followed by his predecessors. Mithridates I and Ariobarzanes had on occasion fought battles, but mostly, it appears, on a modest scale and of limited aggressive intent; they were staking out their territory rather than fighting full-scale wars of expansion. Mithridates II had worked with great diplomatic skill to extend the influence of Pontus, and had also shown himself willing to use force: his attempt to capture Sinope failed, but it was a lead which Pharnaces followed in adopting a policy of systematic, aggressive expansion.

Pharnaces' first military involvement, however, was in someone else's war—that between Prusias I of Bithynia and Eumenes II of Pergamum. Pontus did not take any part in the struggle between Antiochus III and Rome—itself perhaps an indication that Pharnaces had not yet come to the throne. Prusias of Bithynia also remained neutral, but Rome's settlement of Asia after the defeat of Antiochus involved the allotment of some land, previously occupied by Prusias, to Eumenes of Pergamum, Rome's chief ally against Antiochus and chief beneficiary of the settlement after the war. This resulted in the outbreak of war between Prusias and Eumenes probably not long after 188.[58] Pompeius Trogus (*Prol.* 32) tells us that Eumenes was pitted against Ortiagon the Gaul, Pharnaces and Prusias.[59] Philip V of Macedon also aided the enemies of Eumenes (Pol. 23.1.4). When and why Pharnaces joined the coalition is not definitely

[56] *BMC Pontus* 42 No. 1, *Recueil Général* 10 No. 2-3. The series could perhaps belong to Mithridates II, except that a monogram on one of the tetradrachms appears again on a drachm of Pharnaces I, the successor of Mithridates III, and in general the monograms of the uncertain series are very similar to those of Pharnaces' coins. This appears to provide a close chronological link between these coins, thus ruling out Mithridates II.

[57] Exactly what the star and crescent do symbolize is a subject of great disagreement: see below p. 97 n. 51.

[58] Pol. 21.45.10; Livy 38.39.15. See Chr. Habicht, *Hermes* 84 (1956) 90-96; Habicht, *RE* 23, 1 (1957) col. 1098-1103; Hansen (supra n. 31) 97 n. 80.

[59] When Walbank (supra n. 46) vol. 3 p. 254 says that there is no evidence for Pharnaces' involvement in this war, he has presumably forgotten this passage of Pompeius Trogus, which he does in fact cite in the first volume of his commentary (p. 300).

known. The fighting seems to have started on the advice of Hannibal who was helping Prusias (Just. *Epit.* 32.4.2), and Cornelius Nepos (*Hann.* 10.1) tells us that Prusias was in Pontus when Hannibal joined him after escaping from Crete. So it does look as if Pontus may have been involved from the first, and we might surmise that Pharnaces became king in about 189/188.[60] In spite of Hannibal's presence in the enemy camp, the Pergamenes gained the upper hand: a victory is recorded at Mt. Lypedron against the Bithynians and Galatians (*OGIS* 298), and a decree from Telmessus attests another victory achieved by Eumenes himself over Prusias, Ortiagon, the Galatians and other allies.[61] In the spring of 183 Eumenes dispatched his brother Athenaeus to Rome to complain of the help given by Philip V of Macedon to Prusias (Pol. 23.1.4). The Senate sent out a commission under T. Quinctius Flamininus to bring about peace between Prusias and Eumenes, and to effect the surrender of Hannibal.[62] Flamininus succeeded in the former task, but Hannibal forestalled him in the latter by committing suicide. In 183 the kings of Pergamum and Bithynia made peace.[63]

This situation was not to the liking of Pharnaces. If he desisted from hostilities against Eumenes at all, it was only for a short time. For in the winter of 183/182 ambassadors of Eumenes and Pharnaces were in Rome putting their respective cases concerning the dispute that had arisen between them (Pol. 23.9.1-4). This appears to be the first official contact between Rome and Pontus. Pharnaces was actually causing quite a stir in Anatolia, because not only was he fighting Pergamum, but he had also seized Sinope. In 220 the Rhodians had been instrumental in thwarting the attempt of Mithridates II on the city (above p. 23), but this time Pharnaces had pounced unexpectedly and captured it (Pol. 23.9.2; Strabo 12.3.11 c.546; Livy 40.2.6). In order to complain about the fate of Sinope, the Rhodians also sent envoys to Rome in the winter of 183/182. The Roman response to these various representations was a commission, led by a certain Marcus, ordered to enquire about the war that had arisen between Pharnaces and Eumenes, and to investigate the

[60] Habicht, *RE* 23, 1 (1957) col. 1099 raises the possibility that although Pompeius Trogus mentioned Pharnaces among the combatants in this war between Bithynia and Pergamum, he may have confused this war with the one that followed shortly, between Pharnaces and his neighbours. Prusias' presence in Pontus, however, when Hannibal arrived, may indicate some connection between the Bithynian king and Pharnaces, and provide some further slight evidence for Pharnaces' involvement in the earlier war: see McGing (supra n. 15).

[61] See M. Segre, *RFIC* 60 (1932) 446-452.

[62] For the sources on Flamininus' embassy, see Broughton, *MRR* vol. 1 p. 380.

[63] For the date, see Habicht (supra n. 60) col. 1103.

Pontic seizure of Sinope.[64] After his investigation, Marcus reported back to the Senate that Eumenes had displayed great moderation, and Pharnaces correspondingly great greed and insolence, but the result was merely another commission which was instructed to look into the matter with more diligence. Pharnaces kept Sinope, even after his defeat in the war that was in progress. It was the most important addition yet to the kingdom of Pontus.[65] Its colonies Cotyora and Cerasus were also added to the kingdom, either following their metropolis, or, like it, being captured. From these two cities Pharnaces took settlers to found his new city of Pharnaceia. Trapezus was also a colony of Sinope, but it is not clear whether Pharnaces controlled it (above p. 5). The whole Black Sea Coast, however, from Amastris at least as far as Cerasus was now in Pontic hands.[66]

It is unlikely that the capture of Sinope was the cause of the war between Eumenes and Pharnaces. Of the embassies at Rome in 183 it seems to have been only the Rhodians who were complaining about Sinope: Eumenes and Pharnaces had another quarrel. And after his final defeat Pharnaces had to give up his conquests, yet he retained Sinope. The war arose more probably out of the earlier war between Prusias and Eumenes.[67] It was perhaps just a continuation of hostilities by Pharnaces in pursuit of his ambition to expand his kingdom.[68] A fragment of Polybius might be taken to indicate that Pharnaces initiated the war by invading Cappadocia whose king Ariarathes IV was Eumenes' prospective father-in-law (Livy 38.39.6), but the fragment cannot be placed with certainty.[69] Another possibility is that Pontic interference in Galatia sparked off the war, as Galatia is the first consideration in the treaty of 179 reported by Polybius (25.2).[70] At any rate, by 181 Ariarathes of Cap-

[64] Pol. 24.1.2-3. There is no way of identifying this Marcus: see Broughton *MRR* vol. 1 p. 383; Walbank (supra n. 46) vol. 3 p. 254. For analysis of the war, see for instance, Meyer, *Geschichte* 72-80; Niese (supra n. 25) vol. 3 (1903) 74-9; R. B. McShane, *The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum* (1964) 161-3; Will, *Histoire politique* vol. 1, 242-5; T. Liebmann-Frankfort, *La frontière orientale dans la politique extérieure de la république romaine depuis la traité d'Apamée jusqu'à la fin des conquêtes asiatiques de Pompée (189/8-63)* (1969) 79-83; Hansen (supra n. 31) 101-4; J. Hopp, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der letzten Attaliden* (1977) 44-8; A. N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East* (1984) 28; 42. On Roman policy in the war, see now S. M. Burstein, *AJAH* 5 (1980) 1-12.

[65] For Sinope see above p. 3-4. Also Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 593-595; 665.

[66] See Meyer, (supra n. 5) 117; A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (ed. 2. 1971) 152; 420 n. 12.

[67] Habicht (supra n. 60) col. 1099.

[68] For Pharnaces' territorial ambitions, see Stähelin, (supra n. 37) 63; S. Yu. Saprykin, *VDI* 1979, No. 3 (149) 50.

[69] Pol. Fr. 112: "but he, relying on these men, undertook a war against Ariarathes." See Walbank (supra n. 46) vol. 3 p. 253.

[70] See Hopp (supra n. 64) 45; Burstein (supra n. 64) 2.

padocia had certainly become involved, for in that year he too sent envoys to Rome, joining those of Eumenes and Pharnaces (Pol. 24.1.1; Livy 40.20.1).[71] Shortly before, Marcus had presented his report on the situation in Asia Minor, and the Senate had dispatched its second commission of enquiry. It was perhaps the influence of this commission that helped bring about a truce between Pharnaces and his enemies (Pol. 24.1.3; 24.5.1; 24.14.3). During the temporary lull in hostilities, Eumenes sent his brothers to Rome, hoping finally to put an end to the war (Pol. 24.5.2-8; Diod. 29.22). They were splendidly treated, but achieved no more than the dispatch of yet another commission—the third—although this time the commissioners were given firm instructions to end the war.[72] While these negotiations were going on in Rome, Pharnaces broke the truce: his general Leocritus invaded Galatia with ten thousand troops, and he himself prepared an invasion of Cappadocia (Pol. 24.14.1-4). It was probably this sort of behaviour that earned for Pharnaces the adverse judgement of Polybius (27.17), who said that he surpassed all previous kings in lawlessness. Eumenes was forced to make his own preparations. In the previous year, 181, probably before the arrangement of the truce, two Galatian princes had allied themselves to Pharnaces. They now wanted to change sides to Eumenes, but he rejected their offer and joined forces with Ariarathes. At this stage, the third set of Roman commissioners arrived, and made a determined effort to bring about peace, persuading Eumenes and Ariarathes to abandon for the moment their new offensive, and urging Pharnaces to meet with his enemies. He refused, but did agree to send representatives to Pergamum to discuss terms. It seems, however, from the complete lack of cooperation of these envoys that Pharnaces was not in the least interested in peace. So the negotiations failed, and the war continued.

Certain incidents of the war are difficult to date. One such is the capture by Leocritus of Tieium, and the massacre of the mercenaries who had been defending it (Diod. 29.23). This is important, as it indicates an attempt by Pharnaces to extend his kingdom further west along the coast, and it may have been what brought Prusias II of Bithynia into the war, as Tieium seems to have belonged to Bithynia at this time.[73] We learn of

[71] For a possible inscriptional reference to the Cappadocian involvement in this war, see G. Pugliese Caratelli, *PP* 27 (1972) 182-185, who publishes M. Segre's text and commentary of an inscription from Cos, which mentions the armed forces of Ariarathes. Caratelli thinks that this refers to the time of Pharnaces' war.

[72] Hansen (supra n. 31) 103 mistakenly counts four Roman commissions: there were three.

[73] Rather than to Pergamum: see Magie, *RRAM* 760 n. 56. The capture of Tieium may on the other hand have been a reaction to, rather than the cause of, Bithynia's entry into the war: see Habicht (supra n. 60) col. 1110.

Prusias' involvement from the peace treaty signed at the end of the war (Pol. 25.2).

It appears that Seleucus IV of Syria may also have considered entering the war, on the side of Pharnaces, possibly in return for the offer of five hundred talents.[74] He is said to have led a large army up to the Taurus mountains intending to help Pharnaces, but then withdrew, as this would have involved breaking the treaty of Apameia, by which Antiochus III had agreed to remain east of the Halys river and Taurus mountains. It is again difficult to date this, but 183 is a possibility. For in that year Flamininus had been sent to bring about peace between Prusias and Eumenes, and Polybius does speak of him also as an envoy to Seleucus (Pol. 23.5.1). Perhaps when Eumenes had gained the advantage in his war with Prusias, and hostilities were coming to an end, Pharnaces had looked around for allies to continue the fight. Seleucus was interested enough to prepare an army, but then backed down. The Senate may have received news of Seleucus' action, and for that reason told Flamininus to visit him, and confirm him in his decision to remain neutral.[75]

Another incident of uncertain date is the attempt by Eumenes to block off the Euxine trade, by stationing his fleet at the Hellespont (Pol. 27.7.5). Rhodes had too much trade at stake to allow this.

In 179 his enemies brought Pharnaces to terms, and although we do not know the exact circumstances of the end of the war, it is clear from the peace terms that Pharnaces must have been thoroughly overpowered (Pol. 25.2). The names of the participants help us to gauge the extent of the war. The main signatories were Eumenes, Prusias and Ariarathes on the one hand, and Pharnaces and Mithridates on the other. This Mithridates is probably the brother of Pharnaces, the future king Mithridates IV Philopator Philadelphus, although it seems possible that Polybius is referring to the Mithridates satrap of Armenia who is mentioned explicitly later on in the treaty.[76] We do not know exactly what part the Armenian Mithridates played in the war, but he had to pay an

[74] Diod. 29.24; Pol. Fr. 96. Possibly Pol. Fr. 112 belongs in this context: could it have been on Seleucus and the Syrians that Pharnaces was relying when he invaded Cappadocia?

[75] This, at least, seems a possible explanation for Flamininus' visit to Seleucus, although Walbank (supra n. 46) vol. 3 p. 221, thinks the visit was too early to connect with Pharnaces' war against his neighbours. Burstein (supra n. 64) 9 n. 13 thinks it is unlikely to have been direct Roman intervention that led to Seleucus' decision to back down.

[76] For the view that the Mithridates of Pol. 25.2.3 is not the Armenian satrap of Pol. 25.2.11, see, for instance, Niese (supra n. 25) vol. 3 p. 78 n. 2; Walbank (supra n. 46) vol. 3 p. 271.

indemnity of three hundred talents for attacking Cappadocia, and thus breaking his treaty with Eumenes.[77] Pharnaces had to agree not to invade Galatia, and to break all links forged with the Galatians. He had to withdraw completely from Cappadocia and Paphlagonia and give up Tieium; restore all treasures taken from Ariarathes and from Morzius of Paphlagonia, paying to them an indemnity of nine hundred talents, and an additional three hundred to Eumenes. All hostages, deserters, prisoners, war materials had to be returned. Also included in the treaty as *adscripti*, were Artaxias, ruler of Armenia, Acusilochus (otherwise unknown), Gatalus of Sarmatia and the free cities of Heracleia, Mesembria, Tauric Chersonesus and Cyzicus.

It is by no means clear whether all or any of these additional signatories actually took part in the fighting, or if they did whose side they were on, or whether they merely remained neutral, but concerned enough at the state of affairs to want official involvement in the treaty.[78] It does, however, seem likely that they took sides, even if they did not fight: their interests were presumably at stake and threatened more by one side than by the other. As Pharnaces was the one with the aggressive expansionist plans, we might surmise that the *adscripti* perceived the greater threat to come from him, and so aligned themselves behind the Pergamene coalition. Heracleia was very much in the war zone, and it would be interesting to know her stance in the conflict, but it is not recorded. To be sure, in the recent past Bithynia, not Pontus, had been her main enemy,[79] but Pharnaces' present actions were surely more immediately alarming than the Bithynian threat, although there is no evidence to support McShane's statement that Pharnaces actually seized Heracleia.[80] He was, however, clearly advancing west along the coast, seizing first Sinope, then Tieium; it would be surprising if the Heracliots did not consider themselves next on his list of acquisitions, and take sides with the enemies of Pontus.[81] Chersonesus enjoyed close ties with her

[77] Durrbach, *Choix* 101, No. 73 states incorrectly that Pharnaces had to pay a three hundred talent indemnity to Mithridates.

[78] Saprykin (supra n. 68) 43-49 maintains that the free cities were neutral. E. Bikerman, *Philologus* 87 (1932) 278 ff. shows that *adscripti* were not necessarily participants in fighting. For further debate on the involvement of the secondary signatories, see, for instance, A. Heuss, *Stadt und Herrscher des Hellenismus* (1933) 138 n. 1; J. Seibert, *Metropolis und Apoikie* (1963) 162-164; W. Dahlheim, *Struktur und Entwicklung des römischen Völkerrechts im dritten und zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (1968) 214-216; Hopp (supra n. 64) 47 n. 71; Burstein (supra n. 64) 9 n. 19.

[79] See Saprykin (supra n. 68) 46 ff. Prusias I had tried to capture the city—Memnon 19.1.

[80] McShane (supra n. 64) 161.

[81] Burstein (supra n. 64) 10 n. 25 disagrees, and suggests that Eumenes' attempt to close the Hellespont, and his return of Tieium to Bithynia after the war, provide evidence

mother city Heracleia,[82] and so was probably similarly ill-disposed towards Pharnaces. This seems to be borne out by the terms of the treaty which the Chersonitans made with Pharnaces probably in 155 (*IOSPE* 1^2 402; *SEG* XXX, 962)[83]: the detailed provisions against possible unfriendly action—presumably by either side, although only Pharnaces' oath survives—do seem to imply a previous hostility between the parties. Free cities would mostly have found it in their interests to support each other, and it has been plausibly suggested that Heracleia looked for backing not only from her own colony Chersonesus, but also from Cyzicus and Mesembria, thus explaining their involvement.[84] As for Gatalus of Sarmatia, there is little to be said for the common assumption that he was on Pharnaces' side, and that in the course of the war he attacked Chersonesus at the instigation of Pharnaces.[85] This is deduced from the treaty of Pharnaces and Chersonesus, mentioned above, in which Pharnaces promises to help the Chersonitans, if "the surrounding barbarians" attack. The surrounding barbarians, however, are almost certainly the Scythians, not the Sarmatians, as it was the Scythians who were at this time the common enemy of the Greek cities of the north Black Sea Coast,[86] and we know of at least one occasion when the Sarmatians acutally helped Chersonesus: Polyaenus (*Strat.* 8.56) records a victory of Queen Amage of Sarmatia over the Scythians on behalf of Chersonesus. It is, therefore, much more likely that Gatalus was aligned with Chersonesus on the side of the anti-Pharnaces coalition.[87] The loyalties of Artaxias and Acusilochus cannot be determined, but as it seems quite probable that all the other *adscripti* were against Pharnaces, perhaps these were too.

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of Heracleia's hostility to Pergamum. Blocking off the Euxine would indeed have hurt Heracleia, as Burstein claims, but the attempt was unsuccessful and in the circumstances must surely have been aimed at Pontus rather than Heracleia. And as Tieium seems to have been in the possession of Bithynia before the war (see above n. 73), its return to Prusias II afterwards, seems reasonable, and is hardly a reliable pointer to attitudes during the conflict.

[82] See Seibert (supra n. 78) 160 ff.

[83] The treaty is dated in May of the 157th year of Pharnaces' era, which is usually assumed to have started with the accession of Mithridates II of Cius in 336/5, thus putting the treaty in 179; for bibliography see Perl (supra n. 39) 301 n. 10. Burstein (supra n. 64) 5-7 argues convincingly that Pharnaces was using the Seleucid era, and that the treaty was, therefore, struck in 155 right at the end of his reign. See also McGing (supra n. 15). The treaty of *IOSPE* 1^2 402 is clearly something entirely separate from that reported in Pol. 25.2, not part of it, as E. H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks* (1912) 518 n. 2 seems to have thought.

[84] See Seibert (supra n. 78) 216.

[85] See for instance, Diehl, *RE* 19, 2 (1938) col. 1850; Will, *Histoire politique* vol. 2, 243; Dahleim (supra n. 78) 216 n. 85; Hopp (supra n. 64) 47 n. 71.

[86] See V. F. Gajdukevic, *Das Bosporanische Reich* (German ed. 1971) 312.

[87] See Rostovtseff, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 220; Walbank (supra n. 46) vol. 3 p. 272.

The Senate's main interest in these events appears to have been in seeing that things remained the same as they had been before the war. Burstein disproves the idea of a 'cooling' in Rome's relations with her ally Pergamum: Polybius and Justin together demonstrate the strength and consistency of Roman diplomatic support for Pergamum; and Pharnaces' reopening of hostilities after the truce was probably due to the peace terms offered by the Roman ambassadors being too favourable to Eumenes.[88] Furthermore, it is likely that Rome was involved in the treaty negotiations of 179, in spite of Polybius' silence on the matter. For the inscription recording the alliance of Pharnaces and Chersonesus describes both parties as having a relationship of *philia* with Rome, and although the alliance probably dates to 155 and not 179, as is generally thought,[89] the only recorded occasion in this period when Rome had the sort of involvement in affairs that might have led to the establishment of *philia* with Pontus and Chersonesus, was at the end of Pharnaces' war. It appears, then, that Rome supervised the peace negotiations in 179, and that all the interested parties entered into "friendship" with her.[90] The evidence does point to a fairly close Roman interest in what was going on. There may have been some worrying aspects to the conflict—especially perhaps the report that Seleucus IV had been preparing to help Pharnaces—but the senatorial commissions will have kept a close eye on events. More drastic action was simply not needed. Pharnaces showed no signs of being able to defeat his enemies, and thus cause an upset in the balance of power in Anatolia: the Senate evidently thought that in this case its allies could look after themselves, and so they did. Rome's first impressions of a Pontic king will have been mixed: Pharnaces was a trouble-maker —fiercely ambitious and rather dismissive of Roman diplomacy—but he did at least implictly recognise Rome's position by sending missions to the Senate. And in his alliance with Chersonesus, he sounds like a loyal enough client: the defensive alliance will hold good provided that he and the Chersonitans maintain the *philia* not only between themselves, but also with Rome, and that nothing is done against Roman interests. Badian was hardly right to claim that "the proud Pharnaces never became a client of Rome."[91]

Pharnaces' alliance with Chersonesus does show an attempt to establish relations in the northern Euxine, and we also have epigraphic

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[88] Burstein (supra n. 64) 5.

[89] See above n. 83.

[90] Even if this is not the case, and it is denied by Sherwin-White (supra n. 64) 28; 42, it is at least clear that Pharnaces was the first king of Pontus to become a 'friend' of Rome, not Mithridates IV Philopater Philadelphus (*OGIS* 375), nor Mithridates V Euergetes (App. *Mith.* 10; 12).

[91] E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae 264-70 B.C.* (1958) 99.

evidence for an interest in the west coast of the Black Sea. An inscription from Odessus attests his relationship with that city (*IG Bulg.* 1^2 40).[92] Unfortunately the inscription is so fragmentary that it is not clear what is happening. Rostovtseff thought it concerns an embassy sent by the people of Odessus to Pharnaces to ask for help in difficult times.[93] If this is the case, the embassy could have resulted from the same sort of difficulty that faced the Chersonitans—trouble with the neighbouring barbarians. It has been suggested, however, that it is at least possible that the embassy was Pharnaces', and that it was he who was looking for help in difficult times.[94]

Pharnaces also set about establishing a good relationship with Athens (and Delos). His sister Laodice was honoured with a statue on Delos.[95] More informative is the lengthy inscription of the Athenian people, also from Delos, honouring Pharnaces and his newly-wed Seleucid wife Nysa.[96] They are both to receive a crown of gold, and a bronze statue to be set up on Delos. The exact nature of the benefaction is not known, but it appears that Pharnaces had made some kind of voluntary donation, perhaps soon after the capture of Sinope in 183, when he would be anxious to show his new subjects how civilized, how hellenized a monarch he was. His affairs, we are told, were not in good order, and he seems to have had difficulty paying his yearly instalments. The inscription is dated in the archonship at Athens of Tychander, now generally accepted as 160/159;[97] and Pharnaces' embarrassed circumstances may still be a result of the war of 183-179. It is interesting to see Pharnaces allying himself by marriage to the Seleucid house, following in the footsteps of Mithridates II. It is some indication of his independence from Rome that he accepted this marriage from Demetrius I in the first place: Demetrius had escaped from Rome to take up his throne, and Ariarathes V of Cappadocia refused a similar offer of marriage out of deference to Rome (Diod. 31.28).

The coins of Pharnaces again have a striking, realistic portrait on the obverse, but introduce a new reverse, breaking away entirely from the

[92] For the history of Odessus, see Ch. M. Danov, *ANRW* II, 7.1(1979) 281 ff.
[93] Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 1482 n. 75a.
[94] Hopp (supra n. 64) 48 n. 71. A further inscription (*IOSPE* 1^2 351) recording a decree of the Chersonitans honouring Menophilus, son of Menophilus, from Sinope, is perhaps to be dated to the same period as the alliance between Chersonesus and Pharnaces (*IOSPE* 1^2 402), in which an official, Menophilus son of Menophilus is again mentioned. There is, however, no particular reason to suppose that Menophilus put up the Chersonitan envoys who had come to see Pharnaces, as Saprykin (supra n. 68) 57 suggests.
[95] Durrbach, *Choix* 105 No. 74; *Ins. Delos* 1555.
[96] *OGIS* 771; Durrbach, *Choix* 97 No. 73; *Ins. Delos* 1497 bis. For a possible gem portrait of Nysa see M. L. Vollenweider, *Antike Kunst* 23 (1980) 148-150.
[97] See Perl (supra n. 39) 301 n. 10.

Alexander types: it depicts a standing male figure, sometimes with a thunderbolt above his head, wearing a flat cap, chiton, chlamys and cothurni, and holding in the left hand a cornucopia and caduceus, and in the right hand a vine branch at which a doe nibbles. In the field are the star and crescent and the inscription "of King Pharnaces". The figure is a puzzling pantheistic divinity, which in 1889 W. Wroth declared "had not been satisfactorily explained," and in 1973 had still not met with a satisfactory explanation.[98] Rostovtseff thought that the god of Pharnaces was more Iranian than Greek,[99] but perhaps it is best to see a figure which brings together east and west, a task in which the kings of Pontus, especially from now on, were particularly interested.

The reign of Pharnaces marks some new departures in Pontic foreign policy. First, a willingness and indeed desire to become more deeply embroiled in Anatolian politics. Although the silence of our sources does not permit certainty, the expansion of Pontus under its first four kings seems to have been accomplished on the whole in a quiet way. A close connection did grow up with the Seleucids and an involvement in their disputes, but Pontus was not the instigator of serious conflicts: she took sides in the disputes of other people. When the results were potentially too dangerous she remained on the sidelines: the war of Antiochus III against Rome was a major conflagration in the east, but there is no word of Pontic involvement. Pharnaces also seems to have started out, like his predecessors, taking part in someone else's war. Later, however, he threw down the gauntlet to almost all the important Anatolian princes, challenging them in an aggressive but unsuccessful war of expansion—expansion west into Bithynia, Paphlagonia and Galatia, south into Cappadocia, east into Armenia. His resources did not match his ambition—a useful lesson for his successors. The capture of Sinope was a logical extension of the kingdom, and it was perhaps the possession of this city with its fine harbour and extensive trade connections, that enabled, or inspired him to look north across the Euxine, and set up ties with Chersonesus and

[98] *BMC Pontus* p. XXIII; N. Davis and C. M. Kraay, *The Hellenistic Kingdoms. Portrait Coins and History* (1973) No. 200-203. A portrait of the divinity Men Pharnacou would appear to be an attractive possibility, but as Wroth pointed out, the figure has none of the attributes of Men known from other sources (for Men, see above p. 8 n. 33). Scholarly uncertainty is reflected in the descriptions offered of the figure: e.g. Pantheistic divinity (?) (B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum* [1911] 500); Hermes-Mithra (?) (*Recueil Général* 11); composite male divinity (E. T. Newell, *Royal Greek Portrait Coins* [1937] 40). A. Alföldi, *Hermes* 65 (1930) 378 interpreted the figure as Aion-Saviour, who was going to introduce a new *saeculum frugiferum*. F. Imhoof-Blumer, *Nomisma* 6 (1911) 13-23 collected other examples of pantheistic divinities depicted on coins, but all are from the imperial period, and throw little light on Pharnaces' issue.
[99] Rostovtseff, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 224.

Odessus. This interest in the northern Euxine cities was something new, and something that Pharnaces' grandson Mithridates VI Eupator developed further and to good advantage. The Athenian connection was probably not new, as the Delian inscription honouring Pharnaces and Nysa mentions previous Pontic benefactions and existing friendly relations between Athens and Pontus (*OGIS* 771 lines 8-10). Whether this refers to the time of Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia and dynast of Cius, or has a more recent application is not known. Another new factor in Pontic affairs was Rome. Pharnaces found it necessary to play the diplomatic game of sending missions to Rome, probably for fear that his enemies might so misrepresent him that the Senate would interfere seriously: mere commissioners and their instructions could safely be ignored. Although Pontus was still only on the fringes of the Mediterranean world, the shadow of Rome was lengthening, and Pharnaces' immediate successors considered it to their advantage to keep in with the new dominant power.

Pharnaces' policy of expansion was substantially a failure in terms of territory acquired, but one of the most important features of his reign was that he had pointed the kingdom in new directions—directions which Mithridates Eupator would follow half a century later.

For the moment, the death of Pharnaces marked the end of an era in Pontic history. His successor Mithridates IV Philopator Philadelphus adopted a less aggressive foreign policy, involving the establishment and maintenance of cordial relations with Rome. An inscription from the Capitol records a dedication of Mithridates to the people of Rome, and refers to his *amicitia* and *societas* with them (*OGIS* 375). There are dedications from fifteen other kings, dynasts and peoples on the same monument, testifying to the growing realization of Rome's supremacy.[100] Mithridates treated his *amicitia* seriously, and fought on the side of his "friend's" ally, Attalus II, in the war of Pergamum against Prusias II of

[100] Among these other dedications is one of the Lycians, thanking Rome for the return of their ancestral freedom. T. Reinach, *L'histoire par les monnaies* (1902) 128; *BCH* 30 (1906) 47, dated the Lycian dedication to 167, and thought that the Mithridates inscription must be of the same date. J. Larsen, *CP* 51 (1956) 158-9 argued that the inscriptions do not all have to be dated within a short time of each other: the dedication of the Lycians may have been the earliest and most important, but it is possible that other people were later allowed to put their inscriptions on the monument. Recently, and most persuasively, R. Mellor, *Chiron* 8 (1978) 319-330 has suggested another interpretation of these dedications: the monument was destroyed, or damaged, in the fire of 83, and the inscriptions reinscribed, thus explaining why they all appear part of a single group of Sullan date (see also *SEG* xxviii, 803). Mellor's arguments should remove any temptation to follow Mommsen and Degrassi in believing that Mithridates Philopater Philadelphus was not Pharnaces' I successor, but an otherwise unattested son of Mithridates Eupator. See also Magie, *RRAM* 1090 n. 48; Olshausen (supra n. 13) col. 415-6.

Bithynia (Pol. 33.12.1).[101] He and Ariarathes V of Cappadocia sent help in the winter of 155/4 in accordance with the terms of their alliance with Attalus. Mithridates' alliance refers probably to an agreement made on his own initiative rather than to the general peace treaty of 179.[102] Polybius also implies that Mithridates and Ariarathes were allied to each other, or at least on very close terms, as their joint forces were commanded by Demetrius, the son or brother of Ariarathes V.[103] It appears, then, that Mithridates IV abandoned the aggressive isolationism of his predecessor, and embarked on a much more conciliatory foreign policy.

Mithridates IV did not, like his brother, marry a Seleucid princess, but instead took as his wife his own sister Laodice.[104] The coins of their joint rule display on the obverse a fine double portrait, realistic, like previous royal portraits. The reverse shows Zeus and Hera standing facing, each holding a sceptre, with the inscription on five vertical lines "of King Mithridates and Queen Laodice Philadelphoi".[105] Clearly the joint rule of Mithridates and Laodice is associated with that of the Olympians. The choice of this reverse type is a declaration of Hellenism, which was to be followed by the next king Mithridates V Euergetes. In another issue however, perhaps before his marriage, Mithridates IV drew attention to the Persian origins of the dynasty by choosing a reverse type of Perseus, standing facing wearing a chlamys, pointed curved helmet and winged boots. In his left hand he holds the Harpe and in his right the head of Medusa.[106] The star and crescent are also present, and his full name "of king Mithridates Philopator Philadelphus" (the obverse has a portrait of Mithridates alone). Perseus was an excellent bridge between east and west, clearer than the figure of Pharnaces' coins, for he was definitely a Greek hero, but had Persian associations: the Persians regarded him as an Assyrian.[107] There are two other coin issues connected with Mithridates IV. The first has on the obverse a portrait of Mithridates wearing a laurel crown, and on the reverse the same Hera figure of the

[101] See Chr. Habicht, *Hermes* 84 (1956) 101-110.

[102] Hopp (supra n. 64) 77 n. 101. Contra, Olshausen (supra n. 13) col. 416. The treaty of 179 does not say anything about the signatories becoming allies.

[103] Demetrius is usually thought to be the son of Ariarathes V, but may be the son of the previous king and brother of Ariarathes V: see Hopp (supra n. 64) 77 n. 102.

[104] For an inscription honouring her, see above n. 95.

[105] *Recueil Général* 13 No. 7; *SNG Von Aulock* 1[1] No. 4; 1[15] No. 6674-5.

[106] *Recueil Général* 12 No. 6. This Perseus figure is Men-Mithra according to A. N. Oikonomides, *Mithraic Art* (1975) 71-3.

[107] Hdt. 6.54; 7.150. See G. Kleiner, *MDAI* (I) 6 (1955) 15. For the sources on Perseus' Persian connections see K. Schauenberg, *Perseus in der Kunst des Altertums* (1960) 132-3 n. 923; Catteral, *RE* 19, 1 (1937) col. 987-8 No. 1. For more on Perseus as a bridge between east and west, see below p. 95 n. 36.

joint issue of Mithridates and Laodice.[108] The second depicts Laodice veiled, on the obverse, and again the same Hera on the reverse, with the inscription "of Queen Laodice". The resemblance between the portrait of this coin and the Laodice of the joint tetradrachm, and the presence of the similar reverse Hera, make it very likely that the Laodice of this second coin is the wife and co-regent of Mithridates IV.[109]

The policies of the next king of Pontus, Mithridates V Euergetes, are slighly more complicated, and perhaps more important in helping to assess the reign of his son and successor Mithridates VI Eupator. For it is reasonable to suppose that the impression left by Euergetes may well have affected the general perception of Eupator, at least at the beginning of the latter's reign. Some areas seem straightforward enough. Euergetes continued, for instance, his predecessor's policy of loyalty and friendliness to Rome. He sent some ships and auxiliaries to help the Roman forces at Carthage in the Third Punic War (App. *Mith.* 10).[110] He also provided forces in the war against Aristonicus,[111] for which service he was rewarded with the gift of Phrygia Maior (App. *Mith.* 57; Just. *Epit.* 37.1.2; 38.5.3). On the death of Attalus III the kingdom of Pergamum passed by bequest into the possession of Rome, but the senate chose to turn only part of the bequest into a province; the rest they divided up as a reward for the loyal allied kings.[112] The sons of Ariarathes of Cappadocia, who was killed in the course of the war, received Lycaonia, and Mithridates got Phrygia.[113] Lycaonia bordered directly on

[108] This is a gold stater: see Kleiner (supra n. 107) Tafel 2 No. 12. Pharnaces also issued in gold, as revealed by D. R. Sear, *Greek Coins and their Values*, vol. 2 (1979) 680.

[109] Reinach at one stage (*Mith. Eup.* 477) thought that this Laodice was the mother of Mithridates VI Eupator, and wife of Euergetes, but in *Recueil Général* 13 No. 8, the coin is attributed to Queen Laodice (widow of Mithridates IV?). Kleiner (supra n. 107) 14 suggested that both the Mithridates/Hera gold stater, and the veiled Laodice/Hera gold stater, and the veiled Laodice/Hera tetradrachm were posthumous issues. For a possible gem portrait of Mithridates IV see Vollenweider, (supra n. 96) 147-8.

[110] This is in 149, and is the earliest clearly dated action of his reign. There is, however, an inscription of Euergetes' reign from Abonuteichus honouring Alcimus son of Menophilus, dated by the era year 161 (see T. Reinach, *NC* 5 [1905] 113-119), and as it is likely that he, like his father Pharnaces, used the Seleucid era, the Abonuteichus inscription would show him to be ruling in 152/151. Mithridates IV would then have had a very short reign, at longest from some time in 155 to some time in 151: see McGing (supra n. 15).

[111] Strabo 14.1.38 c.646; Just. *Epit.* 37.1.2; Eutropius 4.20; Oros. 5.10.2.

[112] The view that the Senate's arrangements in Asia showed a reluctance to annex territory, has been challenged by W. V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 B.C.* (1979) 148 ff. Harris maintains that the Senate was trying to ensure the future security of the land that was annexed. For recent discussion see Sherwin-White (supra n. 64) 88-92.

[113] The Mithridates of *IGR* IV 292 1.13 is not Mithridates V Euergetes as Olshausen (supra n. 13) col. 417 still seems to think. The activities of Diodorus Pasparus are to be associated with the Mithridatic wars and their aftermath, not with the war of Aristonicus: see C. P. Jones, *Chiron* 4 (1974) 183-205.

Cappadocia, but Phrygia was quite far removed from the boundaries of Pontus, and the assignment of Phrygia to Euergetes implies that he held some kind of sway in Galatia and perhaps Paphlagonia.[114] It is not necessary to assume that this influence was lost on the death of Euergetes, just because Justin (*Epit.* 37.4.6) informs us that Mithridates Eupator seized Galatia. Eupator may have been dissatisfied with the existing influence, and wanted instead to occupy the country directly. He was still able to call the Galatians his allies on the eve of the First Mithridatic War (Just. *Epit.* 38.4.9).

There is a faint possibility that Euergetes inherited Paphlagonia from its king Pylaemenes. When Eupator and Nicomedes III of Bithynia invaded it in 108 and divided it up between them (see below p. 68-70), they were ordered by Rome to return it *in pristinum statum* (Just. *Epit.* 37.4.4). Eupator, however, claimed that his father had inherited the country, and was surprised that the Romans were now making an issue of Paphlagonia when they had not done so before. Suspicion immediately attaches to this claim because it was made to justify the Pontic invasion. Similarly Cappadocia, another of Eupator's victims, had always belonged to his ancestors, so it was claimed: in the reign of his father Euergetes, it had merely been recovered by Pontus (App. *Mith.* 12). Both Cappadocia and Paphlagonia in fact appear to have been quite independent kingdoms, and there is little reason to believe Eupator's self-justifying claims. Support for this view, at least in the case of Paphlagonia, can be found in the action of Nicomedes. He was able to offer no just excuse for his part in the invasion, and promised the Roman ambassadors that he would return the kingdom to its legitimate king. There is no indication that he thought Mithridates was the legitimate king. Clearly he regarded the Pylaemenids as the rightful rulers, as is demonstrated by his trick of installing his own son as king, under the royal Paphlagonian name of Pylaemenes.

Euergetes' interest in Cappadocia is more clearly stated: "he invaded it as a foreign territory" (App. *Mith.* 10). We also find Laodice, Euergetes' daughter, married to the young king of Cappadocia, Ariarathes VI (Just. *Epit.* 38.1.1; Memnon 22.1). It is usually thought that this marriage came after the invasion, and marked a cessation of hostilities between Pontus and Cappadocia.[115] D. Glew has recently challenged this view.[116] He asks how Euergetes, if he overran Cappadocia, hoped to control it merely by marrying his daughter to its king,

[114] Meyer, *Geschichte* 82; Stähelin (supra n. 37) 86.

[115] See Olshausen (supra n. 13) col. 419.

[116] D. Glew, *Athenaeum* 55 (1977) 388 ff.

and why Ariarathes, if he beat off the Pontic attack, agreed to marry the daughter of his defeated opponent. His suggestion is that Euergetes' relations with Cappadocia were in fact friendly, and that the invasion was undertaken on behalf of Ariarathes VI to settle internal strife in Cappadocia. This, he feels, makes better sense of the marriage: having helped Ariarathes establish himself, Euergetes cemented the relationship by marrying his daughter to him. This is possible, but the accepted opinion does make perfectly good sense: Euergetes overran Cappadocia, but then, learning from what had happened to a similarly aggressive Pharnaces, he decided not to occupy it, and instead to leave Ariarathes on the throne, hoping to keep a close check on him through Laodice, and thus control the county indirectly. When Ariarathes V died, probably in 130, his son Ariarathes VI was still too young to rule, and his mother Nysa acted as regent.[117] Ariarathes VI will only have been a little older at the time of his marriage to Laodice, and thus still, Euergetes might have assumed, quite pliable, especially as his forces had just been defeated by Euergetes. In view of Eupator's early activities in Cappadocia, this makes rather better sense than Glew's version of events. For Eupator's Cappadocian policy was almost certainly the same: that is, he was unwilling to occupy the county directly but tried constantly to control it indirectly through intermediaries (see below, p. 75; 82 ff.). Eupator probably just took over his father's policy.

His daughter's marriage was thus an important part of Euergetes' foreign policy. As for his own marriage, it is possible that he married a Seleucid. This is not stated directly in any source, but is an inference from Justin (*Epit.* 38.8.1), who reports the ancestral claims of Mithridates Eupator: *paternos maiores suos a Cyro Darioque, conditoribus Persici regni, maternos a magno Alexandro ac Nicatore Seleuco conditoribus imperii Macedonici referat*. Reinach thought that this necessarily meant that Euergetes married a Seleucid, but it is possible that it is only an imprecise reference to earlier queens of Pontus, a number of whom, as already seen, were from the Syrian royal family.[118]

Strabo (10.4.10 c.477-8) provides interesting information on Euergetes' recruitment of mercenaries. He tells how Dorylaus *anēr taktikos tōn Mithridatou tou Euergetou philōn* went on recruiting expeditions to Greece, Thrace and Crete. Former kings of Pontus had undoubtedly used Galatian mercenaries, but possibly Greeks too. Metrodorus, *phrourarchos* of

[117] For the date of the death of Ariarathes V, see Appendix I p. 173. Justin (*Epit.* 37.1.4) calls Ariarathes' widow Laodice, but has clearly confused her with Laodice the wife of Ariarathes VI. Nysa's regency is attested numismatically by a joint issue of Nysa and Ariarathes: see B. Simonetta, *The Coins of the Cappadocian Kings* (1977) 29.

[118] Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 41; T. Reinach, *L'histoire par les monnaies* (1902) 133.

Amaseia, is recorded in an inscription making a dedication on behalf of Pharnaces (*OGIS* 365). It is not certain that he was a mercenary: the Greek cities of Amisus and Sinope were part of the kingdom of Pontus in Pharnaces' reign, and Metrodorus may have been a citizen of one of these.[119] Pharnaces' general Leocritus appears more clearly to have been a Greek mercenary officer.[120] Another Greek commandant, Meriones, is attested at Amaseia in the second century.[121] Euergetes appears to have been the first Pontic king to recruit mercenaries in the Aegean.[122] Dorylaus, as we saw, enjoyed the title *tōn philōn* of the king, thus providing a glimpse of the court titulature so characteristic of other Hellenistic monarchies.[123] Dionysius the Athenian, son of Boethus, honoured in an inscription from Delos, is described as *tōn timōmenōn philōn* of Euergetes, argued convincingly by Robert to indicate that he was an official of the Pontic administration.[124] Similarly Alcimus son of Menophilus, the strategos honoured at Abonuteichus, was "un fonctionnaire du pouvoir royal."[125] The process of hellenization in the court probably began quite early—the royal coins are, from the beginning, clearly the work of the best Greek artists[126]—and speeded up considerably with the capture of Sinope, and moving there of the capital from Amaseia.[127] In the time of Mithridates Eupator the degree of

[119] G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (1935) 186.

[120] E. Olshausen, *AncSoc* 5 (1974) 159-160 says that it is quite possible that Leocritus and Metrodorus were Iranians who had taken Greek names, but the natural assumption is that they were Greeks.

[121] *Studia Pontica* vol. 3 (1910) 116 No. 95a.

[122] He may have got the idea of recruiting in Crete from Prusias II of Bithynia, who was on good terms with the city of Aptera (*OGIS* 341), or from Eumenes II of Pergamum who had formed a treaty of friendship and alliance with most of the Cretan cities in 183 (SIG^3 627). The Cretan connection established by Euergetes was important in Eupator's time (App. *Sic.* 6).

[123] See G. Corradi, *Studi ellenistici* (1929) 318-343; E. Bikerman, *Institutions des Séleucides* (1938) 40-50; Chr. Habicht, *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 45 (1958) 1-16. For the most detailed analysis of the extensive material from Egypt, see L. Mooren, *The Aulic Titulature in Ptolemaic Egypt. Introduction and Prosopography* (1975); *La hiérarchie de cour Ptolémaique. Contribution à l'étude des institutions et des classes dirigeantes à l'époque hellénistique* (1977).

[124] Durrbach, *Choix* 170 No. 100; *Ins. Delos* 1559. See L. Robert, *JS* July/September 1978, 152 n. 6.

[125] Robert (supra n. 124) 153. The man honoured was not Daippus, son of Criton, as stated by Robert, but Alcimus: Daippus was the priest proposing the motion to honour Alcimus.

[126] See G. K. Jenkins, *Ancient Greek Coins* (1972) 231-2.

[127] Rostovtseff, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 217-8 thought that Pharnaces was responsible for moving the capital to Sinope, but we do not know this for sure. Strabo (12.3.11 c. 545) tells us that Mithridates VI Eupator was born and brought up there, which implies that it became the capital, at the latest, in the time of Mithridates V Euergetes. On the other hand, Strabo also says that as well as being born there, Eupator honoured Sinope especially, and treated it as the metropolis of his kingdom—as if to say that previous kings had not treated it as their metropolis.

hellenization appears to increase dramatically. This is probably a reflection not only of Eupator's efforts in that direction, but also of the increase in number and variety of sources.

Internally then the kingdom, or at least the court, was becoming more Greek, and in foreign policy too Euergetes made an effort to present a thoroughly philhellenic face to the outside world. The king himself, as well as his councillor Dionysius, was honoured on Delos: Aeschylus the son of Zopyrus, and the gymnasiarch Seleucus dedicated statues in his honour.[128] That of Aeschylus is undated, but Seleucus was gymnasiarch in 129/8. We learn more of Euergetes' relationship with Delos from the royal tetradrachm recently discussed by L. Robert, the first royal issue of Euergetes to be discovered.[129] The obverse bears, as usual, a portrait of the king, but for the first time it is somewhat less than realistic with the hair more flowing and romanticized than that of his predecessors' royal coin portraits. The idealized portraits of Eupator's coins (see below p. 97 ff.) previously appeared to mark an abrupt change from the realistic to the idealized, but Euergetes' tetradrachm provides evidence of an intermediate stage. The type of the obverse is a standing male figure, facing-left and holding against his left arm a bow. On his outstretched right arm stands a female figure with a "forme schématique" on either side, and the inscription on three vertical lines reads "of king Mithridates Euergetes". Robert has identified the figure convincingly as a statue of Apollo Delios, against the suggestions of M. Karamesini-Oikonomidou.[130] The figures on the right arm are the three Graces. Here again, as with the type chosen by Mithridates IV and Laodice of Zeus and Hera, is a proclamation of Hellenism, but this time with special reference to the benefactions bestowed by Euergetes on Apollo's sacred island. The choice of type was inspired by his donations to Apollo, and the statues set up by Seleucus in 129/8, and by Aeschylus, were a recognition of these donations. The issue of Attic tetradrachms of Socrates/Dionysodorus in 116/115 (according to the low chronology of the New Style silver coinage of Athens) also depicting Apollo Delios, was

[128] For Aeschylus see *Ins. Delos* 1557. The dedication is in honour of *Bas[il]ea Mithradatē[n]/Basileōs Pharnakou*. The epithet 'Euergetes' is missing, but the inscription can only refer to Mithridates Euergetes. For the dedication of Seleucus see *OGIS* 366; Durrbach, *Choix* 168 No. 99; *Ins. Delos* 1558.

[129] Robert (supra n. 124) 151-163.

[130] Robert (supra n. 124) 155. Karamesini-Oikonomidou's suggestions were: Apollo holding a small figure of triple Hecate; a local divinity associated with Apollo; a representation of Mithridates Euergetes in the form of Apollo, holding triple Hecate: see *Stēlē. Tomos eis Mnēmē Nikolaou Kontoleontos* (Athens 1978) 149 (I was unable to acquire this volume, but the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris kindly provided me with a French translation of the article).

perhaps a celebration of the young Eupator's generosity to the island following in his father's footsteps of devotion to its god Apollo. Robert restores to respectability the coin of Euergetes reported by Foy Vaillant, but ever since regarded, for little apparent reason, as a fake. In spite of Vaillant's inaccurate description, Robert identifies the reverse type again as Apollo Delios. On this coin there is also a year date—173. By the Seleucid era this comes to 140/139 and by the Bithynian era 125/4. Either will fit as both are well within the limits of Euergetes' reign, although it does seem more likely to me that Euergetes was using the Seleucid era.[131] The donations of Euergetes do not have to have been close chronologically to Seleucus' session as gymnasiarch: one particular donation might have been, but it is likely that this devotion to Apollo was a feature of most of Euergetes' reign. For the reverse types chosen by the kings of Pontus for their coins seem to have remained the same throughout their reigns: one king used fundamentally the same type, sometimes with slight variations.[132] So if we picture Euergetes coining in the early part of his reign, then it was probably Apollo Delios who appeared on the reverse.[133]

In the reign of Mithridates Euergetes we may identify three strands of foreign policy. First, a clear pro-Roman strand inherited from his predecessor. Euergetes was a loyal and valuable "friend" of Rome, and he reaped a considerable reward in the acquisition of Phrygia. Whether Rome's removal of Phrygia from Pontic control at the beginning of Eupator's reign reflects Senatorial suspicion of Euergetes' power and activities, is a matter for speculation.[134] As Glew points out, the likeliest explanation may be that that Senate was simply taking advantage of a kingdom that was now controlled only by Euergetes' widow and two young sons.[135] Even allowing, however, for a degree of Roman unease,

[131] See McGing (supra n. 15).

[132] Mithridates IV is not really an exception: he used one type for coins issued on his own behalf (Perseus) and one type for joint issues with Laodice (Hera and Zeus).

[133] In connection with Euergetes' philhellenic policy, it is important to point out that L. Robert, *BCH* 59 (1935) 459-465 (= *OMS* vol. 1 p. 518-524) has been incorrectly cited as suggesting that the king Mithridates mentioned in the inscription listing equestrian victors from Chios, is Mithridates Euergetes. M. Segre, *Il Mondo Classico* 2 (1932) fasc. 2 p. 1-4 restored the name of the Pontic king in lines 12-13 (and in three other places) as *Basileus [Mithradatēs]/[Basile]ōs Mithradatou Eu[pator]*. Robert rightly questioned the strange position of the nominative *Eu[pator]*, and restored instead *Eu[ergetou]*. The result is the same as Segre's version—the victor is still Mithridates Eupator—but the reading is better. Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 1531 n. 111 misinterpreted Robert, and thought he was suggesting that the victor was Euergetes. Robert (supra n. 124) 153-4 n. 11 has himself corrected Rostovtseff, but Magie, *RRAM* 1091 n. 49 made the same mistake, and it has recently occurred again in Olshausen (supra n. 13) col. 417.

[134] For discussion of the possibilities, see Glew (supra n. 116) 383 ff.

[135] Glew (supra n. 116) 385-6.

there is no evidence whatsoever to support the theory that Rome was behind the assassination of Euergetes, and that the Senate expected Euergetes to bequeath his kingdom to Rome.[136] Second, there was an equally clear philhellenic strand. This was not new, but the emphasis on Apollo and Delos seems to have been. The third strand is his policy towards his neighbours in Anatolia, and it is less clear. The evidence for his involvement in Paphlagonia and Cappadocia is clouded by the attempts of Mithridates Eupator to justify his own occupation of these countries, but it does seem that Euergetes was expansionist. He may have hoped to expand his kingdom under cover of a pro-Roman policy, perhaps gaining for Pontus the same sort of position held by Pergamum and Rhodes in the first half of the second century, but his methods were much more subtle than those of Pharnaces: he attempted to extend Pontic influence rather than territorial boundaries. If he did overrun Cappadocia and inherit Paphlagonia he chose not to occupy them.[137] Phrygia was an unexpected addition to the kingdom. It was a reign of consolidation and fairly quiet expansion of influence—a good preparation for the next ambitious king, although hardly to the same extent that the reign of Philip II of Macedon prepared the way for his son Alexander, a comparison that has recently been made.[138]

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[136] Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 39; Rostovtseff, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 226. Strabo (10.4.10 c.477) implies that Euergetes' wife was involved in the assassination: when Dorylaus heard of Euergetes' death and discovered that the succession had passed to his widow and her children, he despaired of the situation in Pontus, and remained in Crete.

[137] Orosius (5.10.2) calls Euergetes king not only of Pontus, but also of Armenia, but the statements of Strabo (12.3.1 c.541; 12.3. 28 c.555) show clearly that Eupator was the first to become master of Armenia Minor.

[138] Olshausen (supra n. 13) col. 417.

CHAPTER TWO

EUPATOR ON THE COAST OF THE BLACK SEA

Mithridates V Euergetes was assassinated probably in 120 when his son Eupator was about thirteen years old.[1] It is not clear what testimentary arrangements Euergetes had made, whether he specified a joint rule of his widow and eldest son Eupator (Memnon 22.2), with perhaps their second son too (Strabo 10.4.10 c.477), or just a regency for his wife until Eupator should be old enough to govern for himself.[2] At any rate Euergetes' queen took over the power, and according to Justin (*Epit.* 37.2), to secure her own position she tried to do away with Eupator: the boy's guardians, we are told, forced him to ride and throw the javelin from a dangerous horse, and when this failed to kill him, they turned to the surer means of poison. He was on his guard, however, and took antidotes to build up an immunity, which worked so effectively that he was unable to kill himself by poison at the end of his reign (App. *Mith.* 111). To avoid these attempts on his life Eupator removed himself from the court and lived in the woods, where he grew strong by hunting, and became used to all hardships. He allegedly lived this life in the wild for seven years, before returning to assume the government twenty three years before the outbreak of the first war with Rome (Just. *Epit.* 38.8.1). A period of thirty years between his accession and the First Mithridatic War is approximately correct, but a seven year absence of Eupator cannot be accepted. We know from two Delian inscriptions that he had assumed control of his kingdom by 116/115: Dionysius, the gymnasiarch of that year, erected statues in honour of king Mithridates Eupator and

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[1] Eupator died in the consulship of Cicero, 63 (Dio. Cass. 37.10; Oros. 6.6.1), having ruled for fifty-seven years and lived for sixty-eight or sixty-nine (App. *Mith.* 112. Pliny, *HN* 25.6 says that he ruled for fifty-six years). Strabo (10.4.10 c.477) gives his age as eleven when he succeeded to the throne, Memnon (22.2) says thirteen. A tentative argument in favour of Memnon can be made: the existence of comets, which according to Justin (*Epit.* 37.2) appeared in the year of Eupator's birth and of his accession to the throne, can, it is said, be confirmed by Chinese sources, and dated accurately to 134 and 120: see J. Finegan, *Handbook of Biblical Chronology* (1964) 241-245. Finegan interprets Justin's phrase *genitus est* as "conceived" rather than "born": the comet of 134 marked Eupator's conception, and his birth occurred in 133, thus making him thirteen in 120.

Eutropius (6.12) says that Mithridates lived to be seventy-two (also Oros. 6.5.7) and ruled for sixty years. A fragment of Sallust's *Histories* (Sall. *H.* 5.5. Maur.), probably referring to Eupator, has him living to be over seventy, and according to Dio (36.9.4), he was already over seventy in 68.

[2] See Janke, *Memnon* 38-9.

his brother Mithridates Chrestus.[3] There is no mention of their mother, so presumably by this stage she had been removed from her position.[4] Mithridates Chrestus' association with his brother also soon came to an end: Eupator had him killed, and thus was left to rule alone. Further doubt has been cast on the seven years in the wild, by the observation of Pfeiler that municipal Pontic coinage seems to bear Mithridates' portrait from the very beginning, and throughout the early years, of his reign.[5]

Although it is quite possible that Euergetes' widow did try to remove her son, it is also very likely that Justin (or Pompeius Trogus) has misunderstood the Iranian nature of Eupator's education. Herodotus (1.136) lists the three basic elements in the education of a Persian noble—"to ride and shoot and tell the truth", precisely the virtues attested epigraphically for the fourth century Lycian dynast Arbinas.[6] Putting a boy on a mettlesome horse can hardly be regarded as a convincing attempt to do away with him, and the story transmitted in Pompeius Trogus, or his source, was probably supposed to be, not the description of a serious attempt on Eupator's life, but the demonstration of the young king's excellence in one of the fundamental skills demanded of a noble Persian. Eupator was a fine horseman—he could drive a sixteen-horse chariot (Suet. *Ner.* 24), and even at the end of his life was able to ride one thousand stades in a day (App. *Mith.* 112)—and he set great store by this skill. How important it was to him may be gauged by the story of Alcaeus of Sardis who outstripped him on the racecourse and paid for his success with his life (Plut. *Pomp.* 37).[7]

The incident with the horse also brings to mind immediately the story of Alexander and Bucephelas (Plut. *Alex.* 6). Eupator himself, as we shall see, fostered a comparison of himself with Alexander, and Justin's story should probably be understood as reflecting just such a comparison, as well as an Iranian reality.

Mithridates' withdrawal for seven years may be a mixture of two further Iranian elements. First, Widengren has shown that it is a recognisable feature of Iranian royal legend for the king to spend part of his youth secreted away in the country.[8] Second, the Persians clearly attached great importance to hunting, an exercise which provided an excellent training in riding and shooting, two of the educational elements

[3] Durrbach, *Choix* 187 No. 113; 189 No. 144; *Ins. Delos* 1560, 1561. See also *SEG* XXXVIII, 668.
[4] Eupator probably killed her (App. *Mith.* 112; Sall. *H.* 2.75 Maur.), although Memnon (22.2) says that he merely threw her in prison where she died.
[5] H. Pfeiler, *GNS* 18 (1968) 75-6.
[6] See L. Robert, *CRAI* 1975, 328-9; *JS*, Jan/Jun 1978, 6.
[7] For Alcaeus see L. Robert, *REA* 62 (1960) 342-346 (= *OMS* vol. 2 p. 858-862.)
[8] G. Widengren, *Hommages à Georges Dumézil. Collection Latomus* vol. 45 (1960) 230-231.



Map 2

listed in Herodotus and the Arbinas inscription. Hunting strengthened, toughened and taught one to endure all types of hardship (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.10; 1.4.7-9; 8.1.38): this is exactly what Eupator learnt in his years of living in the wild (Just. *Epit.* 37.2.9). So once again Justin's story may be a misunderstanding of Persian culture. It may also once again reflect a comparison with Alexander. For although there is no direct parallel in the Alexander story to Mithridates' seven year absence, we do learn that Alexander went on strenuous hunting expeditions after the capture of Persepolis to keep fit and strong (Plut. *Alex.* 40), and that when he had leisure he would sometimes spend the day in hunting (Plut. *Alex.* 23).

The story of Eupator's birth is yet another example of Iranian influence, and probably of Alexander imitation. The greatness of Mithridates' reign was foretold by the heavens (Just. *Epit.* 37.2.1-3): in the year of his birth[9] and of his accession to the throne, a comet appeared for seventy days, filling a quarter of the whole sky and blocking out the sun, symbolizing the length of the king's life, the extent of his conquests and his eclipse of the might of Rome.[10] When still a baby, Eupator was struck by lightning, an incident supposed to provide the explanation for his surname Dionysus, whose mother Semele had been struck by lightning when pregnant with him (Plut. *Mor.* 624 B, *Quaest. conv.* 1.6.2). The star and thunderbolt are part of Iranian royal legend,[11] and the association of Eupator with lightning also serves to recall the similar experience of Alexander the Great, whose mother Olympias had a dream that her womb had been struck by lightning (Plut. *Alex.* 2.2). These stories of Eupator's birth and early life indicate the importance of the Iranian tradition in the Mithridatid family, and at the same time reflect a comparison between the king and his great predecessor Alexander.

Justin (*Epit.* 37.3.1; 38.7.4-5) implies that the first enterprise of the young king was his conquest of the Crimea and Bosporan kingdom. Reinach dated the start of these northern campaigns to 110, but based his date on the evidence of Justin discussed above, that Eupator had been in exile for seven years and took over the administration of Pontus twenty-three years before the first war with Rome.[12] The young king perhaps

[9] Or possibly conception: see above n. 1. p. 43.

[10] For the interpretation of the symbolism, see Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 42 n. 2.

[11] See G. Widengren in *The Sacral kingship. Numen* Suppl. 4 (1959) 248; Widengren (supra n. 8) 232-3.

[12] Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 58. For further discussion of the date, see E. Salomone Gaggero, *Sandalion* 2 (1979) 138 ff. who suggests 109 for the beginning of these operations: she assumes that Mithridates' northern campaigns marked the start of his conflict with Rome, which Justin says lasted for forty six years. D. B. Shelov, *VDI* 1980, No. 153, 29-30 argues for the opinion expressed many years ago by Niese and Meyer, that Mithridates took control of Colchis *before* his intervention in Chersonesus and the Bosporan kingdom, but there seems to be no reliable way of sorting out the relative chronology.

waited until he had removed his mother and brother and thus established himself firmly on the throne, before he embarked on the northern expedition: one might suggest 115 or 114, but precision is unattainable. The immediate cause of his interference in the region was the invitation from the people of Tauric Chersonesus for him to become their protector (Strabo 7.4.3 c.309). In the Hellenistic period the relationship of the Greek cities situated on the north and west coasts of the Black Sea with the various native groups surrounding them is not very well documented in the literary sources. It is therefore difficult to follow in detail, although the outline is made fairly clear by epigraphical evidence: the basic trend was for these cities to come under increasing pressure from their barbarian neighbours.[13]

In the north Black Sea area the pressure was caused by waves of Sarmatians arriving in southern Russia and forcing the Scythians against the Greek cities of the coast.[14] During the third century, although the situation may not have been critical,[15] there is evidence of distress. The famous citizen oath of Chersonesus contains great detail about the preservation of the city (*IOSPE* 1^2 401), giving the clear impression that danger threatened, an impression confirmed by another third century inscription from Chersonesus which refers to "great dangers" apparently caused by "surrounding barbarians" (*IOSPE* 1^2 343). As we have already seen (above p. 30) the Chersonitans were definitely under threat from *oi parakeimenoi barbaroi* in the time of Pharnaces I of Pontus (*IOSPE* 1^2 402). The main danger was posed by Scilurus and the Scythian kingdom which he established in the Crimea with forts at Palacium Chabum and Neapolis (Strabo 7.4.7 c.312). About the middle of the second century Olbia succumbed to him, as coins of the city inscribed with his name indicate.[16] Olbia was further north than Chersonesus and was seriously threatened by the barbarians at an earlier date than Chersonesus. The lengthy and important inscription honouring Protogenes in thanks for his extensive services to the city in a time of dire need, provides clear information on Olbia's situation in the third century (*IOSPE* 1^2

[13] For the Greek cities of the Black Sea, see especially Ch. M. Danov, *RE* Suppl. 9 (1962) col. 1055-1140. For a general discussion of the epigraphical material from these cities, see D. M. Pippidi (ed.), *Actes du VIIe congrès international d'épigraphie grecque et latine. Constantza 9-15 Septembre 1977* (1979)—the contributions of G. Mikhailov (p. 263-271), E. Popescu (p. 273-292) and Ju. G. Vinogradov (p. 293-316).

[14] See Rostovtseff, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 227; V. F. Gajdukevic, *Das Bosporanische Reich* (German ed. 1971) 303.

[15] Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 675.

[16] See B. Pick, *Die antiken Münzen Nord-Griechenlands. Dacien und Moesien* vol. 1 (1898) Pl. XII No. 4-5.

32).[17] There is a grave shortage of money, corn, fortifications, a lack which Protogenes repeatedly fills with great generosity. Barbarians are at the gates, the most feared apparently being the Galatians and Sciri (side B lines 6-9). Also a certain king Saitaphernes and the Saii (perhaps his tribe) are demanding money (Side A lines 10-12; 35-36). It looks as if the Olbians were buying off Saitaphernes, or perhaps paying protection money. Their problems, like so many Greek cities of the northern and western Euxine were similar to those facing the people of Byzantium, described by Polybius (4.45). Although very advantageously situated as regards the sea, Byzantium was in constant danger on the landward side from the Thracians. If they fought and defeated one group, there would be many more groups to deal with. If, on the other hand, they bought off their enemies, this would be a sign of weakness and would call down more enemies on their head. They possessed fine fertile land which produced a rich harvest, but often had to suffer its loss to the barbarians. The situation became even worse with the arrival of Commontorius and his Celts. The Byzantines were now forced to pay an annual tribute of forty talents, until relieved of this burden by Cavarus, a friendly king of the Thracians who defeated the Celts. It seems that the Byzantines had a special protector in Cavarus (Pol. 8.22.1). As we shall see, acquiring such a protector was one solution to the barbarian threat adopted in a number of cities.

The Greek cities themselves could only be of limited help to each other.[18] Especially in the second century they were probably too preoccupied with their own troubles to be of significant help to anyone else. There were usually friendly relations between them, as shown for instance by the Istrian inscriptions honouring people from Tomis, Callatis, Apollonia, Olbia, and the connections of Callatis with Olbia, Chersonesus, Tyras, Apollonia.[19] They could, however, find time to fight with each other occasionally: Byzantium fought with Callatis and Istrus over the possession of Tomis in about 260 (Memnon 13), and even in the less secure first half of the second century, we have an inscription recording how Hegesagoras and the Istrians helped Apollonia in a war against Mesembria.[20] But these were rare occurrences: the barbarian threat

[17] The date of the Protogenes inscription has been much discussed: see Gajdukevic (supra n. 14) 310-311 n. 5 for bibliography. See also *SEG* XXIX, 717.

[18] For the relations of the Greek cities of the west coast of the Black Sea with each other and with their barbarian neighbours, see Ch. M. Danov, *Klio* 38 (1960) 75-80; *ANRW* II, 7.1 (1979) 106-113; D. M. Pippidi, *Epigraphische Beiträge zur Geschichte Histrias in hellenistischer und römischer Zeit* (1962) chs. 1-7; *I Greci nel Basso Danubio* (1971) chs. 4-5; *Scythica Minora* (1975) chs. 1-13.

[19] See D. M. Pippidi, *I Greci nel Basso Danubio* (1971) 115-116.

[20] *IGBulg.* 1^2 388 bis. See also D. M. Pippidi and E. M. Popescu, *Dacia* NS 3 (1959) 235-258; *Bull. Epig.* 1961 No. 419 p. 187 ff.

could scarcely allow the extravagance of Greek fighting Greek. The best protection for the Greeks lay not in each other, but in alliances or agreements with native kings and princes, either to keep away one group of barbarians or to play one group off against another.

We saw how the Olbians had made an arrangement with Saitaphernes, paying him to leave them in peace, or in the hope of gaining his protection; how Chersonesus enjoyed the protection of the Sarmatian rulers Gatalus and Amage against the Scythians (above p. 30), and then turned for help to (or accepted it from) Pharnaces I of Pontus; how Odessus too struck up a relationship of some sort (it is not clear what) with Pharnaces. Odessus and the other Greek cities of the west coast had to endure the same sort of pressure from the interior as exerted on Byzantium or Chersonesus, and they too looked for native protection. Mesembria made a treaty with the Odrysian king Sadalas in about 250.[21] At about the same time, Apollonia came to some sort of arrangement with King Cotys who sent his son Rhaiscuporis to Apollonia, perhaps to guarantee the agreement.[22] At the end of the third century Istrus made an agreement to pay an annual tribute to the Getan king Zalmodegicus, in return for the restoration of Istrian hostages and some sources of revenue.[23] Probably barbarian pressure prevented the Istrians from harvesting their land satisfactorily, as there appears to have been difficulty with their food supply. We have an inscription from the second half of the third century honouring a certain Diogenes who had lent money to the Istrians so that they could buy corn,[24] and another from the end of the third or beginning of the second century, honouring a priest of the Gods of Samothrace, for, among other services, helping with the corn supply.[25] A little later, in the first half of the second century, a Carthaginian merchant is honoured by Istrus for importing corn under favourable terms.[26] Help did not have to come from barbarian kings on-

[21] *IGBulg.* 1^2 307. See also *SEG* XXX, 71. For the date, see H. Bengtson, *Historia 11* (1962) 26. Mesembria seems to have got on reasonably well with its immediate native neighbours, at least in the first half of the second century: see *IGBulg.* 1^2 312 and Ch. M. Danov, *Klio* 38 (1960) 77-8.

[22] *IGBulg.* 1^2 389. See D. M. Pippidi, *Scythica Minora* (1975) 44.

[23] D. M. Pippidi, *Epigraphische Beiträge zur Geschichte Histrias in hellenistischer und römischer Zeit* (1962) 77; Pippidi (supra n. 22) 44. At the end of the second or beginning of the first century Tomis was getting on very badly with what appear to be its Getan neighbours: see *SIG*^{3} 731.

[24] D. M. Pippidi, *Histria* 1 (1954) 476 No. 1; *Bull. Epig.* 1955 p. 239; Pippidi (supra n. 23) 24.

[25] For this priest and, in general, for the problems of the Istrian corn supply, see Pippidi (supra n. 22) 111 ff.

[26] S. Lambrino, *Dacia* 3-4 (1927-1932) 400 No. 3; *Bull. Epig.* 1962 No. 237 p. 189; Pippidi (supra n. 22) 42.

ly: it is likely that Antiochus III came into contact with the cities of the western Euxine, and was possibly even allied to them.[27] If this is so, they were, of course, left to their own devices again after 190.

Probably shortly after their arrangement with Zalmodegicus the Istrians entered a similar kind of relationship with king Rhemaxus, as we learn from the Agathocles inscription.[28] Zoltes and his Thracian bands have been raiding Istrus, and Agathocles was involved in the various attempts to ward them off, both with money and by force of arms. Agreements were made, but Zoltes proved faithless and continued to raid. Protection, however, was found in king Rhemaxus and his son Phradmon (?) with whom the Istrians made an arrangement to pay a *phoros* in return for military aid. Recourse to foreign kings was, then, a well tried expedient among the Greek cities of the Euxine.

Towards the end of the second century the pressure became too much to withstand. Strabo tells us that Chersonesus was sacked by the barbarians and forced to invite Mithridates Eupator to become its *prostates* (7.4.3. c.308). Mithridates was already planning an expedition against "the barbarians who live beyond the isthmus as far as Borysthenes and the Adriatic", and was delighted to send an army to Chersonesus to fight Scilurus and his sons. He also took the opportunity to establish himself as master of Bosporus, its king Paerisades willingly handing over the kingdom to him. We hear little of barbarian troubles affecting the kingdom of Bosporus and its rulers the Spartocids in the third and second centuries, but evidently they were not immune: Paerisades handed over his kingdom to Mithridates because he was no longer able to hold out against the barbarians, who kept on increasing the amount of tribute he had to pay (Strabo 7.4.4 c.310); he too had apparently been trying to buy them off.[29] Strabo fills in some details about particular incidents in Mithridates' northern undertaking, but the most important evidence for the course of events is the inscription of the Chersonitans honouring Diophantus son of Asclepiodorus, the general of Eupator (*IOSPE* 1^2 352; *SEG* XXX, 963). There is another relevant inscription which appears to be connected with the negotiations between Eupator and Chersonesus (*IOSPE* 1^2 349): it records the honours bestowed on an ambassador of

[27] See Bengtson (supra n. 21) 28. He suggests that *IGBulg.* 1^2 388, which mentions an Antiochus, should be connected with Antiochus III rather than, as usually assumed, Antiochus II.

[28] S. Lambrino, *Revue des Études Roumaines* 5-6 (1960) 180-217; Bengtson (supra n. 21) 21-28; *Bull. Epig.* 1962 No. 234 p. 187; Pippidi (supra n. 22) 31-55. For the problems of Istrus in the first century, see *SIG*^{3} 708, the Aristagoras inscription.

[29] For the history of the Bosporan kingdom in this period, see especially E. H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks* (1913) 569-591; Rostovtseff, *CAH* vol. 8 ch. 18; R. Werner, *Historia* 4 (1955) 412-444; Gajdukevic (supra n. 14) ch. 9.

Mithridates by the people of Chersonesus. There is no indication in the text of the date, but Latyschev thought it should be dated before the First Mithridatic War, and sensibly suggested that the ambassador brought the reply of Mithridates to the Chersonitans' request for help.[30] Mithridates was an obvious potential source of help, given Pharnaces' alliance with the Chersonitans. There is no evidence that Pharnaces was called on to fulfill the promise of help contained in the alliance, and now was the time to see if Pontus really was going to be of any use. It was unusual for a Greek city to get help from so far afield,[31] but the theory was much the same as before: Mithridates would function, it was hoped, as Zalmodegicus or Rhemaxus had done for the Istrians, or Cavarus for the Byzantines.

To return to the Diophantus inscription, we learn that immediately on arriving, Diophantus had to face a sudden attack from Palacus, Scilurus' successor. He was victorious in the battle, thus making Mithridates the first foreign invader to conquer the Scythians (lines 1-9). This, it seems, was a source of considerable pride to Mithridates, as representatives of the two branches of his family (the two branches to which he laid claim) the Macedonians and the Persians, had previously failed in their encounters with northern enemies. With some exaggeration and looseness in the term "Scythians", Mithridates was able to claim that Cyrus and his army had been wiped out by them, and Darius, Philip and Alexander's general Zopyrion routed (Just. *Epit.* 37.3.2; 38.7.3). After his victory, Diophantus subdued the neighbouring Tauri and founded a town, perhaps the Eupatorium mentioned by Strabo (7.4.7 c.312).[32] From here he made his way to the Bosporan kingdom where, we are told vaguely, "he achieved many great things in a short time" (line 11). Minns held that this meant Diophantus "reduced" Bosporus,[33] but his activity there

[30] It is not impossible that the ambassador brought an offer of help from Mithridates. Strabo's account implies that the Chersonitans took the initiative, but it could be that Mithridates had made overtures.

[31] Pontus was only apparently far away. As we have seen (above p. 3), there were close ties between the north and south coasts of the Black Sea, and indeed the cooperation between Chersonesus and Mithridates Eupator is itself another demonstration of those ties.

[32] This is the natural interpretation of lines 9-10, favoured by the Roberts, *Bull. Epig.* 1974 No. 381 p. 249: *tous de paroikountas Taurous u[ph e]auton poiēsamenos kai polin epi tou topou sunoikixas*. Pippidi (supra n. 19) 192-198; (supra n. 22) 72-74, maintains unconvincingly that *oi paroikountes Tauroi* is not to be translated as "neighbouring Tauri", but rather as "the Tauri who live on the land as *paroikoi*" (*paroikos* = "individu appartenant à une catégorie de la population privé de droits civiques", or in a technical sense, "habitant de la *chora* d'une cité grecque reduit à cultiver la terre pour le compte des propriétaires de *kleroi*"). According to Pippidi, *polin epi tou topou sunoikixas* means that Diophantus granted the *paroikoi* the right to constitute a polis.

[33] Minns (supra n. 29) 519.

was not necessarily military. Zebelev argued persuasively that Diophantus was on a diplomatic mission, and that the *megalas praxeis* refer to his success in persuading Paerisades to cede his power to Mithridates willingly.[34] Diophantus returned to Chersonesus and after enrolling the best citizens, set off into the interior of the Crimea, the heart of Palacus' territory. Here he received the submission of Chabum and Neapolis, and nearly everyone became subject to Mithridates. His job appeared to have been completed, and he was honoured suitably by the Chersonitans. He then returned to Pontus. This was the end of Diophantus' first campaign (line 15).

After an interval of unspecified length the Scythians displayed their natural fickleness and revolted. So Diophantus was again dispatched with an army, and although winter was approaching, he set out against the forts which he had previously reduced. He was hindered by bad weather and turned to the coast where he took Cercinitis and The Walls, and laid siege to Kalos Limen. That these places were in enemy hands gives an indication of how serious the situation of Chersonesus was. For in the citizen's oath (*IOSPE* 1^2 401, lines 8-9; 20-31) they are part of Chersonitan territory, or at least under its jurisdiction. It is perhaps at this stage that some Mithridatic forces were put under siege by the Scythians in the vicinity of Chersonesus (Strabo 7.4.7 c.312). The incident is not mentioned in the Diophantus inscription, but is placed most easily at a time when Chersonesus were being pressed closely by the Scythians, that is, at the beginning of the first or second campaign of Diophantus. Palacus thought the time right to launch a major attack and this time, as well as his own troops, he had the help of Sarmatian allies—the Roxolani under the leadership of Tasius. They were fifty thousand strong, but no match for the six thousand well-armed, well-trained troops of Diophantus who won a resounding victory with great slaughter of the enemy (Strabo 7.3.17 c.306). While Diophantus was facing this larger threat, it seems that the Chersonitans managed to capture Kalos Limen.[35]

The winter had previously prevented Diophantus from assaulting the Scythian strongholds of Chabum and Neapolis, but at the beginning of the following spring he lost no time in doing so. Although the inscription is badly preserved at this point (lines 30-31), the Pontic army clearly was victorious, forcing some of the Scythians to flee and others to come to terms. Most of the Crimea was now under Mithridatic control, and was

[34] S. Zebelev, *REG* 49 (1936) 23-25. See also *SEG* XXX, 963.

[35] This is Latyschev's interpretation of *IOSPE* 1^2 353, a fragmentary inscription apparently honouring some Chersonitan citizens for defeating the Scythians and capturing *tou*]*s kata Kalon Li*[*mena*] *topo*[*u*]*s*.

to remain so until Mithridates' death, but there was still work for Diophantus in the Bosporan kingdom. He made his way there, evidently without his army, and arranged matters to the advantage of Mithridates: [*katasta*]*samenos kai ta en*[*th*]*ina kalōs kai sumpherontōs Basilei Mithradatōi Eu*[*patori*]. Zebelev again argued convincingly that this does not refer to military activity, but to the conclusion of Diophantus' diplomatic mission begun during his first visit. When he had returned to Pontus after the first campaign, he had informed Mithridates of Paerisades' willingness to abdicate his power, and now Diophantus was making the formal arrangements for what had been agreed earlier.[36] While he was still there the Scythians of the party of Saumacus revolted and killed Paerisades who had reared Saumacus (*ton men ekthrepsanta auton*).[37] The revolutionaries also plotted against Diophantus—at least one of their aims was probably to break the agreement between Paerisades and Mithridates[38]—but he escaped the danger on a boat sent to him by the Chersonitans. At the beginning of spring he was ready to move against the rebels after receiving help from Mithridates. He took Theodosia and Panticapaeum, punished those responsible for the revolt, captured Saumacus and sent him to Pontus. The conquest of the Crimea was now complete: it was part of the kingdom of Mithridates.

Although we know that Diophantus' campaigns came at the beginning of Mithridates' reign, we do not know how many years they spanned and indeed the chronology of the rest of Mithridates' expansion in the Euxine, both of territory and of influence, is mostly unknown. I will not, therefore, attempt to give a chronological account of this expansion, but will examine it geographically, first the land on the Asian side of the Cimmerian Bosporus, then Olbia and the cities down the west coast of the Black Sea[39] and finally the east coast south of Gorgippia.

[36] Zebelev (supra n. 34) 27.

[37] There has been a great deal of discussion, especially in Soviet scholarship, on the nature of the revolt and its participants, centering on the interpretation of the phrase *ton men ekthrepsanta auton*: see most recently Z. W. Rubinsohn, *Historia* 29 (1980) 50-70, who traces carefully the history of the scholarship on the subject. Zebelev (supra n. 34) 30-35 argued that Saumacus was a slave (*threptos*) of Paerisades and that the revolt was a slave revolt, but Rostovtseff's objections to Zebelev were strong, and his interpretation more plausible (*SEHHW* 769; 1512 n. 35): Saumacus was a young Scythian noble brought up in the Bosporan court, perhaps as a hostage. In support one could cite the parallel in *IG Bulg.* 1^2 389 where just such a young prince, Rhaiscuporis, is sent by his father as a hostage to Apollonia. A. I. Nemirovskij, in T. V. Gamkrelidze (ed.), *Études Byzantinol* (1978) 63-70 suggests that *ton men ekthrepsanta auton* refers to Paerisades rearing not Saumacus, but Mithridates Eupator. This surely goes against the Greek.

[38] See Gajdukevic (supra n. 14) 313.

[39] For the Mithridates' relations with the peoples and cities of the west coast of the Black Sea, see especially E. Salomone Gaggero, *Pulpudeva* 2 (1978) 294-305.

When Neoptolemus was active in the northern Euxine we do not know. We hear of him gaining an unusual double victory over the barbarians on the Bosporan straits—once in a naval battle during summer, and once in a cavalry engagement during winter when the straits were frozen (Strabo 2.1.16 c.73; 7.3.18 c.307). Just before the Second Mithridatic War, in about 84, the tribes of this area revolted (App. *Mith.* 65), and Mithridates went to war with them, but it was only after the fighting with Murena that he had time to subdue them (App. *Mith.* 67). Neoptolemus' activity may have been connected with the quelling of this revolt,[40] or perhaps with an earlier period, shortly after Diophantus' campaigns: having gained control of the Crimea, Mithridates may well have wanted to extend his power to the Asian side of the Bosporus, where the rulers of the Bosporan kingdom used to hold sway with the title of kings of the Sindians.[41] This area did not necessarily come under Pontic control through Diophantus' victories, and if not, it was perhaps acquired by Neoptolemus.

The coinage from these new dominions reflects clearly Mithridates' influence. The grazing stag/Pegasus of his own royal issues (see below p. 97 ff.), and of issues from Amisus, Chabacta and Taulara (see below p. 94 n. 34) can be seen on the coins of Panticapaeum and Chersonesus.[42] The ivy surround on the reverse of his royal issues appears at Panticapaeum, Phanagoreia and Gorgippia.[43] An eagle standing on thunderbolt and cornucopia between star-crested caps of the Dioscuri were common types among the cities of Pontus during Mithridates' reign (see below p. 94 n. 30; 96 n. 44): they both appear at Panticapaeum and Chersonesus, and the latter at Gorgippia. Similarly the widespread Pontic type of thyrsus and cista (see below p. 96 n. 40) is copied at Panticapaeum and Gorgippia.[44] Mithridates' portrait has been recognised on the issues of several western Euxine cities (see below p. 58), and in the Bosporan kingdom too, one Dionysus head is clearly intended as a portrait of the king.[45] Furthermore, the presence in northern, and indeed other, Black Sea cities of large quantities of Pontic municipal issues from Eupator's reign, also attests the king's new power in the region.[46]

Neoptolemus perhaps operated west of the Crimea, as well as east. There was a tower bearing his name at the mouth of the river Tyras (Strabo 7.3.16 c.306), although it may date from earlier times.[47] Mithridates did extend his sway in this area at least as far as the city of Olbia. The most important evidence for his relations with Olbia is an inscription of its people honouring a ship captain from Amisus (*IOSPE* 1^2 35). The inscription is fragmentary and its interpretation much disputed, but the most satisfactory version is that of Wilhelm: the captain was entrusted with a shipment of royal supplies for the Armenians settled in Olbia by Mithridates; he set out from Amisus and stopped in at Sinope to pick up an embassy of Olbians and perhaps the help (*boētheian*? 1.10) they had been sent to seek. He brought his shipment through safely in very difficult conditions.[48] It is known that Mithridates did resettle some of his subjects from Pontus in the Bosporan kingdom,[49] so it is not unlikely that there should be Armenians in Olbia, but Wilhelm does not attempt to explain why they were there.[50] One natural assumption is that the Armenians were not just randomly resettled, but constituted a Pontic garrison. That Olbia would have needed a garrison for protection is demonstrated vividly by the inscription honouring Niceratus, who died in defence of the city against the constant threat of the enemy (*IOSPE* 1^2 34; *SIG*^{3} 730). The exact date is not clear, but the end of the second century or beginning of the first is usually assumed.[51] It therefore probably refers to the

[40] See B. Niese, *RhM* 42 (1887) 569.

[41] See Rostovtseff, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 570-1.

[42] Minns (supra n. 29) pl. 4 No. 22; pl. 6 No. 6-7; K. Dittrich, *Antike Münzen aus Olbia und Pantikapaeum* (1959) 109; A. N. Zograph *Ancient Coinage* (*BAR* Suppl. series 33 (ii) 1977. Transl. of 1951 Russian ed.) Part ii pl. 36 No. 20; pl. 43 No. 8; V. A. Anokhin, *The Coinage of Chersonesus IV Century B.C.-XII Century A.D.* (*BAR* Suppl. series 69, 1980) 52.

[43] Dittrich (supra n. 42) 106: Zograph (supra n. 42) pl. 43 No. 5-7.

[44] For discussion of the dating of the eagle on thunderbolt types at Panticapaeum and Chersonesus, see Anokhin (supra n. 42) 53. For thyrsus and cista types see Zograph (supra n. 42) pl. 36 No. 19; pl. 43 No. 20; *CAH* vol. of plates IV p. 4 No. [m] and [n]. For cornucopia between caps of the Dioscuri, see Zograph (supra n. 42) pl. 41 No. 20 (see also No. 21 which lacks the cornucopia); Dittrich (supra n. 42) 101; Anokhin (supra n. 42) 51. Zograph dated the issue of these coins in the Bosporan kingdom to the end of the third or beginning of the second century. D. B. Shelov, *Coinage of the Bosporus VI-II Centuries B.C.* (*BAR* Suppl. series 46, 1978) 171, argues more convincingly for the end of the second century. The Dionysian heads of Bosporan and Chersonitan coins may also reflect Pontic municipal coinage (see below p. 96 n. 40): see Anokhin (supra n. 42) 51-2.

[45] See Zograph (supra n. 42) 300.

[46] See Zograph (supra n. 42) 298.

[47] See Diehl, *RE* 7A (1943) col. 1850.

[48] A. Wilhelm, *Klio* 29 (1936) 50-59; L. Robert, *Hellenica* 2 (1946) 58-60. For other interpretations see E. Belin de Ballu, *Olbia. Cité antique du littoral nord de la mer noire* (1972) 133-4. Before Wilhelm's analysis, Minns (supra n. 29) 464, following Rostovtseff, identified two separate services of the Amisene captain. The first was rendered in 71/70 when Lucullus was besieging Sinope. The Armenians were the Cilician troops lent by Tigranes to defend Sinope, where the ship captain was bringing supplies. The second service fell in the last moments of Mithridates' reign when the Olbians wanted support against their Getan enemies, and when Mithridates would have been glad of Olbian help in his projected invasion of Italy. Later Rostovtseff favoured Wilhelm's version—see Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 1559 n. 13.

[49] See M. Rostovtseff, *Iranians and Greeks in Southern Russia* (1922) 149.

[50] Zebelev suggested that the Armenians were from the town of Armena near Sinope, not from Armenia: see *Bull. Epig.* 1944 No. 134 p. 218. An unpublished epigram from Chersonesus, however, concerning the commander *Armeniōn toxotōn* of Mithridates' troops, argues against Zebelev's theory: see *Bull. Epig.* 1980 No. 339 p. 421.

[51] Pippidi (supra n. 19) 135. Latyschev placed it in the first decades of the first century.

situation in Olbia just before the city came under the protection of Mithridates, although it may date from the period between the dissolution of Mithridates' protectorate and the sack of the city by the Getae towards the middle of the first century (Dio Chrys. 36.4-5).[52] Either way, the Olbians will no doubt have been looking for just the sort of protection that other cities of the Euxine were seeking. It is also difficult to attach with confidence a date to the inscription honouring the Amisene sea captain. If the Armenians are from Armenia Maior then presumably it will date from the time after the marriage of Mithridates' daughter Cleopatra to Tigranes, as it seems only from then that Pontus and Armenia were allies.[53] The term "Armenians", however, could just as easily apply to inhabitants of Armenia Minor, over which Mithridates gained contol probably before his alliance with Tigranes. As for a lower date, the end of Mithridates' reign is the only limit. For although in 72/1 M. Terentius Varro Lucullus launched a successful campaign against the cities of the western Euxine supporting Mithridates,[54] the cities further north were not affected: Tyras remained in Eupator's sphere during the last decade of his life, and, therefore, it is to be assumed that Olbia did also.[55]

Coins of Olbia show possible Mithridatic influence. The king's own features are thought to be represented on the obverse of two Olbian issues.[56] Another issue depicts on the reverse a dolphin between caps of the Dioscuri with eight-rayed star in field.[57] As already noted (above p. 54), a cornucopia between caps of the Dioscuri is a common type for the municipal coins of Pontus issued under Mithridates Eupator's rule, and the dolphin of the Olbian issue has in fact a very similar shape to the cornucopia. It is, however, the circulation "in enormous quantities at Olbia" of Pontic municipal issues which points most clearly to the city's inclusion in Mithridates' realm.[58]

The next major Greek city south round the coast from Olbia was Tyras. Of its relations with Eupator we have only numismatic evidence,

[52] For the later date, see Belin de Ballu (supra n. 48) 135.

[53] This was probably 95: see below p. 78. The marriage took place at the time of Tigranes' first expulsion of Ariobarzanes from Cappadocia, and just before Sulla's restoration of Ariobarzanes. J. Seibert, *Historische Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen in hellenistischer Zeit* (1967) 120 dates the marriage to 93, assuming, as was generally accepted at the time, that Sulla's intervention was in 92. See below p. 78 n. 45.

[54] Broughton, *MRR* vol. 2 p. 118.

[55] See Zograph (supra n. 42) 176: coins of Tyras copy Pontic types dated to the last decade of Eupator's rule. Lucullus' assault therefore cannot have reached as far as Tyras. D. B. Shelov, *VDI* 1962 No. 2 p. 95-102 disagrees, and redates the Pontic-influenced coins of Tyras, which he thinks revolted from Mithridates' domination in about 72/1.

[56] Belin de Ballu (supra n. 48) 134-5; Zograph (supra n. 42) 205. Neither coin, however, seems well enough preserved to enable a confident identification with Eupator.

[57] Pick (supra n. 16) pl. 10 No. 31; Minns (supra n. 29) 486.

[58] See Zograph (supra n. 42) 209.

but is has been assumed from this evidence that it too came under his authority.[59] The reverse type of an eagle standing on a thunderbolt is the common Pontic type already seen at Panticapaeum and Chersonesus.[60] The cornucopia of another coin is also suggestive of Pontic influence.[61] North of Tyras, Olbia was under Mithridatic control, and the cities further south on the coast were the king's allies: Tyras too undoubtedly recognised Mithridates' authority.

Epigraphical evidence provides the clearest information on Eupator's influence among the Greek cities of the Rumanian and Bulgarian coast of the Euxine. In an inscription from Apollonia, the people and council honour Epitynchanon, son of Menecrates, a man from Tarsus who commanded the troops sent by Mithridates to Apollonia *epi tēn* [*s*]*uṇ*[*machian*(?)[62] It appears then that Mithridates had a *summachia* with Apollonia, and indeed this is probably the nature of his relationship with the other cities of this coast. The troops are for the city's protection, but against which enemy we do not know. Danov thought the help was sent in 72/1 when M. Lucullus was campaigning against these cities, but Magie suggested it should be connected with Mithridates' earlier expansion across the Euxine.[63] As the inscription records thanks to Epitynchanon for his presumably successful help, and as Lucullus sacked Apollonia, it seems unlikely that the inscription refers to the time of the siege of the city by Lucullus. Whatever the date of the inscription, it is probable that the alliance at least was concluded before the First Mithridatic War. For on the eve of that war Pelopidas was able to claim that Mithridates had acquired many nations, among them "the Greeks bordering on the Euxine, and the barbarian tribes beyond them" (App. *Mith.* 14). Among the named barbarian allies are Bastarnae and Thracians,[64] and to have such allies as these, Mithridates must have been active on the west coast of the Black Sea. When the Social War broke out in Italy, we in fact hear of Mithridates being engaged in war with Bastarnae and Sarmatians (Plut. *Mor.* 324 C, *De fort. Rom.* 11). It would be natural then that he had struck up a relationship with the Greek cities of this area in the course of his activities there. Apollonia was not his only ally. As

[59] See Shelov (supra n. 55) 95-102, analysed by E. Belin de Ballu, *L'histoire des colonies grecques du littoral nord de la mer noire* (1965) No. 156, and K. Golenko, *Chiron* 3 (1973) 492 No. 88. See also Zograph (supra n. 42) 176.

[60] Minns (supra n. 29) pl. 1 No. 6; Zograph (supra n. 42) pl. 38, No. 19.

[61] Minns (supra n. 29) pl. 1 No. 5.

[62] See Ch. Danov, *JOAI* 30 (1936) Beibl. 89; *IGBulg.* 1^2 392, where the last word is read *s*]*unṃạc̣ḥi̟*[*an*.

[63] Magie, *RRAM* 1092 n. 53.

[64] App. *Mith.* 15; 41; Just. *Epit.* 38.3.6; Dio Cass. 36.9.3-4.

Eutropius (6.10) reported, M. Lucullus also captured Callatis,[65] Parthenopolis, Tomis, Istrus, Burziaon. Mesembria too succumbed (*IG Bulg.* 1[2] 314a) and presumably other places such as Odessus and Dionysopolis. Coins confirm the alignment of some of these cities with Mithridates. A Lysimachean type stater from Istrus bears on the obverse a portrait with features clearly modelled on Mithridates, or one of his immediate family.[66] Tomis has the same.[67] The Mithridatic portrait on coins from Callatis is supplemented in some cases by a monogram made up of the letters *MITH*, interpreted by Pick as *Mithradates*.[68] Mithridates' portrait disguised as Heracles has long been recognised on coins of Odessus, and recently of Mesembria.[69] Byzantium and Chalcedon may also have come under the protectorate of Mithridates, if it is correct to identify his portrait on coins of those cities.[70]

On the eastern side of the Euxine below the territory of Gorgippia was a long inhospitable stretch of coast which Mithridates never completely subdued or won over to his side. Between the Second and Third Mithridatic Wars he did launch an attack against "the Achaeans beyond Colchis", but was defeated heavily (App. *Mith.* 67). And in 66 when he was making his way by land around the east coast of the Euxine he had to defeat the Achaeans to get through their land (App. *Mith.* 102). That at least is what Appian says, but he is probably not clear as to who the Achaeans were. For he himself also calls them allies of Mithridates during the Third Mithridatic War (*Mith.* 69), and Strabo says that in 66 the Achaeans welcomed Mithridates, but that the Zygi were the serious obstacle to his march (11.2.13 c.496). Both Strabo and Appian agree that the Heniochi were friendly. In spite of some confusion over the disposition of the Achaeans, it is clear that there was a stretch of this coast which did not recognise Mithridates.

Further down the coast was the land of Colchis which Mithridates annexed to his Empire (App. *Mith.* 15). Justin implies that he got possession of it peacefully by inheritance (Epit. 38.7.10): *extrema regna hereditatibus propter munificentiam adquisita possideat, Colchos, Paphlagoniam, Bosphorum.*

[65] The date of the *Foedus* between Rome and Callatis (*CIL* 1[2] 2676) is usually accepted as 71: for bibliography, see Salomone Gaggero (supra n. 39) 300 n. 31.

[66] Pick (supra n. 16) No. 482 pl. 2 No. 27; *CAH* vol. of plates IV p. 4 No. [i]. Pick suggested that the portrait bears the features of Mithridates' son Ariarathes.

[67] Pick (supra n. 16) No. 2474-2486 pl. 21 No. 6; *CAH* vol. of plates IV p. 4 No. [h]. In this case, Pick thought that the features of the portrait belonged to Mithridates' son Pharnaces.

[68] Pick (supra n. 16) 92.

[69] Odessus—see, for instance, Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 66; Pick (supra n. 16) No. 2171-2176. Mesembria—see M. J. Price, *NC* 8 (1968) 6; pl. 2 No. 16; pl. 3 No. 21.

[70] *CAH* vol of plates IV p. 4 No. [f] and [g]; Price (supra n. 69) 9; pl. 4 No. 26.

But this is only a claim made by Mithridates in a speech justifying his behaviour: Memnon (22.3) states directly that the area was subjected by force. From then on, the country was always administered by one of the king's *philoi* who functioned as *uparchos kai dioikētēs*: one of these was Strabo's mother's uncle, Moaphernes (Strabo 11.2.18 c.499).[71] East beyond Colchis he seems to have tried to enter friendly relations with the Parthians, Medes and Iberians (Memnon 22.4). Pelopidas was able to claim in 89 that Arsaces of Parthia was an ally of Mithridates (App. *Mith.* 15), but we hear no more about Medes or Iberians, so probably his efforts failed. Arsaces at no stage plays any role in Mithridates' affairs, and if he did become an ally it must have been a purely formal move, and practically speaking meaningless. Mithridates and Tigranes were still trying to win him to their side during the fight against Lucullus in the Third Mithridatic War (see below p. 154).

Strabo tells us that Mithridates acquired the coast east of Trapezus up to Colchis (12.3.1 c.541) and that he became master of Armenia Minor when Antipater ceded it to him (12.3.28 c.555). The whole coast then from Amastris to Dioscurias was part of the kingdom of Pontus. Indeed almost the whole circuit of the Black Sea was either under direct Pontic control or in the case of the western Euxine, part of a Pontic protectorate.[72] Only the coast of Bithynia, and part of the wild north east coast above Colchis remained entirely outside the Pontic sphere.

The benefits Mithridates reaped from all this were extensive. Polybius, when discussing the favourable position of Byzantium mentions in general terms the trade of the Black Sea (4.38.3-6): the best and most plentiful supply of cattle and slaves came from the countries of the Euxine, and luxuries too—honey, wax, preserved fish. Corn was a two-way trade: sometimes it was exported from the area, sometimes imported (Olive oil and wine were the major products imported by the Euxine). More specifically we learn from Strabo (7.4.6 c.311) that Mithridates exacted an annual tribute from the Crimea and adjoining area in Asia of one hundred and eighty thousand medimni of corn and two hundred

[71] The only coins issued in Colchis showing Mithridatic influence are bronze issues of Dioscurias, with an obverse type of the two caps of the Dioscuri surmounted by stars (there is no cornucopia between them): see Minns (supra n. 29) pl. 9 No. 28; *Sylloge Numorum Graecorum. The Royal Collection of Coins and Medals. Danish National Museum Bosporus-Pontus* (1944) No. 102-3; D. M. Lang, *Numismatic Notes and Monographs* 130 (1955) 11 No. 5. There have been frequent discoveries, however, of the municipal issues of Pontus, as well as some silver tetradrachms and gold staters of Mithridates himself: see Shelov (supra n. 12) 42-3.

[72] See Eutropius 5.1: *Mithridates enim, qui Ponti rex erat atque Armeniam minorem et totum Ponticum mare in circuitu cum Bosporo tenebat ...*

talents of silver.[73] Almost certainly the cities of the west coast also paid a *phoros* for their protection as they had done for previous protectors.

The amount of corn produced by the Chersonese for Mithridates is not surprising: it was an area of extremely rich corn production, and in the times before Mithridates, a major granary for the Greeks (who also got their salted fish from the Euxine). The corn trade between the Bosporan kingdom and Athens had been famous.[74] In the time of Demosthenes, Athens imported half of its corn, four hundred thousand medimni, from the Bosporus (Dem. *Lept.* 29-40). In 359 B.C. when Athens was suffering a famine, king Leucon of the Bosporus sent so much corn to the city that there was a surplus sufficient to make a profit of fifteen talents. Strabo (7.4.6 c.311) mentions a consignment of two million, one hundred thousand medimni sent by Leucon, which was perhaps the amount he sent during the famine. In the fifth century Mytilene got corn from the Euxine (Thuc. 3.2.2), and in the fourth century too we hear of one hundred thousand medimni being exported to Mytilene (*SIG*^{3} 212). The best place for catching fish suitable for salting appears to have been the mouth of the Greater Rhombites river on the east side of the sea of Azov (Strabo 11.2.4 c.493), but from the depiction of fish on coins, it was evidently an important industry in such places as Olbia, Tyras, Istrus.[75] A major source of food, then, was one of the most important gains of Mithridates' expansion in the Black Sea.

The acquisition of Colchis was also of crucial importance for the abundance of ship-building materials it produced—it became his major source for such material (Strabo 11.2.17-18 c.498-9)—and probably also for its food supply, gold resources and position on the Transcaucasian trade route which linked the Black Sea basin with the countries of the East.[76] Armenia Minor provided a large cavalry force for the Pontic army (App. *Mith.* 17), and indeed it is in the huge supply of manpower to which Mithridates now had access that the chief advantage of his Euxine expansion lay. When Polybius mentioned the abundance of slaves from the Black Sea he was probably referring to Thrace,[77] although slaves were exported from Tanais on the Sea of Azov (along with hides and other products of nomadic peoples—Strabo 11.2.3. c.493). It was not, however, with slaves that Mithridates manned his army, but with subject nations, allies and mercenaries, and these he gained in abundance.[78] Repeatedly troops from east, west and north of the Black Sea are numbered among his forces. He was called in at the beginning to protect Chersonesus and Bosporus from the Scythians and their allies, and had to fight and defeat them. They were now his subjects, and he had the right to conscript them into his armies: *A Scythia exercitum venire iubet* (Just. *Epit.* 38.3.7). The Scythians are called his allies too: probably Mithridates left native princes with considerable independence to rule their tribes, and it was more tactful to call them allies; or perhaps only some Scythian tribes were directly subject to him, and the others were "allies". At the end of his reign when the loyalty of his supporters was wavering, he sent his daughters as wives to Scythian princes to try to secure their help (App. *Mith.* 108). Scythian manpower was important to him.[79]

The most powerful peoples to the north and north west of the Black Sea were the Sarmatians and Bastarnae.[80] Diophantus had defeated the Roxolani, one of the Sarmatian tribes, in his Crimean campaigns, but when the Social War broke out in Italy, Mithridates was still involved in war with Sarmatians and Bastarnae (Plut. *Mor.* 324C, *De fort. Rom.* 11). As well as force, he seems to have used diplomacy to win them to his side: *Mithridates intellecto quantum bellum* (First Mithridatic War) *suscitaret legatos ad Cimbros alios ad Gallograecos et Sarmatas Bastarnasque auxilium petitum mittit. Nam omnes has gentes ... variis beneficiorum muneribus iam ante inlexerat* (Just. *Epit.* 38.3.6). His efforts were at least partially successful: Pelopidas named Bastarnae and Sarmatians among Mithridates' allies before the first war with Rome (App. *Mith.* 15), and one hundred Sarmatian cavalry are reported to have distinguished themselves early in this war (App. *Mith.* 19). In connection with the Third Mithridatic War the Bastarnae are called the bravest of his troops and specific Sarmatian tribes are named among his forces.[81]

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[73] There were 48 *choinices* in one medimnus, and at Athens a *choinix* was one man's corn ration for a day. So 180,000 medimni was a substantial amount, enough, for instance, to supply an army of 50,000 men for nearly half a year.

[74] Minns (supra n. 29) 574-5; Gajdukevic (supra n. 14) 97-100. For the corn trade in the fourth century, see S. M. Burstein, *Historia* 27 (1978) 428-436.

[75] For the fishing industry of the Euxine, see Danov (supra n. 13) col. 959-985.

[76] See Shelov (supra n. 12) 32-35. In spite of scanty evidence, Shelov argues that Colchis constituted a very important link in the economic and politico-military system of the Pontic empire throughout Mithridates Eupator's rule: it was one of his principal bases in the struggle for pan-Pontic domination.

[77] See Gajdukevic (supra n. 14) 101 n. 16.

[78] It is, however, difficult to distinguish easily between mercenaries and subjects: see G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (1935) 188; M. Launey, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques* vol. 1 (1949) 423.

[79] Just. *Epit.* 38.7.3; App. *Mith.* 13; 15; 41. There is some doubt about the nationality of the native prince who plotted to kill Lucullus. In App. *Mith.* 79 he appears as Olcabas the Scythian, but in Plut. *Luc.* 16 he is Olthacus, prince of the Dandarians. App. *Mith.* 117 also mentions an Olthacus chief of the Colchians. Appian seems to be confused, and probably Plutarch is to be followed.

[80] For the number and size of the Bastarnae see Pol. 25.6.

[81] App. *Mith.* 69. See also App. *Mith.* 71 where the Bastarnae are the first troops to break into the harbour at Chalcedon. Cf. Memnon 27.7.

Mithridates cultivated good relations with the Celtic tribes of the Danube (App. *Mith.* 15; 109), and Bituitus, who helped him commit suicide, is described as "leader of the Celts" (App. *Mith.* 111), so it appears that Mithridates did have some Celtic troops in his army. The Thracians of the Danube region and of the Rhodope and Haemus mountains also fought on Mithridates' side (App. *Mith.* 13; 15; 69), but they were mercenaries who changed sides according to where their own advantage lay (Dio. Cass. 36.9.3-4). They did, however, serve a useful purpose on occasions: at the instigation of Mithridates they swept through northern Greece and Epirus as far as Dodona which they sacked (Dio. Cass. fr. 101.2).[82] Conversely, in the First Mithridatic War one of the Thracian kings Sadalas sent a force under his subject Amatocus to help Sulla.[83] The Balkan Coralli also fought on Mithridates' side (App. *Mith.* 69).

On the other side of the Black Sea, by the time of the First Mithridatic War Pelopidas claimed to have had at Pontic disposal "all those from around the Tanais (Don) ... and Maeotic lake (Sea of Azov)" (App. *Mith.* 15). The only specific references to the presence of Maeotians in the Pontic army are the story of Olthacus who plotted against Lucullus and who was prince of the Dandarians, a Maeotian tribe (above n. 79), and the mention of the Agari, probably a Maeotian tribe, who were said to have accompanied Mithridates because of their knowledge of poisons, and who cured him when he was wounded in battle against Fabius during the Third Mithridatic War.[84] The evidence for the loyalities of the coastal tribes between Gorgippia and Dioscurias is, as we have seen (above p. 58) confusing, with Appian calling the Achaei both enemies and allies, while according to Strabo they were friendly and the Zygi hostile. The Heniochi, both agree, were friendly and counted as allies in the Third Mithridatic War (App. *Mith.* 69). Curiously the Colchians are not mentioned specifically among Mithridates' troops, although they were a warlike race (*ethnos areimanes*—App. *Mith.* 15). It is unlikely that he did not enlist them. Armenia Minor, as we have seen, provided ten thousand mounted troops, a cavalry force of great importance.

[82] The Livian Epitomator reports raids of the Thracians before and during the First Mithridatic War (*Epit.* 70; 74; 76; 81; 82). Salomone Gaggero (supra n. 39) 302 suggests that this may reflect an alliance between Mithridates and the Thracians, and was perhaps part of his preparation for war with Rome.

[83] See M. Holleaux, *REG* 32 (1919) 320-337 (= *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* vol. 1 [1938 reedited 1968] 143-159). Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 941; 1558 n. 8 confused Amatocus and Sadalas and reversed their roles.

[84] Strabo (11.2.11 c.495) calls the Agri a Maeotian tribe, but these are probably the same as the Agari whom Appian calls a Scythian tribe (*Mith.* 88).

The only evidence we have for Roman reaction to Mithridates' activities in the Black Sea before the Third Mithridatic War is in Memnon (22.3-4), a problematic passage:[85]

> (3) He also subdued in war the kings around the river Phasis right up to the regions beyond the Caucasus, and increased his kingdom, and was very boastfully puffed up with pride. (4) Because of this the Romans were suspicious of his intentions, and decreed that he should return to the kings of the Scythians (*tois Skuthōn basileusin*) their ancestral kingdoms. He modestly (*metriōs*) complied with their demands (or, he was sufficiently compliant with their demands), but he befriended as allies the Parthians, the Medes, Tigranes the Armenian, the Scythian kings (*tous skuthikous basileis*) and Iberia.

The problem is twofold—a strange repetition of the Scythian kings in the two sentences of section (4), and more important, Memnon's statement that Mithridates complied with the Roman demand to return to the Scythians their ancestral kingdoms: it seems clear that he did not do so.[86] There have been two main solutions put forward. Orelli suggested that for *tois Skuthōn basileusin* in the first sentence of section (4) one should read *tois Phrugōn basileusin* on the grounds of known Roman interference in Phrygia.[87] Rome's interference, however, lay in taking Phrygia away from Pontus and annexing it, not in giving it back to Phrygian kings, whoever they might be: Phrygia had been part of the kingdom of Pergamum bequeathed by its last king Attalus III to Rome, and then given by Rome to Mithridates V Euergetes of Pontus, and it is difficult to see who these Phrygian kings were, to whom the country was to be returned. Orelli's reading must be rejected. Appian (*Mith.* 10) echoes the Roman suspicion, mentioned in Memnon, of Mithridates' large empire, and suggests that this suspicion may have led the Senate to order Mithridates out of Cappadocia—an order which we know he obeyed. If the text of Memnon is to be changed, then the reading *tois Kappadokōn basileusin* would make more sense than Orelli's.[88] There may not,

[85] In the last sentence of this passage, Jacoby, *FGrHist.* 434 F. 22.4 confusingly reads *tous Phrugōn basileis* for the manuscript reading *tous skuthikous basileis*, mistakenly taking up at this point in the text Orelli's reading for the first sentence of section (4), which was *tois Phrugōn basileusin* instead of the manuscript *tois Skuthōn basileusin*. R. Henry, *Photius Bibliothèque IV* (Budé, 1965) 73 repeats Jacoby's error.

[86] See Janke, *Memnon* 42.

[87] P. Desideri, *Athenaeum* 51 (1973) 247 n. 148 supports Orelli's reading, but his support is based on an incorrect interpretation of Mithridates' involvement in Phrygia: see B. C. McGing, *GRBS* 21 (1980) 35-42.

[88] Rome initially offered feedom to the Cappadocians, but the country remained a monarchy, so that an order to Mithridates to evacuate it could be interpreted by Memnon as an order to return it to its kings. We also know that Eupator was ordered to quit Paphlagonia, which he partioned with Nicomedes III of Bithynia in 108 (Just. *Epit.* 37.4). He may eventually have obeyed this order (see below p. 69): *tois Paphlagonōn basileusin* would therefore also be a possible, and better reading than Orelli's.

however, be any need to emend the text. Janke argues that Roman interest in so remote an area as Scythia is unlikely, and that the command in Memnon refers in fact to Asia. What has happened is that the excerptor of Memnon has run together the Senate's order to Mithridates to evacuate his Asian conquests with the remarks which Memnon made about Mithridates' conquests in the north: the result, as it appears in the text, is an order to return Scythia to its rulers, an order which did not exist.[89] Janke is probably right, although caution is needed in assessing the likelihood of Roman interference in Scythia. The west coast of the Black Sea, because of its proximity to Macedonia and Illyria, was certainly an area of concern to Rome. We know from the Cnidus version of the Pirate Law that the Caeneic Chersonese was annexed to the province of Macedonia by T. Didius at the end of the second century,[90] and M. Lucullus attacked Mithridates' Greek allies on this western Euxine coast in 72/1 (above p. 58). So it is by no means impossible that the Senate would have interfered in Scythia, especially if one accepts the picture of aggressive Roman imperialism recently painted by Harris.[91] But Janke's analysis is convincing for the following reasons: Mithridates did not return Scythia to its kings; Asia Minor was undoubtedly of central concern to Rome and her clients in a way that Scythia probably was not; and it is in Asia Minor that other sources document precisely the sort of Roman interference and Mithridatic compliance that Memnon records for Scythia.

Pharnaces had drawn attention to the possiblity of expansion in the northern Euxine.[92] Mithridates Eupator, immediately on taking up his throne, followed in his grandfather's first tentative steps across the water from Pontus, and created an enormous power in and around the Black Sea. It was no doubt a process spread over many years, but although there were revolts and developments in the area throughout Eupator's reign, probably much of the territorial expansion had been completed, and many of the king's alliances and ties established, before the time of the First Mithridatic War. An important feature of Mithridates' activities in the Black Sea is the role he plays as the champion of Greeks against barbarians, a stance he was to adopt later in Asia Minor and Greece, in his struggle against Rome.

[89] Janke, *Memnon* 42-3.

[90] See M. Hassall, M. Crawford and J. Reynolds, *JRS* 64 (1974) 204 col. 4 lines 5-31. For this inscription see also A. Giovannini and E. Grzybek *MH* 35 (1978) 33-47; G. V. Sumner, *GRBS* 19 (1978) 211-225.

[91] W. V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC* (1979).

[92] Shelov (supra n. 12) 28 points out other possible precursors of Eupator's Black Sea ambitions: the Bosporan king Eumeles, and Callatis' attempt to establish hegemony in the west Black Sea area.

The Romans and Mithridates' neighbours in Asia Minor had for the moment little immediate cause for concern, but the acute observers among them will have recognised a young king of great ambition and growing power, and will have suspected that trouble might be in store.

CHAPTER THREE

EUPATOR IN ASIA BEFORE THE FIRST WAR WITH ROME

Paphlagonia and Galatia

Justin (*Epit.* 37.3. 4-5) tells us that early in his reign Mithridates journeyed incognito through Asia and Bithynia, gathering information on the state of affairs and planning for his future victories. On his return to Pontus he was met with news of the birth of a son to his sister-wife Laodice, who now tried to kill him: she had been unfaithful in his absence believing him dead, and considered his removal her only pledge of safety. If the journey did take place, and there is no particular reason to disbelieve the story, it must have been before the joint Pontic-Bithynian invasion of Paphlagonia in 108/7.[1] We may place it in about 109 or 108.[2]

The annexation of Paphlagonia was Mithridates' first major enterprise in Asia Minor. Little is known about Paphlagonia at this time. It had been one of the areas overrun by Pharnaces, who was forced to give it up on his defeat in 179, and to pay an indemnity to its king Morzius (Pol. 25.2; see above p. 29). This Morzius had fought for the Gauls against Manlius Vulso in 189 (Livy 38.26.4), but had somehow avoided trouble from such an attachment. Another of its kings, Pylaemenes—a dynastic name according to Justin (*Epit.* 37.4.8)—helped the Romans in their war against Aristonicus (Eutropius 4.20.1; Oros. 5.10.2). As for the organisation of the country, Strabo (12.3.41 c.562) says that a little before his own time, Paphlagonia was governed by several rulers in spite of its small size. Thus it was not a unified kingdom and should prove an easy victim for Mithridates. There was also a hope that because of its insignificance, annexation of it would be of little concern to the Romans, who were at this time fully occupied in fighting Jugurtha.

Any expansion in Asia, however, was likely to be viewed with disfavour and suspicion by other rulers of the region. In this matter the failure of Pharnaces was instructive. He had tried to expand his kingdom in one major war against all his neighbours together, and he discovered

[1] The evidence for this date is the Bithynian coin issue of the era year 190 (i.e. 108/7) which displays on the reverse a palm, signifying, it is to be presumed, the victorious enterprise in Paphlagonia: see *Recueil Général* 231 No. 40.

[2] As most scholars have done, approximately, since Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 86 n. 1 suggested 108: see for instance F. Geyer, *RE* 15 (1932) col. 2166 (107); G. Daux, *BCH* 57 (1937) 81 (107); G. Vitucci, *Il regno di Bitinia* (1953) 99 n. 2 (108).

that his resources were not equal to the task of dealing with such a large coalition. A more cautious approach, progressing step by step, might produce more favourable results. Moreover, an effective way of weakening the potential opposition was to take as an ally its most powerful member. Pharnaces enjoyed the support of Mithridates of Armenia, but this was hardly a significant addition to this strength. Indeed the failure to acquire a strong ally can be seen as an important factor in his defeat. The most powerful kingdom after Pontus in western Asia Minor at this time was Bithynia, and it was here that Mithridates Eupator looked for an ally.

The two kingdoms had many similarities. Both came into existence at about the same time and grew under the guidance of kings from non-Greek families.[3] Both royal lines projected themselves as philhellenic, minting coins with Greek types,[4] founding cities and naming them after the founder in good Hellenistic fashion, and developing many and varied ties with the Greek World.[5] Both pursued policies favouring one or other of the main Hellenistic monarchies, Pontus leaning towards the Seleucids, Bithynia unswervingly hostile to them, but allied with the Ptolemies and Antigonids. Representatives of both worked steadily for the expansion of their kingdoms through a mixture of diplomacy and war. In the course of the second century it had become increasinly clear that Rome was the leading power in the Mediterranean, and even if Pontus was more toward the fringe of the Roman world, she had, like Bithynia, been drawn into the friendship and alliance of the Senate and Roman people. In spite of the similarities of development, however, political relations between Pontus and Bithynia had for the most part been far from cordial. It is true that Pharnaces helped Prusias I against Pergamum (above p. 24), but Prusias II soon after joined the coalition against Pharnaces' subsequent aggression (above p. 27-8), and later, in another war against Pergamum, was opposed by Mithridates IV (above p. 34-5). Furthermore Nicomedes III seems to have had some dispute with Mithridates V Euergetes over an unspecified matter, as we learn from a

[3] For the early history of Bithynia, see F. Geyer, *RE* 17, 1 (1936) col. 493-499 (Nicomedes I-IV); Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 566-571; 662-3; 826-9; Magie, *RRAM* 311-320; Vitucci (supra n. 2); Ch. Habicht, *Hermes* 84 (1956) 90-110; *RE* 23, 1 (1957) col. 1086-1127 (Prusias I and II); *RE* 10a (1972) col. 387-397 (Ziaelas); col. 448-455 (Zipoetes); B. F. Harris, *ANRW* II, 7.2 (1980) 857 ff.

[4] After Nicomedes II, Bithynian coins become standardized: the obverse continues to bear the portrait of Nicomedes II, and the reverse always depicts a standing Zeus, possibly Zeus Stratios: see P. Pollak, *ANSMusN* 16 (1970) 47. For the coins of the Bithynian kings see Recueil Général.

[5] The greatest Bithynian Philhellene was Nicomedes III (c.127-94), who acquired the surname Euergetes because of his generosity (Licinianus p. 22 Criniti): see Magie, *RRAM* 1119 n. 46.

fragment of Caius Gracchus' speech against a Lex Aufeia.[6] It was not, then, a history of cooperation which brought the two powers together now in alliance, but mutual interest. The power and wealth of both kingdoms must have made each appear the obvious ally to the other, with Bithynia's strategic position at the mouth of the Euxine perhaps a particular attraction to Pontus, and the expanding domains of Pontus in southern Russia a proof for Bithynia of Pontus' increasing strength. And if Pharnaces' war in Asia had shown Eupator the difficulty of direct annexation without substantial allied support, the wars of Prusias I and Prusias II will have done the same for Nicomedes.[7] In addition, there was perhaps a common interest between the two kings in their dissatisfaction with Rome. At the very beginning of his reign Mithridates had been deprived by the Senate of Phrygia, given to his father as a reward for services rendered in the war against Aristonicus. This loss annoyed him.[8] In 104 when Nicomedes was asked by Marius to send troops to help fight the Germans, he refused, saying that all his subjects had been enslaved through the exactions of the publicani (Diod. 36.3).[9] This dates to a time after the alliance with Mithridates, but the conditions referred to may well have existed at an earlier date.

In 108 the allied forces of Nicomedes III Euergetes and Mithridates VI Eupator invaded Paphlagonia, which was then divided up between the victors.[10] At the time, Rome was at war with Jugurtha, and in 110 A. Postumius Albinus had suffered a humiliating defeat at his hands (Sall. *Jug.* 37). It has been suggested plausibly that Rome's continued inability to defeat Jugurtha may have inspired Mithridates and Nicomedes in

[6] H. Malcovati, *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta Liberae Rei Publicae* vol. 1 (ed. 4 1976) 187-8. This speech is usually dated to about 123: see, for instance, Vitucci (supra n. 2) 98; Broughton, *MRR* vol. 1 p. 515 n. 3. A. H. J. Greenidge and A. M. Clay, *Sources for Roman History 133-70 B.C.* (ed. 2 1960) 29 suggest a date of 124. Magie, *RRAM* 1043 n. 27 was right to point out that the cause of the dispute is unlikely to have been competition between Nicomedes and Mithridates for the prize of Phrygia.

[7] For the unsuccessful wars of Prusias I and II against Pergamum, see especially Ch. Habicht, *Hermes* 84 (1956) 90-110.

[8] For the taking of Phrygia from Pontic control see Just. *Epit.* 38.5.3; App. *Mith.* 11; 12; 13; 15; 56. T. Drew-Bear, *Historia* 21 (1972) 75-87, followed most recently by W. V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 B.C.* (1979) 152-154, argued that Phrygia was annexed by the Senate on the death of Mithridates V Euergetes in 120. It is possible, however, that the senate initially declared Phrygia free after Euergetes' death, and only annexed it in 116: for an analysis of what Appian, our main literary source on Phrygia says, see B. C. McGing, *GRBS* 21 (1980) 35-42.

[9] For Nicomedes' slave-dealing activities see E. Badian, *Publicans and Sinners* (1972) 87; 146 n. 30.

[10] Just. *Epit.* 37.4.3 ff.; 38.5.4; 38.7.10. We do not know on what basis it was divided up, and Magie, *RRAM* 197 was hardly justified in saying that Mithridates "seems to have taken the lion's share". Indeed as it was Nicomedes who set up a king of Paphlagonia, perhaps it was he who got the larger part.

their Paphlagonian venture.[11] In 109 the consul M. Junius Silanus was defeated by the Cimbri, and thereafter one disaster followed another until Marius restored Rome's fortunes with his victories at Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae.[12] The alliance of Pontus and Bithynia the two strongest powers in Anatolia, may have worried the Senate, but such was Rome's preoccupation elsewhere that there was little chance of more than a token Roman objection to the seizure of Paphlagonia.

Senatorial ambassadors were sent with a demand for Mithridates and Nicomedes to return Paphlagonia *in pristinum statum*. The kings ignored the order, at least in the beginning. Mithridates claimed, probably falsely, that the country was his by hereditary right, and Nicomedes gave his own son the royal Paphlagonian name Pylaemenes, and placed him on the throne (see above p. 37). The conquerors recognised Rome's difficulties in Africa and Europe, and felt safe, for the moment, in holding on to Paphlagonia. Later Mithridates may have withdrawn. At the beginning of the First Mithridatic War, according to Justin (*Epit.* 38.5.6), Eupator claimed that he had given up Paphlagonia when ordered to. In spite of the initial defiance that we have just seen, some support for this claim can be found. Eupator was ordered by the Senate in about 96 (see below p. 77) to evacuate Cappadocia, which he had annexed, and over which Nicomedes was claiming a right (Just. *Epit.* 38.2.6). In order that things should be fairly managed the Senate also ordered Nicomedes out of Paphlagonia. It would hardly have been fair if Mithridates had been allowed to retain his part of Paphlagonia, while Nicomedes had to give up his. Moreover, Sulla accused Mithridates in 85 of having used Rome's discomfort in the Social War to seize, among other places, Paphlagonia (App. *Mith.* 58). If he had not given it up after his first seizure, it is difficult to see how he could seize it again. After the removal in 96 of Nicomedes and Mithridates, Paphlagonia and Cappadocia were declared free (Just. *Epit.* 38.2. 6-7; Strabo 12.2.11 c.540). To the surprise of Rome, the Cappadocians wanted a king, not liberty, and it is possible that the Paphlagonians too preferred monarchy. For at the beginning of the First Mithridatic War, Mithridates is said to have driven out of Paphlagonia the kings Nicomedes and Pylaemenes, friends of the Roman people (Oros. 6.2.2; Eutropius 5.5.2). As Pylaemenes is mentioned with Nicomedes (IV), it may be that he is the son of Nicomedes III (and possibly the same person as Socrates Chrestus, whom Eupator employed at the end of the 90's—see below p. 79-80) who was installed as king of Paphlagonia by his father under the dynastic

[11] See D. Glew, *Athenaeum* 55 (1977) 387.

[12] See Glew (supra n. 11) 386 for Rome's defeats.

name Pylaemenes. Perhaps the Paphlagonians had appreciated his earlier rule and preferred it to the freedom offered by Rome.[13]

In 108 not only did Mithridates ignore the Roman threats, he even occupied Galatia too. It is not clear who gave the Galatians the area of central Asia Minor which was named after them, but it was probably Antiochus I of Syria (above. p. 20). The Galatians did not form a unified nation, but were divided into three tribes—Tolistoagii in the west, Tectosages around Ancyra and the Trocmi in the east. These tribes were each divided into four tetrarchies, at the head of which was a tetrarch. There were thus twelve tetrarchs governing the Galatians, at least in the time of Strabo (12.5.1 c.567), although it is not clear whether there were still tribal chiefs as mentioned by Livy (38.19.2) for the year 189.[14] There were few cities or states in Asia Minor that at one time or other did not have to fight against the Galatians after Nicomedes I of Bithynia had brought them across from Europe. On their arrival they set out on a course of devastation and destruction.[15] Antiochus defeated them in a great battle probably in 275 (above p. 19), and then they joined his side to fight against Ptolemy Philadelphus in the First Syrian War. In one incident of this war they fought along side Mithridates I of Pontus, but later rounded on his successor Mithridates II; they attacked Heracleia; they supported Ziaelas the pretender to the Bithynian throne and fought for Antiochus Hierax. Their most persistent aggression was directed at the Attalids of Pergamum, for whom they posed a constant threat. Philetaerus defeated them. Eumenes I paid them off. Attalus I won a crushing victory over them.[16] In the reign of Eumenes II they fought for Antiochus III against Rome, and in return they had to face the expedition of Manlius Vulso (Pol. 21.37-39; Livy 38.18-27). They were ordered to stop attacking Pergamum, but did not comply, as we find them in league with Prusias I of Bithynia and Pharnaces I of Pontus against Eumenes. The latter's victory, however, seems to have enabled him to add Galatia to his kingdom.[17] Pharnaces tried to annex it in the war of 183-179, but as we have seen, he was forced in the end to surrender all his conquests (above p. 29). Thinking that the attention of Eumenes and Attalus was diverted by the Third Macedonian War, the Galatians again attacked Pergamum, only to meet with a heavy defeat (Diod. 31.14).

[13] See Magie, *RRAM* 1098 n. 14.

[14] For the location and organisation of the Galatians see especially F. Stähelin, *Geschichte der Kleinasiatischen Galater* (ed. 2 1907) 42-45.

[15] Stähelin (supra n. 14) 8-10; Magie, *RRAM* 730-1.

[16] Philetaerus—Durrbach, *Choix* 38 No. 31; Eumenes I—Livy 38.16.14; the sources for the victory of Attalus I are listed in Magie, *RRAM* 734 n. 20.

[17] Stähelin (supra n. 14) 61 n. 5.

They did, however, seek from Rome, and in 166 win, complete independence—on condition that they kept the peace (Pol. 30.28.1; 30.30.6). Thereafter we hear little of them, although the letters of Attalus II and Eumenes II to the high priest at Pessinus indicate that all was not entirely quiet.[18]

The lack of a unified organisation in Galatia, just as in Paphlagonia, probably made it an easy task for Mithridates to seize part of it, almost certainly just that part closest to Pontus where he built the fortress of Mithridatium (Strabo 12.5.2 c.567): it is highly unlikely that he seized the whole of Galatia.[19] There is little evidence that Nicomedes was a partner in this Galatian operation, as suggested by Reinach to explain how Nicomedes could have invaded Cappadocia some time later.[20] Reinach felt that Nicomedes needed a common frontier with Cappadocia in order to be able to launch an attack against it, but he could simply have marched through Galatia with or without permission. Mithridates V Euergetes, as we saw (above p. 36-7), must have had a guaranteed route through it to his Phrygian territory. Perhaps Nicomedes made a similar arrangement.

Diodorus (36.15.1) reports that Mithridates sent envoys to Rome to bribe the Senate, but that Saturninus insulted them and was brought to trial for his behaviour. The mission has usually been dated to 103, and connected with Eupator's enterprises in Paphlagonia and Galatia.[21] Although it is not clear what sort of trial he had to face, Saturninus will have been protected in 103 from prosecution by the *sacrosanctitas* of his tribunate.[22] It is possible that Mithridates' envoys came to Rome at the end of 103 and that Saturninus was charged in 102, but in fact Diodorus appears to place the whole incident just before Saturninus' election in 101 for the tribunate of the following year. It is more likely, therefore, that

[18] See Welles, *Royal Correspondence* No. 55-61.

[19] At the start of the First Mithridatic War Eupator tried to demonstrate to his troops how reasonable he had been in the face of Roman demands (Just. *Epit.* 38.5.6): he had, as requested, given up Phrygia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, Bithynia. If he had seized the whole of Galatia he would certainly have had to give that up too, but there is no mention of it. He might have got away with the annexation of a border area. G. Daux, *BCH* 57 (1933) 81 dated the occupation of Galatia by Mithridates after the Cappadocian wrangle between Nicomedes and Mithridates (see p. 74 ff.) suggesting that Eupator may have taken Galatia as a result of the ill-feeling caused between himself and Nicomedes over Cappadocia. This has nothing to recommend it over Justin's (and Reinach's) order of events.

[20] Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 88.

[21] See for instance Meyer, *Geschichte* 92; Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 88; Magie *RRAM* 1093 n. 57; E. Olshausen, *RE* Suppl. 15 (1978) col. 423.

[22] See E. J. Weinrib, *Phoenix* 22 (1968) 32-56 who deals mostly with magistrial immunity from prosecution, but does mention tribunes.

Eupator's mission visited Rome in 101.[23] The Roman victory at Aquae Sextiae will have made it clear to Mithridates that Rome's northern troubles were coming to an end, and that bribes might profitably be distributed in the hope of diverting senatorial interference from what he had so far accomplished in Paphlagonia and Galatia. In addition, his interests and involvement in Cappadocia were increasing, and he may also have been hoping to soften the response to his dealings in that country.[24]

Cappadocia

The early history of Cappadocia is sparsely documented.[25] As in Pontus the ruling family was of Iranian descent. The social structure, religion and langugage were also the same as in Pontus.[26] The dynasty of princes ruled under Persian and then Macedonian sway, and Cappadocia's independence, it is usually agreed, was proclaimed by Ariarathes III (c. 255-220). The opportunity for such a proclamation was perhaps his marriage to Stratonice, the daughter of Antiochus II of Syria. The link with the Seleucids was strengthened when Ariarathes IV (c.220-163) married the daughter of Antiochus III (Diod. 31.19.7; App. *Syr.* 5), and fought for Antiochus at the battle of Magnesia (Livy 37.31.4; 37.40.10). After the war he immediately espoused the cause of the victors by asking forgiveness from Rome (Pol. 21.40; Livy 38.37.5), and became a friend and ally of the Roman people. He also betrothed his daughter to Eumenes I of Pergamum—a profitable move, as Eumenes won from the Senate a substantial reduction in Cappadocia's war indemnity. In the war against Pharnaces from 183-179, Ariarathes sided with the anti-Pontic coalition. He showed his loyalty to Rome by sending help in the Third Macedonian War (App. *Mith.* 11; Livy 42.29.4), and also had his son brought up in Rome (Livy 42.19.3-6; Diod. 31.19). He successfully resisted the Galatians (Pol. 31.8.1), and Ptolemy of Commagene who tried to seize some of his territory (Diod. 31.19a).

Ariarathes V Eusebes Philopator (c.163-130) was a thoroughly hellenized monarch and such a devoted student of philosophy that he made Cappadocia, so long unknown to the Greek world, a haven for men

[23] E. Gruen, *Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts 149-78 B.C.* (1968) 168 dates the embassy to 102 or 101.

[24] When Mithridates invaded Cappadocia and installed his son Ariarathes IX as king, there was initially no Roman response. Perhaps his bribes were effective: see T. J. Luce, *Historia* 19 (1970) 170.

[25] For the Ariarathids see B. Niese, *RE* 2 (1896) col. 815-820.

[26] See Rostovtseff, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 213-216; Magie, *RRAM* 200-201. The Cappadocian royal family, like the Mithridatids, also claimed descent from Cyrus or one of the seven conspirators: see Diod. 31.19. On the possibility that for the first half of the third century Cappadocia was ruled by the kings of Pontus, see above p. 15 n. 18.

of culture (Diod. 31.19.8). It is possible that before his accession he was educated at Athens along with the future Attalus II of Pergamum, whose brother Eumenes had married Ariarathes' sister Stratonice; and that the two students set up a statue of their teacher Carneades (the latter's correspondence with king Ariarathes is reported by Diogenes Laertius 4.65).[27] When he became king, Ariarathes and his wife Nysa were honoured as patrons by the Technitai of Dionysus at Athens (*OGIS* 352). In his loyalty as a friend and ally of Rome he refused a marriage alliance with Demetrius I of Syria (above p. 32), and met his death fighting for the Roman cause against Aristonicus (Just. *Epit.* 37.1.2). His services were rewarded with the gift to his family of Lycaonia.

Ariarathes V died probably in 130.[28] Ariarathes VI Epiphanes was still too young to rule alone, and his mother Nysa took over the kingdom as regent, displaying, if we are to believe Justin (*Epit.* 37.1.4), a grim determination to hold on to her power: she allegedly murdered five of her six sons, leaving only the youngest alive.[29] Even if the story is not literally true, it may reflect a period of turbulence in the royal family which ended in Nysa's death, and which Mithridates Euergetes of Pontus took advantage of to invade Cappadocia. Rather than occupy the country openly, Euergetes married his daughter Laodice to Ariarathes VI, who was still young enough for Laodice to be able to wield considerable power, presumably in her father's interests (see above, p. 37-8).

The next important event in Cappadocia of which we hear is the death of Ariarathes VI, killed by Gordius, a Cappadocian noble, at the instigation of Mithridates Eupator according to Justin (*Epit.* 38.1.1). There is no strong reason to disbelieve Justin on this and maintain that Mithridates was innocent.[30] Gordius and Eupator were certainly close

[27] The identification of the Ariarathes and Attalus, however, with the Kings of Cappadocia and Pergamum is not certain. H. Mattingly, *Historia* 20 (1971) 31-2 has suggested that they are members of an ordinary Athenian family, as is the mint magistrate Ariarathes of 121/120 (according to the "low" chronology of the Athenian New Style silver coinage, which I accept: see above p. 118 n. 141). For the statue of Carneades see *SIG*³ 666.

[28] Appendix I p. 173.

[29] For Justin's mistake in calling her Laodice, and numismatic evidence of her regency, see above p. 38 n. 117. B. Simonetta, *The Coins of the Cappadocian Kings* (1977) 29 assumes that Nysa's regency must be squeezed into the first part of 130, as Ariarathes VI issued coins in his own name during the first year of his reign. This is considered by O. Mørkholm, *NC* 9 (1969) 28 to be a weakness in Simonetta's analysis of the royal Cappadocian coins, as it does not leave enough time for Justin's account of her domestic troubles and murder of her children. Her absence from the coins, however, does not necessarily mean that she is no longer regent or that she is dead. Ariarathes may not have wanted her to appear on his coins, or she herself may not have considered it advisable. As long as she was alive, even if she was no longer regent, she was still the king's mother, a position which would give her ample scope for domestic intrigue.

[30] As Argued by D. Glew (supra n. 11) 387, following Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 81-2.

associates at a later stage, and their association may well have gone back to this occasion. If one were to accept the exergue letters on the coins of Ariarathes VI as his regnal years, the date of his death would fall in 116/115 at the earliest. For technical numismatic reasons it appears that we cannot interpret the letters in this way, but in fact the reigns of his successors can best be fitted in if we assume a date for his death of about 116.[31] Mithridates had just removed or was about to remove his mother and brother, and it makes good sense that he might also wish to be rid of Ariarathes VI at this time. When Laodice married him in the mid 120's, Ariarathes had still been very young and presumably pliable. Ten years later she may have been finding it much harder to exert control over her husband; there was a danger that Pontic influence in Cappadocian affairs might wane, or it might even have done so already. With Ariarathes VI out of the way, Laodice could now advance her brother's wishes in the country more easily, from her position as regent for her own young son Ariarathes VII.

Justin's account of this period is impossibly compressed (*Epit.* 38.1.1 ff.). He says that while the throne of Cappadocia was empty after the death of Ariarathes VI, Nicomedes III of Bithynia invaded (*vacuam morte regis Cappadociam invadit*). Mithridates hurried to help his sister, but found that she had married the invader, so instead helped his young nephew: Nicomedes and Laodice were expelled and the throne restored to Ariarathes VII. After a few months (*interiectis mensibus*), Mithridates tried to force Ariarathes to receive Gordius back into Cappadocia. This demand, Justin felt, was aimed at doing away with Ariarathes. For if he refused to receive Gordius, Eupator could justifiably go to war against him, and on the other hand if Ariarathes complied with the demand, he would be taking in an assassin: Gordius had murdered Ariarathes VI and, Eupator hoped, would be able to do the same to Ariarathes VII. Ariarathes resisted and prepared for war, but before battle was joined, Eupator murdered him treacherously at a meeting. The new king was Mithridates' own eight year old son, installed as Ariarathes IX, with Gordius as his *rector*.[32]

The problem with this account is that it leaves a very short reign for Ariarathes VII. Nicomedes invaded Cappadocia just after the death of Ariarathes VI—that seems to be the implication of Cappadocia's situation as *vacuam morte regis*. He was swiftly expelled along with his new wife, and some months later Ariarathes VII was killed treacherously by Eupator. If the exergue letters on the coins of Ariarathes VII do indicate regnal years, and there seems to be no technical reason against taking them so, then he reigned for at least sixteen years.[33] The invasion of Cappadocia by Nicomedes, if associated with the beginning of the reign of Ariarathes VII, will come before the joint Pontic-Bithynian annexation of Paphlagonia: that goes against the order of Justin and is unlikely. The sequence and rationale of events was probably as follows.[34]

Eupator had Ariarathes VI murdered in about 116, and was then able to maintain influence in Cappadocia through Laodice as regent for the young Ariarathes VII. In about 103/102, however, Nicomedes invaded Cappadocia, and Laodice decided to support him. By this stage Ariarathes was old enough to be undesirably independent and Laodice, remembering what had happened to her husband, perhaps began to fear that her son would go the same way. And without her son, her own usefulness to Eupator was at an end. Life with Nicomedes offered better opportunities. She may even have invited him to occupy Cappadocia and marry her.[35] They were expelled and Ariarathes VII restored. As Glew points out,[36] Mithridates at this stage had Cappadocia at his mercy if he wanted to seize it, but his failure to do so indicates that he wanted something else, that is, to control it by means of intermediaries. When he insisted on Ariarathes receiving back Gordius, Mithridates was not necessarily scheming to do away with Ariarathes, as Justin claims: he was simply trying to ensure that his interests in Cappadocia were safeguarded, and Ariarathes on his own was not sufficient guarantee of this. If his nephew had proved suitably compliant there may have been no advantage in removing him. As it was, Mithridates killed him and in about 100/99 set up his own son as king.[37] He employed the same trick as

[31] See Appendix I p. 175. Mørkholm (supra n. 29) 28 argued that the accession of Ariarathes VII took place when Mithridates was in full control of Pontic policy, which could hardly have been earlier than 115. He seems to support an accession date for Ariarathes VII of about 112/111.

[32] He is counted as the ninth Ariarathes because there was still one son of Ariarathes VI left alive, and this man is called Ariarathes VIII. He made a bid to oust Eupator's son, but was defeated and died soon after: see above p. 76-7.

[33] See Appendix I p. 174-5. Even if technical objections were to be raised, there would appear to be too many issues for a reign of the brief duration implied by Justin.

[34] For discussion of the dating of Cappadocian events see Appendix I.

[35] J. Seibert, *Historische Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen in hellenistischer Zeit* (1967) 117 suggests that when Nicomedes invaded, Laodice may have married him in order to protect her son's succession. Her flight before Eupator, however, and the fact that she left Ariarathes in the country seem to indicate that she was acting in her own interests, as Glew (supra n. 11) 388 n. 34 maintained. For events in Cappadocia see now A. N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East* (1984) 105 ff.

[36] Glew (supra n. 11) 338.

[37] That Ariarathes VII was alive and still ruling in 102/1 is one of the few secure dates in the whole period, and results from his inclusion in the Delian heroon dedicated to Mithridates that year by the priest Helianax: see Daux (supra n. 19) 82. For the heroon see below p. 90-91. Ariarathes IX was probably the son born to Eupator while he was away on his journey round Asia in 109/108: see Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 86 n. 1.

Nicomedes had used in Paphlagonia, giving the young king the royal Cappadocian name. As Nicomedes had not yet, it appears, been forced to give up Paphlagonia, it was a trick well worth trying.

Up to this point there had been no further Roman reaction to the king's activities beyond the embassy demanding that he give back Paphlagonia. But the Senate was not completely lacking in interest. It was probably the events in Cappadocia described above that Marius went to investigate in 99/8 (Plut. *Mar.* 31. 2-3).[38] Luce has argued that Marius went to the east to stir up a Mithridatic war, which was anyway expected at Rome, and in which he would be given the command.[39] It is likely, as Luce says, that Marius wanted and needed a military command, and it is at least possible that he was instrumental in bringing about the First Mithridatic War through his agent M'Aquillius in 89, but it is difficult to see how in 99/8, without an army and with words alone he could hope to provoke Mithridates into war. Eupator was clearly an ambitious king, but at this stage he had done little if anything to suggest that he was willing to take on the might of Rome. "Be stronger than the Romans or obey their commands in silence", Marius told him—scarcely the provocation that Luce would have us believe. Marius had had good experience of an ambitious king in Africa, and this experience may have led him to believe that at some stage Mithridates would clash with Rome, but he can have had little reason to suppose that this clash was imminent, or that he could make it so. Marius was probably investigating the possibility or likelihood of war, rather than actually hoping to cause one.[40] For the moment his mission seems to have had little effect, but Marius may have been at least partly responsible for the strengthening of Roman resolve in relation to Mithridates that becomes clear during Sulla's Asian intervention a few years later.

It was not Rome, but Nicomedes of Bithynia who spoilt things for Mithridates in Cappadocia. The rule of Ariarathes IX was not popular, so the Cappadocians recalled a brother of Ariarathes VII from Asia

[38] As E. Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (1964) 171 suggested. More recently, (*Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic* [1968] 32) Badian placed Marius' meeting with Eupator before Ariarathes IX had been made king of Cappadocia—a less satisfactory order of events: see Luce (supra n. 24) 166.

[39] Luce (supra n. 24) 166-168.

[40] M. Sordi, *RIL* 107 (1973) 370-379 argues that Marius was not on a private journey, but in fact was an offical *legatus* in 99/8, carrying to the east the Senate's order for Mithridates and Nicomedes to evacuate Cappadocia and Paphlagonia. She cites *C.I.L.* $1^2$845 as evidence that Marius was at one time a *legatus*, but the name from this inscription is entirely missing. The missions of Nicomedes and Mithridates to Rome which were sent to lay claim to Cappadocia, would have to fall in 100. This might be possible, but Sordi makes no attempt to integrate the coin evidence (i.e. five years initially for Ariarathes IX in Cappadocia: see Appendix I p. 172).

where he was being brought up. This young man was defeated and driven off by Eupator, and he died soon after (Just. *Epit.* 38.2.2). Nicomedes now became anxious that with all opposition overcome in Cappadocia, Eupator might turn against Bithynia. So in about 96 he put forward a false pretender to the Cappadocian throne, who was supposedly a third son of Ariarathes VI, and sent Laodice to Rome in order to testify that the child was legitimate.[41] This had the effect, of course, of bringing the whole matter to the Senate's attention. Mithridates immediately sent a counter-embassy under Gordius to argue that Ariarathes IX was a legitimate descendant of Rome's great friend and ally Ariarathes V. The Senate turned down both claims and ordered Mithridates and Nicomedes to evacuate Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, which were then declared free. The Cappadocians, however, wanted a king, and were allowed to choose one from among themselves: they chose Ariobarzanes, although there was apparently some support for Gordius (Just. *Epit.* 38.2.8; 38.5.9; Strabo 12.2.11 c.540). Having fallen out with Nicomedes, Mithridates was without an ally at this point, and more important, there was nothing happening in the Roman empire to divert the Senate's attention from any defiance he might show. So he had no choice but to comply with the order to quit Cappadocia: he withdrew his son, and probably Gordius too. In Asia Minor he was back to where he had started, but he soon turned his mind to acquiring a new ally: this time he looked eastwards, to Armenia (Just. *Epit.* 38.1-4).

Armenia did not emerge into full independence as a kingdom until after the battle of Magnesia when Artaxias and Zariadris, formerly governing the country as generals of Antiochus III became kings (Strabo 11.14.5 c.528).[42] The area had been subject to the Medes and was then ruled by Achaemenid, Macedonian and Seleucid governors (Strabo 11.14.15 c.531). Artaxias and Zariadris fought against the Romans for

[41] We are told by Asconius that M. Aemilius Scaurus incurred *invidia* because of a *legatio Asiatica* (Asc. p. 21c.), and that he was accused in 90 by Varius of accepting bribes from Mithridates (Val. Max 3.7.8.). Perhaps it was while engaged on this Asian embassy that he was suposed to have been bribed. E. Badian, *Athenaeum* 34 (1956) 122 first argued that Scaurus' *legatio* took place in 96, but then he changed to 97 (E. Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* [1964] 172) in order to allow Scaurus to return to Rome in time (by July 96) to suggest the creation of Asia as a consular province for the year 95. This will have been the cause of the *invidia* into which he fell. The argument is based on the assumption that Asia was the consular province of Q. Mucius Scaevola, but becomes irrelevant if one accepts Marshall's arguments for Asia as Scaevola's praetorian, not consular, province: see B. A. Marshall, *Athenaeum* 54 (1976) 117-130. One cannot specify the date of the *legatio Asiatica*, and in fact it is not even certain that it was Scaurus who went on it: Asconius says that Q. Servilius Caepio prosecuted Scaurus *ob legationis Asiaticae invidiam.* It is at least possible that he incurred *invidia* on account of someone else's *legatio*.

[42] For the early history of Armenia see Baumgartner, *RE* 2 (1896) col. 1181-1186.

Antiochus, but after the war changed sides and were recognised as autonomous kings. Very little is known about Armenian history between then and the appearance of Tigranes I, a descendant of Artaxias. Culturally Strabo tells us that Persian influence went deep (11.16.1 c. 532). Tigranes united the whole of Armenia and was its first great king. His accession can be dated to 96/95.[43] Mithridates betrothed his daughter Cleopatra to Tigranes and may at the same time have struck up an alliance with him.[44] At this stage in his career Tigranes was hardly the great power he became a little later, but Mithridates may have recognised his strength, or perhaps it was Tigranes' conquest of Sophene which bordered on Cappadocia that suggested to him the idea of gaining Armenia as an ally.

Through Gordius, Tigranes was persuaded to move into Cappadocia and expel Ariobarzanes, probably towards the end of 95 or at the beginning of 94, when Ariobarzanes had just become king. Sulla appears to have been praetor in 95 and to have been assigned, in the normal fashion, Cilicia as his *provincia*, with the intention of fighting the pirates.[45] When he was on his way to the east, the invasion of Cappadocia by Tigranes will have made the restoration of Ariobarzanes a more pressing task than fighting the pirates, and his instructions were changed accordingly. Sulla restored Ariobarzanes in the face of Cappadocian and Armenian opposition, and had to drive out Gordius.[46] Gordius was perhaps present in Cappadocia not because he stayed there after the

[43] E. Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (1964) 176 n. 49.

[44] Justin (*Epit.* 38.3.5) places the alliance a little later than the marriage, but see Magie, *RRAM* 1099 n. 16 who argues that the agreement recorded by Justin—that Mithridates should keep the territory they conquered, and Tigranes the moveable assets—was probably made before Tigranes' attack on Cappadocia.

[45] For the assignment of Cilicia, see Badian (supra n. 43) 161-2. Sulla's praetorship was for a long time placed unquestioningly in 93 and his governorship in 92: e.g. Reinach, *Mith.Eup.* 98. Badian (supra n. 43) 158-160 was the first to challenge this, arguing for 97 and 96. A. N. Sherwin-White, *CQ* 27 (1977) 173-183 countered Badian and suggested 95 and 94. G. V. Sumner, *Athenaeum* 56 (1978) 395-396 comes to the same conclusion as Sherwin-White, *via* a different argument. I have followed Sherwin-White and Sumner (although the former, in his latest contribution [supra n. 35] 109 ff., seems to have abandoned his earlier position).

[46] Glew (supra n. 11) 389 says that "none of our sources indicates that he (Sulla) ever met Pontic troops in battle" when restoring Ariobarzanes. This is not quite right. Frontinus (*Str.* 1.5.18) reports that Sulla fought *adversus Archelaum praefectum Mithridatis in Cappadocia* ... Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 162 n. 2, dismissed this as a mistake, but it is possible that Mithridates opposed Sulla indirectly in Cappadocia, by assigning his general Archelaus to help Gordius. There need not, however, have been any Pontic troops involved. G. Bendz, *Frontin: Kriegslisten* (1963) 206 accepts the confrontation between Archelaus and Sulla in Cappadocia. Badian (supra n. 43) 168 does not allow for Armenian interference in Cappadocia until a later date, and has difficulty in explaining why Sulla had to fight a large force of Armenians.

departure of Ariarathes IX, but because Tigranes had sent him there to seize power.[47] Gordius had been the one to represent Mithridates' wishes with Tigranes (*per Gordium impellit* [sc. Tigranen] *ut Ariobarzani bellum inferat*—Just. *Epit.* 38.3.2) and as we saw, there had been a faction among the Cappadocians who wanted Gordius as king. The terms of the agreement between Tigranes and Mithridates were that the *urbes agrique* should go to Mithridates, and *homines ... et quaecumque auferri possent* to Tigranes. So it is likely that Gordius was sent to repossess Cappadocia, perhaps to prepare the way for the reinstallation of Ariarathes IX, in a continued attempt by Mithridates to impose his influence in the country indirectly, and thus avoid direct opposition to Rome. The armed expedition of Sulla in Cappadocia was "the first time since 188 that a Roman army of any sort had intervened in the dynastic quarrels of the Anatolian kings".[48] It was then a forceful reaction to Mithridates' activities and a clear indication that the Senate realized the threat from him, and was prepared to take a much stronger line than before.[49]

Mithridates was sufficiently impressed to hold back and build up his forces for the next few years. The Social War, however, offered a good opportunity for action and he took it. He employed an assassin, Alexander, to remove Nicomedes IV who was now occupying the Bithynian throne, but the plot failed (App. *Mith.* 57). He then sent in Socrates Chrestus, a pretender to the Bithynian throne, with an army to annex the kingdom. At the same time he secured the expulsion of Ariobarzanes from Cappadocia and the restoration of Ariarathes IX.[50] Probably at the end of 90 Manius Aquillius was given the job of restoring Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes to their thrones, a job he carried out either at the end of

[47] Sherwin-White (supra n. 45) 182 suggested that the Senate recognised Ariobarzanes as king in 97 or 96, but that he failed to maintain his position against Gordius who had not left the kingdom with Ariarathes IX. Ariobarzanes was only able to start coining when Sulla restored him in 94. The coin evidence at the time led Sherwin-White to believe that only an opening triennium of Ariobarzanes had to be fitted in before he was expelled in 91/90, but the first part of his reign is now seen to be six years (see Appendix I p. 172), and his coining does not have to have stopped in 91/90: he was restored by Aquillius after this expulsion, and not securely exiled until Mithridates launched the first campaign of the war in 89. When ordered out of Cappadocia in about 96, Mithridates was, as we have seen, in a necessarily compliant mood, and there seems nothing "absurd" (see Badian [supra n. 43] 166) in the idea of the king removing Gordius from Cappadocia at that time, and having him brought back shortly afterwards by Pontus' new ally Tigranes.

[48] A. N. Sherwin-White, *JRS* 67 (1977) 72.

[49] Glew (supra n. 11) 390 underestimates the importance of Sulla's armed intervention, in keeping with his thesis that the First Mithridatic War took the Romans completely by surprise.

[50] Just. *Epit.* 38.3.4; App. *Mith.* 10. For Socrates' claim to the throne see Licinianus p. 22-4 Criniti; Memnon 22.5. Bagoas and Mithras who, according to Appian, conducted the invasion of Cappadocia, may have been Armenians; see P. Desideri, *Athenaeum* 51 (1973) 3.

that year or in the following one.[51] According to Appian, Mithridates had his forces in readiness for war, but did not respond to the restoration of his neighbours. Indeed he even had Socrates killed, probably to display his righteousness.

Nor did he respond when Aquillius and his colleagues tried to force Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes to invade Pontus in order to provoke Mithridates into war (App. *Mith.* 11). Ariobarzanes refused, but Nicomedes was heavily in debt to the commissioners and had to agree. So he marched into Pontus and returned with a large amount of booty.[52] Mithridates delayed because he wanted many and just reasons for war. Appian emphasizes this, and reports in detail on the diplomatic activity just before the war when Pelopidas, the Pontic envoy, complained to the Roman commissioners of Nicomedes' actions, and called on them to defend their ally Pontus, or restrain Nicomedes.[53] The ambassadors of Nicomedes reply, and argue convincingly that Mithridates has really been preparing war against Rome not Bithynia. He has conquered the Tauric Chersonese and has an army in readiness of his own forces and of Thracians, Scythians, and other allies. He has allied himself by marriage to Tigranes of Armenia, and is courting the favour of the kings of Egypt and Syria. He has a fleet of three hundred warships and has sent to Egypt and Phoenicia for skilled sailors. Pelopidas delivers a final speech in which he urges the Romans to prevent the sort of things Nicomedes had done; or to help Mithridates who is the one with a grievance; or to stand aside and let Pontus and Bithynia settle their own differences. This puts the Roman ambassadors in a difficult situation, because what Mithridates seems to be looking for, is the right to retaliate and recover what had been seized by Nicomedes at the instigation of the Roman ambassadors themselves. They did not grant this right; and Mithridates is seen to be treated unjustly. He once again moves into Cappadocia and

[51] Sherwin-White (supra n. 45) 182 n. 48.

[52] Glew (supra n. 11) 397, maintains that as Amastris was close to the western boundary of Pontus and this was as far as Nicomedes' expedition penetrated, the incursion only just reached into Pontic territory and was therefore not as provocative as might appear. We do not, however, know from which direction the Bithynian force entered Pontus, and as well as invading, Nicomedes did also close off the Euxine, presumably just to Pontic shipping. This would be a very serious matter. It may also have come to Mithridates' ears how Aquillius had tried to persuade Ariobarzanes to invade Pontus like Nicomedes, but had failed. There could be no mistaking these highly provocative actions.

[53] As Sherwin-White (supra n. 35) 113 points out, Appian's view is the only detailed account of the build-up to the First Mithridatic War, and although "doubtless a literary expansion ... it contains no basic improbabilities". Desideri (supra n. 50) attempts at length but unconvincingly to identify Appian's source as Posidonius. Sherwin-White (supra n. 35) 117-118 puts forward a much more likely candidate in P. Rutilius Rufus, a case already well argued by D. Glew, *The Outbreak of the First Mithridatic War* (diss. Princeton 1971) 57-73.

sets up Ariarathes IX, while Pelopidas makes what is apparently the last-minute attempt of a reasonable man to prevent war. The Bithynians were right, he says, about Mithridates' power. He has countless allies from around the Black Sea. Tigranes too is an ally. Arsaces king of Parthia is a friend. If a war were to break out these were not the only ones likely to help Pontus: Asia, Greece, Africa, Italy itself would side with Mithridates. Pelopidas suggests taking the dispute to Rome, but it is too late, and in 89 war starts.[54]

What was going on in the period leading up to this conflict? What was Aquillius trying to do, what were Eupator's plans for expansion in Asia Minor, and when did he decide on war with Rome?[55] First of all, it is clear that Aquillius was not carrying out Senatorial policy. Appian stresses this (*Mith.* 17). The Social War was raging, and the last thing the Senate wanted was any trouble in the east. Aquillius' actions provide a good example, and perhaps the first, of a major change that takes place in the conduct of Roman foreign policy in the first century B.C. Up till now 'Roman' policy had been synonymous with 'Senatorial' policy. In the complex history of the last century of the Republic, Roman policy, became, in Badian's words "a plaything of private and factional ambitions."[56] Aquillius was in many ways the first exponent of "that aggressive imperialism of the individual army commanders", that so characterizes the period.[57] One interesting theory explaining the Roman commissioners' actions is that of Luce, who argues that they were acting in the interests of Marius, of whom they were proven associates—starting a war in which Marius would then be given command.[58] Alternatively, and more probably, they may simply have been acting out of personal greed and ambition:[59] a short, sharp war with rich rewards was an attractive possibility.

[54] I follow E. Badian, *AJAH* 1 (1976) 109-110 and A. N. Sherwin-White in *Miscellanea di studi classici in onore di Eugenio Manni* vol. 6 (1980) 1981-1995 (also briefly Sherwin-White [supra n. 48] 74 n. 86 and now Sherwin-White [supra n. 35] 122 ff.) in dating the outbreak of the war to 89. Appian (*Mith.* 22) clearly implies that Asia was one of the consular provinces allotted before the elections of 89 for the following year (see also App. *BCiv.* 1.55). In June 89 it appears Sulla knew that the most desirable post for the next year would be the command against Mithridates (Plut. *Sull.* 6): Glew (supra n. 11) 398 ff. fails to demonstrate that the Romans were still not aware in 89 that there would be war with Mithridates. How Mithridates' campaigns of 89 and 88 should be divided up is a matter of disagreement between Sherwin-White and Badian: see below p. 109 n. 96.

[55] These problems are analysed most recently by Sherwin-White (supra n. 35) 119-131.

[56] E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae 264-70 B.C.* (1958) 289.

[57] Sherwin-White (supra n. 48) 75.

[58] Luce (supra n. 24) 186 ff. The arguments, however, of Sherwin-White (supra n. 35) 119-120 against this theory seem strong.

[59] Geyer, *RE* 15 (1932) col. 2168-9.

As for Eupator's plans, the ancient sources tend to make it look as though he set out at an early stage in his career to create a large empire in Asia Minor and indeed in Europe, and had resolved to fight Rome many years before the First Mithridatic War. In 85 Sulla accused him of starting that war which he had resolved on long before, hoping to rule the world if he could conquer the Romans (App. *Mith.* 57). When he turned to Tigranes of Armenia in his search for a new ally in about 95, he had at that stage been contemplating for a long time a war with Rome (Just. *Epit.* 38.3.1). He desired to rule *totius Asiae et si posset Europae* (Florus 1.40). His activities in Asia Minor are all interpreted in the light of this plan for world domination and thus the war with Rome "acquires a degree of inevitability".[60] Glew has questioned this picture of unchanging policies and ambitions of Eupator, as depicted especially in Justin, and reflected in modern scholarship. He maintains that Mithridates decided on war with Rome only shortly before the war actually broke out, and that when it did, Rome was taken by surprise. None of Mithridates' actions before Sulla's intervention "bespeaks a grand strategy of conquest such as he later adopted, and there are indications that as late as the time of Manius Aquillius' embassy he had not yet resolved on war with Rome".

This is open to doubt. It is difficult to date all the advances of Mithridates' power and influence in the Black Sea, but the winning of a kingdom in the Crimea was one of the first enterprises of his reign, and by the time of the First Mithridatic War he had clearly created an empire for himself in the Black Sea area of considerable strength. He was, then, probably right from the beginning of his reign an ambitious monarch, and one quite prepared to expand by conquest. Conquest in Asia Minor, however, was, as Pharnaces demonstrated, likely to be a much more difficult proposition than in the remoter areas of the Euxine. Mithridates V had perhaps seen this already, for although he invaded Cappadocia, he did also withdraw, content to hold sway by means of his daughter's marriage to the young Ariarathes VI. Eupator's first move in the area appears to have been based on the same policy—maintenance of influence in Cappadocia through Laodice, in this case effected by the removal of Ariarathes VI. The idea of conquest was by no means abandoned: for a number of reasons Mithridates decided on a more openly aggressive policy in Paphlagonia and Galatia. Firstly, Pharnaces' error had not been to use force, but simply to take on more than he alone could manage: with Cappadocia under Pontic influence and Bithynia an ally, potential opposition to Eupator was significantly reduced. Secondly,

[60] Glew (supra n. 11) 381.

Cappadocia was a major Anatolian monarchy and it would be wise to tread carefully there: Paphlagonia and Galatia were not even unified kingdoms, and there was a greater chance of getting away with rougher treatment. Thirdly, Eupator may quite simply have been sufficiently emboldened by his success in southern Russia to try out force of arms in Asia Minor. Finally, Rome's preoccupation with other problems may have led him to suppose that the Senate would be unable to take serious measures against an invasion of Paphlagonia and Galatia—as indeed was the case.

When the next crisis in Cappadocia arose, Laodice perhaps inviting Nicomedes to take possession of the country, Mithridates persisted in his policy of exerting indirect control: he expelled Laodice and Nicomedes and reestablished his nephew Ariarathes VII as king. It is unlikely that his object in doing this was some high-principled attempt "to protect the interests of the legitimate king".[61] The legitimate king happened to be his own nephew, and in protecting him, it is more likely that Mithridates was protecting his own interests in Cappadocia. This becomes clearer when he insisted on having Gordius received back by Ariarathes. He may have suspected that Ariarathes was not going to prove a suitable puppet, and the latter's refusal to accept Gordius confirmed this suspicion. Mithridates had now lost all control and influence in Cappadocia, and there was nothing left but to invade and neutralize Ariarathes. He was still not prepared for open annexation, and again aimed to hold sway by means of a regency: this time he made his own son king, as there was none of the legitimate royal line left.[62] A pretence of legitimacy, however, was made for Ariarathes IX: the youth was given the Cappadocian royal name and a descent from Ariarathes V, and coins were issued of the same type as earlier Cappadocian kings.[63] The partnership of Gordius and Ariarathes VII had not worked out, but Gordius and Ariarathes IX might have succeeded just as Laodice's regencies for Ariarathes VI and

[61] Glew (supra n. 11) 388.

[62] Gordius as a Cappadocian noble could presumably have been made king. He enjoyed some support a few years later when the Cappadocians were looking for a king (see above p. 77), but evidently there was more opposition than support, and there was little possibility of pretending that the well-known Gordius was really a member of the Cappadocian royal family, as there was with Mithridates' own young son.

[63] For the coins of Ariarathes IX see Simonetta (supra n. 29) 36-39; O. Mørkholm, *Essays in Greek Coinage presented to Stanley Robinson*, ed. C. M. Kraay and G. K. Jenkins (1968) 241-258. It was claimed by Mithridates that Ariarathes IX was *ex eo Ariarathe genitum, qui bello Aristonici auxilia Romanis ferens cecidisset* (Just. *Epit.* 38.2.5). Ariarathes V died in about 130, and as Ariarathes IX was ony eight years old in 100, *genitum* must mean "descended from" rather than "son of". For this use of the word, see e.g. Vell. Pat. 2.35.2; Tac. *Ann.* 3.76. Mørkholm (above, this note) 242 n. 3 thinks that the alleged father was Ariarathes VI.

VII had succeeded. Nicomedes of Bithynia, however, created difficulties for Mithridates by putting up his own candidate for the throne of Cappadocia and bringing the whole matter to Rome's attention. Consequently, Mithridates' plans were again thwarted, and as we saw, he had no choice but to withdraw Ariarathes (and probably Gordius too). Perhaps he remembered the advice of Marius, and considered that he was not yet stronger than Rome. Probably it was at this point, 96, that Mithridates began to think in terms of war with Rome, to consider that war would be necessary at some stage. This is the year in which he began to issue his own royal Pontic coins (see below p. 97), and soon after, formed ties with Tigranes of Armenia. His accumulation of power and allies certainly seems to reveal aggressive plans, as later the ambassadors of Nicomedes maintained (App. *Mith.* 13), and Sulla himself realised (App. *Mith.* 57). In addition to his Black Sea subjects and allies, Mithridates was able to claim the Parthians and Medes as allies before the first war with Rome.[64] The claim is probably a hollow one. He certainly tried to win over these monarchs,[65] but they do not seem to have contributed any substantial aid. At the time of the third war Mithridates was still looking for help from them, as shown most notably by Sallust's letter of Mithridates to Arsaces.[66] He also made approaches to the kings of Egypt and Syria, although we do not know if any agreement was made.[67] Pelopidas considered it likely that if war broke out, the provinces of Asia, Greece and Africa would fight for Mithridates, and even Italy itself. Eupator's philhellenic policy (see below p. 89 ff.) had certainly been winning him friends in the Greek world, particularly at Athens: the Delian heroon of 102/1 is clear proof of the high esteem in which he was held, and at Athens itself in 97/6 Aristion's coinage bears the Pontic symbol of Pegasus.[68] Pontic support may also be understood in the symbols of the two preceding issues—a gorgoneion on the issue of Nicetes/Dionysius, and twin caps of the Dioscuri each surmounted by a star on the issue of Demetrius/Agathippus.[69] The readiness with which many of the cities of Asia accepted Eupator when he invaded, suggests that he had been recruiting support there too. That the Italian allies, who were in open revolt against Rome would fight for Mithridates, was a safe assumption for Pelopidas to make, although the actual negotiations reported by Diodorus (37.11) between the rebels and the king, and the allied gold coin issue of Pontic type will hardly have pre-dated the start of the First Mithridatic War.[70] We do not know what efforts, if any, Mithridates had been making in Africa,[71] but Pelopidas' assessment of who would fight on the side of Pontus against Rome was clearly more than just a fond hope: it reflects intense diplomatic activity by Eupator. Taking into account this activity and the enormous military forces recruited by Mithridates,[72] it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he was preparing for war.

[64] Memnon 22.4; App. *Mith.* 15. In 88 the Pontic leader at Athens, Athenion, claimed that the Persian Kings were doing homage to Mithridates, but Athenion was trying to bring the Athenians over to Mithridates' side by pointing out how powerful the king was. In the circumstances, his speech can hardly be regarded as reliable evidence. See Athen. 213a.

[65] As is suggested, for instance, by the inclusion of the reigning Arsacid monarch Mithridates II in Eupator's heroon on Delos. For this heroon see below p. 90-91.

[66] Sall. *H.* 4.69 Maurenbrecher. For discussion of this letter see below p. 154 ff.

[67] App. *Mith.* 13. At a later date Mithridates betrothed two of his daughters Nyssa and Mithridatis, one to the king of Egypt, the other to the king of Cyprus (App. *Mith.* 111). They were still young girls in 63 and so are unlikely to have been betrothed before the First Mithridatic War. Antiochus VIII of Syria was another foreign ruler to win a place in Mithridates' Delian heroon. In Sallust's letter, Mithridates says that he warned the Cretans and Ptolemy of Egypt that there would be trouble with Rome. Ptolemy remained neutral in the First Mithridatic War (Plut. *Luc.* 3.1). The Cretans, however, were favourably disposed to Mithridates, and furnished him with mercenaries (App. *Sic.* 6).

[68] The date is that of H. Mattingly, *JHS* 91 (1971) 92 who adjusts slightly Lewis's suggestion of 96/5 for the Aristion/Philon issue (D. Lewis, *NC* 2 [1962] 276). Both dates correctly reject the "high" chronology for the Athenian New Style silver put forward by M. Thompson, *The New Style Silver Coinage of Athens* (1961). See also below p. 118 n. 141. The presence of a Pontic symbol should not be taken to indicate that Athens was already split into pro-Mithridatic and pro-Roman "parties". Mithridates and his family had enjoyed Athenian favour for a long time: see Badian (supra n. 54) 107.

[69] Thompson (supra n. 68) 422-3 pointed out the Pontic implications of the gorgoneion, and was followed by Lewis (supra n. 68) 276 n. 2, but not by Badian (supra n. 54) 128 n. 64. The caps of the Dioscuri are not an exclusively Pontic type, but they do appear on Mithridates' bronze coinage from Amisus, Sinope and Amaseia (and Panticapaeum, Gorgippia, Olbia and Dioscurias), so it is quite likely that there is a Pontic connection in the appearance of this type of Athenian coins at this time.

[70] For the gold issue with Amisene type and Oscan inscription see T. Reinach, *Numismatique ancienne: trois royaumes de l'Asie Mineure* (1888) 197-198; E. A. Sydenham, *The Coinage of the Roman Republic* (1952) 95 No. 643. The coin was surely not struck in Amisus as G. Kleiner, *MDAI* (I) 6 (1955) 8 claims, but was an attempt by the Italian rebels to flatter Mithridates and win his help: see E. T. Salmon, *Samnium and the Samnites* (1976) 370. The silver coin depicting two warriors joining hands, one stepping off a boat, is also thought to have been directed at Mithridates: see Sydenham (above this note) 89 No. 632. It seems to be going too far to argue that the bronze statue in Naples, allegedly representing Mithridates as Heracles, reflects the cooperation between the king and the Italians that the latter hoped for: see S. A. Muscetolla, in *Bronzes hellénistiques et romains. Tradition et renouveau. Actes du Ve colloque international sur les bronzes antiques, Lausanne 8-13 mai 1978* (1979) 90.

[71] Athenion tells the Athenians in 88 that an embassy of Carthaginians was with Mithridates, asking for an alliance (Ath. 214a). C. Nicolet in *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire offerts à André Piganiol* ed. R. Chevallier vol. 2 (1966) 807-814 argues that these "Carthaginians" are North Africans or Spaniards, but the evidence is extremely meagre.

[72] 190,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry according to Memnon 22.6; 250,000 infantry, 50,000 cavalry, 400 ships, 130 chariots according to App. *Mith.* 17: see Janke, *Memnon* 139. For a discussion of these numbers see G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic Age* (1935) 288 ff.; Sherwin-White (supra n. 35) 128-9 n. 112.

When Mithridates persuaded Tigranes to move into Cappadocia and expel Ariobarzanes in 95, he was probably hoping once again to control Cappadocia indirectly through Gordius and Ariarathes IX. He may also have been testing Roman reaction. The response was Sulla's armed expedition in 94. From 93/2 the royal Pontic coin issues became considerably larger, and it is at least very probable that this fact echoes Mithridates' preparations for war against Rome.[73] When he sent Socrates Chrestus to Bithynia, and expelled Ariobarzanes from Cappadocia, the Social War had just started in Italy and offered a good opportunity to make a move. He cannot possibly have thought that Rome would accept the situation—the expedition of Sulla had demonstrated clearly that the Senate was prepared to use force to support Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes—so he knew that the Romans would eventually react: it looks as if he was trying to provoke them. We cannot know what Mithridates would have done, if, as before, Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes had merely been restored to their thrones. As it was, Manius Aquillius and his fellow commissioners played into his hands and provided a *casus belli*. Nicomedes' invasion of Pontus and closing of the Euxine were clearly unjust, and they put the Roman ambassadors in the wrong with their friend and ally Mithridates Eupator. He again invaded Cappadocia and with a last offer of arbitration which he knew would be refused, he showed himself to be reasonable and wronged. This was important: he could now appear convincingly as the great liberator of Asia, throwing of the cloak of Roman oppression. It seems impossible to determine exactly when he decided on war, but as the 90's progressed, his actions make it clear that he foresaw a struggle with Rome. He prepared himself thoroughly so that when the Social War and Manius Aquillius offered the opportunity, he was ready to take it.

Mithridates' actions before the war were probably quite difficult for the Senate and for Aquillius to interpret, as the signals he was sending out were decidedly ambiguous. On the one hand there were general signs for the alert pointing to war, and the degree of concern and realization in Rome of Mithridates' power and ambition should not be underestimated. The story of Marius' meeting with the king is evidence of Roman anxiety, as is Sulla's intervention in 94. Indeed, according to Plutarch (*Mar.* 31), when Marius went to the east, it was believed even then that there would be war with Mithridates at some stage. Memnon (22.3-4), Appian (*Mith.* 10) and Plutarch (*Sull.* 5.3) all report that the Romans were worried by the size of Mithridates' empire well before the First Mithridatic War. Nor can the poor performance of Manius

[73] See M. J. Price, *NC* 8 (1968) 4.

Aquillius and the other Roman commanders at the beginning of the war safely be used as evidence to prove that the Senate failed to perceive the threat from Mithridates. At the start of hostilities the Roman forces, admittedly mostly allies and local levies, were by no means inconsiderable,[74] and besides, Rome frequently got off to a slow start in her wars: the Roman military system in this period was aimed primarily at meeting real crises, not at averting potential ones. In recent wars, against Aristonicus, the Germans and Jugurtha, Roman forces had been far from impressive in the early stages.[75] And in this particular war, of course, Mithridates' timing was vital: Roman resources, troops and the best generals, were fully tied up in a desperate struggle on Italian soil. On the other hand, there were also signs which could be interpreted to mean that war was not an immediate inevitability. In Cappadocia Mithridates had moved with relative care. When confronted in 96, and again in 94 by Sulla, the king backed down. When Aquillius restored Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes, there was still no Pontic aggression. This apparent compliance, however, right up to the last minute, can best be regarded as tactical preparation for war by Mithridates. He was not willing just to sweep into Asia: he wanted, and took great care to appear the aggrieved party, and make the Romans appear the aggressor. With justice and sympathy on his side, he would naturally be in a stronger position to win support. In addition, he wanted to lull the Senate, and more specifically, Aquillius, into a false sense of security, into thinking that Mithridates was not really prepared or able to engage in a major struggle with Rome. And in this he certainly succeeded. Aquillius seriously underestimated Mithridates, and cannot have foreseen the scale of the conflict he was unleashing. The Senate was not even aware of its ambassador's actions, and so the Fathers will hardly have been able to expect a war at this precise moment, even though they were well aware that it was highly probable at some stage. To that extent Rome was taken by surprise.

Mithridates' actions in Asia Minor before the first war with Rome are marked by caution, opportunism and a sense of experiment. The inva-

[74] According to the probably exaggerated figures of Appian (*Mith.* 17) they consisted of a fleet, three divisions of 40,000 men each and the forces of Nicomedes—50,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. Memnon 22.7 says that M'Aquillius confronted Menophanes, the general of Mithridates, "with a few Romans".

[75] Even in the first half of the second century when Rome was inflicting a series of stunning defeats on the major powers of the eastern Mediterranean, wars sometimes did not go well in the beginning. The Third Macedonian War, for instance, was inevitable perhaps a year before its outbreak (A. Giovannini, *BCH* 93 [1969] 853-861), and yet the Senate still felt it necessary to resort to trickery in order to gain time (J. Briscoe, *JRS* 54 [1964] 66-77). Even then Perseus intitally got the upper hand when the fighting started.

sion of Paphlagonia is a good example of all three of these features. Eupator was careful not to repeat his grandfather's error of overconfidence, and wisely took the powerful Nicomedes as an ally. Annexation may not appear a very cautious move, but given that Mithridates was ambitious to extend his power, the invasion of Paphlagonia and Galatia was about as safe an invasion as could be devised in Anatolia. It was safe because he had a powerful ally, because the countries involved were unlikely to be able to create a strong lobby in Rome, and because the Romans themselves were too busy elsewhere to pay serious attention to Asia. The timing was important. In 108/7 Mithridates could try to confuse the issue with claims of hereditary rights, and simply ignore Rome. Later on, if the Senate became too threatening further plans could be devised. So the invasion was at once cautious, opportunistic and experimental. In Cappadocia caution demanded much less direct action, and here Eupator was content to exert indirect influence: Ariarathes VI and VII were murdered to ensure the continuation of the Pontic influence, which Mithridates Euergetes had first achieved. There was no need for Eupator to annex the country directly: Ariarathes IX and Gordius would look after his interests, and one could at least claim that Ariarathes IX was a legitimate Cappadocian king. This scheme worked for five years until Nicomedes disrupted it. The ensuing demand for Mithridates to quit Cappadocia was made at a time when Rome was quite free to devote her full attention to Asia, and also at a time when Mithridates had recently lost his only ally and not replaced him. Defiance would be foolish, and he withdrew. But he immediately got himself a new ally and tried to reestablish his influence in Cappadocia by means of Tigranes. Gordius was reinstalled and perhaps Mithridates' plan was to restore his son Ariarathes IX, but before that could be done, Sulla's armed intervention provided a clear message that Rome was determined to support, by arms if necessary, Ariobarzanes as king of Cappadocia and Nicomedes as king of Bithynia. Eupator's next invasion, therefore, was much less cautious and more provocative than his previous actions. It was still opportunistic—Rome was now deeply involved in the Social War—but he must have known that there would be an armed response. Although the precise opportunity for a war with Rome had not yet presented itself, Mithridates seems to have thought that now was the time positively to look for one. He managed to turn the mistakes of Aquillius to his own advantage and the First Mithridatic War started. Rome was still fully occupied with her Italian rebels, and thus was caught at a very awkward time. The king of Pontus had been preparing economically, militarily and diplomatically for a number of years: he was ready.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FIRST WAR WITH ROME

1. *Propaganda*

In the last chapter I dealt with the political, diplomatic and military build-up to Mithridates' first war with Rome. Now, before moving on to the war itself, I will start by examining the king's propaganda—in what light he projected himself and his kingdom to the peoples of Asia and Europe, and what he wanted these people to think of him. We have seen earlier how previous kings of Pontus paraded their philhellenism as a way of gaining respectability and prestige, and of proving that Pontus was a civilised member of the Greek world. Other Anatolian kings had acted likewise for the same reasons. Mithridates Eupator took great care to follow his predecessors in this matter, and in outward appearance was the most philhellenic of all the kings of Pontus. This aspect of foreign policy, however, becomes more important in Eupator's reign than before, because he used his philhellenism in a new way—as a weapon to help him expand his kingdom: it was in large part as the champion of Hellenism that he came forward to fight the barbarian Romans, just as he had championed the cause of the Black Sea Greeks against their barbarian neighbours. That is not to say that ever since he ascended the throne his policy towards the Greek world had been aimed at war with Rome, but as his reign progressed, and certainly in the 90's he clearly realised that a successful appeal to the Greeks would win for him a highly valuable, indeed probably necessary, source of support for any prospective opposition to Rome.[1] Epigraphical evidence shows well the policy at work and its success.

In 115 the gymnasiarch Dionysus son of Neon set up on Delos a statue of Eupator and his brother Mithridates Chrestus (*Ins. Delos* 1560; Durrbach, *Choix* 187 No. 113), and presumably about the same time, a dedication was made to Zeus Ourios on behalf of Eupator and Chrestus (*Ins. Delos* 1561; Durrbach, *Choix* 189 No. 114). In 116/115 Apollo Delios appears as a symbol on the Athenian tetradrachms of Socrates/Dionysodorus. This coin issue and the two inscriptions probably

[1] See Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 935.

marked a continuation and commemoration by Eupator of his father's benefactions to Delos and its god.[2]

The most significant monument to the high regard in which Mithridates was held at Delos and Athens is the heroon dedicated to him on Delos in 102/1 by the Athenian Helianax, priest of Poseidon Aisios and the Dioscuri-Cabiri, and son of Asclepiodorus.[3] This was a small rectangular building (5m. x 3½m. approx.) closed in on three sides but open on the south side where two columns supported an entablature and pediment. There was one relief bust sculpted in a sort of medallion in the centre of the pediment, and twelve more such busts inside, three on each of the side walls, and six on the back wall. The busts are mutilated but identified by inscriptions as leading courtiers, foreign allies and associates of Eupator.[4] An inscription from the epistyle records that Helianax dedicated the temple with its statues and busts on behalf of the Athenian people and of the Roman people, to the Gods whose priesthood he held, and to king Mithridates Eupator Dionysus.[5] Because the only statue, it appears, was of Eupator, and because all the busts depicted associates of the king, Chapouthier concluded that the monument, "bien que dédié à deux groupes de divinités *sunnaoi* était en fait la demeure d'un seul dieu: Mithridate Eupator devenu Dionysos."[6] The inscription from the base of Mithridates' statue records his continuing *aretē* and *eunoia* towards the Athenian people. The statue itself depicts him in the uniform

[2] As argued by L. Robert, *JS* July/Sept. 1978 p. 160: see above p. 40-41. Robert thinks that Eupator may even have adopted for a time his father's surname "Euergetes": he makes this suggestion, as did Durrbach, on the basis of line 1 of *Ins. Delos* 1560—[*ba*] *sileō*[*s M*]*ithradatou Eupato*[*r*]*os* [*E*]*u*[... See also *SEG* XXVIII, 668.

[3] See F. Chapouthier, *Le sanctuaire des dieux de Samothrace. Exploration Archéologique de Délos* vol. 16 (1935) 13-42; W. H. Gross, *A&A* 4 (1954) 105-117; P. Bruneau and J. Ducat, *Guide de Délos* (ed. 2 1966) 140.

[4] The busts were mutilated probably by the inhabitants of Delos after the departure of the Pontic forces: see P. Bruneau, *BCH* 92 (1968) 673-4.

[5] Mithridates took the surname Dionysus perhaps as a reference to his maternal relative Antiochus VI Dionysus of Syria: see Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 40-1 n. 3; M. J. Price, *NC* 8 (1968) 4. We know from literary sources also that he was worshipped as Dionysus: see Durrbach, *Choix* 215 No. 133. It used to be thought that Eupator did not adopt the name Dionysus until about 88: see, for instance, T. Homolle, *BCH* 8 (1884) 103. H. Ropel, *North Amer. Journal of Numismatics* 4 (1965) 167 still retains this dating, apparently unaware of the Delian inscriptions. Reinach suggested that Helianax was of the same family as the Asclepiodorus and Hermogenes, sons of Asclepiodorus, who with their Rhodian colleague Agathanax made a dedication in honour of Laodice, sister of Pharnaces I and Mithridates IV Philopator Philadelphus: see T. Reinach, *BCH* 34 (1910) 431. A bust of Asclepiodorus, Helianax' father, occupies one of the medallions of the interior of Eupator's heroon. This may just be filial piety on the part of Helianax, but as all the other figures in the sanctuary are associates of Eupator, it is more likely that Asclepiodorus' inclusion indicates an active family loyalty to the royal house of Pontus: see Durrbach, *Choix* 215 No. 133.

[6] Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 41.

of a Roman legionary,[7] which, like the association of the Roman people in the dedication of Helianax' sanctuary, clearly reflects a time when Mithridates had not yet fallen out with Rome.

On the west wall were busts of: Gaius son of Hermaeus, *suntrophos* of Eupator according to Plutarch (*Pomp.* 42);[8] an officer whose name is lost, son of Antipater and Mithridates' private secretary (*epi tou aporrētou*);[9] Dorylaus son of Philetaerus, nephew of Dorylaus Tacticus, the Aegean recruiting agent of Mithridates Euergetes.[10] Dorylaus was one of the most important officers of Eupator's court: *suntrophos*, chief of the bodyguard (?*epi tou egcheiridiou*) and supreme military commander (*epi tōn dunameōn*). On the east wall one of the figures is unidentifiable, but the other two are Papias son of Menophilus, Eupator's chief doctor,[11] and an official of the court of the Arsacid king Mithridates II.[12] One of the busts of the back wall also depicted an official of the Arsacid court.[13] The inclusion of these two men indicates that there was some sort of relationship between Pontus and the Arsacid kingdom at the time, or that Mithridates was eager to forge one, and adds substance to the claim of Pelopidas before the First Mithridatic War that Arsaces was a friend of Mithridates. Of the other five busts on the back wall, one cannot be identified, another is Asclepiodorus, Helianax' father,[14] and the remaining three are; Diophantus son of Mithares;[15] Ariarathes VII of Cappadocia, Eupator's nephew;[16] Antiochus VIII Grypus of Syria.[17]

Further evidence of Eupator's popularity at Delos and Athens is seen in about 94/3 when Dicaeus, priest of Sarapis made a dedication in the Delian Sarapeium on behalf of the Athenian people, the Roman people,

[7] Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 38-9. The head of the statue is missing.

[8] Durrbach, *Choix* 219 No. 136d; Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 32 No. 1; *Ins. Delos* 1570. The Hermaeus of Memnon 28.3, infantry commander in the Third Mithridatic War may be a brother or son of Gaius, but hardly his father. Perhaps he was also the Hermaeus of Plut. *Luc.* 17.3.

[9] Durrbach, *Choix* 220 No. 136e; Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 32 No. 2; *Ins. Delos* 1571. A Callistratus held the post *epi tou aporrētou* some thirty years later (Plut. *Luc.* 17.7), and for that reason his name was restored by Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 459 No. 9b.

[10] Durrbach, *Choix* 220 No. 136 f.; Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 32 No. 3; *Ins. Delos* 1572. For his career see especially Durrbach's commentary.

[11] Durrbach, *Choix* 219 No. 136c; Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 34 No. 12: *Ins. Delos* 1573.

[12] Durrbach, *Choix* 223 No. 136i; Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 33 No. 10: *Ins. Delos* 1581.

[13] Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 33 No. 7; *Ins. Delos* 1582.

[14] Durrbach, *Choix* p. 215; Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 33 No. 7.

[15] Durrbach, *Choix* 218 No. 136b; Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 32 No. 4: *Ins. Delos* 1574. The restoration of Diophantus' name is not certain, and is based on Memnon 27.2 where Diophantus son of Mithares was one of Mithridates' generals in the Third Mithridatic War. See Durrbach's commentary.

[16] Durrbach, *Choix* 221 No. 136g; Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 33 No. 5; *Ins. Delos* 1576.

[17] Durrbach, *Choix* 222 No. 136h; Chapouthier (supra n. 3) 33 No. 6; *Ins. Delos* 1552.

king Mithridates Eupator Dionysus, and his own mother and father.[18] In another dedication of Dicaeus from the Sarapeium, Eupator is again associated with Dicaeus' mother.[19] Fragmentary inscriptions on which Mithridates' name can be read have been found in the Asclepieium and by Mt. Cynthus.[20]

An agonistic inscription from Chios attests Mithridates' victory there in various equestrian events. Segre dated the inscription precisely to 88, suggesting that Eupator's participation in the races was an episode in his triumphal march through the cities of Asia and the islands.[21] Mithridates was an exceptional horseman, and we know that he did at times compete himself, but as Robert pointed out, there was no need for the victor to have competed, or even to be present: in equestrian events the victory belonged to the owner of the horses.[22] The date, then, canot be fixed with certainty to 88, but in view of Eupator's harsh treatment of Chios during the First Mithridatic War (App. *Mith.* 46-7), the victories cannot have been after the war. There is a very similar inscription from Rhodes listing Mithridates' equestrian victories there, but it has not yet been published.[23] It must date from before the first war: Mithridates' unsuccessful siege of Rhodes in that war makes his participation in Rhodian festivals thereafter impossible. Beforehand, however, he would undoubtedly have been welcomed as a great benefactor and lover of Greek culture: the Rhodians themselves erected a statue of him which they let stand even when he attacked and besieged the city (Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.159). Appian tells us that Mithridates cultivated Greek learning (*Mith.* 112), and by the Third Mithridatic War at least, his court had become a centre for philosophers, poets, historians, doctors (*Oros.* 6.4.6).[24] Philosophers

[18] Durrbach, *Choix* 223 No. 137; *Ins. Delos* 2039. By this stage the relations of Mithridates with Rome were considerably more strained than they had been in Helianiax' time, but Dicaeus would have had to assume in his dedication that they were at least formally correct.

[19] *Ins. Delos* 2040. Mithridates' name is all that is left of another inscription from the Sarapeum: see *Ins. Delos* 1564.

[20] Mt. Cynthus—*Ins. Delos* 1566; Asclepieium—*Ins. Delos* 1568: the latter inscription honours king Mithridates, son of king Mithridates: this is probably Mithridates Eupator, but it could be Mithridates IV Philopator, son of Mithridates III. There is no record of Romans giving honours to Mithridates, as B. Forte, *Rome and the Romans as the Greeks saw them* (1972) 117 claims. Nor will any be found in P. Roussel, *Délos colonie athénienne* (1916) 320, to whom Forte refers.

[21] M. Segre, *Il Mondo Classico* 2 (1932) fasc. 2 p. 1-4.

[22] L. Robert, *BCH* 59 (1935) 459-465 (= *OMS* vol. 1 p. 518-524). For Robert's restoration of *Eu[ergetou]* in lines 9, 11, 13 and 15 see above p. 41 n. 133.

[23] See L. Robert, *REA* 62 (1960) 345 n. 4 (= *OMS* vol. 2 p. 861).

[24] For the poet Charinus at the Pontic court, see H. Doerrie, *Festgabe für Otto Hiltbrunner*, ed. H. Th. Johann and M. Lausberg (1974) 69-76. For the historians Heracleides of Magnesia and Teucrus of Cyzicus, see G. Bowersock, *Augustus and the Greek World* (1965) 108.

especially were attracted to his side, the most famous being Diodorus of Adramyttium and Metrodorus of Scepsis.[25] At Athens during the first war his support, as we shall see, was organised by philosopher tyrants. The embassy which he sent to Murena during the Second Mithridatic War was made up of philosophers (Memnon 26.1). Medical science fascinated Mithridates, especially pharmacology, in which he became a recognised expert (Pliny, *HN* 25.2.5). The Alexandrian pharmacologist Zopyrus corresponded with the king on the subject of antidotes (Galen 14.150K), and the famous medical scientist Asclepiades of Bithynia refused an invitation to come to the Pontic court (Pliny, *HN* 25.2.6; 7.37.134), but addressed treatises to Mithridates.[26] In its senior levels—general, judges, court doctors, envoys—the court was predominantly Greek: sixty three percent of those whose ethnicity is known were Greeks from Asia Minor and mainland Greece.[27] And there was clearly the same sort of system of aulic titulature as in other Hellenistic monarchies, with typical titles such as *suntrophos*, *tōn philōn*, *tōn prōtōn philōn*, *tōn timōmenōn philōn*, *patēr tou basileōs*.[28] In the lower level of Pontic officials—garrison commanders, marine, cavalry and infantry officers, political agents, eunuchs—only twenty percent were Greeks (four out of twenty known). It is clear, however, that the Pontic court was a largely hellenised, civilised place, where Greek men of culture were glad to come. This was important for Mithridates' image.

It was only in 96/5 that Mithridates began to issue a series of official royal coins in gold and silver, but throughout his reign the cities of Pon-

[25] For these see Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 279-80.

[26] For Asclepiades, see E. Rawson, *CQ* 32 (1982) 358-370.

[27] See E. Olshausen, *AncSoc* 5 (1974) 164. Percentages are not particularly helpful in this matter, as the numbers involved are too small. Olshausen lists thirty-nine names in his upper layer, twelve whose descent is not known, but all of whom have Greek names. Of the remaining twenty-seven, there are four Romans, fourteen Greeks and nine Asians and other Black Sea inhabitants.

[28] *Suntrophos*—Gaius son of Hermaeus (Plut. *Pomp.* 42), Dorylaus son of Philetaerus (*Ins. Delos* 1572); *tōn philōn*—Dorylaus Tacticus (Strabo 10.4.10 c.477), Athenion (Poseidonius ap. Ath. 5.211e); *tōn prōtōn philōn*—Papias son of Menophilus (*Ins. Delos* 1573); *tōn timōmenōn philōn*—Dionysius son of Boethus (*Ins. Delos* 1559); *patēr tou basileōs*—Metrodorus of Scepsis (Plut. *Luc.* 22). Diophantus son of Asclepiodorus, Eupator's successful general in the Black Sea, is described (in *IOSPE* I² 352) as *philos [men kai euergetas amōn e]ōn piste[u]omenos de [kai timōmenos ou[thenos ēsson upo basileōs Mithrada[ta]*, which may be a version of some such title as *tōn prōtōn kai protimōmenōn philōn*, and is certainly similar to the Cappadocian *tōn prōtōn philōn basileōs Ariobarzanou philorōmaiou kai malista pisteuomenōn kai timōmenōn par' autō*: for the varieties of *tōn timōmenōn philōn*, see M. Holleaux, *BCH* 57 (1933) 31-35 (= *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques*, vol. 3 [1968] 220-224). During the First Mithridatic War a conspiracy was formed against the king by Mynnion, Philotimus, Cleisthenes and Asclepiodotus who are described as *basilei gnōrimoi* (App. *Mith.* 48). Olshausen (supra n. 27) 166-7 seems to regard *gnōrimoi* as a title, but it is more likely that Appian is saying only that the conspirators were known personally to the king. For bibliography on court titulature see above p. 39 n. 123.

tus (and, at times, of conquered or allied territories) were allowed to issue their own bronze coinage, although widespread use of exactly the same types, often of relevance to Mithridates' propaganda, makes it clear that these coins were to some extent officially controlled or inspired, and were thus a sort of royal issue.[29] They advertised both Eupator's cultivation of Hellenism and also the Persian element in his family and kingdom. The Perseus story combines nicely these features, and it looms large in a number of municipal issues. There are in fact five Perseus types (obverses first): head of a young boy or Perseus with wings on his temples/Cornucopia between caps of the Dioscuri which are surmounted by stars;[30] head of Athena (as on New Style Athenian tetradrachms)/Perseus standing wearing a Phrygian cap with the Harpe in his right hand, and in his left the head of Medusa, whose body lies at his feet;[31] Aegis with Medusa's head in the centre/Nike striding right holding a palm on her shoulder;[32] head of Perseus wearing winged helm/winged Harpe;[33] helmeted head of Perseus as Mithridates/grazing Pegasus.[34] On the eve of the First Mithridatic War, Eupator told his

[29] See E. Salomone Gaggero, in *Contributi di storia antica in onore di Albino Garzetti* (1977) 98-9. The standard collections are *BMC Pontus*; *Recueil Général*; *SNG Von Aulock*. The standard analyses are F. Imhoof-Blumer, *NZ* 45 (1912) 169-192; G. Kleiner, *MDAI* (I) 6 (1955) 1-21.

[30] Amaseia, Amisus, Sinope, Adramyttium; see *BMC Pontus* 6 No. 2, 19 No. 65, 100 No. 45; Imhoof-Blumer (supra n. 29) 170 No. 1-3; *Recueil Général* 33 No. 4, 70 No. 36, 207 No. 63; *SNG Von Aulock*, 1[1] No. 15, 16, 69, 70, 230, 231. Imhoof-Blumer (supra n. 29) 172 maintained that the head is not Perseus, but a portrait of the young Mithridates Eupator. This may be so, but clearly the intention of the wings on the boy's temple is to recall Perseus: Kleiner (supra n. 29) 6.

[31] Amisus, Cabeira, Comana, Amastris, Sinope; see *BMC Pontus* 16 No. 30-36, 25 No. 1, 28 No. 1, 85 No. 7-8, 99 No. 42-44; Imhoof-Blumer (supra n. 29) 176-7 No. 35-39; *Recueil Général* 63 No. 17, 117 No. 2, 107 No. 1; *SNG Von Aulock*, 1[1] No. 63, 124, 155-6, 228. Pegasus born from the blood of Medusa appears on Athena's helmet, thus bringing obverse and reverse into close relationship: Athena, from of the old protectress of the hero, helps this ancestor of the royal house of Pontus, her old friend Perseus—see Kleiner (supra n. 29) 5.

[32] Amisus, Cabeira, Chabacta, Comana, Laodiceia, Amastris, Sinope: see *BMC Pontus* 19-20 No. 69-78, 25 No. 2-4, 27 No. 2-5, 28 No. 2, 31 No. 1, 85 No. 9-10, 100 No. 47-49; Imhoof-Blumer (supra n. 29) 177 No. 40-46; *Recueil Général* 71 No. 42-4, 117 No. 4, 105 No. 3, 107 No. 3, 114 No. 3, 175 No. 17, 207 No. 65; *SNG Von Aulock*, 1[1] No. 65, 95-6, 123, 128, 157. For this type see also U. Klein, *GNS* 19 (1969) 24-33.

[33] Amisus, Laodiceia, Sinope: see *BMC Pontus* 19 No. 68; Imhoof-Blumer (supra n. 29) 178-9 No. 54-6; *Recueil Général* 70 No. 35, 115 No. 5, 207 No. 64; *SNG Von Aulock*, 1[1] No. 129, 1[15] No. 6718.

[34] Amisus, Chabacta, Taulara: see *BMC Pontus* 18-19 No. 60-64; Imhoof-Blumer (supra n. 29) 180 No. 62-4; *Recueil Général* 69 No. 32, 104 No. 1, 146 No. 5; *SNG Von Aulock*, 1[1] No. 62, 1[15] No. 6717. Imhoof-Blumer dated this type to the period 80-70, so it will not have been part of Mithridates' propaganda before the first war with Rome, but clearly Perseus was of major importance from the beginning of Eupator's reign. For Pegasus on Mithridates' coins, see L. Lacroix, *Études d'archéologie numismatique* (1974) 78-9.

troops that he was descended on his father's side from Cyrus and Darius, the founders of the Persian kingdom, and on his mother's side from Alexander the Great and Seleucus, the founders of the Macedonian empire (Just. *Epit.* 38.7.1). Perseus was an ancestor of Alexander the Great,[35] and of the Persian royal line, and thus his importance for Mithridates was obvious: he was "the hero of integration between East and West", exactly the integration which Eupator needed to represent.[36] The Perseus story, as we shall see, also appeared on Eupator's own royal issues with the choice of Pegasus as a reverse type. Eupator was not the first king of Pontus to realize the usefulness of Perseus: Mithridates IV had done so before him (above p. 35).

If Perseus had something of east and west in him, another series of municipal bronzes, from Amisus and Sinope, emphasises only the Persian side of Mithridates: the obverse bears a youthful portrait of the king in leather helm, and the reverse a quiver with straps.[37] Since the end of the fifth century, Persian satraps had been depicted on coins wearing the leather cap, the Iranian Kyrbasia, which seems to have been a symbol of Iranian kingship. The Cappadocian monarchs were also depicted on their coins wearing it.[38] The quiver on the reverse may refer to the importance of hunting in the life of a Persian prince (see above p. 44-6). This is the only coinage which appears to refer solely to Mithridates' Persian connections.[39] Other issues are more decidely Greek. Dionysiac types oc-

[35] Arr. *Anab.* 3.3.1-2. For Alexander's emulation of Perseus and Heracles, see P. A. Brunt, *Arrian* (Loeb Classical Library) vol. 1 (1976) 464-6 Appendix 4.

[36] R. Lane Fox, *Alexander the Great* (1973) 201. On Perseus' role as liaison between Greeks and Persians in Asia, see especially F. Cumont, *RA* 1905, 180-182. Also Daremberg and Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines d'après les textes et les monuments* vol. 4.1 p. 401-2; L. Robert, *Hellenica* vol. 6 (1948) 28; L. Robert, *RN* 18 (1976) 41. For the importance of Perseus at Tarsus, see L. Robert, *BCH* 101 (1977) 96-132. For a list of the many cities of Asia Minor representing Perseus on their coins, see F. Imhoof-Blumer, *Kleinasiatischen Münzen* (1902) vol. 2 p. 417.

[37] *BMC Pontus* 20 No. 80-82; Imhoof-Blumer (supra n. 29) 171 No. 6-9; *Recueil Général* 62 No. 13, 206 No. 58; *SNG Von Aulock*, 1[1] No. 57-8.

[38] See H. Pfeiler, *GNS* 18 (1968) 77 nn. 10, 12. Pfeiler refers some of these issues to Mithridates V Euergetes who, he thinks, did not mint any royal issues. He maintains that under Euergetes and in the early years of Eupator's reign, the Iranian character of the kingdom was emphasised. After a time the increasingly strong Greek component in the state forced Eupator to try to reconcile Greek and Iranian by identifying himself with Perseus. We now know, however, (see p. 40 above) that Euergetes did have a royal coinage, and that both reverse type and the king's portrait were emphatically Greek. Further weakening Pfeiler's argument is the fact that the identification of Eupator with Perseus takes place on what must be, to judge from the child-like portrait, the earliest municipal bronzes of the reign.

[39] Some issues with types referring to Persia and formerly attributed to Eupator's time, have been reassigned to the time of his predecessors. For instance, the issue which depicts on its obverse a head in a leather helmet (sometimes just a leather helmet, or a rose) and on the reverse an eight-rayed star with or without half moon: this was attributed to

cur in many cities, an obvious reference to Mithridates' surname.[40] In Amisus, Apollo and Artemis appear on coins before the First Mithridatic War, and at a later date Heracles.[41] It appears from sculpture that Eupator may have associated himself with Heracles (see below p. 99 ff.), and so it is possible that the Amisene issue has particular relevance for Mithridates, although the suggestion of Kleiner that a portrait of the king is clearly intended in the Heracles figure, seems highly subjective, as do so many identifications of Eupator's physical features.[42] Artemis and Apollo, as far as one can tell, have local significance only. The two most widespread municipal issues of the kingdom both appear to be Greek in emphasis, but curiously do not seem to have any particular significance for Mithridates. The first has an obverse with a youthful, helmeted head of Ares, and a reverse with a sword in a scabbard;[43] the second depicts a head of Zeus on the obverse, and an eagle standing on a thunderbolt on the reverse.[44] The Zeus is probably Zeus Stratios, although not certainly.[45] Ptolemaic influence may perhaps be recognised in the eagle reverse, as the eagle on thunderbolt was the normal reverse type of the Ptolemaic dynasty.[46]

Eupator by A. Baldwin, *RN* 17 (1913) 285-313, but has now been reassigned to his predecessors by G. Golenko, *VDI* 1969 No. 107, 130-154. The strange female head in a wolfskin with a striding Nike on the reverse, issued at Amisus and Sinope (Imhoof-Blumer [supra n. 29] 180 No. 65-67) has been attributed to the time of Mithridates IV by Pfeiler (supra n. 38) 78.

[40] Obverse: head of young Dionysus with ivy crown. Reverse: thyrsus with ribbon and bell, or cista covered with panther skin and thyrsus behind.

Amastris, Amisus, Chabacta, Cabeira, Comana, Laodiceia, Sinope, Dia; see *BMC Pontus* 17-18 No. 51-58; Imhoof-Blumer (supra n. 29) 178 No. 49-53, 179 No. 57-60: *Recueil Général* 176 No. 18, 66 No. 25-6, 105 No. 4, 118 No. 5, 107 No. 2, 114 No. 2, 208 No. 73, 65 No. 24, 342 No. 1; *SNG Von Aulock*, 1[1] No. 59, 60, 61, 1[14] No. 6574, 1[15] No. 6775. Imhoof-Blumer maintained that a portrait of Mithridates was intended in the Dionysus head. See also Ropel (supra n. 5) 167.

[41] See Imhoof-Blumer (supra n. 29) 170 No. 4, 171 No. 5, 10-12, 181 No. 68.

[42] Kleiner (supra n. 29) 10.

[43] Amaseia, Amisus, Gaziura, Cabeira, Laodiceia, Pimolisa, Taulara, Amastris, Sinope: see *BMC Pontus* 6 No. 1, 17 No. 40-50, 30 No. 2, 37 No. 1, 39 No. 1, 100 No. 50; Imhoof-Blumer (supra n. 29) 175 No. 24-34, 178 No. 47-8; *Recueil Général* 33 No. 3, 67-8 No. 29-31, 113 No. 6, 117 No. 3, 114 No. 1, 193 No. 2, 146 No. 3, 175 No. 16, 208 No. 67-9; *SNG Von Aulock*, 1[1] No. 64, 93-4, 192-3, 138, 227, 1[15] No. 6694, 6722, 6779.

[44] Amaseia, Amisus, Abonuteichus, Gaziura, Cabeira, Pimolisa, Pharnaceia, Taulara, Amastris, Sinope, Dia: see *BMC Pontus* 15 No. 22-29, 30 No. 1, 36 No. 2, 84 No. 5-6, 99 No. 37-41, 138 No. 1-3; Imhoof-Blumer (supra n. 29) 174 No. 15-23, 181 No. 70-78; *Recueil Général* 32 No. 1, 33 No. 2, 63 No. 14-16, 113 No. 5, 117 No. 1, 115 No. 4, 193 No. 1, 146 No. 1, 167* No. 1, 138 No. 4, 174 No. 14, 206 No. 59-61, 342 No. 2-4; *SNG Von Aulock*, 1[1] No. 55-6, 191, 131-2, 158, 229, 1[15] No. 6695, 6755, 6780, 6865, 6930.

[45] Kleiner (supra n. 29) 10.

[46] See N. Davis and C. M. Kraay, *The Hellenistic Kingdoms. Portrait Coins and History* (1973) No. 13, 14, 17.

The dated royal issues of Eupator beginning in 96/5 combine a number of the features found on the municipal coinage. The obverse bears the king's portrait, and the reverse Pegasus or a grazing stag with a star and crescent in the field, and the whole surrounded by a garland of ivy leaves and bunches of grapes.[47] The ivy garland is not present on two undated coins, a unique gold stater (*SNG Von Aulock* 1[1] No. 5) and a silver tetradrachm (*Recueil Général* 14 No. 11). Both are probably to be dated to the time before Mithridates took the surname Dionysus, that is, some time before 102/1 at the latest.[48] The reverse of the royal issues makes use of the Perseus story with its depiction of Pegasus, conveying again the message that Mithridates is to be seen as the great unifier of Greek and Iranian. The garland of ivy and grapes is another clear reference to Mithridates' surname Dionysus. The inspiration for it may have come from the cistophoric coinage,[49] or perhaps from the Roman provincial issues of Macedonia: these latter were closely influenced by the coinage of Philip V which "had done much to establish a fashion for wreathed reverse types."[50] The star and crescent appear on Pontic royal coins from the time of Mithridates III and seem to have had oriental significance as a dynastic badge of the Mithridatic family, or the arms of the country of Pontus.[51]

There are, it is generally recognised, two main types of portrait of Mithridates Eupator on the obverse of these royal coins, both gold and silver. The first is supposed to be a " 'classical', realistic, at times almost veristic portrait of the Hellenistic monarch"; the second and later version, "a soft idealised head".[52] The difference between the two can best be seen on the silver tetradrachms.[53] The second portrait first appears in 89/88 when the Pegasus of the reverse changes to a stag, and a new era

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[47] *BMC Pontus* 43-45 No. 1-14; *Recueil Général* 13-20 No. 9-16; *SNG Von Aulock*, 1[1] No. 5-14, 1[15] No. 6676-6684. These royal coins are dated by the Bithynian era. Pharnaces probably used the Seleucid era (see above p. 30 n. 83), and it is not clear which of his three successors changed to the Bithynian, but Eupator seems the likeliest: see B. C. McGing, *RhM* forthcoming.

[48] See M. J. Price, *NC* 8 (1968) 2.

[49] Price (supra n. 48) 3.

[50] Davis and Kraay (supra n. 46) No. 125, 126, 128.

[51] Dynastic badge—Davis and Kraay (supra n. 46) 200-209. Arms of Pontus—Kleiner (supra n. 29) 13; G. Kleiner, *JDAI* 68 (1953) 82. "A symbol of Men-Mithra"—A. N. Oikonomides, *Mithraic Art* (1975) 71. "It symbolizes the Persian ancestry of the family and signifies its religious leanings"—P. Pollak, *ANSMusN* 16 (1970) 47. "The astral symbols star and crescent ... probably derive from the worship of Ma"—Price (supra n. 48) 3. "The emblem of the Mithridatic family is a symbol of the Persian deity Ahura-mazda"—A. B. Brett, *Catalogue of Greek Coins, Museum of Fine Arts Boston* (1955) 180.

[52] Price (supra n. 48) 3.

[53] See for instance G. Kleiner, *JDAI* 68 (1953) 78 Abb. 1 and 79 Abb. 2; Price (supra n. 48) Pl. 1 No. 5 and Pl. 1 No. 6-7.

comes into use. The change in 89/8 when Mithridates invaded Asia is taken by Price to be politically motivated. The Pegasus of the early reverses is too reminiscent of Mithridates' Persian ancestry, and "can hardly have been thought a suitable type for a monarch 'liberating' the Greek cities of Asia Minor"; the stag was a reference to the cult of Artemis at Ephesus, but also had Pontic significance, as a doe appears on the coins of Pharnaces I. The change in portrait style of the obverse also had a political motivation: the "soft fleshy portrait which appears on his coins from 89/8 may be the representation of the king in his role as Dionysus", the previous portrait being too much in the style of a Hellenistic monarch.

Some of this is quite acceptable. The silver tetradrachms of the second type do portray a more highly idealized head: the wrinkles, and what Reinach called the "tired" features of the first portrait are now gone.[54] The stag does appear with regularity after the invasion of Asia, and the new Pergamene era starting in 89/8 clearly celebrates the start of a new age in the history of Asia. One should not, however, make too much of the difference. For a start, both types of portrait of the king with Pegasus and the stag, appear concurrently between 89/8 and 86/5, before finally the idealized portrait/stag coins take over completely. The stag's most obvious connection is with Ephesian Artemis, and for Eupator's new mint at Pergamum in the new part of his empire, it makes good sense to honour Artemis.[55] As his Pontic mint continues with Pegasus, there is no sudden attempt by Mithridates to suppress his Persian origins. As Price himself admits, even the stag may have had Pontic significance: for it appears both on Pharnaces' coins (in the form of a doe), and on Mithridates' own silver tetradrachms of 96/5, and gold staters of 93/2.[56] Indeed not only did Mithridates make no attempt to suppress his Persian origins, he positively flaunted them, at least in one very visible aspect: he called the governors of his new territories 'satraps' (App. *Mith.* 22; Welles, *Royal Correspondence* No. 73), when the title of provincial governors in all the other Hellenistic monarchies was *stratēgos* not *satrapēs*.

[54] Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 274. n. 1. That the gold staters of 93/2 and 89/8 differ in the same way, although stated with confidence by Price, seems less convincing: the issue of 93/2 already has the swept-back hair and idealized features of the 89/8 issue.

[55] If coin symbols were to have any propaganda value, their interpretation had to be reasonably simple and obvious. Kleiner (supra n. 53) 90 connects the stag not only with Ephesian Artemis, but also with Milesian Apollo (the cult statue of Apollo made by Canachus held a young stag in the right hand); with Pergamum, whose founder Telephus was suckled by an Arcadian stag; and with Heracles, Telephus' son, who hunted the Ceryneian stag for a year. It is difficult for us to estimate what the ancients would or would not have understood in a particular symbol, but one wonders whether this is not all too obscure.

[56] See Brett (supra n. 51) No. 2337; Price (supra n. 48) Pl. 1 No. 3.

Here surely, as Welles noted, he was acting as the successor of the Achaemenid Persians. It is nonsense to say that he was playing down this side of his image in deference to the Asiatic Greeks. Even on the mainland in northern Greece 'satraps' were appointed (App. *Mith.* 35).

As for the two portraits, it is difficult to accept that the earlier is even remotely veristic: one only has to compare it with the portraits of Mithridates III, Pharnaces or Mithridates IV to see that. The features of the face are more detailed and somewhat more realistic, but even the very earliest portraits are highly romanticised, with handsome Greek features and long flowing hair. The identification of Mithridates Euergetes' tetradrachm makes it clear that the change from tough native portraits to idealised Greek ones was not entirely Eupator's idea: this trend, admittedly developed further by Eupator, was in fact started by his father. Kleiner thinks that the earlier type of Eupator's portrait reflects the Alexander portrait of the time seen clearly on the Roman provincial issues of Macedonia,[57] which are in turn based on the famous Lysimachean issues.[58] There can be little doubt that Alexander is the model. The second type imitates Alexander even more clearly. In this we see the open, apparently inhaling mouth, the luxuriant wind-swept hair, the exalted expression of Alexander's portraiture.[59] Mithridates was coming as the liberator of the Asiatic Greeks (Cic. *Flac.* 60), just as once Alexander had appeared in Asia. This interpretation of the second type is more likely than Price's view that it depicts Mithridates as Dionysus, for the association with Alexander is much clearer than any possible connection with Dionysus.

If the interpretation of coin symbols and iconography is difficult, the mere identification of Mithridatic portraits in sculpture is even more so, relying as it does solely on the known coin portraits. The first and still most convincingly identified piece of sculpture thought to be Mithridates is the Heracles head with lion skin in the Louvre. The profile and side whiskers led F. Winter in 1894 to suggest that this was in fact Mithridates Eupator in the guise of Heracles.[60] At the time there was no other evidence for Mithridates' apotheosis as Heracles, but subsequently his features have been recognised on posthumous issues of Alexander (as Heracles) from Odessus, Mesembria, Byzantium and other Black Sea cities.[61] There is little consensus on the date of the Louvre head so we

[57] See, for instance, M. Bieber, *Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art* (1964) Pl. 40 No. 87.

[58] Bieber (supra n. 57) Pl. 22 No. 43, Pl. 24 No. 46.

[59] See H. P. L'Orange, *Apotheosis in Ancient Portraiture* (1947) 11-38.

[60] F. Winter, *JDAI* 9 (1894) 245-8 Taf. 8.

[61] See M. Bieber, *The Sculpture of the Hellenistic Age* (ed. 2 1961) 122; Price (supra n. 48) 6. See also above p. 58.

cannot say at what point Mithridates began to identify himself with Heracles, or at least not on the basis of this sculpture.[62]

If the Louvre piece is unanimously accepted as Mithridates, it would appear to be the only one. Further identifications, often of the king as Heracles, are mostly highly subjective and none seems secure. In 1908 Winter discussed a Heracles from Pergamum, part of a group sculpture of Heracles rescuing Prometheus from the tormenting eagle.[63] He thought that the Heracles figure perhaps represented Attalus II or III,[64] but G. Krahmer made a case for identifying it as Eupator.[65] If this is accepted we have a clear work of propaganda: Mithridates is now depicted in the guise of the Greek god Heracles rescuing the Greek world (Prometheus) from the Roman eagle. Another appearance of the king as Heracles was suggested by Oikonomides in a bronze statuette of the British Museum.[66] The figure wears a short Thracian tunic with a belt of Iranian type, and has side whiskers like Mithridates, but the identification is very speculative.[67] The king has been identified in other guises besides Heracles: Dionysus[68] for instance, Helios[69] and Inopus.[70] The

[62] Bieber (supra n. 61) dates the head to about 92-90 because she thinks that the man depicted appears to be about forty years old. E. Pfuhl, *JDAI* 45 (1930) 15 argues for a date in the 80's on historical grounds, and V. Müller, *A Bull* 20 (1938) 408 for the period 85-75 on stylistic grounds.

[63] F. Winter, *Altertümer von Pergamon* vol. 7.1 (1908) 175-180.

[64] He did not, as far as I can see, identify it as Mithridates Eupator, as claimed by A. N. Oikonomides, *Archaeology* 15 No. 1 (1962) 13 (also A. N. Oikonomides, *North Amer. Journal of Numismatics* 4 [1965] 12).

[65] G. Krahmer, *JDAI* 40 (1925) 203.

[66] A. N. Oikonomides, *Archaeology* 15 No. 1 (1962) 13-15. Bieber apparently agrees with the identification. G. Richter, *The Portraits of the Greeks* vol. 3 (1965) 275 seems undecided.

[67] Professor Jocelyn Toynbee informs me by letter that she thinks it is just Heracles. It would be a great mystery, she says, how a portrait of Mithridates should have got to Hadrian's wall, where this statuette was found.

[68] A. N. Oikonomides, *Athene* (Chicago) vol. 24 No. 4 (1963) 7-9 suggests that the Dionysian head in Copenhagen (Ny-Carlsberg Glyptothek No. 1082 a) represents Mithridates. In profile the head is certainly similar to the Louvre Heracles and coin portraits.

[69] A. Krug, *AA* 1969, 185-189 claims that the Helios figure from Venice harmonises nicely the elements of Alexander's portrait, the attributes of Helios and the individual portrait of Mithridates himself. J. M. C. Toynbee, *Roman Historical Portraits* (1978) 116 accepts Krug's identification, but by letter expresses some uncertainty. There seems to be no supporting evidence that Mithridates was associated with Helios (although it is by no means impossible), in spite of Günther's attempt to make Mithridates represent the oriental Sun God, who he argues, played a large role in the second and first centuries as the "Erlöser von der sozialen Knechtschaft": see R. Günther in *Sozialökonomische Verhältnisse im alten Orient und Klassischen Altertum*, ed. R. Günther and G. Schrot (1961) 101-2.

[70] See J. Charbonneaux, *R. Louvre* 1 (1951) 8-16. Kleiner (supra n. 53) 84 n. 45 accepts this identification, but it is rejected by Bieber (supra n. 57) 67 n. 60 and Richter (supra n. 66) 275. The portrait of Eupator supposed by Bieber (supra n. 61) 122 to be in the possession of D. M. Robinson has nothing to do with Mithridates Eupator: it depicts Mithridates I Arsaces VI of Parthia—see D. M. Robinson, *AJA* 31 (1927) 338-344.

list of identifications grows—bronzes from Naples and Herculaneum, heads from Ostia, Aphrodisias, Odessa, Leningrad, and a famous one from Delos[71]—but it would be rash to base any theories of Mithridatic iconography on such insecure foundations.

Finger rings and gems bearing his portrait certainly existed in Eupator's reign: Athenion the philosopher returned to Athens from Asia in 88 wearing a gold ring with the portrait of Mithridates engraved on it (Poseidonius ap. Ath. 212d). Precious stones was a subject in which the king had a special interest. Zachalias of Babylon dedicated a work to Mithridates in which he attributed man's destiny to the influence of gems (Pliny, *HN* 37.169). Mithridates himself wrote on the subject of amber (Pliny, *HN* 37.39), and his considerable collection of rings was dedicated on the Capitol by Pompey (Pliny, *HN* 37.11). Of the gem and ring portraits that survive, some seem to show the Alexander-like head of Mithridates' coins.[72] Others bear soft, almost effeminate portraits.[73]

We can see clearly from his coins that Mithridates represented himself to the Greek elements in the east as an Alexander figure.[74] This is borne out by his behaviour during the wars against Rome. Early in the first war he lodged at an inn where Alexander had also once stayed, thinking it a good omen to copy Alexander (App. *Mith.* 20). When he saw the earthquake damage at Apameia, Mithridates donated one hundred talents for rebuilding, as Alexander had done at an earlier date (Strabo 12.8.18 c. 578). Alexander extended the sacred precinct of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus by a stade, and Mithridates extended it further, as far as the arrow he shot from the roof of the temple (Strabo 14.1.23 c.641). In the third war Mithridates was seriously wounded in the course of his victory over Triarius, but his physician lifted him up on high so that his worried

[71] Naples and Herculaneum—E. Muscettola, *Bronzes hellénistiques et romains. Tradition et renouveau. Actes du Ve colloque international sur les bronzes antiques, Lausanne 6-13 mai 1978* (1979) 87-94; Ostia—R. Calza, *Scavi di Ostia* vol 5: *I ritratti* 1 (1964) 21 No. 12 table 7; Aphrodisias—*AJA* 78 (1974) 127; *AS* 24 (1974) 23 (This head, it is now argued, in fact may be that of Nicomedes IV of Bithynia—see J. Reynolds, *Aphrodisias and Rome* [1982] 24); Odessa and Leningrad—O. I. Neverov, *TE* 13 (1972) 110-118; Delos—E. Michalowski, *Les portraits hellénistiques et romains. Explor. Arch. de Délos* vol. 13 (1932) 5-8 table 7. The difficulty Kleiner (supra n. 53) 84 ff. has in deciding whether this Delian head represents Alexander, one of his succesors, or Mithridates, demonstrates well the difficulty and uncertainty in identifying sculptural portraits of Mithridates.

[72] E.g. G. Richter, *Engraved Gems of the Greeks and Etruscans* (1968) No. 649-650. No. 651-652 have also been identified as Eupator, but Richter is sceptical about this, and they certainly do not seem to look anything like the Mithridates of other portraits.

[73] E.g. O. I. Neverov, *VDI* 1969, No. 107, 172-175; *Soobščenija Gosudarstvennogo Ermitaza. Reports of the Hermitage Museum Leningrad* 37 (1973) 41-5; *TE* 17 (1976) 175 No. 1-3; J. Boardman and M. L. Vollenweider, *Catalogue of the Engraved Gems and Finger Rings in the Ashmolean Museum* (1978) No. 317.

[74] See A. N. Oikonomides, *Archeion Pontou* 22 (1958) 219-243.

troops could see that he was alive, just as in India the wounded Alexander had shown himself from a ship to his troops (App. *Mith.* 89). Alexander's cloak was found among the possessions of Mithridates after his death (App. *Mith.* 117). "There is no doubt that the ambitious Mithridates felt himself a genuine heir to Alexander the world conqueror", wrote M. Bieber.[75] The clear evidence of his coins and his actions adds some support to the suggested sculpture identifications in which Mithridates appears as Heracles and Dionysus. For here too he may well have been following Alexander. Heracles and Dionysus were said to be ancestors of Alexander, and both had led expeditions to the east (Arr. *Indica* 5.8 ff.), and thus provided objects of emulation for Alexander, who appears in the guise of both.[76] We do not know why Mithridates took the name Dionysus, nor what features of Dionysus he found desirable or advantageous when choosing the name, but when he came to project himself as Alexander it was a quite fitting surname. Perhaps Alexander even had something to do with the choice. The sculpted portraits and the coins of Mithridates as Heracles may also be attributed to his imitation of Alexander.

When Athenion returned to Athens in 88 from his embassy to Mithridates, he delivered a speech to the people telling them of the rapid advances made by the Pontic forces in Asia. In the speech, he mentions oracles coming from all quarters foretelling Mithridates' victory (Ath. 213b). Oracles, then, were part of the king's propaganda. Although it is probably impossible to say precisely which ones he used, from surviving prophetic utterances we can see the sort of thing that was available to him. Phlegon of Tralles records the early anti-Roman propaganda of Antisthenes (Jacoby, *FGrHist.* 257 F36). After the defeat of Antiochus III at Thermopylae by M'Acilius Glabrio, so the first story runs, one of the Syrian dead, Bouplagus, appeared to the Romans warning them to stop despoiling the slain, as Zeus was angry at their action, and would send a "bold-hearted race" against them to bring their rule to an end and change their ways. The Delphic oracle also warned them with threats of loss and toil. Another story tells the tale of how the Roman general Publius had an oracular fit and prophesied trouble for Rome after her victory in Asia. He foresaw the coming of a king leading a mighty army recruited in both Asia and Europe, which would conquer and oppress

[75] Bieber (supra n. 61) 122.

[76] For Alexander's appearance as Dionysus and Heracles see E. Neuffer, *Das Kostüm Alexanders d. Gr.* (1929) 16, 45-7 (Dionysus); 16-17, 47-48 (Heracles). See also A. Heuss, *A & A* 4 (1954) 70. Alexander's close association with, and apotheosis as Dionysus was perhaps not a prominent feature of his own lifetime but was built up by later, especially Ptolemaic, tradition: see A. D. Nock, *JHS* 48 (1928) 21-30.

Rome because of Athena's anger. He then foretold the course of the war in Asia before talking once again of armies and kings from Asia bringing destruction to Rome. Finally Publius warned that a wolf would eat him. This turns out to be true, but the wolf leaves his head, thus enabling Publius to declare the truth of his prophecies, and continue forecasting the destruction of Rome. The date of these stories is not certain, but it seems reasonable to place at least their original version shortly after the war against Antiochus.[77] Assuming that the second story especially was written before Mithridates' time, it does not really matter what particular king was intended when the piece was written: a king from the east uniting Europe and Asia, and bringing death and destruction to the Romans would clearly fit Mithridates perfectly.

The coming of a king appears elsewhere. *The Oracle of Hystaspes* foretold the destruction of Rome, even, it was said, before the Trojan race came into existence. The Roman empire will be destroyed, and rule will return to Asia.[78] The exact succession of apocalyptic events is not clear. It appears that chaos and misery will follow the end of Rome, but that eventually the good people will gather on a mountain surrounded by the forces of the impious king, and will pray to God, who will send them a king from heaven to rescue and free them and destroy all the wicked with fire and sword.[79] The date of the oracle is disputed, but a good case has been made that it was originally a Persian anti-Macedonian oracle, which was then re-written as anti-Roman about the time of Mithridates Eupator, who will have been the saviour king referred to in the work.[80]

The *Bahman Yasht* has many similarities with the *Oracle of Hystaspes*, and again envisions the coming of an oriental saviour king, who will throw off

[77] See H. Fuchs, *Der geistige Widerstand gegen Rom in der antiken Welt* (ed. 2 1964) 29-30 n. 16; Forte (supra n. 20) 41-43. See also J. Mesk, *Philologus* 80 (1925) 310. For the most recent detailed analysis of the subject, see J. D. Gauger, *Chiron* 10 (1980) 225-261. Gauger argues that the author is not the Antisthenes of Rhodes discussed by Polybius (16.14-20), but the Athenian peripatetic philosopher Antisthenes mentioned by Hesychius: he perhaps belonged, Gauger suggests, to the circle of Aristion the supporter of Mithridates, and edited the whole piece as an addition to the king's propaganda.

[78] Lactant. *Div. Inst.* 7.15.11. For the oracle, preserved in paraphrase by Lactantius, see J. Bidez and F. Cumont, *Les Mages Hellénisés* vol. 2 (1938) 361-376. It is not immediately clear how much is paraphrase of the oracle, and how much Lactantius' own picture of events. There seems to be a mingling of traditions by Lactantius: see Fuchs (supra n. 77) 31-35.

[79] S. K. Eddy, *The King is Dead. Studies in the Near Eastern Resistance to Hellenism 334-31 B.C.* (1961) 32 thinks that the calamities and chaos refer to the time of the Roman rule, but the text appears to state clearly that they follow the end of the Roman empire.

[80] See Eddy (supra n. 79) 32-36; 176-7. For the identification of the king as Mithridates, see also H. Windisch, *Die Orakel des Hystaspes* (1929) 155; G. Widengren in *Hommages à Georges Dumézil. Collection Latomus* 45 (1960) 231; Forte (supra n. 20) 113. Bidez and Cumont (supra n. 78) vol. 1 p. 218 date the oracle after Mithridates' death.

the oppression of foreign rule.[81] The birth of this prince will be marked by a star falling to earth, as happened when Mithridates was born. Although the oracle dates probably from the third century, Mithridates would find plenty in it to apply to himself, and evidently the original underwent continuous change to fit different times, right up until the thirteenth century A.D.[82]

A king from the east also appears in the *Oracle of the Potter*[83] and in *Sibylline Oracles* 3.652-6: "and then god will send a king from the east". Most of book three of the *Sibylline Oracles* seems to have been a second century B.C. production,[84] and parts of it would have provided good material for Mithridates. One reads of "an empire with many hoary heads from the western sea which shall rule over much land and convulse many people and cause fear to all kings in time to come. It shall appropriate much gold and silver and afflict mortals. But there shall be a great fall for those men when they enter on a course of overweening injustice" (lines 175-183). This introduces two important themes of propaganda which Mithridates undoubtedly used.

First is the "traditional theme of regal anti-Roman propaganda: the Romans are intent on the destruction of all kings."[85] Demetrius king of Illyria tells Philip V of Macedon that the Romans find it intolerable that any king should exist beside their empire (Just. *Epit.* 29.2.4). Antiochus the Great tried to persuade Prusias of Bithynia to join his side against the Romans, who were coming to Asia to destroy all kingdoms, so that in all the world there should be no other empire but Rome's.[86] Perseus of Macedon thought that a free state and a king were by nature hostile to each other, and that Rome systematically attacked kings (Livy 44.24.1 ff.). This type of propaganda is useful primarily in the attempt of one king to gain the alliance of another. Mithridates apparently used it in this way during the Third Mithridatic War when he was trying to win over king Arsaces (Sall. *H.* 4.69.15-17 Maurenbrecher), and almost certainly used it for the same purposes before the first war: on the eve of that

[81] For a translation see E. W. West, *Pahlavi Texts* Part 1. *The Sacred Books of the East* vol. 5 (1880) 191-235. For the similarities with *The Oracle of Hystaspes* see Eddy (supra n. 79) 18; J. Collins, *The Sibylline Oracles of Egyptian Judaism* (1974) 10.

[82] Eddy (supra n. 79) 17-32; 343; West (supra n. 81) LIII-LVI.

[83] This was translated into Greek from the original Egyptian in the first century B.C: see Eddy (supra n. 79) 292-294.

[84] See A. Rzach, *RE* 2A (1923) col. 2128; Collins (supra n. 81) 21-33.

[85] L. Raditsa, *A Historical Commentary to Sallust's Letter of Mithridates* (Diss. Columbia 1969) 221.

[86] Livy 37.25.5 ff. For the Scipios' counter propaganda, see Pol. 21.11. For Roman attitudes to kings see E. Rawson, *JRS* 65 (1975) 150-152.

war when he addressed his troops, he referred to the Roman hatred of all kings (Just. *Epit.* 38.6).

The other propaganda theme is that of Roman avarice. "However much Rome took from tribute-paying Asia, three times as much money Asia shall take back again from Rome, paying back her destructive arrogance. And as many Asians as were enslaved in Italian homes, twenty times this number of Italians shall toil in poverty in Asia and shall pay back their debt ten thousand-fold" (*Sib. Orac.* 3.350-355). If this was of Mithridatic or earlier date, as most maintain, it will have been excellent material for Mithridates who evidently laid great emphasis on Roman greed.[87] Pelopidas warned the Romans before the first war that Asia, Greece, Africa and Italy itself would side with Pontus because they could not endure the *pleonexia* of Rome (App. *Mith.* 16). And after the war, Mithridates argued that it was brought on by the greed of the Roman representatives: if there was one charge to which the Romans were particularly susceptible it was *philokerdia* (App. *Mith.* 56). His murder of Manius Aquillius by pouring molten gold down his throat was clearly a dramatic attempt to draw attention to the Roman love of money (App. *Mith.* 21). The letter of Mithridates in Sallust propounds much the same theme, coupling greed for power with love of money: the real reason for the wars that Rome fights is *cupido profunda imperi et divitiarum* (Sect. 5). When these *latrones gentium* (sect. 22) were halted by the ocean in their westward expansion, they turned to the east. Everything they possess, wives, horses, land, empire had been robbed (Sect. 17).[88] This rhetoric fell on receptive ears in Asia. Mithridates himself claimed at the beginning of the first war that the Romans were hated for *rapacitas proconsulum*,

[87] For discussion of the date see Fuchs (supra n. 77) 36; Eddy (supra n. 79) 179; Forte (supra n. 20) 113; Gauger (supra n. 77) 247-8. W. Tarn, *JRS* 22 (1932) 135-137, followed by Collins (supra n. 81) 57-62, dated lines 350-380 to the time of Antonius and Cleopatra. Asia, according to this interpretation, means "Egypt", which seems unlikely: Collins can only claim, rather weakly, that "Egypt might have identified itself with Asia, since the Ptolemies laid claim to Coele-Syria." Nor is there any particular difficulty in reconciling Mithridates' ideology with lines 367-380, which envisage not only the defeat of Rome by Asia, but also a reconciliation and shared prosperity between east and west. "There was no room," Collins says, "for such reconciliation in the fight to the death between Mithridates and Rome." The reconciliation referred to, however, is a general one between east and west, not a particular one between the east and Rome. Mithridates emphasised his role as a unifier of east and west. One cannot be certain, but it does seem preferable to associate lines 350-380 with Mithridates rather than with Cleopatra. Keil, *CAH* vol. 11 p. 583 does not, as Forte (supra n. 20) 113 n. 51 claims, suggest a date in the reign of Titus: Keil is referring to *Sib. Orac.* 4. 145 ff.

[88] For many of these same propaganda themes, see Jugurtha's attempt to win the alliance of Bocchus (Sall. *Jug.* 81.1): the Romans were unjust, profoundly greedy and the common enemies of all. They had a desire for power, and a hostility towards all kingdoms. For discussion of Sallust's letter of Mithridates see below p. 154 ff.

sectio publicanorum, calumnia litium (Just. *Epit.* 38.7.8). Diodorus (37.5) confirms this when he relates how the publicani of Asia, in partnership with those in charge of the courts at Rome, had filled the province with crimes which Scaevola corrected, thus extinguishing, at least for a time, the inveterate hatred of the provincials for the Roman empire. Rutilius Rufus, Scaevola's legate, also defended Asia against the injustices of the publicani (Livy, *Epit.* 70). Epigraphy attests disputes between publicani and locals at, for instance, Ilium, Priene, Pergamum.[89] There was trouble too at Ephesus. As Appian (*Mith.* 23) points out, there was no clearer proof of the provincials' hatred for the Romans than the 'Asian Vespers' of the First Mithridatic War, when the resident Romans and Italians were massacred. Cicero no doubt had this in mind when he talked of this hatred (e.g. *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 65; *Flac.* 8.19), but it was probably clear even before the Asian Vespers.

Mithridates' opinions of himself and his countrymen, his views about the Romans, and his own version of events are summarized by Pompeius Trogus in a long speech delivered by the king to his troops just after the opening engagement of the first war (Just. *Epit.* 38.4-6). He points out that the Romans are not invincible: his own troops have just proved that with their victory over Aquillius, and others had triumphed too—Pyrrhus, Hannibal, the Gauls, the Italians. Rome was at that very time under great pressure from the Italians and from internal discord, so now was the time to act. Moreover the Romans had already effectively declared war on Pontus. For it was an act of war to deprive him of Phrygia, which had been given to his father as a reward after the war against Aristonicus, and which had earlier come into the possession of Pontus when Mithridates II received it as a dowry from Seleucus Callinicus. Obedience to the Roman demands had had no effect. He had given up Phrygia and Paphlagonia. He had removed his son from Cappadocia, a country which he had seized quite fairly. The Senate declared war on Socrates Chrestus, and Mithridates dutifully killed him. He had done everything demanded of him, but was unfairly blamed for what Tigranes and Gordius did. Gordius, because he was a friend of Mithridates, was not recognised as king of Cappadocia by the Romans, although the people of Cappadocia wanted him. Nicomedes attacked Pontus at the instigation of the Roman Commissioners who then regarded it as a *casus belli* that Mithridates would not let his kingdom be ravaged by Nicomedes. In fact the Romans were hostile to all kings, as for instance, Eupator's own grandfather Pharnaces, Eumenes of Pergamum, Antiochus the Great of Syria, Perseus of Macedon, Aristonicus, even Jugurtha the grandson of that stalwart Roman friend, Massinissa. Just as the founders of Rome were brought up by a wolf, so now their descendants displayed the blood-thirstiness and greed of wolves—greed for riches and empire. Mithridates himself, in comparison with the low-born kings of Rome, was of noble Persian and Macedonian stock, and his people had never been subject to foreign kings. His armies had won brilliant victories against the previously undefeated Scythians, whose country was harsh and poor, in contrast to the fertile and wealthy land of Asia, where battle was now to be joined. Let them follow bravely their just and generous king who had added by inheritance Colchis, Paphlagonia, and Bosporus to the kingdom of his father.[90]

[89] For the Roman exploitation of Asia see T. R. S. Broughton, *An Enonomic Survey of Ancient Rome*, ed. T. Frank, vol. 4 (1938) 534 ff.; Magie, *RRAM* 159-176; E. M. Sandford, *JNES* 9 (1950) 28-36.

There were two major aspects to Mithridates' propaganda. On one side was the image he projected of himself. This had mixed appeal to win over both Greeks and Asiatics. To the Greeks he was, at least before his struggle with Rome, a philhellene of the highest order, with a record of benefactions and thoroughly civilised behaviour. His senior courtiers were mostly Greeks, and his court was filled with Greek men of letters and learning. His coin portraits depicted a new Alexander, a new champion of Hellenism: he would rescue the Greeks from their money-loving, oppressive overlords, the Romans. On another level he was more of an oriental. Although certain features of Alexander as an ideal king may have been attractive to Asiatics as well as Greeks,[91] he was of course the great conqueror of the east, and not therefore an obvious eastern hero.[92] To his eastern subjects and prospective eastern subjects, Mithridates aimed to present himself as a Persian prince of royal lineage: he sacrificed to Ahuramazda (in the form of Zeus Stratios) like other Persian kings (App. *Mith.* 66; 70), and emphasised his Iranian connections in speeches and on coins. All people, he hoped, would see in him the king from the east destined to bring about the destruction of Rome foretold in oracles. They would receive encouragement in such a view from the great victories Mithridates had already achieved. He did not, however, merely have separate Greek and oriental identities. He was the great unifier of the east and west. He was at once both a Persian king and a Macedonian

[90] See Fuchs (supra n. 77) 16. It is not immediately clear how much of this speech can be attributed with safety to Mithridatic propaganda, or how much is due to Pompeius Trogus' powers of invention. The same question arises with Sallust's *Letter of Mithridates* to the king of Parthia, and as Trogus' speech certainly owes something to Sallust's letter, I have postponed discussion until chapter V: see below p. 154 ff.

[91] See D. Glew, *Hermes* 105 (1977) 256.

[92] For Persian hostility to Alexander see Eddy (supra n. 79) 12-13.

king—the embodiment of Perseus, the bridge between Greece and Asia.[93]

On the other side of the king's propaganda was the picture he painted of the Romans as unjust, hostile to kings, and greedy for empire and riches. They had been the ones to provoke him, and by their repeated and unjustified demands, with which he had complied, they had in fact already declared war. He was the one who had been wronged.

2. *The War*

Mithridates' extensive preparations were rewarded with rapid success when the war opened.[94] Nicomedes of Bithynia led the invasion of Pontus, while the Roman commanders Aquillius, Oppius and Cassius apparently remained in defensive positions on three of the main routes into Pontus. Nicomedes was overwhelmed by the Pontic generals Neoptolemus and Archelaus, and Aquillius was then put to flight.[95]

[93] For a good summary of Mithridates' preparations and propaganda for the fight with Rome, see H. Volkmann, *Sullas Marsch auf Rom. Der Verfall der römischen Republik* (1958) 30-36; Salomone Gaggero (supra n. 29) 89-123.

[94] For some standard accounts of the war, see for example Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 115-199; T. Mommsen, *The History of Rome* (English transl. by W. P. Dickson) vol. 4 (1901) 25-52; H. Ormerod, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 240-259; Magie, *RRAM* 211-231; Will, *Histoire politique* vol. 2, 399-405; A. N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East* (1984) 121-148.

[95] The Roman strategy at the beginning of the war is not clear. On the location of the Roman forces, see Magie, *RRAM* 1101 n. 26. Manius Aquillius was positioned in Bithynia on Mithridates' route into that country from Pontus, i.e. at the Bithynian border on the main east-west road through northern Anatolia (E. Badian, *AJAH* 1 [1976] 110 states that Aquillius was defeated in Cappadocia, but as A. N. Sherwin-White in *Miscellanea di studi classici in onore di Eugenio Manni* Vol. 6 [1980] 1992 points out, this is incorrect). Cassius was *en mesō Bithunias te kai Galatias* (App. *Mith.* 17) probably guarding the route from Pontus via Ancyra into Bithynia or Phyrgia Epictetus: he may have been at Gordiocume in Bithynia (Reinach), or at Dorylaum or Pessinus (Magie). Oppius seems to have been at the border between Lycaonia and Cappadocia (at this stage already occupied by the Pontic forces of Ariarathes IX—App. *Mith.* 15) guarding the Southern Highway (Magie, *RRAM* 789 n. 18). D. Glew, *The Outbreak of the First Mithridatic War* (diss. Princeton 1971) 97 ff. argues that the Romans were not trying to invade Pontus at all, but merely wanted to restore Ariobarzanes to Cappadocia. Nicomedes' advance into the valley of the river Amnias was aimed not at invasion, but at protecting Oppius' rear while he restored Ariobarzanes; the first battle took place in territory not strictly belonging to Mithridates, but only claimed by him. There does not, however, seem to be any evidence, despite Magie's assertion to the contrary (Magie, *RRAM* 1093 n. 57), that the Amnias valley was the part of Paphlagonia seized by Mithridates in his (and Nicomedes') invasion of 108. The battle took place in Pontus proper, and after it Nicomedes fled with his survivors into Paphlagonia (App. *Mith.* 18). Nor is it at all clear how Nicomedes' seizure of the Amnias valley was necessary for the protection of Oppius' rear, when Aquillius and Cassius were already guarding the routes into Roman Asia through Bithynia and Galatia. The positions adopted by the Roman commanders were in fact both defensive and offensive, and this may indicate that the Roman strategy was to wait and see how Nicomedes fared; if he was able to check or defeat Mithridates, the Roman forces were in position to advance along the main routes into Pontus; and if he were defeated, then they were in position to defend Asia from any of the likely directions of Pontic attack.

Mithridates thus broke into Bithynia and occupied it without further opposition. He spent what was left of 89 organising it, and probably also sent his troops in to Phrygia.[96] A notable feature of his early victories was the mercy he showed to his captured enemies, sending them home with clothing and supplies, and generally treating them kindly. This won for him a reputation for *philanthrōpia* which in turn persuaded many cities to side with him, and welcome him as god and saviour (Diod. 37.26). *Philanthrōpia* was an important quality of the ideal Hellenistic king,[97] and it fitted in with Mithridates' Alexander propaganda: Alexander was the type of the ideal king,[98] a role which Mithridates was now trying to fill.[99]

In 88 the Roman forces did not even confront the king. After the defeat in 89 of Manius Aquillius, who fled to Pergamum and then towards Rhodes, Cassius had withdrawn to a Phrygian stronghold where he tried to regroup and train his recruits, but failed and retired to Apameia (App. *Mith.* 19). Here he received substantial support (sixty thousand modii of grain) from the wealthy Chaeremon of Nysa, a member of a family which became increasingly important in later years.[100] Oppius made his way to Laodiceia on the Lycus. Mithridates swept down through Phrygia, stopping for a night, as we have seen (above p. 101), at the same inn as Alexander. Apameia seems to have gone over to his side willingly, and it was

[96] Badian (supra n. 95) 109-110 relies on the Epitomator of Livy for his suggestion that it was not until 88 that Mithridates moved into Phrygia. *Epit.* 74 reports the restoration, presumably by Aquillius, of Ariobarzanes and Nicomedes. In 89 they are once again driven out by Mithridates (*Epit.* 76). *Epit.* 77 recapitulates the events of 89 in an ablative absolute phrase—*Mithridates Ponti rex, Bithynia et Cappadocia occupatis et pulso Aquillio legato*—before going on to the invasion of Phrygia in 88: *Phrygiam provinciam populi Romani, cum ingenti exercitu intravit*. *Epit.* 78 then recounts in more detail the events of 88. The war started in 89 with the occupation by Mithridates of Cappadocia and Bithynia, M'Aquillius and Nicomedes having been defeated, and at the beginning of 88 it was carried into Phrygia. *Epit.* 77 does not refer to a second expulsion of Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes, as Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 109 n. 2 thought, and then explained by rearranging the order of the Epitomes. Sherwin-White (supra n. 95) 1984 ff. places more reliance on the evidence of Appian, which implies that by the end of the first year of the war Mithridates had in fact invaded Phrygian Asia (App. *Mith.* 22; *BCiv.* 1.55). Sherwin reinterprets the Livian Epitomes: *Epit.* 76 records the outbreak of the war in 89, a subject which is "reserved for full treatment in the latter part of Book 77", and *Epit.* 78 covers the Asiatic events of 88. This version has the advantage of relieving some of the pressure on the year 88, which otherwise has to bear an almost impossible load of events: see also Sherwin-White (supra n. 94) 122 ff.

[97] See *The Letter of Aristeas* ed. P. Wendland (Teubner 1900) sect. 208; Archytas of Tarentum in Stob. 4.5.61. See also W. Schubart, *APF* 12 (1937) 9-11; J. Joel Farber, *AJP* 100 (1979) 509-510.

[98] Heuss (supra n. 76) 68-72.

[99] For the relationship of the different aspects of Mithridates' propaganda see Glew (supra n. 91) 253-256.

[100] See Cassius' letter to the people of Nysa, recording Chaeremon's services—Sherk, *RDGE* 260 No. 48. For the family of Chaeremon see Strabo 14.1.42 c.649; Welles, *Royal Correspondence* 297-8; Bowersock (supra n. 24) 8.

perhaps at this date and because of its willing defection to him that Mithridates donated the money for the repair of the earthquake damage. Cassius fled to Rhodes (App. *Mith.* 24) and Chaeremon to Ephesus (Welles, *Royal Correspondence* No. 74).[101] Tralles followed Apameia into the Pontic camp, and was rewarded for its decision (Cic. *Flac.* 59). Laodiceia on the Lycus, on the other hand, was probably the first place to resist Mithridates and undergo a siege (App. *Mith.* 20; Strabo 12.8.16 c. 578). Oppius organised the defence, and, we learn from two recently published inscriptions, the siege lasted long enough for Oppius to ask for and receive reinforcements from the people of Aphrodisias.[102] Resistance ended when the besieged were promised that no harm would come to them if they handed over Oppius. They complied. We do not know what happened to Aphrodisias thereafter, but it probably had little choice but to go over to the Pontic side.[103] While Mithridates himself led the advance in Phrygia, Mysia and Asia, he sent subordinates out against Lycia, Pamphylia and other southern regions (App. *Mith.* 20). It was in the south that the Pontic advance made least headway. In Lycia, Patara was besieged by Mithridates himself later in the year (App. *Mith.* 27), while Telmessus and other cities had helped in the defence of Rhodes against the heavy Pontic attack.[104] Pamphylian towns were among those which supplied ships to Lucullus (App. *Mith.* 56) and inland, Termessus clashed with the enemy.[105]

In Caria, there was a mixed welcome for Mithridates. Stratoniceia resisted but was captured after a siege and fined (App. *Mith.* 21). After the war it was rewarded handsomely for its loyalty by Sulla.[106] Tabae also

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[101] Appian (*Mith.* 112) says that Cassius was captured by Mithridates and released at the end of the war, but as the king failed to capture Rhodes, this can hardly be right—see Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 119 n. 4.

[102] Reynolds (supra n. 71) docs 2 and 3. Appian (*Mith.* 17) says that Oppius originally commanded forty thousand men, but that at Laodiceia he only had his cavalry and some mercenaries. That he was short of men is now confirmed by his appeal to Aphrodisias. Reynolds suggests that Oppius may have suffered an unattested and heavy defeat, or else that Appian got the original numbers wrong. It also seems possible that his army just dispersed in the flight to Laodiceia.

[103] It seems to have suffered no losses of men or materials, and so can hardly have opposed Mithridates. We now know that after he was set free by Mithridates (App. *Mith.* 112), Oppius went to Cos (Reynolds [supra n. 71] doc. 3) perhaps taking advantage of the famous medical facilities there to recover from his ordeal. Here he received an embassy from the people of Aphrodisias: their efforts to secure his favour may, Reynolds suggests, betray an anxiety over their compromising behaviour after the submission of Laodiceia.

[104] For the possiblity that Arycanda sided with Mithridates, see Magie, *RRAM* 1348 n. 41.

[105] Inhabitants of Termessus were lost in the war according to the *Lex Antonia de Termessibus*—C. G. Bruns, *Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui* (ed. 7 1909) 92 No. 14, I, 35-II, 1.

[106] Sherk, *RDGE* 105 No. 18.

resisted and was likewise rewarded.[107] On the other hand, Caunus was clearly Mithridatic: it took part in the general massacre of Romans (below p. 113 ff.). Cnidus and Cos also succumbed.[108] Cos proved a profitable addition to Mithridates' domains, as an Egyptian prince had been left there with a large sum of money.[109]

Some of the staunchest opposition we hear about was that offered by Magnesia on the Maeander, which fought off the Pontic assault with great courage.[110] Ilium and Chios were among those places upon whom Sulla bestowed freedom after the war, either as a reward for their cooperation or for what they had suffered out of loyalty to himself (App. *Mith.* 61). Chian ships certainly helped Mithridates in the siege of Rhodes, but clearly the king was highly suspicious of the islanders' loyalty (App. *Mith.* 46-7). They were reluctant Pontic supporters and perhaps they had started out by resisting Mithridates before being forced to capitulate. It was for their loyalty during the war that Sulla gave them freedom.[111] We do not know the loyalties of Ilium in the early stages of

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[107] Sherk, *RDGE* 100 No. 17. For extensive textual revisions of this inscription see M. Crawford and J. Reynolds, *GRBS* 15 (1974) 289 ff.

[108] The Coans claimed that the Romans who fled for shelter to the temple of Asclepius were spared: Tac. *Ann.* 4.14.3. For Mithridates and Cos see S. M. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos—An Historical Study from the Dorian Settlement to the Imperial Period* (1978) 138-139.

[109] App. *Mith.* 23. Joseph. *AJ* 14.7.2. says that Mithridates took eight hundred talents of Jewish money, intended for the Temple in Jerusalem.

[110] Not Magnesia near Sipylus, although there is confusion in the sources, and in modern literature, about the stance taken by both Magnesias. It is clear from Appian (*Mith.* 21; 61) that one of the Magnesias resisted Mithridates (see also Livy, *Epit.* 81; Plut. *Rei Publ. ger. Praec.* 14) and the other received him willingly, but in in spite of Magie's statement to the contrary (*RRAM* 1102 n. 32), Appian does not distinguish clearly between them. Tacitus (*Ann.* 3.62) says that Sulla honoured Magnesia on the Maeander for its loyalty and courage shown against Mithridates. Pausanias (1.20.5) recounts how the Magnesians near Sipylus wounded Archelaus, Mithridates' general, when he raided them, and also killed most of the barbarians with him. Strabo (13.3.5 c.621) mentions briefly that Magnesia near Sipylus was made a free city by the Romans, but does not give a date or reason for this grant.

Scholarly use of this evidence has often resulted in both Magnesias resisting Mithridates. See, for instance, O. Kern, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander* (1900) XVI and T. Ihnken, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Sipylos* (1978) 161-2, who cite the same evidence, each to show that their Magnesia resisted the Pontic king, except that Ihnken fails to cite the Tacitus passage (so too does Magie, *RRAM* 1102 n. 32, who argues that Magnesia near Sipylus resisted Mithridates and the other welcomed him). G. E. Bean and W. L. MacDonald in R. Stilwell, ed., *The Princeton Encyclopaedia of Classical Sites* (1976) 544-5 both claim that their Magnesia (Bean—Maeander; MacDonald—Sipylus) resisted Mithridates. See also Burchner, *RE* 14 (1928) col. 472 (Magnesia on the Maeander resisted Mithridates and was made free); Ruge, *RE* 14 (1928) col. 473 (Magnesia near Sipylus resisted Mithridates and was made free). As Tacitus was surely using the *acta Senatus* in *Ann.* 3.60 ff. (see R. Syme, *Tacitus* vol. 1 [1958] 285), it looks as if his statement on the matter should definitely be right against what is more of a passing reference by Pausanias.

[111] See Sherk, *RDGE* 351 No. 70.

the war, and although it is possible that it offered some sort of resistance to Mithridates, it seems more likely to have endeared itself to Sulla by its refusal to admit that "robber", Fimbria, in the closing stages of the war (App. *Mith.* 53; Strabo 13.1.27 c.594). The town of Apollonis also seems to have put up a fight against the king (Cic. *Flac.* 71).

Elsewhere, many places not only received him, but actually invited him in (Cic. *Flac.* 61).[112] Appian (*Mith.* 21) names Cos, Magnesia, Ephesus, Mytilene.[113] Coins indicate the Pontic allegiance of certain places. At Pergamum Mithridates issued his new style silver tetradrachms with the new "Pergamene" era.[114] Smyrna issued bronzes with an obverse portrait of the king.[115] Gold staters were issued at Ephesus, Erythrae, Miletus, Smyrna and Tralles, and although the types are not obviously Pontic or Mithridatic, it is probably best to interpret the coins as a demonstration by these cities, at Mithridates' instigation, of their independence from Rome.[116] Apart, then, from southern areas and scattered instances elsewhere,[117] a very large part of Asia Minor had fallen into Mithridates' hands by early 88. To administer these new territories he set up provincial and city governors, and as we have seen (above p. 98-9), in a striking proclamation of his Persian origins and role as an oriental king, he addressed the provincial governors as 'satraps'.

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[112] Although the *Pro Flacco* is hardly the most reliable evidence on the subject, as in it Cicero is launching a ferocious attack on Asiatic Greeks, the same picture emerges from other sources—Appian (*Mith.* 21), Justin (*Epit.* 38.3.8) and Diodorus (37.26).

[113] The Mytilenaeans handed over M'Aquillius. There is some confusion in the sources over his death. Diodorus (37.26.2), apparently referring to Manius, calls him a very young man and says that he committed suicide before he could be captured. Appian (*Mith.* 21) and Pliny (*HN* 33.48) report the story of the molten gold. Licinianus (Criniti p. 20) says that Sulla asked for the return of Aquillius at the peace negotiations at Dardanus.

[114] See T. Reinach, *Numismatique Ancienne. Trois royaumes de l'Asie Mineure. Cappodoce, Bithynie, Pont* (1888) 193.

[115] *BMC Ionia* 247 No. 118; J. Milne, *NC* Ser. 5, 7 (1927) 100. Mithridates' continuation of the Mucian games at Smyrna (Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.51) was perhaps a recognition of Scaevola's honesty as a governor of Asia, and an attempt to highlight Roman corruption by recognising a rare exception to the rule. Smyrna may have won back Sulla's favour by helping him during the winter of 85/4: see A. W. Lintott, *Historia* 25 (1976) 490.

[116] See B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum* (1911) 660; K. Regling, *Zeitsch. für Numismatik* 35 (1925) 265 ff. Kleiner (supra n. 29) 8-9, thinks that these gold coins date from the period of revolt against Mithridates, when things started to go wrong for him. It is surprising that the types do not seem to have particular relevance to Mithridates, but it is difficult to see how these cities could afford to coin in gold without his backing. We know, for instance, that there was a great deal of debt in Ephesus when it revolted against Mithridates (*SIG*[3]742). Moreover, the revolt was an attempt to show loyalty to Rome and win back her favour: an issue of gold was "a declaration of independence" (G. Hill, *Ancient Greek and Roman Coins* [1906] 87), and hardly the way to appease Rome.

[117] Magnesians, Paphlagonians and Lycians still persisted with their opposition according to App. *Mith.* 21.

An order was then issued by the king from Ephesus to the cities of Asia telling them to kill all resident Romans and Italians with their families and freedmen, and thus rid Asia of their troublesome presence.[118] Estimates in the ancient sources of the numbers killed varied from eighty thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand.[119] There were at least two major advantages to be gained from Mithridates' action. First, it removed a large body of opponents and potential troublemakers. And second, the ensuing confiscations of property brought much wealth to the king. So great, in fact, was the income from his successes, according to Justin (*Epit.* 38.3.9), that he was able to remit the private and public debt of cities, and grant a five year tax exemption. The Asian Vespers introduces the important question of what sections of society supported or opposed Mithridates, as it usually assumed that the massacre was carried out by "the rabble",[120] and it has been argued that Mithridates represented the "lower" classes in a great class war against their Roman and "upper" class oppressors.[121]

Analysing the social structure of Greek and Asian cities in this period is a difficult task, as the sources do not often focus on the subject, and it is not always clear what the terminology, ancient and modern, means. Against the view that social tension was caused by a split along constitutional lines of aristocratic oligarchs against democrats, Briscoe has suggested a more simple division between rich and poor, with oligarchy being "the ascendancy of the rich, democracy of the poor".[122] Deininger somewhat similarly divides Greek society into an "Unterschicht" of the poor masses, and an "Oberschicht" of the rich *principes* who wielded the

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[118] There is disagreement on the date of the massacre. Badian (supra n. 95) 110-111 places it before the middle of 88: there is no mention of it in the speech of Athenion delivered to the Athenians on his return from Asia, and therefore, Badian argues, it had not yet taken place. After the massacre, time has to be allowed in 88 for the long and unsuccessful sieges by Mithridates of Rhodes and Patara, which were followed by the despatch of Archelaus and his army to Greece. Sherwin-White (supra n. 95) 1994-5 favours the winter of 89/88 for the Asian Vespers: Cicero (*De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 7) speaking in early 66 says that it is now the twenty third year of Mithridates' reign since the massacre, which must have taken place, therefore, not later than the beginning of 88. It is not, however, clear whether Cicero is counting inclusively or exclusively, and the passage does not seem to rule out a date of perhaps May or June 88. For further discussion see Sherwin-White (supra n. 94) 124.

[119] P. Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.—A.D. 14* (1971) 224-7 thinks even the lower figure is an exaggeration. Interestingly Dio (fr. 109.8) reports the opinion that the massacres of Sulla and Marius in the Civil War were far worse than Mithridates'. For analysis of the sources on, and details of the Asian Vespers, see Th. C. Sarikakis, *EEThess* 15 (1976) 253-264.

[120] See for instance Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 938; Magie, *RRAM* 217.

[121] See Gunther (supra n. 69) 94-105.

[122] J. Briscoe, *P & P* 36 (1967) 3.

political power.[123] It is not clear who precisely comprised these classes, and there are only a few indications in the sources. From the evidence of papyri Rostovtseff was able to describe in some detail the "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat" of Egypt at the end of the second century,[124] but as has been pointed out, conditions will have varied from place to place.[125] In 146 an assembly of the Achaean League was filled with an unprecedented crowd of *ergastēriakoi kai banausoi* (Pol. 38.12.5), which Fuks identifies as "artisans, semi-skilled workers, unskilled wage-earners, people occupied in a small way with commerce."[126] Factory and workship employees were most prominent at Corinth, the industrial centre of Greece, just as at Syracuse in 356 the *nautikos ochlos* was especially important among the general class of *banausoi*, who formed "the urban proletariat including the poorer artisans, skilled and semi-skilled workers in workshops, and day-labourers."[127] These presumably will be the "Unterschicht" of Deininger, but unfortunately the sources are rarely so precise. Furthermore, a simple bipartite division along the lines suggested by Briscoe or Deininger hardly covers the whole of society. Slaves, for instance, cannot safely be included in the "Unterschicht", but surely constitute a separate group with its own distinct interests. At the same time it would be wrong to assume that all members of a particular social group enjoyed a complete community of interest, or that those with such a community of interest necessarily all came from the same class. When Appian (*Mith.* 48) tells us, for example, that debtors, metics and slaves maintained their support for Mithridates even at the end of the first war with Rome—they were promised cancellation of debt, citizenship and freedom respectively—this should not be taken as an indication solely of lower class support, or of support from the whole lower class. There were no doubt upper class debtors, debt by no means being a prerogative exclusively of the lower class;[128] and while metics may not, from the point of view of wielding power, have been part of the "Oberschicht", the wealthier ones will surely have identified more with that class. And an offer by the king to emancipate slaves would not appeal to any of the free elements of society, upper or lower class. Similarly no citizen, upper or lower class, would be pleased at a general promise of citizenship for metics. Debtors,

[123] J. Deininger, *Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland 217-86 v. Chr.* (1971) 10-20. For a detailed review, which is itself a valuable discussion of many of the problems surrounding class analysis in the Hellenistic period, see P. Derow, *Phoenix* 26 (1972) 303-311.
[124] Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 878 ff.
[125] Derow (supra n. 123) 309.
[126] A. Fuks, *JHS* 90 (1970) 85.
[127] A. Fuks, *CQ* 18 (1968) 214.
[128] See D. Asheri, *Leggi greche sul problema dei debiti* (1969) 92 ff.

metics and slaves represent particular interest groups rather than a particular class in society. Allowing for such considerations, let us look at the nature of Mithridates' support.

This is a subject that also affects the king's propaganda for he undoubtedly made strategic use of social unrest in Asia,[129] and it is possible that he tried to project himself as a social reformer, offering early on in the war manumission of some slaves, partial cancellation of debts and partial redistribution of property:[130] we have seen Justin's reference to a remission of debt and exemption from tax, and Appian (*Mith.* 22) tells us that to ensure the success of the massacre he ordered, Mithridates promised a cancellation of half their debts to debtors who killed their Roman and Italian creditors, and he ordered the satraps and governors to share the property of the dead with him;[131] slaves who killed their Roman masters were to be freed. Although obviously this would appeal to many of the less privileged members of society, some of the debtors no doubt came from the upper class, and there was no social revolution intended here. The promises of the king, while casting him somewhat in the light of a social reformer, were made in pursuit of a strictly anti-Roman measure. The only slaves to be freed were those who had been serving, and had killed, their Roman masters: the small shop owner with perhaps two or three slaves vital to his business, was not going to suffer any more than the large estate owner with many scores of slaves. There was no general cancellation of debt: again, local creditors were not affected, it was only the Romans who suffered. The same applies to the redistribution of land: only the land that had been in Roman possession was to be redistributed.[132] It is very unlikely that Mithridates enunciated a general programme of social reform in support of the masses as part of his propaganda before and during the early stages of the war,[133] as it is difficult to see how he could then have had any hope of winning, and how in fact he did win, upper class support. When Sulla addressed the leaders of

[129] See E. J. Jonkers, *JVEG* 18 (1964) 383-391.
[130] On Mithridates as a social reformer and on the nature of his support, see Salomone Gaggero (supra n. 29) 111 ff.; Sherwin-White (supra n. 94) 240 ff.
[131] He later accused the Chians of enjoying the profits of the massacre, but not sharing them with him: see App. *Mith.* 47.
[132] In contrast to Syracuse in 356, when the entire territory of the state was to be redistributed in a definite attempt to bring about a major social revolution: see Fuks (supra n. 127) 216-7. The opposition came from *ippeis*, *gnōrimoi*, *aristoi*, members of the "Oberschicht".
[133] As Glew (supra n. 91) 255, seems to think. It would, however, be easy for opponents of the king to ignore the strict limitations of his promises made at the time of the Asian Vespers, and portray him as a populist leader seeking the support of the masses. Hellenistic kings were often accused of this—Philip V, for instance, Antiochus, Perseus—and not always fairly; see D. Mendels, *AncSoc* 8 (1977) 155-174; *AncSoc* 9 (1978) 53-73.

the cities of Asia after the war (App. *Mith.* 61-2), he recounted how Mithridates had broken faith with them by, among other things, cancelling debts, redistributing land and freeing slaves: the clear implication is that they did not expect such behaviour from him, and would not have supported him had they known he would act in this way. He may even have promised them that he would not do these things: this would explain Appian's reference to a breach of faith. Later on in the war the king's promises were less restricted and more socially revolutionary (see below p. 129), but Sulla can hardly have been referring to the measures promised in connection with the Asian Vespers: the wealthy upper classes and slave-owning layers of society may have been uneasy at Mithridates' promises, which might lead to agitation from other debtors and slaves, but for the moment they were not directly affected, and in the beginning they do seem to have supported the king. It may have been "the rabble" who most favoured and perhaps carried out the massacre of Romans, but there is nothing to suggest that the other classes were totally against the idea, even if they were unwilling personally to take part.[134] The people of Tralles decided to hire an assassin to carry out Mithridates' order in an attempt to avoid the blood-guilt (App. *Mith.* 23; Dio fr. 101.1): this was presumably the considered decision of the city, not the act of a crazed mob. The same holds true of the welcome afforded Mithridates by various cities of Asia (and, as we shall see, by Athens): there are no grounds for supposing that the normal processes of decision-making were swept aside by a tumultuous rabble determined to support Mithridates. The "Unterschicht" may have been in the ascendancy, but their view must have been shared in many cities by a majority of the governing "Oberschicht". Sulla confirms this when, addressing the principal citizens of Asia after the war, he says that it was they who invited Mithridates in to their cities or joined him when he came, and obeyed his order to kill all Italians. At least in the beginning of the war, support for Mithridates, the civilised benefactor and liberator of the Greek world, came from the governing classes, as well as the lower ranks of society.[135]

At the same time, what opposition there was, did come from the upper classes. Chaeremon of Nysa has already been mentioned as a prominent

[134] Cic. *Flac.* 17 refers to *sutores* and *zonarii* supporting Mithridates at Pergamum, but in this passage Cicero is trying to prove that the decisions of Greek cities are made by assemblies of unprincipled fickle mobs. There is no difficulty, he says, in arousing *opifices et tabernarios atque illam omnem faecem civitatum.* Appian, who gives most details of the massacre, perhaps significantly does not blame it on *oi polloi*, *to plēthos*, *ta plēthē*, *oi ochloi*, although he does recognise such a group: see for instance the distinction at Rhodes in 43 between *oi en logō ontes*, *oi eu phronountes* and *o leōs*, *to plēthos* (App. *BCiv.* 4.66).

[135] This need not surprise us: Fuks (supra n. 126) 78-89 has demonstrated the upper class opposition to Rome in the Achaean War.

opponent of Mithridates. Two letters survive from the king to his satrap Leonippus, putting a price on the heads of Chaeremon and his sons Pythodorus and Pythion, and urging Leonippus to apprehend them (Welles, *Royal Correspondence* No. 73-4). Mithridates regarded Chaeremon's opposition as an important inspiration for the movement against himself. We hear of the notable rhetor Diodorus Zonas inciting resistance to the king (Strabo 13.4.9 c.628).[136] The Stoic Poseidonius was a prytanis at Rhodes, and went in 87 on an embassy to Rome. Dionysodorus of Thasos was rewarded by the cities of Assus, Lampsacus and Rhodes, perhaps for his services during the First Mithridatic War.[137] The Aphrodisian ambassador Artemidorus was very active in the anti-Mithridatic camp.[138] These are typical of the sort of influential provincials who led the opposition to Mithridates. There is an interesting example of upper class opposition to the king at Adramyttium. This is one of the places, Appian tells us, where the massacre of Romans was particularly horrifying, so the city certainly started out on Mithridates' side. Later, the adventurer and self-styled Academic philosopher Diodorus had the city councillors slaughtered in order to please Mithridates (Strabo 13.1.66 c.614): it appears that the *boulē*, or part of it, was intending to turn against the king (it is not clear from Strabo whether the split is between the upper and lower classes, or whether it is a division within the governing class itself). Probably the decisive factor in whether a city supported or opposed Mithridates was in many cases the extent of upper class support he managed to win: to the lower classes he offered relief from Roman oppression and the chance of improvement, and they will have favoured him almost everywhere. This seems to be the best interpretation of the sources, at least as far as they apply to the early stages of the war, but there is no need to assume that exactly the same processes occurred everywhere. There may, for instance, in some cities have been a democratic revolution in which the aristocracy were quite simply eclipsed: later in the war, this could well be what happened at Adramyttium, and at other places where tyrants established themselves. A strong Roman presence in a city could also be important: clearly the Laodiceians resisted Mithridates because of Oppius' presence. Large

[136] Diodorus Zonas was accused, presumably by Mithridates himself, of causing cities to revolt from the Pontic cause (he got off); he was not accused by the Romans of getting cities to revolt from Rome, as Sarikakis (supra n. 119) 262 says. Nor is there any evidence that he was installed as tyrant of Sardis by Mithridates, as Sarikakis also claims.

[137] For these opponents of Mithridates see Bowersock (supra n. 24) 5, 11. Bowersock puts the activities of Dionysodorus in the First Mithridatic War, but C. Dunant and J. Pouilloux, *Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos* vol. 2 (1957) 21-35 No. 170-172 suggest a slightly later date.

[138] See Reynolds (supra n. 71) docs, 2, 3, 4 and p. 149-150.

numbers of Romans, however, were not in themselves decisive: to a certain extent the more Romans there were in a city, the greater was the massacre in 88—but where the Romans were numerous in proportion to the rest of the community, there they might hope to wield influence. It was probably at the instigation of the proportionately large Italian community on Delos that the island defected from Athens when the city took the Pontic side.[139]

Athens played an important part in the First Mithridatic War. At the end of the 90's it was in a state of considerable upheaval. Medeius, having made himself archon for three consecutive years, 91/0 to 89/8, had become in effect a tyrant.[140] Public life suffered: the assembly, the courts, the temple of Demeter and Persephone and the philosophical schools were all shut, the gymnasia in decay. An appeal had been made to Rome, at least by Medeius, but the Senate was too occupied with the Social War to be able to turn its attention to Athens, and Medeius seems to have been told to manage as best he could for the time being. Although there is no need to picture Medeius as the head of a pro-Roman party, he clearly favoured Rome: the New Style silver issued under his leadership shows this to be the case, with its symbols of Roma on the Xenocles/Harmoxenus issue of 90/89, and Roma and Nike on the Cointus/Cleas issue of 89/88.[141] Medeius drops out of the picture early in 88, for what reason we do not know. It is at about this time that we hear of the Athenian mission to Mithridates led by the Peripatetic philosopher Athenion as an official envoy of the demos.[142] From Asia Athenion wrote back, saying how with Mithridates' support *epipheromena ophlēmata* would be removed, democracy restored and gifts, public and private, bestowed. We do not know what sort of debts were to be removed, but it is again *a priori* unlikely that Mithridates was promising a general cancellation of debts as he

[139] For the influence of the Italian community on Delos, see for instance, W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* (1911) 434.

[140] For Athens in this period, see most recently Badian (supra n. 95) 105-128 who challenges the usually accepted view (e.g. Ferguson [supra n. 139] 440 ff.) that it was an indebted democratic mob led by demagogues which brought the city over to Mithridates, while the right-minded upper class oligarchs remained firmly pro-Roman.

[141] The exact date of these issues is disputed. I have followed Badian (supra n. 95) 117-119 and D. M. Lewis, *NC* 2 (1962) 277, but H. Mattingly, *JHS* 91 (1971) 92 puts both issues one year earlier. I have assumed Lewis's "low" chronology for the New Style silver coinage of Athens rather than the "high" chronology argued by M. Thompson, *The New Style Silver Coinage of Athens* (1961). There can be little doubt that Lewis is correct. No one aware of the debate has followed Thompson. For bibliography see Chr. Habicht, *Chiron* 6 (1976) 130 n. 17.

[142] For the official nature of Athenion's embassy, see Badian (supra n. 95) 110-111. The story of Athenion is reported only by Poseidonius (ap. Ath. 5. 211e-215b)—it is a passage of pronounced hostility to Athenion. For bibliography, see Deininger (supra n. 123) 248-9 n. 1.

could not hope to win upper class support on such a basis. And at first the upper classes must have lent their support to Athenion, and thus to the Mithridatic cause, in spite of the apologetic view of Plutarch (*Sull.* 12.1) and Velleius Paterculus (2.23) that Athens was forced into its pro-Pontic stance. The mere fact of Athenion's mission demonstrates that, and also his reception when he returned to Athens from Asia. On the way back he was blown off course to Euboea, and warships and a silver-footed litter were sent from Athens to escort him home. Enormous crowds turned out to meet him, among them the Technitai of Dionysus welcoming him as the messenger of the New Dionysus. He was put up in the sumptuous house of the wealthy Dies, a member of what was perhaps originally a Tyrian family.[143] The archons chosen when Athenion returned were all highly respectable citizens (see below), and his own birth need not have been as lowly as Poseidonius would have it, when he accuses him with standard rhetorical invective of being the son of an Egyptian slave girl.[144]

After delivering speeches to the people, Athenion was elected *stratēgos epi tōn oplōn*, and immediately set about choosing the archons and other officers. Inscriptional evidence supplies the names of nine of these officials (*IG* II² 1714), who as Badian has shown, are no "democratic mob", but members of prominent political families.[145] It is also clear that 88/7 was the year of *anarchia* referred to in *IG* II² 1713:[146] in this case an Eponymous Archon was chosen, but for some reason it was later considered necessary to eliminate his memory, and designate the year *anarchia*, just as if no Eponymous Archon had been chosen.[147] Habicht made the interesting suggestion that the Eponymous Archon chosen, was in fact Mithridates Eupator himself.[148] This is certainly quite possible and even likely. We know that Mithridates was Eponymous Stephanephorus in Miletus in 86/5,[149] and there could be no better advertisement of his Hellenism than that he should give his name to the year at Athens, as chief magistrate in the cultural centre of the Greek world.[150]

[143] On Dies see S. Dow, *CP* 37 (1942) 311-314. Deininger (supra n. 123) 251 n. 16 suggests that Dies was not necessarily a supporter of Athenion, but may have fled or been absent for some other reason. There is nothing in Poseidonius to support this, although it is possible. On the upper class support implied by Athenion's mission and reception, see M. Laffranque, *Pallas* 11 (1962) 109.

[144] Badian (supra n. 95) 113.

[145] Badian (supra n. 95) 112-3 with n. 31.

[146] S. Dow, *Hesperia* 3 (1934) 144-146.

[147] See Badian (supra n. 95) 114; Habicht (supra n. 141) 128.

[148] Habicht (supra n. 141) 130.

[149] *Milet: Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen*. III *Das Delphinion in Milet* (1914) 268.

[150] Badian (supra n. 95) 125-6 n. 41 thinks that if Mithridates was archon, it could not have been in 88/7, because at that stage Athenion was still at times pretending to support the Romans, and thus had not finally broken with them. The text of Athenaeus 5.214b,

In the beginning the upper classes in Athens, or at least part of them, were willing to go along with Athenion and adopt the Mithridatic cause, but they soon turned against both, when Athenion set himself up as tyrant, and started to murder *tous eu phronountas tōn politōn*. His thieving and murderous behaviour is described in considerable, and probably exaggerated detail by Poseidonius (Ath. 5.213 ff.), but it will have ensured the desertion of much of his upper class support. Cicero (*Brut.* 306) recalls how Philo, the head of the Academy, fled to Rome during the war, along with the *optimates* of Athens.[151] We cannot easily tell to what extent Athenion's actions were approved or planned by Mithridates. Did Mithridates send him with specific instructions to seize power in Athens, or did Athenion merely take advantage of the already unsettled situation in the city, and by his own decision rise to sole power on a wave of popular agitation, thus presenting the king with a *fait accompli*? Strabo (9.1.20 c.398) says that Mithridates set up in Athens the tyrants he wanted. This would appear to be the case with Aristion the Epicurean philosopher who took over control of Athens after Athenion.[152] Delos

however, where Athenion is said to be feigning support for Rome, appears to be interrupted, so that we cannot be sure what Athenion was doing. Badian also doubts that the other archons would have agreed to serve under Mithridates, given that Athens had not yet fully committed itself to him. They were, however, the sort of men who had sent Athenion to Mithridates in the first place, and the city does in fact seem to be firmly on the Pontic side. There was good sense in such support: the king, well known for his benefactions to the Greeks, was sweeping triumphantly through Asia. He was behaving with great generosity to those that welcomed him, and with restraint towards his defeated enemies (Manius Aquillius had not yet been murdered, nor had the Asian Vespers taken place—*contra*, Sherwin-White [supra n. 94] 136); there were promises of benefits for Athens; and the prospects for Pontic success were excellent. Badian is prepared to have Mithridates archon in 87/6. All the magistrates of that year were executed by Sulla as being committed to the king's cause, while those of the previous year survived. These latter may in the beginning have been just as committed, but they probably deserted Athenion when he turned to tyranny, and even if they did not, the fact is that their actions did not entail any direct opposition to Sulla or other Roman forces. The magistrates of 87/6 were in office during Sulla's siege, and paid the penalty.

[151] On the political affiliation of the philosophical schools see E. Candiloro, *SCO* 14 (1965) 158-171; Deininger (supra n. 123) 245. Velleius Paterculus (2.23) maintained that in spite of appearances, Athens remained totally loyal to Rome. The extent of the upper class desertion from Mithridates may be exaggerated according to Badian (supra n. 95) 115. He thinks that the leniency of Sulla's punishment meted out to the defeated Athenians, and the survival and subsequent attainment to office of, for instance, the archons of 88/7, may not have been due to their taking sides with Rome, but simply to Sulla's practical nature: if all the guilty *optimates* were suitably punished, there would be no one left to run Athens.

[152] I have followed B. Niese, *RhM* 42 (1887) 544-581 in distinguishing between Athenion and Aristion. Others have maintained that they were the same person: for bibliography on the subject see Deininger (supra n. 123) 256 n. 3. From the point of view of Mithridates' policy, it does not really make much difference whether it was Athenion who was set up again as tyrant after the capture of Delos, or whether it was a new man, Aristion.

declared for Rome, not Pontus, and as the island was of great importance to Athens, an expedition was sent to reclaim it, under the leadership of another philosopher-politician, the Peripatetic Apellicon of Teos (Ath. 5.214 d ff.).[153] The assault was beaten off by the Roman praetor Orbius,[154] but later in the year the island fell to the forces of Mithridates' general Archelaus, who was crossing the Aegean with a big fleet, bringing over the islands to the side of Pontus. After the sack of Delos, in which many of its inhabitants were killed,[155] Archelaus sent Aristion to Athens with the Delian treasures and two thousand men. Athenion had either not survived the defeat of Apellicon or was now pushed aside by Aristion. It seems clear that the Pontic intention was to set up Aristion in power at Athens, but that is not necessarily the case with Athenion. It may be that Athenion's actions suggested to Mithridates the idea that upper class Greek support was not necessary everywhere; that, in fact, it might be easier to control certain places by means of populist tyrants. And the tyranny of Aristion was probably thoroughly populist: Pausanias (1.20.5) says that he relied on the turbulent sector of society. Strabo (9.1.20 c.398) mentions how Aristion was the strongest of the Athenian tyrants and violently oppressed the city—the upper classes would be no more eager for this, than they had been for Athenion's despotism.

The invasion of Archelaus raises the question of what Mithridates was doing in Greece in the first place. The ancient sources show no surprise at, and provide no explanation of, why the king moved the war into Greece. And yet it is an important question, without an immediately clear answer. The embassy of Athenion provided the opportunity to intervene on behalf of the mainland Greeks, just as the invitation of the Chersonitans had provided the opportunity to champion the Black Sea Greeks and embark on the conquest of the Crimea. In this latter case, however, the economic advantages of such a conquest were obvious. In the case of Greece the advantages were by no means as obvious. Strategically the conquest of all Asia Minor left Mithridates with a good natural frontier, easily defended by his fleet which controlled the Aegean

[153] On the importance of Delos to Athens, see, for instance, Ferguson (supra n. 139) ch. 9; P. Roussel, *Délos Colonie Athenienne* (1916) ch. 4; W. A. Laidlaw, *A History of Delos* (1933), 169-200; J. Day, *An Economic History of Athens under Roman Domination* (1942) ch. 3; P. MacKendrick, *The Athenian Aristocracy 399-31 B.C.* (1969) 49-65.

[154] The Orobius of Poseidonius is not the well-known Delian merchant L. Orbius as Mommsen suggested, but a Roman praetor with a small squadron of ships: see Durrbach, *Choix* 235-6.

[155] App. *Mith.* 28; Plut. *Sull.* 11; Florus 1.40.8; Strabo 10.5.4 c. 486. Pausanias (3.23.3-5) attributes the sacking of Delos to the Pontic general Menophanes. It may be that Menophanes was a lieutenant of Archelaus, and actually carried out the assault, while Archelaus masterminded the whole Aegean campaign; see Janke, *Memnon* 47.

virtually unchallenged: at the very beginning of hostilities the Roman fleet guarding the mouth of the Euxine had given in without a fight (App. *Mith.* 19). Greece would be much harder to defend, and economically appeared to offer Mithridates little that he did not already have. His production facilities in Pontus seem to have been quite adequate, and the supplies of men, food and raw materials from his Euxine empire were almost inexhaustible. In itself, then, Greece did not offer obvious economic or strategic advantages. The war against Rome, however, had to be fought somewhere, and if Mithridates had any doubt about the loyalty of Asia, it was clearly preferable to fight elsewhere, and prevent the Roman armies from coming in contact with the Asians: without the immediate hope of Roman protection, there was less likelihood of allies deserting. The war in Greece therefore might have been a sort of offensive defence, aimed at securing Asia by providing a battleground some distance away from his new territories. Moreover, the conquest of Greece could only make Rome's task in humbling Mithridates even greater. It is also possible that he was drawn into Greece by his own propaganda: a claim to be the great liberator of the Greek world would sound hollow if he failed to liberate Greece itself, and for the New Alexander to have no kingdom in Greece might also appear strange. Factors such as these may have been sufficient to draw the king to Greece, but they do assume a limited ambition on his part. Could it be that he had larger plans, and by conquering Greece was really aiming at Italy itself? Early in 88, or perhaps in 89, the Italian rebels turned to Mithridates in desperation for help.[156] At this stage he was still too busy subduing Asia, but he promised to help when he could. Was he beginning to believe the oracular prophecies of a king from the east bringing destruction to Rome? As it turned out, the Italians were virtually beaten and nothing came of the negotiations, but we do also hear of the story at the end of the king's life of how he planned to launch an invasion of Italy, marching across Europe and down over the Alps, as a sort of Hannibal from the east (p. 165 below). Was this perhaps a revised version of his failed plans from the time of the first war with Rome?

The answer to these questions is probably 'no'. The story of a land invasion from the east is, very likely, only the invention of a hostile tradition, designed to fit in with the general assessment of the ancient sources that Mithridates planned to conquer the world (above p. 82). He was an ambitious king, he had built a large empire in the Euxine, and had made extensive preparations for a war against Rome, but grandiose plans of conquering Italy do not tally very well, at least in the first two years of the conflict, with the efficiently executed and realistic aims so far displayed. Having stated that, however, it must be admitted that adaptability was a distinguishing feature of Mithridates, and his plans almost certainly developed as the war progressed and offered new opportunities. The first priority was to defeat and expel the Romans from Asia Minor, and secure this new frontier. The attempt on Rhodes, aimed probably at the acquisition of total naval supremacy in the Aegean, was part of this objective, and made possible by the surprising absence during 88 of a consular army in the east.[157] The implication of events to this point may well be, as Sherwin-White suggests, that the king originally thought of confronting Rome on Asian soil under conditions most hostile and difficult for Sulla.[158] But then Athenion invited Mithridates to champion the Athenians, and once again the continuing delay in the despatch of an army from Italy made the conquest of Greece a realistic and inviting possibility. The advantages of fighting outside Asia were clear, and such a move into Greece would be thoroughly consistent with his propaganda, and most awkward for Rome. If the venture in Greece were successful, and the Romans defeated there, further plans could be made, possibly even for an invasion of Italy, or at least for striking some sort of deal over control of the eastern Mediterranean. If the war in Greece were indecisive, the king would still have a strong bargaining position,[159] and even if his armies were defeated, there was Asia to fall back on. The extension of the war into Europe was an excellent move.

It was a considerable success for Mithridates to have won Athens to his side,[160] and Archelaus now set about winning over as much of the rest of Greece as possible. The Achaeans submitted, the Spartans too (although they resisted and were defeated), and all of Boeotia except Thespiae, which underwent a siege (App. *Mith.* 29; Memnon 22.7). Demetrias, Magnesia and Euboea resisted, but were ravaged (App. *Mith.* 29), and Euboea at least was brought over to Mithridates (Memnon 22.10). The Pontic commander in this arena was Metrophanes, who may have been

[156] Diod. 37.2.11; Ath. 213c. The Italian overtures were not dated after the Asian Vespers by Poseidonius, as claimed by E. Gabba, *Athenaeum* 32 (1954) 85 = *Republican Rome. The Army and the Allies* (transl. by P. J. Cuff 1976 of the most important articles from *Esercito e societa nella tarda reppublica romana* [1973]) 88: see Badian (supra n. 95) 110. In 90 Scaurus was accused by Varius of accepting bribes from Mithridates (Val. Max. 3.7.8). Gabba argues that this charge is traditional, and not to be connected with the negotiations between the Italians and Mithridates.

[157] See Sherwin-White (supra n. 94) 124-5.

[158] Sherwin-White (supra n. 94) 125-6.

[159] A. N. Sherwin-White, *JRS* 67 (1977) 74 thinks that Mithridates invaded Greece to strengthen "his bargaining position for a final settlement."

[160] For the significance of Eutropius' description of Athens (5.6.1) as *civitas Achaiae*, see R. J. Penella, *AJP* 101 (1980) 447-8.

part of another army sent across to Greece under the leadership of Arcathias one of Mithridates' sons (App. *Mith.* 35; 41). It is not absolutely clear when this army entered Europe. Appian (*Mith.* 35) may imply that it did not come until the siege of Athens by Sulla was under way, but already in the early summer of 88 Athenion had been talking about a Pontic army in Thrace and Macedonia, and Arcathias' army may have been operating in this area even before Archelaus crossed the Aegean.[161] We know little of what went on up there. From Appian (*Mith.* 35) it seems that Arcathias had little trouble in defeating the opposition in Macedonia, and setting up satraps to govern it. The Thracians seem to have helped him.[162] When his troops joined up with those of Archelaus before the battle of Chaeroneia they are described as being fresh and at full strength (App. *Mith.* 41). On the other hand Memnon (22.12) says that there were many engagements, and that the Pontic supplies became critically low until Taxilles, who, it appears, took over command of the northern army when Arcathias died, relieved the situation by capturing Amphipolis. Abdera too was occupied (Licinianus, Criniti p. 20). So things may not have been as easy as Appian implies. The Thasians we know declared their loyalty to Rome, swearing an oath that they would kill their children and die fighting rather than desert Rome.[163] After the war the islands of Sciathos and Peparethos were put under the control of Thasos.[164] Sciathos was certainly on the Pontic side: it was being used as a storehouse for plunder when Q. Braetius Sura attacked it (App. *Mith.* 29). As Peparethos was also given to Thasos, it too had probably sided with Pontus. The Athamani on the other hand supported Rome and erected a statue in honour of Braetius.[165]

By the end of 88 Mithridates' campaign had on the whole been spectacularly successful. Most of Asia Minor and Greece were in his possession. The fairly meagre opposition which his propaganda had failed to neutralize was, with some exceptions, swept aside by his armies. The few

[161] Arcathias is called Ariarathes in Plut. *Sull.* 11, but see Appendix I p. 173. Sherwin-White (supra n. 95) 1995 places Arcathias' invasion in the summer of 87, but the evidence he cites does not rule out an earlier date. Plut. *Sull.* 11 does not show that "the proconsul of Macedonia in spring 87 was not yet threatened by a Pontic attack from Thrace": it merely says that Braetius Sura marched back to Sentius. Although Amphipolis was captured by Taxilles in 87 (Memnon 22.12), this does not mean that the Pontic army invaded Thrace and Macedonia only in 87.

[162] Perhaps as mercenaries: see Dio 36.9.3-4, a passage which shows their unreliability. See also Livy, *Epit.* 81. For the northern campaign see Janke, *Memnon* 57 ff.

[163] Sherk, *RDGE* 116 No. 20 col. 1 c lines 2-8.

[164] Sherk, *RDGE* 119 No. 21.

[165] Fougères, *BCH* 13 (1889) 388 No. 7. See also A. Reinach, *BCH* 34 (1910) 318, who thinks that Braetius defended the Athamani not against Pontic forces, but against native tribes.

exceptions, however, to this picture of overall success were worrying and significant. The most important was Mithridates' failure to reduce Rhodes (App. *Mith.* 24-27). In spite of his best efforts he could not break down the Rhodian resistance, and was forced to withdraw. This would be a serious blow to the prestige of Pontic arms, and was only made worse when the king next laid siege to Patara in Lycia, and failed there too. Before Sulla's arrival in Greece there was further cause to worry, and that was the success achieved by Q. Braetius Sura, legate of Sentius the governor of Macedonia. With the small force at his disposal, Braetius managed to put Metrophanes to flight and to engage Archelaus and Aristion for three days at Chaeroneia, after which he was either forced to retire when the Spartans and Achaeans came to help the Pontic forces (App. *Mith.* 29), or even managed to push Archelaus back to the sea (Plut. *Sull.* 11). Lucullus at this point ordered Braetius to retire and leave the war to Sulla who was coming. This seems to indicate that the operations of Braetius took place at the very beginning of 87.[166] Even before a proper Roman army had arrived in Greece Mithridates was encountering military difficulties. If Braetius with his meagre forces could resist and even defeat the larger Pontic contingents, Sulla and the five legions he brought (App. *Mith.* 30) were surely going to cause much more trouble.

And so it turned out. As soon as he landed in Epirus, Sulla called for reinforcements from Aetolia and Thessaly, and then marched to Attica through Boeotia, most of the cities of which immediately went over to Rome, Thebes leading the way (App. *Mith.* 30). Garrisons were probably placed in strategic places while Sulla continued the advance: at least Chaeroneia, as we know from an inscription, was garrisoned through the winter of 87/6, and left under the command of a certain Amatocus, probably a Thracian prince sent to help Sulla by Sadalas king of the Odrysians.[167] Pausanias (1.20.5) and Memnon (22.11) report a Roman victory which resulted in Aristion and Archelaus being penned up in Athens and the Piraeus.[168] Pontic influence in Greece waned. The Peloponnese,

[166] See Badian (supra n. 95) 123 n. 22. For the gratitude of the people of Thespiae in Boeotia to Braetius, see the inscription discussed by A. Plassart, *RA* 1948, p. 825-832, which records the decision of the city to erect a statue of Braetius, and grant other honours.

[167] See above p. 62 n. 83.

[168] Plutarch and Appian do not mention this victory of Sulla, which is strange, as they were probably using Sulla's memoirs as a source. They do mention Braetius' engagement with Archelaus, and there may have been some confusion as to whether it was Braetius or Sulla who forced the Pontic army into Athens: see Janke, *Memnon* 53-5. An inscribed bracelet calls Archelaus *stratopedarchēs* (the Greek term for *praefectus castrorum*) in the Piraeus: see J-Y Empereur, *BCH* 105 (1981) 566-8 No. 7.

or at least parts of it, joined Sulla: we hear of his appropriating the temple treasures of Olympia and Epidaurus as well as Delphi.[169] But with control of the sea, Mithridates was able to support Archelaus in Athens and might hope eventually to wear down the besieging forces. Dromichaetes was sent with reinforcements, and Mithridates did his best to lend support: his name and the symbol of Pontus, star between crescents, appeared with Aristion's as mint magistrate on the Athenian silver issues of 87/6.[170] The same was also issued in gold. Both were extremely limited issues, but the main mint activity of Mithridates at Athens seems to have been directed towards the production of bronze coinage: the issue which displays on its obverse a head of Athena, and on its reverse a fulminating Zeus with star between crescents—hoard evidence has shown that this must be connected with Mithridates Eupator—is the largest of all the fulminating Zeus series.[171] The possession of Athens was bitterly contested, and the siege dragged on through the winter of 87/6, until finally on the 1st March 86 the city was stormed, and shortly after, Archelaus abandoned the Piraeus.[172] The decisive battle of the war was fought at Chaeroneia. The three Pontic forces of Archelaus, Dromichaetes and Taxilles combined to form an army of considerable size, probably much bigger than Sulla's,[173] but the Roman victory was complete. Mithridates, displaying his remarkable ability at raising armies, made one last effort, and sent another large force to Greece under Dorylaus, who joined with Archelaus and the survivors of Chaeroneia. They fared no better this time, and at Orchomenus in Boeotia the Pontic army was once again routed (App. *Mith.* 49; Plut. *Sull.* 21). The war in Greece was ended, and Mithridates' control over his Asian conquests was to last little longer.

The exact chronology of the degeneration of Mithridatic rule in Asia is difficult to determine. Appian (*Mith.* 64 ff.) assigns this decline to the

[169] See Magie, *RRAM* 1106 n. 43.

[170] See Thompson (supra n. 141) 368; 416 ff. who dates them some thirty years too early to the time of Mithridates V Euergetes.

[171] This series with star between crescents has been found in three hoards, the 1926 Piraeus hoard, the 1973 Piraeus hoard and the Cigar box hoard: F. S. Kleiner, *AD* 28 (1973) 169-186; M. Oeconomides-Caramesini, *AAA* 9 (1976) 169-186; A. S. Walker, *Hesperia* 47 (1978) 40-49.

[172] For the destruction caused in Athens by the siege see H. A. Thompson, *Hesperia* 3 (1934) 394; D. B. Thompson, *Hesperia* 6 (1937) 221-3, 411; H. A. Thompson, *Hesperia* 18 (1949) 267; R. S. Young, *Hesperia* 20 (1951) 155, 183, 262; M. Ervin, *Archeion Pontou* 22 (1958) 129-165.

[173] Estimates vary from 60,000 (Memnon 22.13) to 120,000 (App. *Mith.* 41). Plutarch (*Sull.* 16.1) says that Sulla had 15,000 infantry and 1500 horse, but the source is probably Sulla himself who would have had an interest in playing down the size of his army. Having brought five legions with him, and receiving another 6,000 men from L. Hortensius (Memnon 22.13), it would be surprising if Sulla could only muster an army of 16,500 for battle. For discussion of the figures, see Janke, *Memnon* 139-140.

period after the battle of Chaeroneia, but discontent may have been spreading before that: the establishment of tyrants at such places as Tralles, Colophon and Ephesus (App. *Mith.* 48; Strabo 14.1.42 c.649; Plut. *Luc.* 3.3) is perhaps a sign of aristocratic disaffection and popular insurgence, as well as a means for Mithridates of rewarding loyal friends (Plut. *Sull.* 11.2).[174] Whether Mithridates actually encouraged this insurgence or simply adapted to it, is not clear, but as his upper class support deserted him, he would naturally have turned to the "Unterschicht". Undoubtedly, the failure of Pontic arms in Greece will have greatly increased whatever discontent there was before. His supporters in Asia who welcomed him in his triumph, now began to face the probability that they were backing the loser. Disaffection spread, and to combat it, Mithridates resorted to repressive measures.

The first to suffer his anger were the Galatians. Sixty of their nobles had been invited, perhaps earlier than Chaeroneia, to come to Pergamum, ostensibly as guests but probably as hostages.[175] When Mithridates treated them badly, they conspired to kill him, but were discovered and executed. His suspicions took an even more brutal turn after his Greek defeat, and he murdered all the Galatian tetrarchs and their families, except three who escaped: he was sure that if he did not eliminate them, they would side with Sulla, given the chance. He appointed a satrap to govern Galatia, but the escaped tetrarchs drove him out, and took possession of their country (App. *Mith.* 46; Plut. *Mul. Virt.* 23).

Chios next felt the weight of Mithridates' suspicions. The property of all those who had fled to Sulla was confiscated. Zenobius seized the city and took hostages.[176] Mithridates accused the Chians of helping the Rhodians during the siege of that city,[177] and of sending their *aristous* to Sulla. These were not, it seems, merely escaping aristocrats, but according to the king they were acting on public authority, and the Chians did not even deny this (App. *Mith.* 47). If this is true, it would mark a significant

[174] Plutarch (*Luc.* 2.3) says that Cyrene suffered from *turannidōn sunechōn*: perhaps here too there were tyrants during the war.

[175] Magie, *RRAM* 223.

[176] App. *Mith.* 46 names Zenobius, but Memnon 23 says that it was Dorylaus. Appian does say that Dorylaus was conducting an army to Greece, and H. Ormerod, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 254 n. 2 suggested plausibly that Zenobius was an officer of Dorylaus detached from the main expedition, and sent to ensure the loyalty of Chios and the surrounding area. Janke, *Memnon* 64 follows Ormerod.

[177] Janke, *Memnon*, 63-4, thinks that the accusation of helping Rhodes (Memnon 23.1) should be connected with the story in Appian (*Mith.* 25) of how during the siege, a Chian ship rammed Mithridates' flag-ship—accidentally according to Appian, but perhaps intentionally in the king's opinion.

new development in Asia: Mithridates was losing a more generalized support than just that of the upper classes. A fine of two thousand talents was imposed, and when the Chians allegedly gave short weight, they were all deported to the Euxine, and their territory distributed among Pontic settlers.[178] This measure appears to have been a radical attempt to remove the threat of a suspect population, and nourish loyalty in the area by means of Pontic subjects.

The Chians had been tricked into impotence by Zenobius. The Ephesians learnt from this incident, and when Zenobius approached Ephesus, he was invited into the city on his own, and murdered. The standard of revolt was raised. Mithridates' treatment of Chios was a crucial and expensive mistake: with loyalty to him wavering because of the Roman victories in Greece, his action only served to push the waverers into open revolt. An inscription records a decree of the Ephesians passed at this time.[179] They had been surprised, so they claim, by the suddenness and size of Mithridates' attack. Although he thus made himself master of the city, the people of Ephesus were only waiting for the opportunity to revolt, which they have now done, remaining faithful in their affection to Rome. The purpose of the decree was to record the extreme measures taken to promote concord in the city, and thus face the dangers ahead. Extensive relief from public and sacred debt was decreed, and lenders of all sorts of private loans voluntarily agreed to release debtors from their obligations: of those who took up arms for the city, anyone of free but not citizen status, was to be given full citizenship, while public slaves were to be made free and given metic status. This was undoubtedly an attempt to maintain, or win over, the loyalty of the less privileged classes in the city, who will have found much appeal in Mithridates. At first the king reacted with violence, but the revolt spread to Tralles, Hypaepa, Mesopolis, Sardis, Smyrna and Colophon (App. *Mith.* 48; *Oros.* 6.2.8),[180] and he tried a more gentle approach: the Greek cities were declared free, citizenship offered to metics, debts cancelled and slaves liberated. In this way, Appian tells us, he did enjoy the support of debtors, metics and slaves. The Ephesians had been careful to specify that only public slaves would be freed, and some, not all, debts relieved. There was a limit to what could be done and social revolution was not the aim: privately owned slaves could not be liberated, as this would upset the whole structure of society. In 146 the Achaean League had been willing to go even further than the people of Ephesus: private slaves were freed and enlisted in the army, but the number of them was restricted to twelve thousand, so even here there was no general manumission of slaves (Pol. 38.15.3). It looks as if Mithridates was now forced to go one better, and offer a general cancellation of debts and freeing of slaves. Where earlier in the war he had been careful, with the qualifications and limitations of his promises, to avoid the appearance of fomenting complete social revolution, he was now forced in the search for supporters into extreme social measures. This is probably what Sulla was referring to when he addressed the leaders of Asia after the war (App. *Mith.* 61-2).[181]

While cities revolted from the king, whatever upper class support he had left disintegrated, and prominent people began to conspire against him. Four associates of his from Smyrna and Lesbos formed a plot, but were discovered and executed (App. *Mith.* 48). Eighty Pergamenes were also detected in a conspiracy and killed.[182] Altogether sixteen hundred suspects were removed. In addition to this slaughter, there was now widespread robbery: Mithridates realised he was beaten, and determined

[178] App. *Mith.* 47; Memnon 23. The Heracliots rescued the Chians, according to Memnon, and later re-established them in Chios.

[179] *SIG*³ 742. See J. H. Oliver, *AJP* 60 (1939) 470 for textual changes in lines 28-34, and for the most recent text of the inscription, H. Wankel, *Die Inschriften von Ephesus* vol. 1 a (1979) 48-55. The long Ephesian debt law *SIG*³ 364, which makes frequent reference to *o koinos polemos* was dated by R. Dareste, *Rev. Hist. de droit français et étranger*, 1877 p. 161 ff. to the period after the Sullan settlement of Asia when the state of debt was a serious problem. The war referred to would then be the First Mithridatic War. See also R. Dareste, B. Haussoullier, A. Reinach, *Recueil des inscriptions grecques* vol. 1 (1892) 30 No. 5. Reinach later took back this opinion, and ascribed the decree to the time of Aristonicus: see Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 176 n. 1. The lettering, however, appears to favour a date in the early third century: see Magie, *RRAM* 920 n. 10. Asheri (supra n. 128) 42-47 and Wankel (above this note) 13 ff. both favour an early third century date, when the war referred to would be that between Ephesus and Priene. For further discussion of the phrase *o koinos polemos* see E. Maroti, *Klio* 40 (1962) 124-127.

[180] Perhaps also Miletus: an inscription records a certain Biares who was in command of the temple of Apollo, of the city walls and towers, and of the harbour. See A. von Gerkan, *Milet* II, 3 (1935) 131 No. 400 who suggests a Mithridatic date. Cos and Cnidus defected at the urging of Lucullus (Plut. *Luc.* 3.3). In an inscription from Tenos (*IG* XII, 5, 860, cf. *SEG* XXIX, 756/7) L. Aufidius Bassus and his sons are said to have helped in 'the common war' and 'the constant raids of the pirates': Maroti (supra n. 179) 124-127 thinks that both phrases refer to the fight against the pirates, in contrast to others who have argued that the 'common war' is that against Mithridates.

[181] Fifteen thousand slaves were said by Plutarch (*Sull.* 18.5) to have fought on the Pontic side at the battle of Chaeroneia. Although Sulla would have an interest in exaggerating these figures, it may be that Mithridates had offered a more general emancipation of slaves before the revolt of his Asian cities.

[182] They are referred to in *IGR* IV, 292 lines 13-14, one of the inscriptions concerning Diodorus Pasparus, whose activities followed the First Mithridatic War: see C. P. Jones, *Chiron* 4 (1974) 193. Maroti (supra n. 179) 126 claims that the Pergamene inscription *IGR* IV, 298 records a naval victory over Mithridates, but as the Roberts point out (*Bull. Epig.* 1964 No. 348) there is no mention of a fleet or victory, and Mithridates' name is entirely missing.

to seize as much of the moveable wealth of the province as he could. Perhaps it was at this stage that he helped to organise the pirates.[183]

He entrusted the last campaign of the war to his son Mithridates, and to his best generals Taxilles, Diophantus and Menander (Memnon 24.4). The opponent now was Fimbria who had brought the war into Asia. In spite of some initial success the Pontic army was once again destroyed. This was particularly unfortunate for the king, because after the defeat at Orchomenus he had instructed Archelaus to sue for peace (App. *Mith.* 54): as he was now beaten in Asia too, he was bargaining from a position of increasing weakness. He did, however, have one strong and important card left in his hand, and that was his fleet. Archelaus and Sulla met in Boeotia, probably late in 86.[184] The terms offered by Sulla allowed Mithridates to retain his own kingdom and become a "friend and ally" of Rome; but he had to restore Bithynia and Cappadocia to their kings; give up all his other conquests of the war; pay a two thousand talent indemnity; and surrender seventy warships.[185] Not surprisingly Archelaus agreed, for this was an exceptionally mild settlement, probably due in large part to Mithridates' continuing naval supremacy.[186] The terms, however, needed royal ratification and the king was still prepared to try to lower the price of defeat: he refused to cede Paphlagonia and rejected the clause on warships. Soon, however, peace at any cost became an urgent necessity. Fimbria forced him out of Pergamum, and shut him up in Pitane. Here the whole Mithridatic threat could have been brought to an end by Lucullus, had he been willing to blockade the harbour, as Fimbria requested (Plut. *Luc.* 3.4-7). Lucullus had been collecting a fleet on Sulla's instructions, and was now in the vicinity of Pitane. As before, when he ordered Braetius Sura to leave the war to Sulla, so now he refused to recognise Fimbria. He sailed on, and put to flight a Pontic squadron under its admiral Neoptolemus. While not a serious blow in itself, this incident may have suggested to Mithridates that even his control of the sea would soon be threatened. Under this pressure, and preferring to surrender to Sulla than to Fimbria, he accepted the offered terms. The negotiations had lasted over the winter, and some time in the course of 85, Sulla and Mithridates met at Dardanus in the Troad to confirm the agreement.[187] Thus formally Mithridates' first war with Rome came to an end.

[183] App. *Mith.* 63. See E. Maroti, *Ricerche storiche ed economiche in memoria di Corrado Barbagallo* vol. 1 (1970) 481-486. A pirate raid on Ephesus referred to in *IGR* IV, 1029 may date to this time: the Astypalaeans, it is recorded, came to the rescue of Ephesus and defeated the pirates. Rostovtseff, *SEHHW* 1514 n. 48, favoured a date in the First Mithridatic War, but others have preferred the late second century: see Magie, *RRAM* 1160 n. 9; Wankel (supra n. 179) 28-32.

[184] Magie, *RRAM* 1107 n. 46.

[185] These are the terms reported in Plutarch (*Sull.* 22), no doubt based on Sulla's own account. Appian (*Mith.* 55) adds the return of all Roman prisoners and runaway slaves, and the restoration of the Chians and other deportees to their own cities. Memnon talks of a three thousand talent indemnity and the surrender of eighty ships. For discussion, see Janke, *Memnon* 75-7.

[186] See Sherwin-White (supra n. 94) 143-148 who also argues strongly that the leniency of the Roman terms was not due to Sulla's desire to rush back to Italy.

In the end Roman arms had triumphed, in spite of the king's highly effective preparations for war. He had projected a very impressive image of himself to Greeks and Asiatics alike—a civilised philhellene and a noble Persian, who had already made a name for himself in the Euxine, and who in 89 had an extremely powerful army and navy. At the outbreak of the war his patience and restraint enabled him to cast the Romans in the role of aggressors, and his timing to sweep triumphantly across Asia Minor without serious opposition from Rome. While some members of the upper layers of society opposed him from the start and led the resistance to him, others declared for him, and added their substantial support to that of the less priviledged classes. The rest of the war saw the gradual disintegration of this support. First of all the upper classes became disenchanted especially in places where tyrants arose, although whether the establishment of tyrannies was a cause or effect of upper class discontent, will perhaps have varied from place to place. The repeated defeats of Pontic armies in Greece was really the end of the war for Mithridates. Dissatisfaction in Asia spread: the fact is that propaganda was useless where it was not backed up by military success, as it had been at the beginning of the war. The king unwisely turned to oppression, but if he thought by his treatment of Chios that he could frighten the people of Asia into loyalty, he was seriously mistaken. Now prominent people plotted to kill him, and city populations that had welcomed him before, revolted. He was reduced to appealing for support from wherever he could get it, and that was now only slaves, debtors and metics: these were not, however, the people who controlled cities. Now anyone but the most desperate had come to realise by trial and comparison what sort of protector they enjoyed before in the Romans, and what sort they had chosen instead (App. *Mith.* 62). By this stage the king could only try to salvage lenient terms, as victory was unattainable: wars are won with armies and their leaders, and while the Pontic forces and their generals put up a fierce fight, in the end they were unable to match the brilliant Sulla and his seasoned legionnaries.

[187] Magie, *RRAM* 1110 n. 58 argues for early autumn 85. See also Lintott (supra n. 115) 491.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SECOND AND THIRD WARS AGAINST ROME

Mithridates got off lightly from the first war: even Sulla's own troops recognised that (Plut. *Sull.* 24.4). He was simply confined to the territories he possessed before the war. Military defeat must have severely damaged his prestige, but the rich resources of his empire would soon enable him to build up his power again. The Jugurthine war had probably made it clear to the Senate that the only effective neutralisation of a determined native king was death or capture. And the terms of the treaty of Dardanus hardly constituted sufficient revenge for the thousands of Romans and Italians murdered in the Asian Vespers. Even immediately after the war, many must have thought that Rome had unfinished business with Mithridates.

Some of the king's Black Sea subjects had taken advantage of his defeat to revolt, and the first thing he did on his return to Pontus was to go to war with these Colchian and Bosporan rebels (App. *Mith.* 64).[1] The Colchians wanted Eupator's son, also called Mithridates, as king, which may imply that they were dissatisfied with the previous administration of their country. When this request was granted they returned to their loyalty.[2] Eupator, however, was suspicious of the young prince and executed him. We do not hear how the Colchians reacted, but presumably another *uparchos* or *dioikētēs* was sent to govern the region (Strabo 11.2.18 c.499). Indeed perhaps it was now that Colchis was transferred to another of the king's sons, Machares, ruler of the Bosporan kingdom, who certainly later on controlled it.[3] The causes and participants of the Bosporan revolt are not known, but it was a more serious affair than the Colchian uprising, and Mithridates felt it necessary to fit out a fleet and large army.

These preparations provided L. Licinius Murena, whom Sulla had left in charge of Asia with the two legions of Fimbria,[4] with one of the two

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[1] The bosporan coins of the archon Hygiaenon formerly ascribed to the time of this revolt (e.g. by Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 296), are now generally dated to the end of the third century B.C.: see D. B. Shelov, *Coinage of the Bosporus VI-II Centuries B. C.* (Engl. transl. by H. Bartlett Wells 1978) 159.

[2] D. B. Shelov, *VDI* 1980, No. 153, 37-8 maintains that the younger Mithridates was not installed as a vassal king of Colchis, but as governor or deputy.

[3] See D. B. Shelov, *VDI* 1978, No. 143, 60.

[4] Memnon 36.1 incorrectly states that Murena was sent by the Senate.

grounds on which he launched the so-called Second Mithridatic War.[5] For Mithridates' actions were misinterpreted, and it was said that he was preparing for war, not against the Bosporan people, but against Rome (App. *Mith.* 64; Cic. *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 9). Murena had this on good authority: Archelaus, the senior Pontic general in the first war had recently defected to the Roman side, and now urged Murena to anticipate what he argued was the inevitable Pontic attack.[6] Furthermore, a charge seems to have been laid against Mithridates that he was not abiding by the terms of the Treaty of Dardanus: Appian (*Mith.* 64), although contradicting himself, reports that the king had not yet given up all of Cappadocia.[7] Glew establishes that this charge was probably not true, but may refer rather to difficulties encountered by Ariobarzanes in reestablishing control over parts of his kingdom that still favoured Pontic supremacy.[8] Clearly his innocence will have had an important effect on Mithridates' attitude towards Rome: in spite of complying fully with Sulla's peace terms, he was now subjected to the wilful aggression of Murena. In retrospect we can see that he was not yet ready to confront Rome again so soon after his defeat. Even if Murena recognised this, as he probably did, he was a man of action who had already moved against the pirates and annexed the city of Cibyra:[9] booty and a triumph beckoned, and the situation in Pontus and Cappadocia offered scope and at least some excuse for intervention. Once again, however, as with Manius Aquillius' actions at the start of the first war, Murena was not carrying out senatorial or Sullan policy: civil war was already threatening in Italy, and would seen be raging.

So in 83, on what Appian calls "trifling occasions for war," Murena marched into Pontus through Cappadocia and attacked Comana, killing some of the king's cavalry. Mithridates objected, and referred to the treaty made with Sulla at Dardanus. In fact this was only a verbal agreement, and had not been ratified in writing. Sulla either did not have time

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[5] For the best analysis of events between 85 and 73, see now D. Glew, *Chiron* 11 (1981) 109-130. Also A. N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East* (1984) 149-152.

[6] Mithridates, it seems, had started out by thinking that the Peace of Dardanus, the terms of which had been negotiated by Archelaus, represented the best deal available. Later on, the king came to believe that Archelaus had treasonably given in to Sulla too easily. Hence the general's flight from the Pontic court: see Glew (supra n. 5) 115.

[7] The contradiction lies in App. *Mith.* 58 where it is said that Mithridates agreed to the terms arranged by Archelaus, and after the meeting with Sulla, "returned to his inherited kingdom alone", clealy implying that he withdrew from all conquered territories, including Cappadocia.

[8] Glew (supra n. 5) 110-114.

[9] See Magie, *RRAM* 240-243. An inscription from Caunus honours Murena, probably for his anti-piratical activities: see R. Bernhardt, *Anadolou* 16 (1972) 117-122; *Bull. Epig.* 1976 No. 660. p. 549-50.

to do this, or, as Mithridates may have thought, left the treaty unwritten on purpose, to allow for an easy resumption of the war when it was necessary or convenient. Mithridates' embassy was made up of Greek philosophers who disparaged the king before Murena instead of supporting him (Memnon 26.1). Murena simply denied the existence of the treaty, and continued to plunder Pontus. Both sides appealed for help to Heracleia, according to Memnon (26.2). Murena was quite prepared to make demands on allies—he had already done so with Miletus, Deiotarus of Galatia, and perhaps Rhodes and Priene[10]—but there does not appear to be any particular reason why Mithridates should have approached the Heracliots, unless it was merely to prevent them from interfering. At any rate, they stayed out of the dispute. Murena spent the winter of 83/2 in Cappadocia, and Mithridates sent ambassadors to the Senate and Sulla to complain about the treatment he was receiving. These ambassadors had not yet returned when Murena again invaded Pontus and overran four hundred villages before retiring to Phrygia and Galatia with much plunder (App. *Mith.* 65). Still Mithridates held back. The Senate sent Calidius to order Murena to stop harassing the king, but there was some suspicion that in private conversation Calidius encouraged him to continue his attacks. At any rate Murena invaded for a third time, and was even encouraged to assault Sinope, the possession of which would give him control of the rest of Pontus (Memnon 26.3). At this stage it is understandable how Mithridates could have thought that, in Appian's words, "the Romans were clearly making war on him." He retaliated by sending his general Gordius against Murena. Gordius attacked some villages, taking booty and prisoners, and then faced the main Roman force until Mithridates arrived with a large army, and inflicted a sharp defeat on Murena.[11] The victory immediately brought over supporters to the Pontic side, and Mithridates followed it up by driving out of Cappadocia all the Roman garrisons established earlier by Murena. He then offered a magnificent sacrifice to Zeus Stratios. Everything seemed to be moving towards another full-scale war. Mithridates again had justice on his side: in the first war he had taken pains to lay the blame on Roman aggression, and now in 82 that aggression had been repeated and was even more blatant.

Conditions were not, however, ideal. He still had a revolt to deal with in the Black Sea, and although his victory over Murena probably

[10] See F. Munzer, *RE* 13, 1 (1926) col. 445.

[11] It is not clear where all this action took place. After the Pontic victory which was won beside a river, Murena fled by a pathless route across the mountains to Phrygia (App. *Mith.* 65). This might be taken to mean the river Halys and the Paphlagonian mountains, but the reference is too vague to judge with confidence.

restored some of his prestige, his total defeat at the hands of Sulla and Fimbria was still very fresh in the memory of his own troops, of the Romans and of his prospective supporters in Asia. Moreover, by the end of 82 Sulla was in complete control of Italy, and although opposition elsewhere continued into 81, Sulla himself was free to turn his attention to Mithridates should the king extend hostilities. Clearly, however, the latter had no wish to do that. Sulla's envoy Aulus Gabinius arrived in the east in 81 with orders to call off Murena and patch up relations between Pontus and Cappadocia.[12] When Mithridates saw that the Romans did not want war, he was quite prepared to back down himself, although he did take advantage of his victory to strengthen his position in Cappadocia: in the reconciliation between himself and Ariobarzanes he betrothed his four year old daughter to Ariobarzanes' son,[13] but also demanded to be allowed to keep that part of Cappadocia of which he had just won control, and have some more in addition. This was the direction from which Murena had brought trouble, and as Mithridates was now anxious to quell the Bosporan uprising, it made good strategic sense to cover his rear and secure his Cappadocian border. This arrangement also, of course, ran contrary to the terms of the Peace of Dardanus, and seems to have met with the disapproval of Gabinius, who refused to participate in the celebrations organised by Mithridates to mark the settlement. But Gabinius had probably been sent by Sulla in response to Mithridates' diplomatic mission to Rome of the previous year, rather than to the news of Murena's defeat, and if he was to preserve the peace, had little choice but to accept the situation as he found it. Further Roman concern at the new state of affairs can perhaps be detected in the award of a singularly undeserved triumph to Murena in 81,[14] which was perhaps a sort of official demonstration that the war had been *iustum*, that Murena's reasons for invading Pontus in the first place were valid.[15]

Mithridates certainly came out of his second encounter with Rome better than he entered it. He had achieved a very welcome victory over Roman arms, and with the southern defences of Pontus now much improved, he could turn with relative safety against his rebellious Bosporan subjects. These he pacified and then placed his son Machares as ruler over them.[16] The success of this enterprise was not matched by his efforts

[12] For Gabinius' early career, see E. Badian, *Philologus* 103 (1959) 87 ff.

[13] Appian (*Mith.* 66) says the girl was betrothed to Ariobarzanes himself, but Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 299 felt that he was too old, and that she was betrothed to his son.

[14] See Broughton, *MRR* vol. 2, p. 77.

[15] Glew's contention, however, that Cilicia was regularly assigned as a province only after 81 or 80, seems unwarranted: see M. Hassall *et al.*, *JRS* 64 (1974) 202 lines 35-37.

[16] On the nature of Machares' power, which was probably not that of a semi-autonomous king, and on his career as a whole, see Shelov (supra n. 3) 59 ff.

immediately afterwards to join up the Bosporan kingdom and Colchis, and thus ensure an uninterrupted land route around the east coast of the Black Sea: he lost two thirds of the army he sent against the Achaean tribes north of Colchis (App. *Mith.* 67). This failure may well have been a factor in the king's sudden determination in the year 80 to have the Peace of Dardanus ratified in writing.[17] He had probably intended to do this anyway, only to be diverted by unrest in the Black Sea and by Murena's invasions. By 80 he was free to attend to the matter, but now, in view of the Achaean debacle it was even more desirable to regularise his position with Rome and protect himself from the random aggression of officials like Murena.[18] The attempt would also be a sort of test of Roman intentions: if the Senate was not prepared to ratify the Peace of Dardanus, Mithridates might legitimately conclude that the Romans were not serious about peace, but were merely biding their time. He therefore sent an embassy to Rome. At the same time Ariobarzanes despatched ambassadors to argue for the return of those parts of Cappadocia still held by Mithridates. Sulla saw an opportunity of enforcing the arrangements made at Dardanus, and ordered the king to evacuate Cappadocia altogether: if these terms were accepted the treaty would be officially signed. By the time he received this reply, Eupator had probably also heard that P. Servilius Vatia had been elected consul for 79 with Cilicia as his *provincia*: a consular army would soon be in a position to threaten the southern flank of Pontus. With this and his recent defeat on his mind, Mithridates found it worth the sacrifice to agree to Sulla's condition and pull out of Cappadocia.[19] In 78 another Pontic embassy arrived in Rome,

[17] The first embassy sent to Rome by Mithridates to achieve this, is usually dated to 79: see for instance, Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 300; Magie, *RRAM* 321; A. H. J. Greenidge and A. M. Clay, *Sources for Roman History 133-70 B.C.* (ed. 2 1960) 230. According to Appian (*Mith.* 67), however, Sulla appears to have been still very much in charge at the time: it is he who gives the order for Mithridates to withdraw from Cappadocia. This suggests that Eupator's first embassy arrived while Sulla was still dictator, that is, before about July or August 80 (for the date of Sulla's abdication from the dictatorship, see the discussion of B. L. Twyman, *Athenaeum* 54 [1976] 77-96) or at least while he was still consul in the remaining months of 80. Mithridates had been eager to settle the Bosporus even before the war with Murena, and it seems likely that he launched the Bosporan campaign as soon as possible after that war, probably in mid 81—Murena had time to return to Rome and hold his triumph in that year—with the Achaean disaster following in the winter of 81/80, rather than at the end of 80, as argued by, among others, Glew (supra n. 5) 122.

[18] Glew (supra n. 5) 123, however, surely exaggerates the seriousness of Mithridates' military position after the Achaean failure when he claims that "the Pontic army now stood at a third its former strength": the particular army involved against the Achaeans may have suffered two thirds losses, but the total armed strength of Pontus surely amounted to considerably more than this one army.

[19] Glew (supra n. 5) 122-3 thinks that Servilius' appointment helped to produce Mithridates' first embassy to Rome. The chronology I have adopted rules this out, although I do accept that it may have affected the king's positive response to Sulla's condition about Cappadocia.

expecting this time to sign the treaty. Instead they found that Sulla had now died, and that the Senate was too busy to receive the envoys. This marks a serious degeneration in Romano-Pontic relations. In the immediate aftermath of Sulla's death, the consuls may, as Appian (*Mith.* 67) says, have been too busy with other matters to bother about Pontic ambassadors, but from Mithridates' point of view it must have appeared a straightforward case of bad faith, and a clear indication of hostile Roman intentions. He immediately persuaded his son-in-law to invade Cappadocia. Tigranes had done this before for Mithridates in the mid 90's, but had subsequently managed to stay out of the First Mithridatic War. His purpose in invading now was apparently to collect a population to fill his new city of Tigranocerta, rather than to occupy Cappadocia permanently. For when he had rounded up three hundred thousand Cappadocians and Cilicians, and emptied twelve Greek cities (Strabo 11.14.15 c.532), he withdrew. The Senate recognised that Mithridates was the one behind this action, and that, presumably, is what they were meant to think: at a time when he might have appeared vulnerable, here was a display by Eupator of his strength, a challenge to the Senate not to underestimate him.

One of the most potentially important areas of Mithridates' foreign policy in this period between the major wars, was his relationship with Sertorius. During the Social War the Italian rebels had appealed to Eupator for help, but by that stage they were all but beaten. Here now in Spain was another rebel, a Roman magistrate this time, by all accounts resisting the Roman government with great success. He looked a much better prospect than the Italians. With Sertorius diverting Roman resources to the west, Mithridates would be under much less pressure and have much freer scope both for defence and offence in the east. It would be the same for Sertorius—an alliance would benefit both of them. The idea was suggested by L. Magius and L. Fannius, deserters from Fimbria's army who joined Mithridates in 85.[20] Their flattery that Mithridates would play Pyrrhus to Sertorius' Hannibal appealed to him (Plut. *Sert.* 23.2), but clearly the suggested alliance made good sense. So Mithridates initiated contact with Sertorius, and sent Fannius and Magius to negotiate.[21] The date of their first journey is often said to be

[20] See F. Münzer, *RE* 14, 1 (1928) col. 439; *RE* 6 (1909) col. 1992-3.

[21] In App. *Mith.* 68 Fannius and Magius are described as *stasiōtai* of Sertorius (Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 328 called them "die Vertreter des Sertorius"). They were not Sertorians, and E. Gabba, *Republican Rome. The Army and the Allies* (transl. P. J. Cuff 1976) 245 n. 316 suggests that the anti-Sertorian nature of Appian's passage explains the apparent mistake: by calling them Sertorians, Appian is attributing the initiation of negotiations between Sertorius and Mithridates to the former.

79, because the ship in which they sailed was bought from Verres while he was on his *legatio Asiatica* (Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.87).[22] This seems too early. An agreement was reached just before the outbreak of the Third Mithridatic War, and although there was not immediate approval of Mithridates' terms, one would have to ask what the negotiators were doing for four or five years. Verres' ship was purchased in 79, but it is by no means a necessary conclusion that Fannius and Magius sailed to Spain the same year. Indeed as Mithridates was trying to have the treaty of Dardanus ratified at that time, it seems unlikely that he would risk negotiations with Sertorius. It was probably about 76 or 75 when these negotiations started.[23]

Mithridates offered to send three thousand talents and forty ships to Sertorius, in return for a recognition of Eupator's rights to Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, Galatia and Asia (App. *Mith.* 68; Plut. *Sert.* 23-4). Plutarch reports that Sertorius would not agree to hand over Asia which was a Roman province, and therefore not negotiable. When M. Marius was sent by Sertorius with troops to help Mithridates we are told by Plutarch that he entered certain cities of Asia with the fasces and axes, and granted freedom and tax exemptions in the name of Sertorius, while Mithridates played a subsidiary role. The implication of this story is probably that Marius was sent not only to help Mithridates as a general, but also as pro-consul of the counter-government of Sertorius to take possession of the province of Asia.[24] In other words, Sertorius did not cede Asia to Eupator: Cappadocia and Bithynia were nothing to do with Rome (*mēden prosēkonta Rōmaiois*) and these the king could have—he could not have a Roman province, which had been acquired in a perfectly just manner (*tō dikaiōtatō tropō*).[25] The final agreement was reached in the summer before the third war started: after talking about the treaty, Appian goes on to say how Mithridates knew that this war with Rome would

[22] See B. Scardigli, *Athenaeum* 49 (1971) 253 for bibliography.

[23] Greenidge and Clay (supra n. 17) 248 and H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero* (ed. 5 1982) 88 date the negotiations to 75, but Glew (supra n. 5) 126 n. 69 accepts 79.

[24] Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 312; F. Münzer, *RE* 14,2 (1930) col. 1818.

[25] For a persuasive analysis of Sertorius' actions, and in particular of why he could not abandon Asia, see Gabba (supra n. 21) 120 ff. It has been suggested by others that Plutarch's statements on this matter are unreliable, on the grounds that the pro-Sertorian source was unable to let its hero surrender Roman territory to the mortal enemy of the state: see, for instance, H. Berve, *Hermes* 64 (1929) 202-212; Magie, *RRAM* 1203 n. 1; 1206-7 n. 10. To argue that he did give up Asia, involves a fundamentally different, and weaker, interpretation of Sertorius. Incidentally, that Sertorius had no hesitation in ceding Bithynia, implies that Nicomes IV was still alive at the time of the agreement between Mithridates and Sertorius, or at least that Sertorius had not yet learnt of his death. After Nicomedes' death, Bithynia became a Roman province, bequeathed to Rome, just as Asia had been, and in those circumstances Sertorius could hardly claim that "it had nothing to do with the Romans."

be *aspeiston*, and so "for the rest of the summer and the whole winter" he made extensive preparations. The treaty was therefore concluded in that summer during the rest of which preparations for next years's war were being made—that is, the summer of 74, the Third Mithridatic War starting in the spring of 73.[26]

Sertorius was, then, one important part of Mithridates' preparations for another offensive war with Rome.[27] It was perhaps now that the king tried to win the support, or at least the good will of Egypt, by betrothing his daughters Nyssa and Mithridatis to Ptolemy Auletes of Egypt and his brother the king of Cyprus (App. *Mith.* 111). He also cultivated relations with the pirates. Appian (*Mith.* 63; 92) says that Mithridates sent them out on the sea during the first war with Rome, and that their numbers rapidly grew larger and their actions more daring.[28] It is difficult to say how close their relationship with Mithridates was. In order to gratify the king, the Cretans supported the pirates as well as providing mercenaries themselves (App. *Sic.* 6; Diod. 40.1), and we do know that the pirate chief Seleucus was a loyal supporter of Mithridates:[29] when the king was fleeing to Pontus after his failure at Cyzicus, his ship was damaged in a storm, and he was carried to safety in Seleucus' ship. Afterwards, Seleucus commanded the garrison of Cilicians defending Sinope against the Romans.[30] On the other hand after the storm when Mithridates was about to entrust himself to Seleucus' ship, his friends advised him against doing this (App. *Mith.* 78): there was clearly a feeling that it was a dangerous thing to do, probably because the pirates would be in a position to hold the king for ransom. So although they were allies, they had to be treated with care.[31] Even after Mithridates' defeat by Sulla they were able to continue and intensify their activities. This shows that they were independent operators. Mithridates may have been pleased at the trouble they caused to the Romans, but we cannot say how far he was responsible, if at all, for directing their operations.[32]

Militarily Mithridates was preparing carefully in the summer of 74 and the following winter, building ships, manufacturing weapons, storing

[26] For discussion of the date of the outbreak of this war, and the order of events, see B. C. McGing, *Phoenix* 38 (1984) 12-18.

[27] I do not deny that there may also have been defensive considerations involved, as Glew (supra n. 5) 126 emphasizes.

[28] For a good general picture, see Cic. *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 31 ff.

[29] For Seleucus see F. Münzer, *RE* 2A (1921) col. 1247.

[30] See E. Maroti in *Ricerche storiche ed economiche in memoria di Corrado Barbagallo* (1970) 486-488.

[31] It is perhaps misleading to talk of "the pirates", as they were hardly a single and united organisation. Mithridates may have had close ties with some and not with others.

[32] H. A. Ormerod, *Piracy in the Ancient World* (1967 repr. of 1924 ed.) 209 ff.; 219 ff. paints a picture of the pirates and Mithridates working in almost complete unison.

corn and gathering together his allied contingents. He had, according to Appian (*Mith.* 69; 119), one hundred and forty thousand infantry, sixteen thousand cavalry and four hundred ships.[33] This time, however, there was a difference in their training and equipment. He replaced the jewelled and gilded weapons and armour with heavy swords forged in the Roman manner, and with armour that protected rather than pleased the eye. Horses were now well trained where formerly they had been merely finely decorated. The infantry were drilled like Roman soldiers. The warships were stripped of their luxuries, and filled instead with war materials (Plut. *Luc.* 7). Mithridates was trying to learn from his mistakes: his relatively undisciplined hordes had not been able to match the best Roman troops in the first war. To beat the Romans one needed their discipline and efficiency. Financially too the king was having to get ready to pay all these troops, and the issues of royal coins, so sparse for nearly a decade, become in 76, 75 and 74 once again very large, just as they had been in the build-up to the first war.[34] The types on these coins are the same as before with now the highly idealized portrait of the king and the stag having displaced completely the less idealized portrait and Pegasus. So the message of the royal coins is the same as before, but this introduces the question of what Mithridates' propaganda was before the third war, and whether there were any new elements to it.

The situation in Asia should in many ways have been even more favourable to Mithridates than it had been before 89, because after the first war the province suffered more than it ever had before. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Sulla ordered all slaves freed by Mithridates to return to their masters. Rioting resulted with the deaths of both free men and slaves. The walls of some towns were torn down. Other towns were plundered and their inhabitants sold into slavery. The Pontic faction throughout the province was punished severely, especially at Ephesus (App. *Mith.* 61). The people of Mytilene, who had handed over Manius Aquillius to Mithridates, were so afraid of what would happen to them that they refused to surrender to Sulla, and held out it seems until 81/80.[35] The cities that had remained loyal during the war received their reward, usually a grant of freedom and autonomy (e.g. Tabae and Stratoniceia—see above p. 110-111), or a confirmation of this status if they already had it (e.g. Rhodes, Ilium, Lycia, Chios). The others had to pay an indemnity of twenty thousand talents, which was supposed to cover five years arrears of taxes, the expenses of the war and the cost of settling

[33] For variations in the sources see Janke, *Memnon* 141; Sherwin-White (supra n. 5) 168 n. 56.

[34] See M. J. Price, *NC* 8 (1968) 5.

[35] Livy *Epit.* 89. Magie, *RRAM* 1124 n. 41.

it (App. *Mith.* 62; Plut. *Sull.* 25.2). The cities were forced to borrow large sums of money at very high rates of interest, and mortgaged everything they had. Even so, by 71 although twice the original indemnity had been paid to the Roman government, such was the rate of interest that the total debt was now one hundred and twenty thousand talents (Plut. *Luc.* 20.4). Plutarch paints a grim picture of the conditions encountered by Lucullus (*Luc.* 20.1-2). The province was beset by unspeakable and incredible misfortunes, its inhabitants being robbed and enslaved by the tax collectors and money lenders, "harpies" as he calls them. Cities sold their precious possessions to pay their debts, and families their children. Torture was employed by creditors before their victims were forced to serve as slaves. Contributing to the debt as fully as the indemnity was the fact that Sulla billeted his army on the Asian cities over the winter of 85/84, stipulating that each host had to pay sixteen drachmae a day to his guest (fifty drachmae and two suits of clothing for military tribunes), and serve him and his friends a dinner (Plut. *Sull.* 25.2).[36] Understandably, the communities tried by diplomatic means to alleviate their situation. Leading figures like Xenocles of Adramyttium and Diodorus Zonas of Sardis spoke up for the province. Ambassadors pleaded their case against oppression before the Asian magistrates or at Rome. Such were Zosimus of Priene, Diodorus Pasparus of Pergamum, and Dionysius and Hierocles of Aphrodisias.[37] The Asian magistrates themselves, however, were sometimes far from disinterested, and scandalously corrupt. Verres was a notorious example (even allowing for the fact that Cicero provides the evidence). He went to Asia in 80 as the legate of Dolabella, governor of Cilicia, and allegedly outraged the inhabitants everywhere he went, perhaps most of all at Laodiceia, where he secured the conviction and execution of Philodamus and his son in a terrible miscarriage of justice (Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.49 ff.; 2.4.71). With the enormous amount of debt, the resulting oppression by publicani and money lenders, and the misgovernment of officials like Verres, the situation in Asia should have been very receptive to the propaganda of Mithridates.

On the royal coins, as we have seen, the king was still the new Dionysus and the new Alexander. That he persevered with his Alexander propaganda is demonstrated well by the incident during the third war when he was seriously wounded, and showed himself to his troops, just as

[36] If this is correct, Broughton estimated that the cost of a billet lasting six months would have been one hundred and twenty million drachmae, quite apart from the cost of food, lodging and clothing: see T. R. S. Broughton, in T. Frank, ed., *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome* vol. 4 (1938) 517.

[37] On Dionysius and Hierocles, see T. Drew-Bear, *BCH* 96 (1972) 443-471, and on the diplomatic activity after the first war, C. P. Jones, *Chiron* 4 (1974) 203 ff.

Alexander had done in India (App. *Mith.* 89). The types of the municipal bronzes do not seem to display any new messages: Dionysus and the Perseus story are still prominent.[38] Mithridates' philhellenic policy, however, probably suffered irretrievably in the first war. Military defeat alone made him an ineffective champion of Hellenism, but would not necessarily have turned the sympathy of the Greeks against him: the alienation of his Greek support was the result of his own behaviour especially at the end of the war. Greeks and Asiatics alike may have been "liberated" from the Romans for a time, but their new overlord had proved even less desirable. Furthermore the treaty with Sertorius introduced a potential inconsistency in the concept of liberation from the Romans. For in the first war the king had claimed to be fighting the common enemies of mankind, and yet here he was now allying himself to one of them. Although there might be an explanation for the Sertorian connection, to many Greeks and other potential supporters it could well appear that Mithridates was no genuine champion of anyone but himself: for the expansion of his empire he was prepared to accept any help, regardless of the source. In fact it may not have been too difficult at least partly to reconcile the treaty with his propaganda, even though it is not completely clear whether Mithridates treated with Sertorius as a government in exile, or as a rebel. In many ways it would have been easier for the king to advertise his new ally as a rebel: in that way it could be claimed that Sertorius was not in fact a Roman at all, but was as much an enemy of Rome as Mithridates. Plutarch's story, however, of Marius taking precedence over Eupator in Asia, does seem to indicate that the king treated Sertorius in something like the same way that Sertorius treated himself—as the leader of a government in exile, opposed not to Rome, but to the particular oligarchic government that controlled Rome at this time. Mithridates need not have pictured the situation in quite the same terms, but could have claimed that the real enemy was the Roman state as it now stood, and Sertorius was not part of that. There was undoubtedly still an element of inconsistency in accepting the help of Sertorius or Fannius, Magius, Marius and any other Romans. In 88 Mithridates had ordered the Asian Vespers—there were advantages in appearing in Asia as the deadly enemy of the Roman oppressors and everyone connected with them—but as time passed it became clear that there were also advantages in acquiring certain Romans as allies. It is difficult to judge what the reaction in 73 was to the king from the people of Asia Minor. Epigraphical evidence is entirely lacking after the first war, but even if a particular person or state had wished to honour him, it is

[38] See F. Imhoof-Blumer, *NZ* 45 (1912) 183.

hardly to be expected that they would have risked Rome's disfavour by doing so. In the third war itself Plutarch (*Luc.* 7.5) says that Bithynia welcomed Mithridates, and that disaffection with Rome broke out in Asia. It appears that some people still found him appealing—perhaps the debtors, slaves and metics who had supported him to the end in the first war—but his advance was so soon held up at Cyzicus, and his whole campaign put on the defensive, that one cannot tell what sort of reception he might have enjoyed in the rest of Asia. Certainly the fact that he was sternly resisted in the first major city of Asia he approached, is an indication that this time he was not going to be welcomed as warmly.

Appian (*Mith.* 70) gives us Mithridates' reasons for reopening the war and some of his propaganda. After invading Paphlagonia with his generals Taxilles and Hermocrates, he made a speech to his soldiers. In it he talked about his ancestors, no doubt recalling, as he had done before, his Macedonian and Persian origins; he boasted with some justification of his own achievements, how he had turned Pontus into a strong kingdom; he pointed out that his army had never been defeated by the Romans when he himself was present. He then spoke on the subject of Roman greed, a subject which had been prominent in his propaganda at the time of the first war, and which occurs again in Sallust's letter of Mithridates to the king of Parthia. Here it is coupled with Roman bad faith over the treaty of Dardanus—the Romans refused to have the treaty ratified in writing, so that they could break it whenever they liked—and both are put forward as the cause of the Third Mithridatic War. Mithridates did not, of course, project himself as the real aggressor, although he apparently made no attempt to deny that it was he who was actually initiating this round of the conflict. It was the Romans who were responsible for the first war, which had never really come to an end: the hostilities of 73 and the following years were merely an extension of that first war. Roman greed, and treachery over the treaty still left Mithridates the aggrieved party. There is little evidence that the king tried to use support for a supposed son of Nicomedes IV as an excuse for war. In Sallust's letter of Mithridates (Sall. *H.* 4.69 Maurenbrecher) it is claimed that Nicomedes did have a son by his wife Nysa, but that the Romans took the country anyway.[39] From this it has been argued that Mithridates invaded Bithynia ostensibly to restore this son.[40] Stier maintains that the details of the letter are so unreliable that they cannot be used as historical

[39] Sall. *H.* 2.71 Maurenbrecher also seems to refer to his son: many people came hurrying from Bithynia to deny that the person in question was the lawful son of Nicomedes.
[40] See Magie, *RRAM* 1201 n. 50 for bibliography.

evidence,[41] but even if one were to assume that Nicomedes had a son, the letter itself does not support the notion that Mithridates used this son as an excuse for invasion. In section 13 Eupator says that he realized the Romans had only postponed war rather than offered him true peace, and for that reason he restarted the fighting (*rursus tamen bellum coepi.*)[42]

It seems, then, that he made no attempt to deny his responsibility for starting the war, or as he argued, for continuing the already existing struggle. But were his stated reasons the only ones? Many have assumed that the real cause of the war was the death of Nicomedes IV and the Roman annexation of Bithynia.[43] This is not in fact stated in any of our sources, however likely it might be that Mithridates would find Roman control of the entrance to the Black Sea totally unacceptable. For Appian the decisive point was apparently the king's treaty with Sertorius, which, as I have argued already (below p. 138 n. 25), took place before Nicomedes' death: this agreement and the subsequent preparations of Mithridates were proof of his decision to go to war. Nicomedes' death and the inheritance of Bithynia by Rome merely made it immediately necessary, and provided the opportunity to implement his plans. So what caused the king to precipitate war by allying himself to Sertorius in 74? Glew has perhaps provided the answer in his suggestion that Nicomedes' health had been failing seriously for some time. In line with the recent Roman interest in Cyrene, for so long virtually ignored by the senate, it might have appeared likely that Rome was also intending to fill the vacuum in Bithynia when Nicomedes died.[44] Or possibly it was generally known before his death that Nicomedes planned to bequeath his kingdom to Rome. Mithridates could not accept this situation, so it was virtually inevitable that he was going to have to fight. For an ambitious opportunist this was not the time to wait and see what happened. The immediate cause of the war, therefore, was not the actual death of Nicomedes and Roman take-over in Bithynia but rather the prospect of these events, which offered Mithridates the opportunity he was waiting for, and prompted him to seek help from Sertorius. When news of the pact between Mithridates and Sertorius reached Rome, the Senate realised that the king had committed himself, and the Fathers moved into

[41] H. E. Stier, in *Beiträge zur alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben. Festschrift für Franz Altheim zum 6.10.1968* ed. R. Stiehl and H. E. Stier, vol. 1 (1969) 441-451.

[42] See L. Raditsa, *Helikon* 9-10 (1969-1970) 632-5.

[43] See for instance Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 315; Th. Mommsen, *The History of Rome* (transl. by W. Dickson, vol. 4 1901) 323; H. Ormerod, *CAH* vol. 9 p. 358; Will, *Histoire politique* vol. 2, 411; E. Olshausen, *RE* Suppl. 15 (1978) col. 432.

[44] Glew (supra n. 5) 128-130, who emphasizes the importance of defensive considerations and fear of Rome in Mithridates' actions. I argue a greater role for his ambition and opportunism: see McGing (supra n. 26) 17-18.

action:[45] the consular provinces of Lucullus and Cotta were changed, and both consuls were despatched to the east, so that when hostilities began in the spring of 73 they were present in Asia.[46] The war was not unexpected. Even in the years before 74 there was an awareness at Rome that Mithridates would fight again, if he got the chance: according to Sallust (*H.* 1.77.8 Maurenbrecher), Phillipus in 77 warned that the king was waiting for an opportunity to declare war, and C. Cotta in 75 referred to the necessity of keeping an army in Asia and Cilicia because of Mithridates' power (Sall. *H.* 2.47.7 Maurenbrecher).[47]

In the speech to his troops the king went on, after dealing with the causes of the war, to emphasize the strength of the Pontic forces and the weakness of the Romans, who were troubled by a difficult war with Sertorius, and by internal disagreement. As a proof of how hard-pressed the enemy was, Mithridates pointed out the Roman inability to do anything about the pirates. These were, as we saw, friendly to Pontus, but the important thing is that they were hostile to the Romans who had been unable to curb them. To demonstrate the degree of internal discord at Rome, Mithridates was able to display the Roman leaders who had joined his side, particularly the Fimbrian officers L. Magius and L. Fannius, and Sertorius' man M. Marius. He might aso have mentioned C. Appuleius Decianus, tribune in 98, who deserted to Mithridates after being prosecuted (*Schol. Bob.* p. 95 Stengl), and the senator Attidius, who although a friend of the king for a long time, was eventually discovered in a conspiracy and executed (App. *Mith.* 90). These men hardly indicated serious disagreement in the Roman ranks, but they were valuable proof that even some Romans supported the king.

Mithridates opened his campaign with an invasion of Bithynia. To guard his rear from possible attack by Lucullus, he sent Diophantus into Cappadocia to take control of the southern route into Pontus (Memnon 27.2).[48] Plutarch, as we have seen (above p. 143), reports that the cities of Bithynia received Mithridates gladly, and those of Asia became restless

[45] Sherwin-White (supra n. 5) 164 suggests that Mithridates may have launched a pre-emptive strike against Paphlagonia in 74, thus alerting the Senate of his decision to go to war. One would expect, however, such an overt move by the king to have been noted somewhere in the ancient sources.

[46] See McGing (supra n. 26) 15.

[47] On both speeches and how the Mithridatic threat was used to influence the course of internal Roman politics, see B. Zuchold, *Acta Classica* (Debrecen) 15 (1979) 17-21. On Cotta's speech see J. Malitz, *Hermes* 100 (1972) 359-386.

[48] For the details of the campaigns of the first part of the war before Pompey's arrival, see for instance, Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 316-371; Mommsen (supra n. 43) 323-351; Ormerod (supra n. 43) 356-371; Magie *RRAM* 321-350; J. Van Ooteghem, *Lucius Licinius Lucullus* (1959) 84-159; Will, *Histoire politique* vol. 2, 411-417.

and disaffected, scarcely one of them remaining quiet. The disaffection may have been focused on the activities of the publicani, as seems to have been the case at Heracleia. Here the fleet of the king's admiral Aristonicus was refused entry because the Heracliots wanted to keep their treaty with Rome.[49] Aristonicus, however, forced them to contribute five ships, and their conversion to the Pontic cause was guaranteed when the publicani in the city were murdered (Memnon 27.5-6). Mithridates' strategy seems to have been to engage Cotta as quickly as possible, before Lucullus could join with him, thus taking the initiative from Rome, and diverting Lucullus' attention from Pontus itself.[50] In the first war the king's early victories had given him the run of Asia Minor, and with no one to oppose him seriously, he had been able to bring over to his side many cities with great ease. The situation this time was very different: there were two proconsuls and a Roman army waiting for him. The disaffected cities of Asia could hardly be expected to declare openly for Mithridates while he was still far off, and while he had not yet shown that he was capable of defeating the Romans. Cotta unwisely offered him the opportunity of an early victory, by sending his naval prefect P. Rutilius Nudus to engage the king in open battle.[51] Rutilius' force was defeated with heavy loss, and the same day the Pontic fleet occupied the harbour of Chalcedon totally neutralizing Cotta's fleet of sixty four ships. Chalcedon was besieged and eventually relieved by Lucullus,[52] but other cities of the area were captured by Mithridates or went over to his side—Nicaea, Nicomedeia, Prusa, Apameia Myrleia, Prusias, and in Asia, Parium and Lampsacus.[53]

With Bithynia in his possession Mithridates moved into the province of Asia, and made his first major objective the capture of Cyzicus. Lucullus refused to engage the huge Pontic army, other than in cavalry skirmishes: he quickly came to realize that his best hope of victory lay in the enemy's difficulty in feeding such a large army (Plut. *Luc.* 8.55 ff.; Livy, *Epit.* 94). There is no obvious reason why Mithridates chose to attack Cyzicus first. Eutropius (6.6) says that the king regarded Cyzicus as the key to the whole of Asia, but it is difficult to see why this should be so. The idea

[49] His name is given as Aristonicus in Plut. *Luc.* 11.5. Memnon 28 calls him Archelaus, but appears to have confused him with Mithridates' former commander-in-chief who was now on the Roman side.

[50] Sherwin-White (supra n. 5) 166 emphasizes Mithridates' desire to "deflect Lucullus from Pontus by offensive action in the Roman sphere and so to bring the Romans to battle on his own terms".

[51] App. *Mith.* 71; Oros. 6.2.13. See Broughton, *MRR* suppl. 54 for an inscription, probably of this Rutilius as quaestor in Macedonia.

[52] See Dessau, *ILS* 60; Van Ooteghem (supra n. 48) 165.

[53] Magie, *RRAM* 1206-7 n. 10-11.

behind his attack was probably partly connected with the help that the city had given to the Roman forces at Chalcedon (Plut. *Luc.* 9.1; App. *Mith.* 73): here the Cyzicenes had suffered heavy losses in the engagement, but Mithridates was perhaps anxious to take vengeance on them and quickly stamp out their opposition, as an example to others. Moreover, with Bithynia now in Pontic possession, Cyzicus was quite simply the nearest major objective in the Roman province of Asia. As it also enjoyed splendid harbour facilities, the capture of Cyzicus would secure a supply route that Rome could not threaten because Mithridates controlled the seas.[54] So there were good reasons to attack it.

While the main theatre of war moved to Cyzicus there were other engagements elsewhere in Asia Minor. Mithridates' general Eumachus overran Phrygia and Pisidia with much slaughter, but was eventually defeated and driven off by Deiotarus, one of the tetrarchs of Galatia (App. *Mith.* 75). Fannius and Metrophanes met defeat at the hands of a certain Mamercus, presumably a legate of Lucullus (Oros. 6.2.16). C. Salluvius Naso appears to have defended Mysia successfully against Pontic forces (*OGIS* 445). Julius Caesar crossed over to the Asian mainland from Rhodes after his capture and release by pirates, and drove out one of Mithridates' officers, thus ensuring the loyalty of cities whose allegiance was wavering (Suet. *Jul.* 4.2).[55] The waverers needed to see Mithridates' men winning before they could gamble and turn against Rome, but the royal forces were nowhere meeting with significant success. The main stumbling block in Mithridates' way was Cyzicus. He had decided to throw his whole armament into taking it by storm. If he had been content to blockade it, he could have let the bulk of his forces loose on Lucullus and Asia. His decision was disastrous. For although he had control of the sea and was able to cut off the city entirely—it was situated on what was almost an island—Lucullus was in turn able to cut him off, at least from the landward side (App. *Mith.* 75). The Pontic fleet could still bring in provisions, but with the arrival of winter (73/72), this became dangerous and insufficient, and effectively the besieger became the besieged. Even if Mithridates had succeeded in capturing the city, it is difficult to see what difference this would have made: it would not have provided a substantial new supply of food, and he would still have been

[54] Sherwin-White (supra n. 5) 166-7.

[55] The Ephesian inscription mentioning the 'victory' of Caesar, refers not to his minor engagement in 73 against the forces of Mithridates, but rather to the battle of Pharsalus: see *Bull. Epig.* 1972 No. 388, p. 453. A. M. Ward, *AJAH* 2 (1977) 31-3 dates Caesar's intervention to 74, mistakenly believing the war to have started in this year: there is no difficulty in assigning his action to 73.

left trapped by Lucullus.[56] When the food shortage became acute Mithridates sent away his cavalry, pack animals and wounded, as these were a useless drain on resources. At the river Rhyndacus Lucullus destroyed this force (App. *Mith.* 75; Plut. *Luc.* 11.3; Oros. 6.2.15; Memnon 28.1), thus depriving Mithridates of his cavalry. Further difficulties followed when the Pontic admiral Aristonicus was captured on a mission to bribe Roman troops (Plut. *Luc.* 11.5; Memnon 28.2). Finally the king took his fleet and sailed to Parium, after entrusting the rest of his land forces to Marius and Hermaeus, who were ordered to make their way to Lampsacus. This force too was heavily defeated, and the survivors besieged by Lucullus in Lampsacus (App. *Mith.* 76; Plut. *Luc.* 11.6; Memnon 28.4; Florus 1.40.7). Here Mithridates rescued them by sea, after a failed attempt to capture Perinthus, and retired to Nicomedeia. The invasion of Asia was over.

As well as being the decisive military engagement of the third war, the siege of Cyzicus also provides an interesting glimpse of anti-Mithridatic propaganda. Just as Mithridates recruited divine and supernatural support for his cause, it should not be forgotten that his enemies did likewise. Cyzicus was supposed to have been given by Zeus to Proserpina as a dowry, and the Maiden was the special protectress of the city. During the siege, the time for her festival came round, and as the Cyzicenes did not have the necessary black heifer for sacrifice, they made one out of paste.[57] A real one, however, conveniently swam across to the city and presented itself for sacrifice (App. *Mith.* 75; Plut. *Luc.* 10). Proserpina herself appeared in a dream to the secretary of the demos, foretelling the arrival of the south wind, which on the following day blew down the Pontic siege engines. The goddess Athena also assisted in the defence of the city: she appeared to the people of Ilium covered in perspiration and with cloak torn, explaining how she had just come from helping the Cyzicenes. The Gods were definitely on the side of Cyzicus, and Appian even reports that Mithridates' councillors advised him to give up the siege for that reason.

Cyzicus is by no means the only evidence for anti-Mithridatic religious propaganda. In the first war Sulla undoubtedly devised a Greek identity for himself as the favourite of Aphrodite confronting the New Dionysus.[58] He carried with him a golden figure of Delphian Apollo (Plut. *Sull.* 29),

[56] For the numerous ancient sources on the siege see Magie, *RRAM* 1208 n. 16. An inscription found at Prusa (*IGR* vol. 3 No. 34) honours a citizen for his services in the Mithridatic Wars—it mentions a siege and king Mithridates—but it probably comes from Cyzicus: see L. Robert, *Études Anatoliennes* (1937) 314.

[57] The festival of the Maiden was called, among other things, the Phersephassia: on the festival see L. Robert, *BCH* 102 (1978) 460-477.

[58] On Sulla's counter-propaganda see H. Volkmann, *Sullas Marsch auf Rom. Der Verfall der römischen Republik* (1958) 36-42.

and he seems to have consulted the Delphic Oracle[59]—an unusual step for a Roman of his day. The answer he received told of the great power which Aphrodite had bestowed on the race of Aeneas, and promised supreme power for Sulla himself. As ordered, he dedicated at Aphrodisias an axe to his champion Aphrodite (App. *BCiv.* 1.97). From Lebadeia and Trophonius "favourable utterances and oracles announcing victory" were issued before the battle at Chaeroneia, and while a certain Quintus Titius foretold the Roman victory at Orchomenus, a soldier named Salvenius prophesied Sulla's future career in Italy: Zeus had appeared to both these men (Plut. *Sull.* 17). As we have seen (above p. 102 ff.), oracles were reported from all quarters proclaiming the future successes of Mithridates, and it is clear that Sulla realized the importance of, and was not to be outdone in, this sort of propaganda.

Not only oracles, but omens and dreams also favoured Mithridates' enemies. While he was besieging Rhodes in the first war, a vision of Isis was seen hurling a thunderbolt at the Pontic siege engine called the "Sambuca" (App. *Mith.* 27; Obsequens 56). During the siege of Athens a Roman soldier was killed by lightning, and because the head of the corpse faced towards the city, the haruspex interpreted it as a sign that the Romans would soon capture Athens (Obsequens 56b). At the very time that Curio captured Aristion after the fall of Athens, there was a sign from the Gods in the form of a rain shower (Plut. *Sull.* 14). At the siege of Patara Mithridates was cutting down a sacred grove to make siege engines, but was warned in a dream to stop.[60] According to Obsequens (56) other portents appeared to Mithridates: a vulture was killed by crows; a large star fell from heaven; laughter upset the sacrifice of a maiden to the Furies. During the first war a statue of Nike fell and shattered in front of the king at Pergamum, at which Mithridates was greatly disheartened (Plut. *Sull.* 11). While being pursued by Pompey, Mithridates had a dream that he was sailing to his Bosporan kingdom and was already in sight of land, when he saw himself without friends and tossed by the sea on a small piece of wreckage (Plut. *Pomp.* 32).

There is a largely insurmountable problem in trying to decide how much of this is consciously manufactured propaganda, and how much genuine belief. From Cicero's *De Divinatione* it is quite clear that there was at this time a widespread belief in omens and portents. Among Mithridates' documents captured by Pompey were some which gave interpretations of dreams which the king and his wives had had (Plut.

[59] It is not completely clear that the oracle reported in App. *BCiv.* 1.97 is Delphic, but the particular reference to Delphi implies it.

[60] App. *Mith.* 27. In Obsequens 56, Mithridates is said to have set fire to a grove of the Furies, at which loud laughter was heard.

Pomp. 37). Sulla too was certainly a superstitious man, but in the support of oracles and Aphrodite, however much he did, or did not believe in them, it is difficult to accept that he was not consciously trying to counter the propaganda of Mithridates. As for the actual mechanics of how omens occurred and were reported, it is impossible to say, for example, whether Lucullus or the Cyzicene leaders were actually responsible for the presence of a black heifer at the right time, or whether they merely utilized the event when it happened. To a certain extent it does not matter: however they arose, supernatural signs clearly had propaganda value. Pro-Roman signs appear to have been more frequent than their Pontic counterparts, but this was probably just a result of Roman success. It is quite possible and likely, for instance, that at the siege of Cyzicus Mithridates found omens to support his cause and foretell the fall of the city, but that because Cyzicus held out against him, we only hear of the "successful" omens. Although Mithridates' defeats at the hands of Rome nearly always put him at a disadvantage in the competition for favourable signs from the Gods, even unfavourable omens could at least be used as an excuse for failure. At the siege of Patara, the king could always say that the gods forbade him to construct siege engines, and therefore were responsible for his failure to take the city. At Cyzicus the same opportunity was available, and Mithridates was advised by his councillors to take it, but refused.

After Cyzicus the Pontic fleet was the only powerful weapon left to Mithridates. It was divided into three main divisions: forty ships had been sent to Sertorius in Spain (Plut. *Sert.* 24); fifty were put under the command of Marius, Alexander and Dionysus after the evacuation of Lampsacus; and Mithridates himself took the remainder of the fleet to Nicomedeia (App. *Mith.* 76). A combination of this splitting of resources, of Lucullus' ability in collecting a new fleet and of bad weather, was enough to deprive Mithridates of his supremacy at sea. On the journey from Lampsacus to Nicomedeia a storm blew up and wrecked many of Mithridates' vessels. It also caused losses in Marius' squadron but Lucullus soon destroyed that anyway, capturing all three admirals. Alexander was kept alive to adorn Lucullus' triumph, Dionysus committed suicide and Marius was executed (App. *Mith.* 77; Plut. *Luc.* 12.3-5) The treaty with Sertorius had been of some service to Mithridates: Marius had at least become one of the senior Pontic commanders, even if his presence had not brought victory.

Lucullus' legates now set about recapturing the cities of Bithynia (App. *Mith.* 77; Memnon 28.5 ff.). One of them, Voconius, was sent with a naval squadron to cut off Mithridates' escape route, but he delayed, and enabled the king to set sail for Pontus with over one hundred ships (Plut. *Luc.* 13.2; Florus 1.40.18). The defence of his kingdom was now Mithridates' first concern. Once again, the weather intervened. A storm destroyed or scattered the whole Pontic fleet.[61] This was the occasion when the pirate Seleucus rescued Mithridates. Having garrisoned Heracleia with four thousand mercenaries (Memnon 29. 3-4), Eupator then sailed off to Sinope and on to Amisus where he tried to organize help. His most obvious resources were his own Crimean kingdom, and his son-in-law Tigranes. So he appealed for help to both Machares his son, whom he had established as ruler in the Bosporus, and to Tigranes. In addition he sent Diocles with a large sum of money to buy Scythian assistance (App. *Mith.* 78). Diocles, however, deserted to Lucullus, and neither Machares nor Tigranes showed any intention of answering his call. So Mithridates was on his own. He again demonstrated his perseverance in defeat, and levied another army of forty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, and established a base at Cabeira for the winter of 72/71.[62]

Earlier in the summer Lucullus, Cotta and C. Valerius Triarius had met at Nicomedeia after it had been vacated by Mithridates, to discuss their plans (Memnon 29.5).[63] It was decided that Cotta should move against Heracleia, that Lucullus should take the main part of the army and invade Pontus, and that Triarius should wait with the fleet for the return of the Pontic squadron sent to help Sertorius.[64] Lucullus advanced into Pontus and spent the winter of 72/71 half-heartedly prosecuting the siege of Amisus: he was afraid that if Mithridates was given no chance of recruiting a new army, he would be forced to take refuge with his son-in-law, Tigranes (Plut. *Luc.* 14.2-15.1). At the beginning of spring Lucullus left Murena in charge at Amisus, and set out against Mithridates at Cabeira.[65] After some initial reverses the Romans eventually triumphed. Mithridates was forced to flee and abandon his kingdom.

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[61] Orosius (6.2.24) says that eighty ships were destroyed, Appian (*Mith.* 78) that sixty were lost. Memnon 29.2 says that Mithridates escaped with most of his fleet, but this seems unlikely, as it is never in evidence again.

[62] For the chronology, see McGing (supra n. 26).

[63] For Lucullus' legates see Magie, *RRAM* 1204 n. 4.

[64] Memnon 33.1 records the battle at Tenedus, where this last surviving part of Mithridates' fleet, numbering just under eighty ships according to Memnon, was defeated.

[65] L. Licinius Murena, consul in 62, was the son of the Murena who fought the second Mithridatic War: see F. Munzer, *RE* 13,1 (1926) col. 446 No. 123. Both Appian (*Mith.* 79) and Plutarch (*Luc.* 15.1) say that Lucullus left Amisus in the spring. Phlegon (Jacoby, *FGrHist.* 257 F 12.3) appears to have a different version of events. He says that in Olympiad 177.1 (summer 72 to summer 71) Lucullus left Murena in charge of the siege of Amisus, and marched to Cabeira, *opou diecheimaze.* For discussion of the problem see Magie, *RRAM* 210 n. 24; McGing (supra n. 26) 12-13.

He only just avoided capture before making his way to Tigranes (App. *Mith.* 82; Plut. *Luc.* 22.1; Memnon 30.1). There was nowhere else to go. Without his presence, resistance in Pontus more or less crumbled. Lucullus was left with a clearing-up operation. The main cities Amisus, Sinope, Amaseia and Heracleia held out for a time, but by the end of 70 Pontus was entirely in Roman hands.[66] With the involvement of Tigranes the war now moved into a new phase.

Tigranes was Mithridates' only hope. During the siege of Sinope Machares had provided supplies for the city, but in the course of the siege or immediately after, he sent Lucullus a valuable gold crown, entered into negotiations with him and became a friend and ally of the Roman people (Memnon 37. 5-6; App. *Mith.* 83; Plut. *Luc.* 24). The campaigns of M. Lucullus in 72/71 on the west coast of the Black Sea robbed Mithridates of his influence in that whole area (App. *Ill.* 30; Eutr. 6.10). Appian (*Mith.* 82), Plutarch (*Luc.* 22.1) and Memnon (38.1) all record that Tigranes did not receive his father-in-law at first, indeed not for twenty months according to Memnon. The explanation is probably that he was trying to play safe, hoping that by completely dissociating himself from the fugitive, other than in giving him refuge, he might be able to avoid war with Rome. Such a war, on the other hand, was clearly Mithridates' best, perhaps only, chance of regaining his kingdom. Tigranes had helped on two former occasions by invading Cappadocia, but he had wisely remained neutral in the Mithridatic Wars, in spite of efforts to involve him more closely: we know, for instance, that Mithridates sent Metrodorus on one occasion to ask for help against Rome. Even Metrodorus had seen and admitted to Tigranes that it was not in Armenia's interest to become embroiled (Plut. *Luc.* 22.2-3). Tigranes was now hoping to continue this policy of neutrality by keeping his father-in-law very definitely at a distance.

While Lucullus was still in the process of reducing the cities of Pontus, he sent his brother-in-law, Appius Claudius Pulcher, on a mission to Armenia to demand the surrender of Mithridates (App. *Mith.* 83; Plut. *Luc.* 19.1; 21.1; Memnon 31.2). Appius Claudius told Tigranes directly and with a minimum of tact, that if the king of Pontus were not handed over, Rome would declare war on Armenia. It was almost inconceivable that Tigranes would comply: he could not give up his own father-in-law or provide such shameful proof of his subservience to Rome. But in spite of the threats, there were no compelling reasons, from Tigranes' point of view, to think that war with Rome was inevitable. The fact was that Mithridates was defeated and humbled, the war brilliantly won by

[66] For the subjugation of Pontus after Mithridates' flight, see Magie *RRAM* 337 ff.

Lucullus. There was no question of Tigranes supplying Mithridates with arms, troops or money, or even receiving him into his presence. It must have seemed unlikely that Lucullus would be prepared to undertake an entirely new and difficult war in Armenia in pursuit of an already defeated enemy who was getting a distinctly cool reception from Tigranes.[67]

From Lucullus' point of view, however, there were other factors to be taken into consideration. In the First Mithridatic War Sulla had been content to defeat and confine Eupator to his kingdom. But mere defeat was not enough: one of Eupator's greatest strengths was his ability at putting armies in the field. Beaten he certainly was, but as long as he was alive and free he was a threat and could reemerge at any moment. An additional worry was Tigranes: he had not in the past confronted Rome directly, but he was now defying Lucullus' wishes, and if left to his own devices might, under the urgings of Mithridates, move to the offensive. There was only one effective way to be rid of the problem and that was to lay hands on Eupator himself. Anything less was strategically unsound. There was, then, perfectly adequate justification for invading Armenia. In the event it proved a controversial invasion. Plutarch (*Luc.* 23.2), no doubt reflecting Lucullus' own view of the situation, reports that Tigranes' reply to Appius Claudius made war in Armenia a necessity. Not everybody agreed: there was a strong body of opinion in Rome that the extension of the conflict into Armenia was quite unnecessary, and Lucullus was accused of prolonging the war and widening its scope for his own benefit (Plut. *Luc.* 24; Vell. *Pat.* 2.33). Perhaps aware that this would happen, Lucullus seems to have attributed aggressive intentions to his enemies that just were not there: apologetic distortion can be detected in Plutarch's statement that Lucullus received information that Mithridates and Tigranes were just about to cross into Lycaonia and Cilicia in order to invade Asia (Plut. *Luc.* 23.7).[68] It is quite clear, however, even from Plutarch's own account that when Lucullus crossed the Euphrates in the winter of 70/69 and invaded Armenia, Tigranes had not moved from his capital Tigranocerta.[69] Nor is there any indication that he had intended to move. The aggressor was undoubtedly Lucullus.

[67] Reinach, *Mith. Eup.* 351 thought that Tigranes' refusal to hand over Mithridates was virtually a declaration of war. This may have been how it appeared from the Roman side, but that Tigranes thought differently and was surprised by the Roman attack is reflected in the story of how he executed the first messenger who announced that Lucullus had invaded (Plut. *Luc.* 25.1; App. *Mith.* 84). For Appius' insensitivity and tactlessness see Sherwin-White (supra n. 5) 174-5.

[68] See Magie, *RRAM* 1215 n. 44.

[69] That it was winter is clear from Plut. *Luc.* 24.4, where the Euphrates is said to have been swollen with winter rains.

Appian (*Mith.* 85) says that after the first engagements between the forces of Tigranes and Lucullus, Tigranes finally sent for Mithridates. This would make good sense. With Lucullus' invasion now under way there was no point in Tigranes keeping Mithridates at arm's length, and his advice on how to fight the Romans might be helpful.[70] Mithridates now had what he wanted: Tigranes was committed to the fight against Rome. Even when Lucullus defeated Tigranes and captured Tigranocerta, it was no disaster for Mithridates. Indeed it turned out to his advantage, because Tigranes, bowing to his superior experience, entrusted to him the command of the new army which they levied in the winter of 69/68 (App. *Mith.* 87). They also sent an embassy to the king of Parthia to try to recruit help from that quarter. This is the occasion of Sallust's letter of Mithridates (Sall. *H.* 4.69 Maurenbrecher), which is potentially one of the most important sources for Mithridates' propaganda, as it purports to be a personal letter of the king himself. It is, however, a difficult problem deciding exactly what this "letter" is, and what it tells us. Was there a real letter of Mithridates to Phraates III, or is this entirely a composition of Sallust? If there was a real letter, to what extent has Sallust reworked it? Whatever it is, how far does it reveal eastern and Mithridatic propaganda? The same sort of questions arise in connection with the speech of Mithridates reported in Justin (*Epit.* 38.4-7).

Firm answers are not at hand, and uncertainty is reflected in modern opinion. Bikerman maintained that the letter of Mithridates "n'est pas une pièce authentique", but is "une composition libre", and he seems to mean that there was no real letter.[71] Earl agrees: "it is a Sallustian composition designed to express ... the arguments which could be expected from a man in Mithridates' position".[72] On the other hand Buchner claimed "hinter allen Reden und Briefen stehen historische Reden und Briefe", although Sallust's speeches and letters are still "freie Schöpfungen".[73] Stier thinks that Sallust had "ein authentisches Vorbild" for the letter.[74] The longest work on the letter is a historical commentary by L. Raditsa, who believes that Sallust would not have invented a document outright: Mithridates' letter is what he calls "authentic", not in the sense that it is a "word for word translation of a Pontic document, but rather that it is a Latin composition based on a close knowledge of eastern propaganda and historiography".[75] Although the details are not necessarily true, they are not arbitrarily invented by Sallust: "they derive from an eastern interpretation of the Roman conquest which was widely broadcast by the eastern monarchs." Raditsa seems to think that there was a real letter of Mithridates—"whether Mithridates' letter to Arsaces itself was private or public is ... difficult to determine",[76] but this is not vital to his thesis: "the question of whether Sallust himself actually studied documents of anti-Roman propaganda ... or simply composed a free composition which acquired its similarity to actual eastern and Pontic propaganda through its use of *loci communes* traditional in Graeco-Roman rhetorical education, though important, is not crucial". However composed, Sallust's letter is at least similar to eastern and Pontic propaganda.[77] Raditsa's method is to examine all the details and to see whether they fit into a tradition hostile to Rome. He feels justified in concluding that the letter faithfully reflects many of the themes, and some of the actual phrases, of the anti-Roman propaganda of Mithridates and the eastern kings.

There is no direct external evidence for or against the existence of a real letter of Eupator, but some observations should be made. First, we learn from other sources that Mithridates did make efforts to win over the king of Parthia, even from the time before the first war.[78] Second, when Pompey captured the fortress at Caenum, he found there private documents of the king (Plut. *Pomp.* 37). Some were correspondence with Monime of an intimate nature, while there were also memoranda which revealed that Mithridates had poisoned his own son Ariarathes and Alcaeus of Sardis. It is quite conceivable that a copy of a letter to the Arsacid king may have been found among the papers. This would be one explanation of how a royal letter could have been available to Sallust. Third, we do have a statement of Fronto, which, as it has been used to

[70] Plutarch, (*Luc.* 22.1) states, and Memnon (38.1) implies, that Tigranes' reception of Mithridates came immediately after the unsuccessful mission to Armenia of Appius Claudius in early 70, but if my interpretation of Tigranes' policy, and of his understanding of the situation, is right, Appian should be followed (Janke, *Memnon* 121 disagrees). Plutarch's account may again contain an apologetic distortion: it would clearly be to Lucullus' advantage in justifying his invasion of Armenia, to predate the coming together of Mithridates and Tigranes. According to Memnon, after receiving Mithridates, Tigranes gave him ten thousand troops, and sent him off to reoccupy Pontus, but recalled him when Lucullus attacked. Plutarch's missing of such favourable ammunition for Lucullus makes it unlikely that it happened: it is perhaps an anticipation of Mithridates' return to Pontus a year later—see Magie, *RRAM* 1215 n. 44.

[71] E. Bikerman, *REL* 24 (1946) 131.

[72] D. C. Earl, *The Political Thought of Sallust* (1961) 109.

[73] K. Büchner, *Sallust* (1960) 241.

[74] Stier (supra n. 41) 447.

[75] L. Raditsa, *A Historical Commentary to Sallust's Letter of Mithridates* (Diss. Columbia 1969) 6.

[76] Raditsa (supra n. 75) 73.

[77] Raditsa (supra n. 75) 311.

[78] App. *Mith.* 13; 87; Plut. *Luc.* 30.1-2; Memnon 22.4; 29.6. The inclusion of Arsacid officials in Mithridates' Delian heroon also indicates this. Dio Cass. 36.1 reports on the diplomatic activity of Eupator in Parthia, but this passage clearly uses Sallust: see *C. Sallusti Crispi Historiarum Reliquiae* ed. B. Maurenbrecher (1891) 54.

disprove the existence of a real letter of Mithridates, I cite in full (Fronto ed. C. R. Haines, Loeb 1920, vol. 2 p. 142):

> Extant epistulae utraque lingua partim ab ipsis ducibus conscriptae, partim a scriptoribus historiarum vel annalium compositae, ut illa Thucydidis nobilissima Niciae ducis epistula ex Sicilia missa: item apud C. Sallustium ad Arsacen regem Mithridatis auxilium inplorantis litterae criminosae et Cn. Pompei ad senatum de stipendio litterae graves et Adherbalis apud Cirtas astu obsessi invidiosae litterae; verum omnes, uti res postulabat, breves nec ullam rerum gestarum expeditionem continentes. In hunc autem modum, quo scripsisti tu, extant Catuli litterae, quibus res a se iacturis atque damnis sane gestas at lauro merendas historici exemplo exposuit.

Bikerman interpreted this to mean that there were letters in Greek and Latin, some of which were written by commanders themselves, and others of which were composed by historians and annalists; as examples of this latter type, Fronto cites the letter of Nicias in Thucydides, and in Sallust the letters of Mithridates, Pompey and Adherbal. Bikerman concluded that there was no real letter to Arsaces.[79] Raditsa suggests that Fronto meant that there were letters in Latin and Greek, parts of which were written by commanders, and parts of which were composed by the historians and annalists;[80] the letters then cited are examples of this composite type. Bikerman is probably right in his translation of *partim ... partim ...* because, in spite of Raditsa's argument to the contrary, Fronto does seem to be making a distinction between letters in historical works, and actual surviving letters of commanders. Thucydides and Sallust provide examples of the former, and the letter of Catulus is an example of the latter. Although right in this, Bikerman was surely wrong to take Fronto as evidence that no real letter of Mithridates to Arsaces existed. The distinction between real letters and those in historical writings by no means rules out the possibility that the latter, although composed by the historian, may be based on real letters.

External evidence, then, cannot tell us whether Sallust's composition is based on a letter of Mithridates. We must turn to what Sallust actually

[79] Bikerman (supra n. 71) 131. On Nicias' letter Bikerman says that "les anciens savaient bien que celle lettre, tout comme les harangues de Thucydide était une composition fictive de l'historien", and cites Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 42 as proof of this statement. Dionysius does not, however, say that a real letter did not exist. A. W. Gomme, A. Andrews and K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* vol. 4 (1970) 385 find "no adequate reason to doubt that Nikias really did write a letter", although not as it appears in Thucydides. Similarly there does not seem to be any doubt that Pompey wrote a letter from Spain: see for example, E. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (1974) 20; R. Seager, *Pompey. A Political Biography* (1979) 19; P. Greenhalgh, *Pompey. The Roman Alexander* (1980) 52.

[80] Raditsa (supra n. 75) 36 n. 56.

says, and see whether it is possible to identify elements which must have come from Mithridatic propaganda. The letter opens (sect. 1) with a conventional rhetorical generalization: anyone in Arsaces' position should consider what course of action is *possibile*, *iustum*, *tutum*, *laudabile*.[81] Mithridates enlarges on this with the observation that he would not even be approaching Arsaces if it were possible for the latter to live in peace, if the Romans were not so wicked and ready to be beaten, if there was not great fame to be gained in victory over them (sect. 2). These are precisely the types of argument one would expect in a *suasoria* on this subject. Although the argument is not specifically Mithridatic, the description of the Romans as *scelestissumi* may be an echo of the king's propaganda: in one of the two surviving letters to his satrap Leonippus, Eupator accused Chaeremon of Nysa of consorting with the Romans, *tois echthistois polemiois*. In the other letter to Leonippus, Eupator calls the Romans *tous koinous polemious* a phrase which is not echoed in Sallust's letter, but which would fit well the general picture of the Romans painted by Sallust's Mithridates (Welles, *Royal Correspondence* No. 73-4 p. 295). There is then a similarity in tone between the king's known propaganda and this part of Sallust's letter, and possibly in the language.[82]

There follows (sect. 3) a reference to a specific situation, the bad relations between Tigranes and Phraates. This was a generally known fact (Plut. *Luc.* 21.4-5; Memnon 38.8), and it would have been necessary, rhetorically, to prove that this enmity was no barrier to an alliance. Both Tigranes and Mithridates are in danger and need Arsaces' help, and Mithridates has something special to offer—his experience. For the rhetorician facing the task of finding positively advantageous features in Mithridates' many defeats, "experience" seems an obvious choice, but it does recur in Memnon (38.7), and perhaps it was Mithridates' approach to his own failures. Sections 5-9 follow up the idea introduced earlier that war with Rome was inevitable for Arsaces. The cause of all Rome's wars is *cupido profunda imperi et divitiarum*, which seems to involve the notion, stated directly later (sect. 17) that the Romans are hostile to all kings. By trickery and faithlessness Rome had brought low Philip of Macedon, Antiochus, Perseus, Eumenes, Aristonicus (Attalus' will bequeathing his kingdom to Rome was a forgery), and Nicomedes of Bithynia, whose kingdom was annexed even though he had a son. The desire for power and wealth as a major cause of wars, was in the Greek world, an idea "certainly conventional and perhaps tradition".[83] Moreover, as Earl

[81] See Bikerman (supra n. 71) 132.

[82] *Scelestissumi* does not seem to me quite close enough to *echthistoi* to justify Raditsa's confidence that this is "a direct echo of Pontic propaganda": Raditsa (supra n. 75) 57.

[83] Raditsa (supra n. 75) 70.

points out, in Sallust's view it was precisely *cupido imperi* and *cupido pecuniae* which "dominated Roman political and social life after 146 B.C.".[84] The same accusations are made by Sallust's Jugurtha (Sall. *Jug.* 81). So the concepts and terminology are certainly Sallustian, but they were also undoubtedly part of anti-Roman propaganda in the second and first centuries (above p. 104 ff.). Mithridates clearly laid great emphasis on Roman greed and almost certainly subscribed to the standard eastern view of Rome as hostile to kings. The account of Rome's opposition to kings could not have been randomly invented: it clearly follows an eastern version of events, consistently hostile to Rome. Whether the details were part of Mithridates' propaganda, we cannot really tell. That Attalus' will was forged is stated nowhere else in our sources, and it is possible that this was a specifically Mithridatic interpretation, although one might think that it was more likely to have originated at the time of Aristonicus. On the death of Nicomedes IV, Sallust does report in another part of the *Histories* that there was a pretender to the throne (Sall. *H.* 2.71 Maurenbrecher), and again it is possible that Mithridates argued his legitimacy, but there is no way of telling, and if he did, it certainly did not cause him to hesitate to invade Bithynia himself.

Sallust's letter then comes to Eupator's own story (sect. 10-15). Although not bordering directly on the Roman empire, the reputation of Pontus for wealth and independence proved irresistible to Rome. Nicomedes was used to provoke a war. Mithridates warned Ptolemy of Egypt and the Cretans of what Rome was really intending, but they ignored his warnings and paid the penalty. To avenge the wrongs committed by Rome, Mithridates then expelled Nicomedes from Bithynia, recovered Asia which had been taken from king Antiochus, and freed Greece. His plans faltered because of the treacherous activities of his commander-in-chief Archelaus. At the peace of Dardanus Rome offered not genuine peace but merely a postponement of hostilities, and therefore Mithridates restarted the war. At Chalcedon he defeated Cotta by land and sea, but at Cyzicus shortage of supplies, not the enemy, forced him to retire. He lost his fleet and his best troops to the weather. After indecisive engagements with Lucullus at Cabeira he was again forced to retreat, this time to Armenia, because of lack of supplies, a problem which did not affect Lucullus. The Romans pursued him in accordance with their custom of attacking all kings, and had taken advantage of Tigranes' inexperience to achieve what they called victory.

We do not hear elsewhere of Mithridates claiming to be entirely separated from the Roman empire, or of his wealth and independence

[84] Earl (supra n. 72) 110.

being an attraction for Rome. This seems to be part of the rhetorical argument proving that the Romans are greedy for wealth and power, and hostile to kings, even those like himself and Arsaces, who are far removed from the Roman empire. The accusation that Nicomedes was used to provoke Mithridates into war was certainly part of Eupator's interpretation of how the First Mithridatic War started (above p. 80). There is no obvious reason why the Cretans and Ptolemy are singled out for mention, and it is puzzling. As we have seen (above p. 84-5), Mithridates made approaches for help to many quarters. Possibly the Egyptians and Cretans are regarded as outstanding examples of independent people who regret not having opposed Rome, as Mithridates advised. The reference to them would seem to be part of the rhetorical attempt to demonstrate that Arsaces will have to fight. The claim to be avenging Antiochus, and recovering Asia as if it were rightfully his, is another feature not known from other sources. It does seem to be the case that Mithridates claimed to have rights over other countries he seized, and it is possible that he did the same for Asia.[85] The king's defeat in the first war is referred to very briefly and in veiled form, with Archelaus' treachery explaining the defeat. Even before his change to the Roman side, suspicion did attach to Archelaus. When Dorylaus arrived in Greece after the battle of Chaeroneia, he found it difficult to believe that such a large Pontic army could have been defeated without betrayal (Plut. *Sull.* 20.2). Sulla increased the suspicion by his kindness to Archelaus and attempts to win him over (Plut. *Sull.* 22.3; App. *Mith.* 55), and eventually fear of Mithridates drove the Pontic general to defect. This no doubt provided a welcome opportunity to devise, and convincing evidence to support, a face-saving explanation for defeat. The evidence appears strong that Mithridates accused the Romans of bad faith over the treaty of Dardanus (above p. 143), and that this was ample excuse to restart the fighting. The death of Nicomedes IV and inheritance of Bithynia by Rome might have been the immediate opportunity for war, but Mithridates did not need it as an excuse.

The final section of the letter (sect. 16-23) consists of a direct appeal to Phraates. The themes of the earlier parts of the letter are repeated in general terms. War with Rome is inevitable, even for Parthia; the Romans have robbed, plundered and tricked their way to power, convinced that those who would not serve them, especially kings, are

[85] For Mithridates' claims over Colchis, Cappadocia and Paphlagonia see above p. 37; 58-9. Raditsa (supra n. 75) 191 maintains that when the Ephesians stated that Eupator had occupied lands which did not belong to him, and to which he had no right (*SIG*^{3} 742, lines 4-7), they were in fact consciously rejecting Pontic claims.

enemies. The wealth of Parthia will inevitably attract the attention of these *latrones gentium*.

What can we conclude about this work? There appear to be three different layers of information. Firstly, parts of the letter seem to be of a general rhetorical nature—the sort of thing that someone in Mithridates' position could be expected to argue, and the sort of thing that a historian making up a letter of the king, could write without any particular knowledge of eastern or Mithridatic propaganda. Secondly, the survey of Rome's aggression against kings reflects an eastern interpretation of events, part of which, Roman greed for instance, and hostility to kings, does seem to have had a place in Mithridates' propaganda, although we cannot tell if he argued the details that appear in Sallust. Thirdly, when Sallust's Mithridates speaks of his own affairs, we do seem to be close to what must have been Mithridates' own propaganda. The details could not have been randomly invented: they undoubtedly show knowledge of some sort of pro-Mithridatic anti-Roman tradition. The obvious source for such a tradition is Mithridates himself, although apart possibly from the word *scelestissumi* and the general concept of the Romans as "the common enemies", nothing necessitates the view that there was a real letter of Mithridates behind Sallust's composition. The details of the pro-Mithridatic view were, no doubt, available in the historical works of his supporters Heracleides of Magnesia and Teucrus of Cyzicus, or in the varied writings of Metrodorus of Scepsis, or in the encomium of the king written by Aesopus.[86] Sallust wrote the history of the Third Mithridatic War, and the knowledge thus gained will have been sufficient to compose his letter of Mithridates: he did not need, and probably did not use a specific Pontic document.

The same sort of mixture of generalized rhetorical composition and specific detail is to be found in Pompeius Trogus' speech of Mithridates at the beginning of the First Mithridatic War (Just. *Epit.* 38.4-7). Although this does owe much to Sallust's letter, and may largely be a rhetorical composition on the same subject adapted to slightly different conditions, it also appears to contain details from pro-Pontic sources. The speech begins with another rhetorical consideration: Mithridates wishes that he had a choice of war or peace with Rome. In fact there was no choice because the Romans were already at war with him. The idea is slightly different from Sallust, but the language is similar and the use of the word *latro* is probably a direct borrowing. There follows a long

[86] G. W. Bowersock, *Augustus and the Greek World* (1965) 108 says that Metrodorus too wrote an encomium of Mithridates, but this is not clear from any of the sources on Metrodorus cited in Jacoby, *FGrHist* 184.

historical survey intended to demonstrate that the Romans are not invincible (Just. *Epit.* 38.4.4-16). Aquillius has just been defeated by Mithridates' own troops, and there have been other famous victors—Pyrrhus, Hannibal, the Gauls, even Rome's Italian allies, whose revolt now in progress, made this the very time to attack Rome. This is nearly all of a very general nature, although there is an unusual analysis of the Gauls. Their very name terrifies the Romans, and Mithridates is able to number them among his forces. His Gauls are in fact even tougher than those that sacked Rome.[87]

In the next section of the speech, Mithridates seeks to show that the Romans have been waging war on him, in spite of his obedience to their demands. Here again we get details which could not have been invented at random, but which appear to reflect real Mithridatic propaganda. The king complains that he had been deprived of Phrygia which was rightfully his: his father Euergetes had received it as a reward for services rendered in the war against Aristonicus, and even before that it had come to Mithridates II as a dowry from Seleucus Callinicus. Eupator had also been ordered to surrender Paphlagonia which had been bequeathed to him. Furthermore, he had withdrawn as instructed from Cappadocia, a land which he had seized quite fairly, and had killed Socrates Chrestus the pretender to the Bithynian throne. He thus did what he was told, but was still blamed for the actions of Gordius and Tigranes. The Cappadocians wanted Gordius as king, but Rome would not agree to this, as he was a friend of Mithridates. Nicomedes attacked Pontus at the instigation of Rome and thus it was the Romans who provoked Mithridates to war.

A second historical survey describes the Roman attacks on kings—Pharnaces, Eumenes, Antiochus, the Galatians, Perseus, Jugurtha. The Romans hate all kings, no doubt out of embarrassment at their own lowly monarchs. Just as the founders of Rome were suckled by a wolf, so now their descendants display the character of wolves, and are *imperii divitiarumque avidos*. This phrase probably comes from Sallust again, but as we have seen, the idea does seem to have been part of the king's propaganda. The mention of Rome's humble origins stimulates Mithridates to talk about his own illustrious lineage and the nobility of his people. He is descended from Cyrus, Darius, Seleucus, Alexander, and his people are not only a match for the Romans, but also in earlier times had resisted the Macedonians. They had never submitted to foreign masters. Under his leadership his armies had subjected Scythia, where Darius and Philip only just dared to go, and then barely escaped. It was a poor, harsh place to fight, in contrast to the rich and temperate land of Asia,

[87] For the Galatians on Mithridates' side see App. *Mith.* 41; 46.

which awaits the arrival of Pontic forces, having grown to hate the Roman domination. Mithridates ends with a strange proof of his justice and generosity: he alone of all kings possesses not only his paternal kingdom but has also acquired by bequest Colchis, Paphlagonia and Bosporus.

Much the same conclusions can be drawn about this speech as about Sallust's letter. Parts appear to be arguments of a general rhetorical nature, which would call for only a general knowledge of Mithridatic affairs. Other parts which apply specifically to Mithridates' own story, do appear to belong to his propaganda. The claim to Persian and Macedonian descent was central to his image of himself. Although the contrast between Asia and Scythia may be purely rhetorical, it is clear that Mithridates was proud of his Scythian conquests.[88] A claim to have inherited Colchis, Paphlagonia and Bosporus must have come from somewhere—Trogus could not simply have invented it—and again the source is probably Mithridatic propaganda contained in the pro-Mithridatic historical tradition. Both the letter of Sallust and the speech of Trogus are problematic pieces of evidence, but it seems a justifiable conclusion that they do contain some of Mithridates' propaganda, especially when they are dealing with the king's own life and times.

The attempts to win over Phraates failed. He made agreements with both the Romans and Mithridates, but helped neither (Plut. *Luc.* 30.1-2). With the newly recruited army, Mithridates was able in 68 to carry out the advice he had given to Tigranes the previous year, and which Tigranes had ignored; that is, not to engage Lucullus in open battle but to harass him, and try to cut off his lines of supply. Tigranes, however, could not hold himself back when Lucullus marched on Artaxata, and he joined battle. He was thoroughly defeated again (Plut. *Luc.* 31.4 ff.). Lucullus moved on to besiege the city of Nisibis where Mithridates' general Callimachus, and Tigranes' brother directed the defence. Meanwhile Mithridates himself made his way back to Pontus with eight thousand troops, four thousand of them supplied by Tigranes, who doubtless hoped that if Eupator could cause enough trouble in Pontus, Lucullus might be forced to evacuate Armenia.

Towards the end of 68 Mithridates returned to his kingdom where Lucullus had left six thousand men under the command of his legates Sornatius, M. Fabius Hadrianus, and C. Valerius Triarius (Plut. *Luc.* 24.1, 35.1; App. *Mith.* 88; Dio Cass. 36.9.2; 36.10.1). The people of Pontus were tired of Roman oppression and gladly welcomed back their king.

[88] See, for instance, *IOSPE* I^2 353 line 8: Diophantus' victory over the Scythians made Mithridates the first person to set up a trophy over them.

Mithridates first encountered and defeated Fabius. He undermined Fabius' strength by winning over Thracians in the Roman camp (they had previously fought for Pontus), and by promising freedom to the Roman slaves.[89] Fabius escaped total defeat in the battle because Mithridates was seriously wounded (App. *Mith.* 88; Plut. *Luc.* 35.1; Dio Cass. 36.9.1 ff.). Triarius came up to relieve Fabius who was trapped in Cabeira, but winter arrived before a decisive engagement could take place. In the spring of 67, however, Mithridates inflicted a crushing defeat on Triarius, the Roman casualties of seven thousand including twenty-four military tribunes, and one hundred and fifty centurions.[90] Lucullus now arrived from Armenia but Mithridates refused to fight. Tigranes was reported to be approaching from the south and Lucullus determined to intercept him. But time had run out for Lucullus. In 68 he had been deprived of the governorship of Asia (Dio Cass. 36.2.1), and Q. Marcius Rex had been given Cilicia (Dio Cass. 36.15.1). Now at the beginning of 67 a Gabinian law gave Bithynia and Pontus to M'Acilius Glabrio, and the Fimbrian legions were disbanded (Plut. *Luc.* 33.5; Cic. *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 26). Lucullus was without a command. The new Roman officials were not prepared to move to the offensive, and Mithridates used the lull to establish himself again in his kingdom and levy troops, while Tigranes plundered Cappadocia.

The lull did not last long. The Manilian law of early 66 gave Pompey extensive powers in the east to prosecute the war against Mithridates and Tigranes. Pompey first of all tested Mithridates' attitude by making friendly overtures through an envoy. Mithridates was confident that he could win to his side the king of Parthia, and he treated the envoy with disdain (Dio Cass. 36.45.2).[91] But he had misjudged Phraates, who in fact entered into friendship with Pompey and invaded Armenia. Mithridates realized that he would have to face Pompey without help, and immediately asked on what terms the war could be ended.[92] Pompey stipulated that he should give up all Roman deserters and surrender. This was unacceptable, especially to the large numbers of deserters in the Pontic camp, and after damning the Romans for their greed, Mithridates

[89] This promise of freedom to slaves hardly bears any social significance, but seems merely to have been a way of weakening Fabius.

[90] For the sources on the battle see Magie, *RRAM* 1219 n. 54.

[91] Seager (supra n. 79) 44 doubts that Pompey made an approach to Mithridates, on the grounds that if it had succeeded, "it would have brought an immediate but inglorious end to the war", and Pompey did not want that. It is not at all clear, however, what it was supposed to "succeed" in—Pompey offered only "friendly words"—and there is no reason to relegate Dio's account of the mission to the realm of fiction.

[92] This enquiry by Mithridates makes clear the fact that Pompey's envoy had not had anything concrete to say.

swore that he would never make peace (App. *Mith.* 98; Dio Cass. 36.45.3-4). The details of the campaign that followed are hard to establish, but for the present purposes it is unnecessary to try.[93] What matters is that after avoiding open battle for a time, Mithridates' army was finally routed, and he himself forced to flee (App. *Mith.* 100; Plut. *Pomp.* 32.3 ff.; Dio Cass. 36.48.2 ff.; Livy *Epit.* 101).

The only apparent source of refuge for him now was Tigranes. Machares had treated with the Romans and so was hostile. Mithridates himself might be able to make his way to the Bosporus, but he would need some kind of army to reassert his authority, and he had no fleet to transport such a force. Tigranes had sheltered him before, but this time he wanted nothing to do with his father-in-law, and even offered a reward of one hundred talents for his capture (Plut. *Pomp.* 32.9; Dio Cass. 36.50.1). Dio says that Tigranes suspected Mithridates of corrupting his son, the young Tigranes who had joined Phraates in attacking Armenia. When defeated by his father, the young Armenian did think of joining Mithridates, but by that stage the king of Pontus was a fugitive. It seems unlikely that Mithridates would have risked losing the senior Tigranes' help, by scheming with his son. Tigranes may have been slow to take up the Pontic cause in earnest, but Lucullus' invasion had forced his hand, and he had finally given his whole-hearted support to Mithridates. The reason why Tigranes now refused Eupator refuge was that he was not prepared to fight to the death with Pompey and risk losing everything: it was better to humble oneself before Rome and hope to keep one's kingdom.

Mithridates was left with no choice but to continue his flight eastwards into Colchis, and it was here that he decided to try to make his way to the Bosporan kingdom by marching round the east end of the Euxine. He spent the winter of 66/65 at Dioscurias, and then completed a remarkable journey all the way round to Panticapaeum (Plut. *Pomp.* 32.9; App. *Mith.* 101-2; Livy, *Epit.* 101; Dio Cass. 36.50.2).[94] Machares his son fled and was forced to commit suicide. Once he had established a base, Mithridates sent off ambassadors to Pompey offering to become a subject of Rome, if he was given back his kingdom. This shows a fundamental change in his attitude: he was virtually admitting that he was beaten, or at least that he was unable to beat the Romans. Pompey demanded that, like Tigranes, he present himself in person with his petition. Mithridates'

[93] See Magie, *RRAM* 354 ff.; 1221 n. 7 (for bibliography). See also J. Van Ooteghem, *Pompée le Grand: bâtisseur d'empire* (1954) 204-225; J. Leach *Pompey the Great* (1978) 76-83; Seager (supra n. 79) 44-46: Sherwin-White (supra n. 5) 191 ff.

[94] For the sources on Mithridates' last years spent in his northern kingdom see Magie, *RRAM* 1229 n. 25.

sense of pride, however, and his defiant character were perhaps more fully developed than Tigranes', and he could never accept this humiliation, so the negotiations broke down. His recruiting of an army and construction of a navy while the negotiations were in progress need not imply a lack of sincerity: it was better to bargain from a position of strength. He succeeded, through the exactions of his ministers, in collecting thirty six thousand men. It is reported that with this army he planned to sweep across Europe and invade Italy by land from the east, as Hannibal had done from the west (App. *Mith.* 102; 109; Plut. *Pomp.* 41; Dio Cass. 37.11.1; Florus 1.40.15). Appian does say that Mithridates had cultivated the friendship of the Gauls, but the theory that the Gauls with whom he was friendly were the Allobroges, and that he was in contact with the Catilinarian conspirators, has little to support it.[95] It is possible that an invasion of Italy was the last defiant idea of a king, who, as his soldiers are said to have thought, wanted to end his life in action rather than in idleness, but if that is so, it remained strictly an idea.[96] Such a plan makes Mithridates seem wildly unrealistic, and it is much more likely that the story originated in a tradition hostile to the king. Pharnaces' propagandists may have been responsible for it, as this son and designated successor of Mithridates now conspired against his father. Phanagoreia and neighbouring cities had already broken into revolt, and Eupator's attempts to win the help of the Scythian kings, by offering his daughters in marriage, had failed. Pharnaces was more of a realist than his father, and was perhaps worried that he might have no kingdom to inherit if Mithridates did not treat with Rome. Machares had negotiated successfully with Lucullus and had thus won recognition as king of Bosporus. Tigranes had kept his kingdom in the same way, and Pharnaces thought this the wisest course of action. It could have been at this stage, to win the support of the army, that Pharnaces started to circulate the story that the old king was intending to march off against Italy.[97] The Bosporan subjects were dissatisfied with Mithridates. During a recent illness he had withdrawn from all public contact, and had dealt only with

[95] See L. Havas, *Acta Classica* (Debrecen) 4 (1968) 13-25. Havas tries to show that Mithridates' plan for an invasion of Italy was the idea of a realistic strategist, not of a madman, but his views on the support which the king had, or might have had, in the west are largely guesswork. Furthermore, he makes no reference to the enormous difficulties for a king whose resources were almost exhausted, in transporting an army from the Crimea across Europe down into Italy.

[96] As Florus 1.40.15 emphasized. There are no large issues of coins, as there were before the First and Third Mithridatic Wars: see Price (supra n. 34) 5.

[97] Equally well it could have been devised later to lessen the stigma attaching to Pharnaces' patricide: he could claim that he had protected the people from the wild ideas of Mithridates. See also below n. 98. Sherwin-White (supra n. 5) 203-6 argues that the story had a Roman origin.

three eunuchs: he was no longer the king who conversed with all of his subjects in their own language. The people were tired of his oppressive and murderous ways, and they wanted a young man to lead them. So they proclaimed Pharnaces king. Mithridates probably realized his son's intention of negotiating with the Romans, as it is said that he feared he might be handed over to them (App. *Mith.* 111). He chose to die instead.[98]

Mithridates Eupator, as Velleius Paterculus noted (2.40.1) was the last truly autonomous monarch in the Greek East. The Ptolemaic dynasty limped on for another few decades, but its fate had already for a long time been at the discretion of Rome. The area of Mithridates' kingdom in Asia Minor and the Bosporus was now firmly part of the Roman sphere, whether administered by provincial governors or by client kings. Most of Pontus itself became a Roman province, and the rest was given to the loyal Deiotarus as part of his client kingdom.[99] Colchis was made part of the kingdom of Aristarchus (App. *Mith.* 114). Pharnaces was enrolled as a friend and ally of the Roman people, and allowed to rule as king of Bosporus. The only way to be king was with Rome's permission. Mithridates had himself perhaps realized this, as his attempt at negotiation indicates, but he had refused to submit to the necessary humiliation.

There was in Pharnaces, however, still something of his father's spirit and ambition. For the next decade or so little is heard of him, but when the civil war of Pompey and Caesar was distracting Roman attention, Pharnaces determined to recover his paternal kingdom. He conquered Colchis and then moved into Armenia Minor, Cappadocia and the eastern part of Pontus (Dio Cass. 42.9.2 ff.; 42.45.2 ff.; Florus 2.13.62; *Bell. Alex.* 34 ff.). Caesar had by this time defeated Pompey and was in Egypt, but his legate Cn. Domitius Calvinus was able to confront Pharnaces. Calvinus rejected Pharnaces' repeated attempts to negotiate, and was then routed in battle. Pharnaces thus took control of almost the whole of Pontus, but only for a short time. Caesar on his arrival in the area defeated him with spectacular speed at the battle of Zela in 47 (App. *BCiv.* 2.91; Plut. *Caes.* 50.2; Dio Cass. 42.4-8; Suet. *Jul.* 37.2). Pharnaces' effort was the final flourish for Eupator's policies, the last attempt

[98] The standard version of his death is that he drank poison, and when this failed, he asked his Gallic bodyguard to finish him off. Dio Cass. 37.13.3 differs, in that Pharnaces is blamed for his father's death. The common, more romantically attractive version may have been devised to divert accusations of patricide from Pharnaces: see Magie, *RRAM* 1229 n. 25. On the subject of Mithridates' attempt to poison himself, see G. Harig, *Schriftenr. Gesch. Naturwiss., Technik, Med.* Leipzig 14 (1977) 104-112.

[99] Magie, *RRAM* 369 ff. For Pompey's eastern settlement see also Leach (supra n. 93) 97; Sherwin-White (supra n. 5) 226 ff. For Pontus in later times see E. Olshausen, *ANRW* II, 7.2 (1980) 903-912; R. D. Sullivan, *ANRW* II, 7.2 (1980) 913-930.

to do things his way. There was no room for a king like him in Asia Minor any more.

In the Bosporus Roman control was not so tight: there the Senate exercised only a "nominal supremacy by giving a formal recognition to the man who proved strong enough to maintain himself in power".[100] First of all Asander ruled for some twenty years, starting it seems in about 47.[101] Pharnaces had left him to govern, while he himself won back Pontus, but when he returned after his defeat at Zela, he was killed by Asander. Mithridates of Pergamum was named by Caesar to succeed Pharnaces, but he too was driven off and perhaps killed (Strabo 13.4.3 c. 625). Nevertheless Asander received recognition from Rome, and took the title *philorōmaios* (*IOSPE* II^2 25). The history of the semi-independent client kings of the Bosporus stretches thereafter far into the imperial period, and outside the scope of this study.[102] Two early representatives might just be mentioned briefly, to demonstrate Rome's position in Euxine affairs. Polemo received from Antonius a large part of the old land of Pontus as his client kingdom, and on the death of Asander also became king of the Bosporus.[103] Paradoxically he thus held for a time most of what had been the kingdom of Mithridates Eupator, but now, of course, the vital difference was that Rome dictated the terms. Dynamis, the daughter of Pharnaces, had an interesting career as the wife to four kings of Bosporus—her descent from Eupator somehow bestowed a sort of legitimacy on her husbands—and as ruler herself for a time. She perhaps owed her success mostly to her special relationship with Augustus, the emperor of Rome, and his wife Livia. She dedicated statues to these her patrons, and she too was known as *philorōmaios*.[104] This was the granddaughter of one of the most persistent, bitter and dangerous of Rome's enemies. She adapted to the new world which her grandfather had glimpsed, but in the end refused to accept.

[100] Magie, *RRAM* 478.

[101] Bowersock (supra n. 86) 51 n. 1.

[102] For the history of the Bosporus after Mithridates, see Brandis *RE* 3, 1 (1897) col. 777 ff.; E. H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks* (1913) 589 ff.; M. Rostovtseff, *JHS* 39 (1919) 95-109; V. F. Gajdukevic, *Das Bosporanische Reich* (German ed. 1971) chs. 9-13.

[103] See Bowersock (supra n. 86) 51-53.

[104] See Rostovtseff (supra n. 102) 99 ff.

CONCLUSION

The generation or two after the death of Alexander the Great was a good time for the development of independent kingdoms in Asia Minor. Alexander's successors were too busy jockeying for position among themselves to pay close attention to minor princes who might set up their own small dynasties. Pontus was particularly well situated in this regard, being of only marginal interest to the major Hellenistic monarchs, Antigonids, Seleucids and Ptolemies, and located outside the areas in which any of them held sway. Persian influence went deep in Asia Minor, and it was a Persian prince of the dynasty in Cius who established the line of Pontic kings which effectively ended with the death of Mithridates Eupator. The sources for most of the kingdom's early history are poor, and there are long periods of silence, but we do hear about some of the events of Pontic history in this period; a struggle with Heracleia over possession of the city of Amastris; a victory over Seleucid forces; a victory over Ptolemaic forces; cooperation with the Galatians and conflict too; marriage alliances with the Seleucids; help for Rhodes; an attack on Sinope. These are really only glimpses of what was happening, but they do give some clues to the early directions of Pontic foreign policy. In the reign of Pharnaces inscriptional evidence is available for the first time, and the literary sources are more helpful, with the result that we know a little more about Pharnaces than any of the earlier kings. He was forceful, ambitious, aggressive, and determined to extend Pontic power. In that aim he largely failed, although he did capture and keep the important city of Sinope. The turmoil that his war of expansion caused in Asia Minor brought Pontus, apparently for the first time, into diplomatic conflict with Rome. In a dramatically short time the Romans had established their supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. This was a new reality which Pharnaces had to face. Although he did his best to ignore and defy her instructions, he nevertheless became the "friend" of Rome. It may have been a combination of defeat and the possession of Sinope that led Pharnaces to turn his attention away from Asia Minor and towards the northern Euxine. Although trade relations between the north and south coasts of the Black Sea had existed before, Pharnaces' attempt to forge political ties with southern Russia, and with the western Euxine, was a new element in Pontic foreign policy. Other policies he continued: he too married a Seleucid princess following the lead of Mithridates II, and he strengthened the already existing relationship with Athens and Delos. The coins of his predecessor Mithridates III demonstrated well the

cultural mix of Pontic society, the Greek and Iranian. Pharnaces' portrait is as confidently non-Greek, but the strange pantheistic figure of the reverse type is perhaps the first attempt to symbolize the coming together of these two elements in the person of the king. The Perseus figure of his successor's coins is directed towards the same end. The reign of Mithridates IV witnessed a willing cooperation with Rome, and a reaction against what had been for most of his reign the aggressive isolationism of Pharnaces. Mithridates V also pursued a similar line in cooperating with Rome, but was encouraged by Pharnaces' experience not so much to abandon the idea of expansion, as to develop a more subtle approach: it seems to have been Euergetes who pioneered the idea of exercising indirect control in Cappadocia. Philhellenism remained an important part of Pontic foreign policy, and Euergetes increased the kingdom's connections with the Greek world. His coins make reference to a special devotion for Delos and its God.

The previous history of Pontus, as far as it can be unravelled, serves to put into perspective the reign of Mithridates Eupator, and to distinguish the traditions he inherited. Many of his ideas and policies were foreshadowed by his predecessors: although he went considerably further, and in so doing created new situations which demanded new policies, it was in some respects only in a quantitative rather than a qualitative sense that his reign differed from those of earlier kings. He was from the beginning ambitious to strengthen and expand his kingdom, and perhaps had most in common with his grandfather Pharnaces. An early opportunity for expansion was offered by the invitation of the Chersonitans to intervene in the northern Euxine. Pharnaces had shown the way, but it was Eupator who developed the full potential of the Black Sea; by conquest and alliance he won control of a large part of its entire circuit. This gave him access to rich supplies of men and materials, and such a success early in his reign established his authority and increased his prestige. In Asia Minor the young king moved carefully and skilfully. In Cappadocia, he continued what seems to have been his father's policy of exerting indirect influence. Paphlagonia he divided up with his ally Nicomedes III of Bithynia, in an operation well timed to take advantage of Rome's northern and African troubles. Good timing (in the war of 89 to 85), and the possession of a strong ally (in the Third Mithridatic War), were again to serve him well in his two major confrontations with Rome. From the very beginning of his reign he was ill-disposed towards the Romans for taking Phrygia away from him, although we cannot conclude from this that he wanted war all along. In fact his plans developed as the situation changed. For a time he was successful in controlling Cappadocia, but it became increasingly clear that

nothing worth while could be achieved in Asia Minor without coming into conflict with Rome. Throughout the mid and late 90's his efforts were directed at preparations for war. Besides the obvious military and economic preparations, there was extensive diplomatic activity in the search for supporters. In this matter the image which Mithridates presented of himself was clearly of great importance. For a long time his ancestors had aspired to Hellenism: they wanted respectability and prestige in the Greek world. Eupator too had followed with great success a philhellenic policy, but he now turned it to a new use—opposition to Rome. His own words, actions and iconography show a sustained effort to present himself not only in general terms as a civilised Hellenistic monarch, but also more specifically as the New Alexander. In the guise of Alexander and of Dionysus he came forward to rescue the Greeks from their barbarian Roman oppressors. This was, however, only one side of his image. He was also a Persian prince, the oriental saviour king of oracles and prophecies—perhaps a more natural role for someone who was a member of a noble Persian family, brought up in the Iranian tradition. When it came to war, for which he was careful to ensure that the greedy and anti-monarchical Romans appeared responsible, Mithridates' preparations were well rewarded. His propaganda and military success won him substantial, although not unanimous, support. Perhaps his biggest triumph was the conversion of Athens and most of Greece to his cause. Precisely what his aims were in moving the war to Greece, we cannot tell. Strategically it made good sense, and from a propaganda point of view it was what might be expected of the champion of Hellenism. But whether he hoped to control more than Asia Minor and Greece is a question which only victory in Greece would have answered. His successes in 89 and 88 all took place before Rome had sent a proper army, but he had achieved in those first two years of war nearly all he could have hoped for. The outcome really depended on how his armies dealt with serious Roman opposition. Victory over Sulla would dispel the doubts of waverers, and perhaps convert confirmed opponents. As it turned out, military defeat led to the disintegration of his support. His own despotic behaviour did not help matters, but however attractive Mithridates' image, simple realism will have shown to his supporters the futility and danger of persevering with one who was demonstrably the loser.

Although Mithridates' strength was not substantially affected by defeat, the blow to his prestige was a serious matter, and even taking into account his ambitious nature, another major war was perhaps not inevitable. The Second Mithridatic War, although marking a deterioration in the relations between Pontus and Rome, at least made it clear that the

king was not willing to plunge recklessly into further conflict. A formal treaty with Rome might have stabilized relations, but if Murena's activities had aroused a suspicion in Mithridates' mind that the Romans were intending to renew the war at their own convenience, the Senate's refusal to ratify the Peace of Dardanus must have all but confirmed that suspicion. And the senators on their part harboured similar suspicions about Mithridates' intentions, that he would seek revenge when the opportunity arose. The impending death of Nicomedes IV, coupled with the probability, or even certainty, that Rome would inherit Bithynia, offered just that opportunity. News of Mithridates' pact with Sertorius left no doubt that the king was once again preparing for war, and the Senate prepared accordingly. When war broke out in 73, both sides were ready. Defeat threw Mithridates back on his resources—first on Tigranes, who had apparently taken no part in the first war, but who now was a valuable ally; and then on his Bosporan kingdom. Towards the end of his life his tentative negotiations with Pompey indicate a realization of failure, but he could not bring himself to accept that his kingdom had been swallowed up by Rome, and that he could rule only with Rome's permission. He was an anachronism. Even in the time of Pharnaces the tension between independent action and Roman intervention had become apparent. The destruction of the Antigonids and defeat of the Seleucids had given warning that although small independent kingdoms might continue to exist and squabble among themselves, Rome was the dominant power and there was no room for competition. That may be clear in retrospect, but can hardly have been obvious to Mithridates. There was no reason to suppose that the Romans were invincible: towards the end of the second century it is easy to understand how the wars against Aristonicus, Jugurtha and the Germans could have raised Mithridates' hopes. Alexander had set the pattern for conquest in the Greek east. Thereafter expansion was frequently the aim of kings. Mithridates' expansionist plans were very much in the tradition of his predecessors both in the Pontic and in other royal houses. Ironically the degree of success he achieved contributed in no small measure to ensuring that he was in fact the last of the fully independent kings of the Hellenistic world.

APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGY AND THE ROYAL CAPPADOCIAN COINS

Cappadocian chronology of the generation or so before the First Mithridatic War is very uncertain. The sources are so meagre and ambiguous that there will be alternatives, inevitably it seems, to almost any scheme suggested. Approximation is the best that can be hoped for.

One of the most important sources for the subject has usually been regarded as the royal Cappadocian coins inscribed with a number in the exergue. Reinach made the first comprehensive arrangement of Cappadocian coins (T. Reinach, *Trois Royaumes de l'Asie Mineure* [1888] 1-87), and assumed that the exergue letters were the regnal years of each king. He has been followed in this assumption by nearly all subsequent scholars, including B. Simonetta who has compiled the most recent systematic classification of these coins (*The Coins of the Cappadocian Kings* [1977]. Reviewed by C. Rodewald, *CR* 29 No. 2 [1979] 340-1; O. Mørkholm, *NC* 19 [1979] 242. Simonetta's book is basically a reprint, with some additions, of his article "Notes on Cappadocian coinage", *NC* [1961] 9-50). For the kings that concern us, these are the supposed regnal years on their coins according to Simonetta (with additions by other people):

Ariarathes	VI	-	1, 2 (?), 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13-15.
Ariarathes	VII	-	1, 2, 7-12, 16.
Ariarathes	IX	-	2, 4, 5, 12, 13, 15.
Ariobarzanes	I	-	1-3, 5, 6, 11, 13-16, 18, 21-25, 26, 27-32.

The eleventh year of Ariobarzanes was added by O. Mørkholm, *Essays in Greek Coinage presented to Stanley Robinson* ed. C. M. Kraay and G. K. Jenkins (1968) 258 from a large unpublished Cappadocian hoard, but has been missed or ignored by Simonetta. The sixth year of Ariobarzanes was not removed from the series by Simonetta as Sherwin-White, *CQ* 27 (1977) 182 n. 49 claimed, although there was some uncertainty about it. It is now certain—Simonetta, *The Coins* 40. The twenty-sixth year was added by A. McNicoll, *AS* 23 (1973) 181-186.

Simonetta has three anchors for his chronology: the death of Ariarathes V in 130, the abdication of Ariobarzanes I in 63 and the death of Ariarathes IX in 87 (the Arcathias of App. *Mith.* 35 who dies in Macedonia in 87 is assumed to be the same man as the Ariarathes of

Plut. *Sull.* 11, and both are taken to be Ariarathes IX of Cappadocia). The dates of each king then follow easily from the regnal years on their coins:

Ariarathes	VI	-	130-116
Ariarathes	VII	-	116-101
Ariarathes	IX	-	101- 87
Ariobarzanes	I	-	94- 63

(Reinach claimed that there were coins of Ariobarzanes from his thirty-third and thirty-fourth years, in which case his dates would have to be 96-63, but Simonetta was unable to substantiate Reinach's claim.)

Mørkholm, *NC* 9 (1969) 28 raised some not very serious historical objections to this scheme, and it is to be remembered that the last extant coin of a particular king is not necessarily his last issue, but if the anchor dates were secure, Simonetta's chronology would have to be correct. Unfortunately none of the anchors is completely safe, although it does seem likely that Ariarathes V died in 130: we know that his death occurred during the war against Aristonicus, 133-130 (Just. *Epit.* 37.1.2), and Eutropius (4.20) says that Ariarathes was one of the Anatolian kings who helped P. Licinius Crassus, commander of the Roman forces from 131 to 130. Reinach (*Mith. Eup.* 81 n. 1) made the sensible suggestion that Ariarathes died in the same battle as Crassus in 130. The abdication of Ariobarzanes I, however, cannot be tied to 63: it may be any of the years 64, 63, 62 (Sherwin-White, *CQ* 27 [1977] 180). Nor is it at all necessary to assume that the Arcathias of Appian who dies in 87 is in fact Ariarathes IX: he may be, but the connecting links between the two are not strong (see Magie, *RRAM* 1105 n. 41; Sherwin-White, *CQ* 27 [1977] 181 n. 43). One important link is the tetradrachm of Ariarathes IX with an obverse portrait that looks very like Mithridates Eupator himself, and a reverse type used by Mithridates on his royal issues—see Simonetta, *The Coins* p. 38 No. 1 pl. IV, 16. On the reverse there is also a monogram, which Reinach interpreted as "Amphipolis" this being where the coin was minted. If this were right it would put Ariarathes IX in Macedonia, and provide good evidence for identifying the Arcathias and Ariarathes of Appian and Plutarch with Ariarathes IX. The interpretation of the monogram, however, is entirely speculative.

These difficulties cast doubts on Simonetta's chronological scheme. Of a more serious nature are the technical objections of O. Mørkholm which have threatened Simonetta's structure with collapse. Mørkholm maintained (*NC* 2 [1962] 407-411) that the exergue letters are not always regnal dates, only sometimes. A heated debate developed between Mørkholm and Simonetta (for full bibliography see Mørkholm's review

of Simonetta cited above, *NC* 19 [1979] 242-6). The different attributions of coins made by Mørkholm need not detain us, but the problem of exergue letters is crucial. Obverse die-links between coins of Ariarathes IV (or Ariarathes V, according to Mørkholm) dated 5 and 33 must cast serious doubt on the possibility of these numbers being regnal years, although if the attribution of these coins to Ariarathes IV is accepted, Simonetta's explanation for the use of a die last employed twenty-eight years earlier is attractive, i.e. in 188 (year 33 of Ariarathes IV) an extremely large number of coins was needed to pay the indemnity imposed on Cappadocia for fighting on the side of Antiochus III, and thus an old die might very well have been used (Simonetta, *NC* 4 [1964] 85). More seriously, it is difficult to avoid Mørkholm's conclusion (*NC* 4 [1964] 22-3) concerning the exergue letters of the coins of Ariarathes VI—coins of year 3 do not seem to have been struck after coins of year 15: *NC* 4 (1964) pl. IV No. 11 (year 15), No. 12 (year 3) and No. 13 (year 3) are linked by a common obverse die, and the die of No. 13 undoubtedly looks more worn than that of No. 11. One could perhaps try to argue that it is the coin itself which is worn, not the die, but the blurred outline and general lack of sharpness do indicate a worn die (Simonetta, *RIN*, 1970, p. 60 touched briefly on this particular problem but offered no explanations why Mørkholm should be wrong).

One is reluctant to abandon entirely such a stalwart aid to Cappadocian chronology as the royal coins. Mørkholm has certainly raised serious technical objections, but the weakness of his position is a failure to suggest what the exergue letters are, if not regnal dates, and how to decide when they are regnal years and when they are not. The most obvious interpretation is that they are regnal years, and there is no insurmountable historical problem caused by taking them so; "in no case whatever do we find numeral letters higher than are compatible with possible length of reign as recorded historically" (Simonetta, *NC* 4 [1964] 86). And the letters do seem to reflect known lengths of reign: in the case of Ariobarzanes I, for instance, as the numbers get higher, the portraits show a correspondingly older man (see G. Taylor, *NCirc* 76, No. 12, Dec. 1968, 372-3). As Mørkholm has not yet raised any technical objections to exergue letters being regarded as regnal years on the coins of Ariobarzanes I, Ariarathes IX and Ariarathes VII, it is perhaps best to interpret them so, as Simonetta does, and as in fact Mørkholm does in the case of Ariarathes IX (*Essays Robinson*, 242 n. 2). It is, of course, very dangerous to rely too closely on the evidence of coins: as already noted, the last surviving coins of a particular king are not necessarily the last he issued; the known exile of a king does not necessarily mean that no coins were issued in his name during his exile—as I have pointed out elsewhere (*Phoenix* 38 [1984] 14-15), throughout the years of the First Mithridatic War there was no interruption in the royal Bithynian coinage, although there was certainly no Bithynian king ruling the country; and gaps in a series do not necessarily signify an absence of the king, who might quite simply not choose to issue coins every year. Taking into account, however, the known regnal years, gaps in the series and what we know of events from literary sources, the following might be suggested as the best approximate scheme for the dates of the Cappadocian kings, although a scheme fraught with uncertainty:

130	- 116	Ariarathes	VI
116/5	- 101/100	Ariarathes	VII
100/99	- 96/5	Ariarathes	IX
95/4	- 90/89	Ariobarzanes	I
89/8	- 86/5	Ariarathes	IX
85/4	- 64/3	Ariobarzanes	I

The coins so far discovered do seem to reveal both a consistent gap between the fifth and twelfth years of Ariarathes IX, and an opening period of six years in power for Ariobarzanes I. The twelfth to fifteenth years of Ariarathes IX fill the period of the First Mithridatic War, and the coins of the eleventh year of Ariobarzanes I were issued in 85/4 when he was restored by Curio (App. *Mith.* 60). Dates for Ariarathes VI of 130-116 do give him a reign of fifteen years, as the exergue letters of his coins, if taken as regnal years, would indicate, but the dates of the other Cappadocian kings lead one to assume a reign of approximately this length anyway.

The matter of the Cappadocian coins is not resolved. In *NC* 4 (1964) 23 Mørkholm wrote: "In future the decision whether an exergual number denotes a date or not will always constitute a problem ... Only a complete corpus of coins based on a systematic study of dies will enable us to reestablish the pattern of Cappadocian coinage." Mørkholm has not yet given us a complete corpus, and until he does (perhaps after he does also) large uncertainties will surround the royal Cappadocian coins.

APPENDIX II

THE SOURCES

Reinach (*Mith. Eup.* 413-481) discussed at some length all the sources, extant and lost, for Mithridates' reign, and I do not intend to do the same. A fully detailed analysis would prove a formidable and lengthy task, and probably an unprofitable one involving, as it would have to, large doses of guesswork and great uncertainty, at least about the lost sources, but some comment on the general state of the source material should be made. For the truth is that we are, on the whole, badly served by the ancient sources, the literary ones at least. A clear indication of this state of affairs is the fact that Appian, a second century A.D. author of no great quality, provides our only substantial and complete account of the Mithridatic Wars. For most of Eupator's predecessors, we have to make do with literary scraps, a few inscriptions and coins: it is like a jig-saw in which many of the pieces are missing. We are even reduced to making an intelligent guess at the existence and dates of Mithridates III. With the reign of Pharnaces I Pontic history does emerge a little more into the light. The invaluable Polybius tells us much about Pharnaces' war with his neighbours, and inscriptions attest his interest in the north and west coasts of the Black Sea, and a good relationship with Athens, but it is not until Eupator's time that Pontus really attracts the attention of historians whose work still survives.

Without Appian's *Mithridatica* we would be very poorly off, and it would be difficult to write a coherent account of the king's clashes with Rome. The *Mithridatica* constitutes one book in Appian's *Romaica*, an ethnographically arranged account of Rome's conquests, leading into a treatment in five books of the civil wars. The author was born probably in Domitian's reign at Alexandria, where he held high office. He received Roman citizenship and moved to Rome. Here he pursued a career as an advocate and became a procurator (for Appian's life and works, see E. Gabba, *Appiani Bellorum Civilium Liber Primus* [ed. 2 1967] VII-XXI). His history is, therefore, far from being a contemporary one, nor is it noted for its excellence. The scale of treatment is very uneven: the history of Pontus, for instance, up to the First Mithridatic War, is covered in three muddled and ill-informed chapters (8-10), while the war itself runs for over fifty chapters (11-63). Precise chronological pointers are almost totally absent, errors abound, and in general it cannot be claimed that Appian is in the front rank of historians. A great deal of effort in the past

has been spent in trying to identify in his work strands of earlier ones now lost to us. Reinach (*Mith. Eup.* 445 ff.) argued that Livy was Appian's major source for the war against Sulla, and Nicolaus of Damascus for the rest of the story. Sallust may or may not have been used for parts of the history of the 70's (B. Maurenbrecher, *C. Sallusti Crispi Historiarum Reliquiae* fasc. 1 [1891] 32 ff.), and Posidonius may or may not be behind Appian's version of the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War (see above p. 80 n. 53), but ingenuity of argument cannot disguise the largely inconclusive results of what is on the whole a fruitless search for lost sources. We can learn more from examining what Appian actually says, rather than where he got it. P. J. Cuff (*Athenaeum* 61 [1983] 148-164) shows well Appian's consistently materialistic approach to history: bribery, corruption and greed feature largely, especially in the *Mithridatica*: this is Appian's own understanding of how things work, not just a reflection of his sources. He is able to pick out important and significant details, but is not good at using them. While not totally without merit, Appian is, as Cuff says, "appallingly inadequate". And he is our major source.

Slightly earlier than Appian is Plutarch, whose biographies of Sulla, Lucullus and Pompey are highly relevant and another very important source (parts too, of his *Sertorius* and *Marius* are useful). Plutarch was quite insistent that he was writing biography which does not have the same demands as history (*Alex.* 1). As he is concerned with the excellence of his subjects he is very favourably disposed to them. Nevertheless his lives are full of valuable information, based often on excellent sources. It is clear, for instance, in spite of the fact that Plutarch was not totally at home with the Latin language (see C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* [1971] 81 ff.) that the biography of Sulla takes as its primary guide Sulla's own memoirs. Sulla was Rome's principal witness of the first war with Mithridates, and although his version of events was no doubt to a certain extent apologetic, his account must have been of primary importance. The life of Lucullus too has a sound basis in its debt to Sallust's *Histories* (Maurenbrecher, fasc. 1 p. 27 ff.; 48).

The *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus (on whom see A. Klotz, *RE* 21 [1952] col. 2300-2313), a universal history in forty-four books, is a work of Augustan date. All that survives are the Prologues, and the third or early fourth century A.D. *Epitome* by Justin. Books 37 and 38 are relevant for Mithridates. The work deals briefly with Mithridates V Euergetes, and then with the youth and early reign of Eupator, bringing affairs up to the beginning of the First Mithridatic War. The account includes a valuable report of a speech delivered by the king just before launching his offensive. Justin tells us things that we do not have from

other sources, especially concerning the early part of Eupator's reign, which Appian passed over so unsatisfactorily, but unfortunately there is no coverage of the Mithridatic wars themselves. This is a pity as Trogus' uncle served under Pompey against Mithridates, and might have provided useful information for his nephew. Klotz argues that Trogus got his material from different historians, in opposition to the more common view (e.g. Jacoby, *FgrHist* 88 II c Comm, p. 220) that Trogus' work was little more than a Latin version of the supposedly anti-Roman Timagenes.

Memnon's history of Heracleia on the Black Sea was excerpted by the 9th century Byzantine scholar and Patriarch of Constantinople, Photius. The excerpts that have come down to us trace Heracleia's history from 364/3 up to the return of Caesar from the east in 47. The Mithridatic wars are covered, and although Heracleia is the main subject of treatment, Memnon does give information not directly relevant to Heracleia. There are interesting snippets, for instance, about early Pontic history. All we really know of Memnon is his name, and even his dates can only be guessed at: anywhere from the time of Caesar to the Antonine period has been suggested (see R. Lacqueur, *RE* 13 [1926] col. 1098-1102; *RE* 17 [1937] col. 1608-1623; Janke, *Memnon* 1-14). Perhaps the most important aspect of Memnon's work is that it seems to represent a tradition quite distinct from, and independent of, that preserved in the other surviving sources.

For the rest, bits and pieces of numerous authors fill in some gaps, solve some problems and create others. Two of the saddest losses for the student of Mithridatic affairs are the *Histories* of one of Rome's greatest historians, Sallust, and the *Commentaries* of his contemporary, Strabo. Extensive fragments of Sallust's masterpiece survive and show that he dealt with the Mithridatic story during the period covered by the work (78-67). The longest fragment is the famous letter of Mithridates to the Arsacid king, an important document. Strabo's *Historical Commentaries* pick up in earnest at the point where Polybius left off in the mid second century. Strabo was a native of Pontus and had close family connections with the royal house of the Mithridatids, and it would have been extremely interesting to have this work. It is some consolation, however, that his *Geography* survives: this tells us a great deal about the resources and extent of Pontus, and also contains some important historical details.

Livy surpassed all his predecessors in the writing of Roman history, and was of enormous influence, but of course his text breaks off in 167. His treatment of Mithridates Eupator was contained in books 70 to 103, and we at least know the contents of these books from the surviving *Periochae*, and from the later, brief and unreliable abridgements written by Florus (1st to 2nd century A.D.), Eutropius (4th century) and Orosius (5th century). The Livian tradition is also heavily represented in other surviving sources on Mithridates: Valerius Maximus, for instance, Frontinus and Obsequens. Livy may also be behind sections of Plutarch, the fragmentary Licinianus and much of Cassius Dio's narrative, which survives and is valuable for the last six years of Eupator's reign.

All our sources ultimately go back to contemporary accounts of one sort or another, none of which survives, although we do hear directly at least one contemporary voice—Cicero's. He did not write history, but certain of his speeches like the *Pro Murena*, *Pro Archia*, *Pro Flacco* and especially the *De Imperio*, do provide an excellent picture of current Roman attitudes to the whole Mithridatic problem. For an analysis of Pontic foreign policy it would have been informative to have the works of some of the avowedly pro-Mithridatic authors: the writings of Aesopus, Metrodorus of Scepsis, Heracleides of Magnesia, Teucrus of Cyzicus and others, would have given us a clear view of the Pontic side of the story, although probably not of the truth. Their influence, however, may still be felt in the surviving tradition. For scattered and often unsatisfactory as the sources may be, it is by no means a totally unbalanced, unsympathetic portrait of Mithridates and his activities that has come down to us.

Epigraphy and numismatics do much to supplement this portrait. Rarely do we learn as much from an inscription as from that commemorating the achievements of Eupator's general Diophantus in the Crimea and surrounding district, but innumerable details are enlightened in all sorts of areas, especially perhaps Mithridates' relationship with the Greek world. New material continues to appear, enabling us to refine and change our views: we have, for instance, learnt a little more about the First Mithridatic War from the recent publication of the inscriptions from Aphrodisias (J. Reynolds, *Aphrodisias and Rome* [1982]). Similarly, new coins are being discovered, like the two tetradrachms of Mithridates V Euergetes (see above p. 40-41) which tell us a number of things we did not know: first, that Euergetes did issue a royal coinage; second, that he had a special reverence for Delos and Apollo, and third, that it was he who began to change the style of portrait (from realistic to romanticized) on the royal Pontic coins. We are also given a date. Chronology is indeed one of the areas in which coins can be of particular help, although it is not always easy to interpret this evidence (see Appendix I for the chronological difficulties posed by the Cappadocian coins). The choice of type also is often of great significance: in the case of the issues, both royal and municipal, from Eupator's empire, we learn much about Mithridatic propaganda, the image that Mithridates was trying to project of himself and his kingdom, and about the political alignment of states in and around the Pontic sphere of influence.

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